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
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TO THE SUBSCRIBERS
TO
NOLAN'S HISTORY OF THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.

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City Road, November 15th, 1856.



THOMAS ADAMSON, BIRMINGHAM.

Thomas Adamson, Birmingham.

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
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VICE ADMIRAL SIR J. W. DUNDAS, C.B.

Portrait engraved by J. G. Smith, 1810.







سلطان عبد الحميد خان

SULTAN ABDUL HAMID II






General Walker
Hon. Secy of War







A PLAN OF
THE DOCKS, BARRACKS, NAVAL STORES, &c. AT SEBASTOPOL.
 PROJECTED AND CONSTRUCTED BY
J. UPTON, COLONEL OF ENGINEERS.
 TAKEN FROM COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL PLANS
 DRAWN EXPRESSLY FOR THIS WORK
 BY W. UPTON ASSISTANT BUILDER




PLAN OF THE NEW DOCK WALL AND BARRACKS AT SEBASTOPOL.



PERSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE BARRACKS AND NAVAL STORES AT SEBASTOPOL.





MAP OF CENTRAL EUROPE
showing

THE DANUBE

FROM ITS SOURCE TO THE BLACK SEA
with
THE ADJACENT COUNTRIES

Scale of English Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100

Barometric Scale

Perhaps no circumstance during the whole war had shown the incompetency of the government and the heads of departments more than this miserable conduct in regard to the ambulances. Dr. Smith had furnished to the country, as was shown in a former chapter, a detailed and most particular account of the ambulances sent out; but these instruments of relief, if they ever existed, had not found their way to the Crimea up to an advanced date in January, 1855. Well might Mr. Macdonald say in one of his letters from Sentari, that what was wanting there and in the Crimea was a *dictator*, competent to grapple with the difficulties, to set aside routine, to sweep out from the hospitals and commissariat all incompetent persons, and to insist upon the immediate execution of every command. This was the obvious remedy for so profound an emergency, instead of sending out commissions of inquiry, to patch up, as Mr. Layard told the government in the house, the negligent nominees of the government, whose callousness and imbecility disgraced the nation and destroyed the troops. Letters from officers are in many respects more instructive as to the state of things than letters from soldiers. One, from an officer in the fourth division, will exemplify this:—

Before Sebastopol, Jan. 15.

"It is certainly dreadfully cold now; and fancy living in canvas tents, with the snow a foot deep on the plain, and of course in drifts much deeper! The poor 63rd have at last almost disappeared, and we are to have the 18th up now to relieve them. The cavalry, to their great disgust, are now turned to the only possible use that can be found for them—namely, to bring up our food, though the cooking of it is a sad affair, there being very little fuel left. They also use the cavalry for ambulances, and a very ghastly procession of sick and dying men, perched on gaunt horses, goes away terribly often from up here; it is a great thing getting them away at all, for they never seem to recover in our hospital here. The survivors of a six mile jolt on a rough road may benefit from change of air, and, at any rate, more attention can be paid to those left behind. I must tell you an instance, while I think of it, of the clever way in which everything connected with the army is done at home as well as out here. We got up at last about twenty pairs of boots per company—a great want, as the men were in a wretched state, and—would you believe?—they were all too small, and except a very few pairs, utterly useless. How curiously the vein of incapacity seems to wind about through everything, not omitting even the humble boot!

"With endless wealth, great popular enthusiasm, numberless ships, the best material for

soldiers in the world, we are the worst clad, worst fed, worst housed army that ever was read of. Our wealth may be seen rotting in different forms at Balaklava; our ships bring the wrong things to the wrong people, and generally leave them at the wrong places; our soldiers die of inanition, and our fine horses die for want of forage, which rots about the port. Let us hope in time to learn wisdom. It is an astonishing thing how long John Bull, who is in most things a business man, has sat quiet and got so little for his money. We do, indeed, thoroughly appreciate the feelings about us at home, whence every description of necessary and luxury is being sent to us; in fact, everything that can be got for love or money seems to be on its way; and the people of England would, I am certain (if they could be procured), send us out at once what we so sadly want—a box or two of hermetically-sealed generals, commissaries, quartermaster-generals, &c., all fit for immediate use in any climate (see the directions on the lid). Perhaps, in time, we may make some ourselves—who knows?

"*January 19th.* A gentle thaw has set in. The health of the troops is much the same; they fade away quite quietly and patiently, dying at the rate of 100 per diem, independently of the sick, who go off to Balaklava or remain in the hospital here. I took a naval friend round the camp this morning, and he was terribly shocked at all he saw, as, living on board ship, he had not much idea of it. The truth is, people in England do not know half enough of our miseries. The post is going out, so adieu!"

A regimental officer of rank wrote:—

Before Sebastopol, Jan. 20.

"May 1855 be more satisfactory to us than has been the gloomy termination of 1854! I have received two newspapers and your letter without any apparent delay. Letters come regularly, but newspapers are not so sure, being in many instances, in my opinion, confiscated by unscrupulous persons after being landed from the mail steamer, but before reaching the heights of Sebastopol.

"In the shape of news I can give you but little; for days together the whole affair appears to be slumbering. Then, generally about midnight, a furious cannonading match between the French and Russians will wake us up for about twenty minutes. Again the fire slackens, and again the monotonous boom—boom—boom every hour or so is resumed. Having now been 114 days within range, the whistle of a ball has lost its effect, unless, indeed, most dangerously near. The ear instantly detects French, English, or Russian shot, and of the last almost its course.

"The sufferings of the troops are very great;

death and disease on every side. Some of the regiments recently arrived, and principally composed of young men, are reported to be nearly *hors de combat*. I write this in a well-worn canvas tent, the snow eight inches deep without, the ink now half frozen, and totally so almost every night. That any exist astonishes me, for even the miserable tent must at least half the week be exchanged for the open trenches. However, no matter what we have to suffer, doubtless some will survive; but very few who originally encamped before Sebastopol will. I am very much afraid, leave the ground. With regard to the raw reinforcements, they die three to one in proportion to the veterans. This is indeed a sad tale—but it is true.

"In our happiest times, in dear old England, a brighter sun never looked down upon us than it did on Christmas-day, 1851. Standing that day on Green Hill, the yellow ruins of Sebastopol, and the white tents of the beleaguering armies, stretched on either side, caused many reflections—sad and solemn retrospection for the brave men who slept the sleep of death around us—joyful and glorious perspective, picturing to myself the ultimate fate of the formidable fortress. Perhaps I may have been too sanguine, but 'hope on, hope ever,' is a good motto. Such was Christmas-day, 1854, 4 p.m.; yet to that hour the division to which I belong had not received an ounce of meat a man for dinner—in fact, dinner we had none.

"In Turkey, with genial warmth, fuel for cookery, and no enemy to contend against, commissariat rations were to be had in abundance, besides tea, sugar, rice, potatoes, ale and porter, for comparatively nominal prices; yet here, with cold, disease, and powerful enemies in front, flank, and rear, commissariat supplies are frequently 'short,' and extras have totally disappeared. I do not blame the commissariat in the Crimea—I do not blame the people of England. I am well aware that England is willing to do her utmost for us, and I am also aware that she can do more for her defenders than any other nation; but there must exist in our executive department some grossly incompetent functionaries, otherwise we certainly would not now be rotting amid the storms of a Crimean winter.

"I have just read the following:—'If the Crimean Army Fund progresses as it has begun, our brave fellows before Sebastopol will spend a jolly Christmas.' Ah me! I made my dinner that day of a 2 lb. loaf, purchased in the French camp for two shillings and eight pence. We read of wooden houses, fur coats, caps, long boots, &c., but these supplies should have been forthcoming in November, since which 2000 stalwart soldiers have been hurried to untimely graves for the lack of such provision."

A remarkable letter appeared at this juncture from Colonel Napier to the *Times*, which deserved more notice from the public and the authorities than it at the time obtained:—

"SIR,—Quoting from your correspondent in yesterday's leading article, on the state of the war, you say, 'There is no doubt, no despondency out here; no one feels diffident for an instant of ultimate success.' I must admit I would not have given credence to the above, had I not at the same time happened to have seen a letter, dated 'Camp before Sebastopol, January 15,' from a regimental officer of rank, which completely corroborates this fact. After describing the wretched state of our soldiers, still under canvas, the thermometer at 8° and 10° (which is 19° lower than it has been here during the coldest weather we have had of late), with three feet of snow on the ground, starved, overworked, without fuel wherewith to cook the rations, their clothes in rags, and in many cases without soles to their shoes; he says, 'The poor fellows work, and starve, and freeze—and without a murmur die!'

"Adverting next to your memorable article of the 23rd of December, on the state of affairs in the camp before Sebastopol, every word of which he says is true, this officer thus continues, after alluding to a friend about to return home:—'For my part, I would not myself go home if I could; I was always a hardy animal, and hope to pull through it and see the business out, for Sebastopol must fall!' And this noble fellow, a true specimen of indomitable endurance and real British pluck, belongs to that 'regimental' class on whom it was attempted to throw the whole onus of our failures during the war. They are at the camp most anxious for the assault; but, alas! it is like their wish for dry frosty weather during the lately prevailing rains. They appear little to foresee what the realisation of such a wish would bring.

"Weeks and weeks ago I wrote and warned the 'authorities' (warnings based on personal experience) of what a Crimean winter was likely to be. Weeks and weeks ago, I recommended that large quantities of sheepskin clothing should be sent out to our troops; I warned the authorities of the probably fatal consequences of their attempting to pass the winter under tents; I recommended that subterranean habitations should be dug, and excavations made for shelter in the sides of the hills. I did this at the risk of being called an officious meddler, but unexpectedly received most courteous replies to the suggestions which I made. However, in this aristocratic land, when was an opinion, unbacked by 'title, high position, parliamentary influence, or wealth,' ever thought worthy of the slightest regard?"

Had my suggestions been attended to, even with the Balaklava road in its present state, a repetition of the Moscow tragedy might possibly not have ensued.

"Our rulers have wantonly neglected, in the prosecution of the war, those appliances of mechanism and science which are at their command. I pointed out a means by which I imagined—and still imagine—that the dock-yards, arsenal, and shipping of Sebastopol might be destroyed, without on our part the loss of a single man; at all events, the trial might have been made—it might yet be made, and at very little cost, even were expense to be regarded with such an object in view. I could at this moment show how the efficiency of our troops, and their destructive powers, might be greatly increased; but publicity in this case would prove of more advantage to the enemy than to ourselves, for they might condescend to avail themselves of a suggestion which our rulers would only 'pooh, pooh!'"

The indifference and routine, the aristocratic coldness and contempt for all beneath their circle, which characterised the government and the officials, so as to provoke the severe strictures of Colonel Napier, continued, notwithstanding all the miseries recorded in letters similar to those which fill the foregoing pages. The people of England manifested their generosity and sympathy towards the sufferers, and their indignation with the government was universally expressed; but the popular deference to the great paralysed all plans which were suggested to make the government and the heads of departments feel that the country was roused to overthrow the system. This want of determined political energy at home to meet the crisis abroad, was the subject of a letter by the Honourable Sydney Osborne to the *Times*, which produced, by its bold, energetic, and truthful tone, a very wide-spread effect:—

"SIR,—Is England voiceless? Are the days for ever gone in which public indignation can find for itself a vent? Does constitutional government consist in the mute submission of the masses to the neglect of their every interest and feeling? We hear the wail of discomfited, discouraged, and betrayed 'party;' we hear as yet no wail from the millions whose every feeling has been outraged, whose dearest interests have been betrayed. Is there one of our so-called statesmen really so dull of apprehension that he does not know what is stirring in the public mind, though—why I know not—its outburst is as yet smothered? Is not society deluged with letters from the Crimea, all telling one tale—the utter incapacity of Lord Raglan; letters, not only of newspaper correspondents, not of mere civilian lookers-on, nor of inexperienced officers, but the outpourings of the

disappointed, disgusted hearts of experienced officers, who, loving the man, stand amazed at his want of all that which, as a general, should make him respected? Yes, the Duke of Cambridge has spoken out the real truth—it has been a soldier's campaign. What has been won has been won by the pure bravery of the men and the officers doing the physical work of the war. Sir E. B. Lytton says, 'Dismiss the ministry, and save the army.' Common sense declares that to be no army which has only the valour of its officers and soldiers to depend upon. Would the country speak out that which it really wants, it would be, not to visit the minister of war with the whole weight of all that has brought us to our present grief; but to cry for the dismissal of that leader on the spot—those blind, obstinate, prejudiced men at home, whose apathy and ignorance of modern warfare would make every effort of any minister abortive.

"Is it a time for this yet great country to be mocked by the pettish actings of jealous, worn-out party leaders? In ordinary seasons, these foolish contentions of the pets of party might amuse, and do no more. We are sacrificing an army to the power we treated with contempt; we are nursed in our moral and physical sickness by the power whose invasion of our land seemed but yesterday to be the bug-bear to fright us from our long, peaceful sleep. We are becoming weakened in every muscle of our national strength, and yet we are as though all this was a mere dream—the nation, the fundholders, the taxpayers, the mourners are passive.

"What do the public really care whether Lord J. Russell is the pitiable thing the Duke of Newcastle and his own speech seem to prove him to be? It may be a serious question to those who, whig-bound by the fostered prejudices of years, think there can be no progress in liberality and freedom, unless this one lord is to lead, or at least to hold the power to destroy those who won't move at his command. Does the country, using its own sober discretion, see its only safety in the rule of some one of half-a-dozen lords, who have been tried again and again, until the history of modern times is a mere kaleidoscope, showing the shaking of these aristocratic fragments into different patterns, each the wonder of one day, the contempt of the next?

"Poor England! poor army! Still sing thy cherished national anthem; still shout, for its music's sake, 'Rule Britannia!' but do, with something like consistency, be up at this time to act, to save your queen from becoming the sovereign of a country that knows not how to afford her a ministry, save her an army, or employ for her a fleet. That cool, calculating discretion which in common hours of trial bids the land be quiet, lest talking to those

who steer the state's vessel should disturb them, is now treason. The worst feature of the worst democracy could show nothing worse, nothing more ominous, than the passive submission of the subjects of a constitutional monarchy, for the sake of an aristocracy, to a tampering with every private principle, every public obligation, which should uphold the honour of the monarch."

There is no doubt that this and similar letters, which were called forth by the tidings from the Crimea and the Bosphorus, prepared the public mind for the overthrow of the ministry, which will be noticed in a separate chapter.

While the men were enduring so much in the Crimea, the horses were fast dying, so that by the end of January the cavalry horses were nearly altogether destroyed. When the surging discontent at home compelled the government to institute a commission of inquiry, Colonel Tulloch and Sir J. McNeil were sent out to the Crimea to investigate on the spot the causes of so much disaster. It has been necessary frequently to refer to this commission, and to the report it made: this report criminated various authorities. Mr. Commissary Filder incurred some censure, although it appears that he was much more "sinned against than sinning." The general commanding the light cavalry, the Earl of Cardigan, and the general-in-chief of cavalry, the Earl of Lucan, were blamed for not having the horses huddled, or in any way placed under shelter until the inclement winter was far advanced (until the end of January, and in some cases until February), and for neglecting opportunity to bring up fodder to the cavalry camp. Whatever may have been the amount of error chargeable upon these officers, it does not appear to have arisen from any indifference to the efficiency of the service, or of the preservation of the horses. These noblemen were at discord; Lord Lucan was not a favourite at head-quarters in the Crimea, although possessing vast influence at the Horse Guards; and these circumstances militated against such arrangements as might otherwise have been easily made. After the battle of Balaklava, the coolness between the commander-in-chief and the lieutenant-general of cavalry was obvious. Whatever Lord Lucan might have accomplished if he had acted more resolutely on his own responsibility, it cannot be denied by those most disposed to censure him (and many are disposed to do so to an unjust extent), that his representations to head-quarters, made early in the winter, were sensible and necessary, and that these representations were treated with neglect. The report of the commissioners reflected much upon the quartermaster-general's department, and upon General Airey personally. The commander-

in-chief, more by implication than directly, was comprised among the blame-worthy. The report attributed the destruction of the cavalry to the neglect and mismanagement of such of the generals as had to do with it. Lord Raglan, General Airey, Lord Lucan, Lord Cardigan, and Mr. Commissary-general Filder, were all held responsible for the loss of the horses. When their report was returned to the government, there was great reluctance to publish it. The commission was alleged to have been a private one, and the report to be for the information of her majesty and her responsible advisers, not for parliament and the public—their business was to pay and confide. Parliament and the people would not confide, and after a hubbub which alarmed the government, the report was permitted to see the light. Immediately the accused generals raised a cry that injustice had been done them, and all their powerful aristocratic connexions joined in the cry. The accused officers were courtiers and friends, or connexions, of the commander-in-chief. One of the most implicated, the Hon. Colonel Gordon, of the quartermaster-general's department, is son of the Earl of Aberdeen, the late premier, a much idolised personage at court. Such influences and connexions were not to be trifled with; these officers impugned the accuracy of the report, and, by implication, the honesty of the commissioners. A new investigation was demanded. The government and the Horse Guards hit upon the expedient of selecting a number of general officers, themselves the very types of routine—men who would be sure to do, in the same circumstances, the same things which the commissioners had denounced. This new commission sat in the hall of Chelsea Hospital, and examined witnesses. Sir John McNeil refused to degrade himself by being present—he had accepted a commission from the crown, and had fulfilled it, and had no more to do with the business. Colonel Tulloch, his colleague, took a different view of his duty; he attended and addressed the court, summoned witnesses, and cross-examined the witnesses of the accused generals, until he at last broke down physically under his herculean exertions. The generals constituting the court of inquisition made a report acquitting every one. The country laughed at the report; it all along ridiculed the appointment of the board of inquiry itself; the mode in which it would proceed, and the judgment at which it would arrive, were as obvious as the motives for its appointment; and the whole metropolitan press denounced the affair as a "job," and predicted its issue. The issue was such as enabled the court and the Horse Guards to keep on their staff appointments the men whom the Crimea commission had represented as bunglers, or worse. Yet it is impos-

sible to deny that the inquiry brought to light a great deal more than was known before. If it acquitted the generals, and evaded as much as possible all admission of the disasters, or censure of the military system which led to them, it brought into public view many exculpating circumstances so far as the cavalry generals were concerned. If the horses were not sheltered and fed, the fault did not lie wholly, or even principally with them—and this is made obvious by the Chelsea inquiry, whereas the Crimea report brought them under a dark cloud of impeachment. The integrity of the Crimea commission was also made apparent. The way in which all these contradictory things were brought about was by witnesses—"officers and gentlemen"—whose testimony was of one hue when given in the Crimea before commissioners invested with power by the crown, and of another hue when given in Chelsea Hospital, and the opinion and desires of "the Prince," the commander-in-chief, and the government, were well known. It was difficult, under the circumstances, for the commissioners in the Crimea to arrive at other conclusions than those at which they arrived; equally difficult, accepting the evidence of the same witnesses, for the Chelsea inquirers to arrive at a judgment much opposed to that which they promulgated, but which has been met by the ridicule of the press and the people, and the ill-suppressed sneers of the keen-witted premier himself. As a specimen of the mode in which the accused generals have run the gauntlet of the public and the press, let the following suffice as a sample. The Earl of Cardigan impugned the integrity of the Crimea report as to the amount of forage given to the horses in November; this his lordship did in a letter to the minister of war. His lordship's letter was thus subjected to the strictures of a military correspondent of a morning journal:—

"In the explanatory letter which the Earl of Cardigan addressed to Lord Pannure, on the subject of the animadversions which he conceived had been cast upon him by the McNeill-Tulloch report, his lordship attempted to prove, from documents to which he referred, that the cavalry horses of the Light Brigade had, during the month of November, 1854, received much more food than the commissioners' report, and the evidence of the colonels of the light cavalry regiments, had represented them to have received. He stated that the commissariat reports, sent to him daily by Colonel Mayow, showed that on the 17th of November the horses had hay and corn, 'but not their full allowance;' and that up to the 22d they had barley, 'but not quite their full rations.' His lordship also remarked that he believed Colonel Doherty's statement, that ten horses had dropped down dead while being led down from

the encampment on the heights of Balaklava, to be an exaggeration.

"We see, from a letter addressed to Lord Cardigan to the assistant adjutant-general of the cavalry division, dated the 29th of November, 1854, that on that day his lordship resigned his command, and by his own showing the horses of his brigade had, up to the 22d of November, been tolerably well fed.

"Lord Cardigan, on his return from the Crimea, made a good many speeches in public. I wish to compare his account of the condition of the light cavalry brigade, which he had then just left, as delivered to the burgesses of Northampton early in 1855, with that with which he has recently favoured Lord Pannure in February, 1856. In addressing the mayor, aldermen, and town-council of Northampton, the papers of the day reported Lord Cardigan to have said that—

"'Had it not been from circumstances, arising partly from ill-health, over which he had no control, he should not have deemed it his duty to leave the seat of war at that time, although perhaps his remaining there would have been almost useless, *for he had nothing left to command.* . . . In addition to other special reasons for losses incurred, hundreds of cavalry horses died through the commissariat failing to provide provisions or forage for them. Before he left the army, which was early in December, the horses of the brigade which he had the honour to command, had been eighteen days without hay, and but a very small portion of barley had been given them to keep them alive. The consequence was that the horses died daily in great numbers in the lines.'

"How can Lord Cardigan reconcile these statements, made when the real facts of the case were fresh in his memory, with the defence of his conduct which he has now laid before Lord Pannure, in which he labours to prove, at the expense of the characters of the officers under his command, that at the time he resigned it, the condition of the horses of his brigade was not nearly so bad as those officers had represented it in their evidence before the commission to be?"

The Chelsea Board managed to transfer the responsibility from one officer to another, so as at last to fix it upon "the system." Sir Richard Airey was exonerated from blame because Commissary-general Filder did not supply him with his requisitions; the commissary was freed from blame because he was hampered for want of transport; the provision of transport was the work of the commander-in-chief—he depended upon the commander-in-chief at home; and his responsibility was so divided with the Board of Ordnance, the Admiralty, the War-office, and the Treasury, that the thing was dissipated and lost, eluding the

pursuit of wiser heads and quicker hands than those of the jury of generals who sat in the hall of Chelsea College.

It is remarkable, that while among the Turks the loss of life far exceeded that of the British, they lost few horses—as they generally placed them for shelter under their own tents, which were better made than those of either the French or English. While matters were in this condition in the Crimea, but little hope was infused by the arrival of reinforcements of either men or horses. Some Asiatic horses were imported, and also a considerable number of mules, many of them Spanish; but the animals died off with great rapidity, being unable to endure the treatment of the camp any more than their predecessors.

The new arrival of officers came out well prepared for the weather as they thought—they had an abundance of pea-coats, Makintoshes, leggings, freize overalls, tastefully got up sheepskins, long boots, and some, greatly to the amusement of the old hands, brought umbrellas! The supply of fine soaps and Martin's blacking, with which several of these gentlemen were furnished, was a source of much banter to them. The correspondent of the *Morning Chronicle* gave this humorous portraiture of these uninitiated gentry:—"It is curious to trace these fresh men through the phases of their acclimatisation to the campaign. I had the good fortune of meeting two of them the other day, just as, covered with dust and perspiration after a long day's hard ride, I was galloping over the road from Kadikoi to Balaklava. They stopped me, but if they had not done so I should certainly have stopped them. They were worth looking at; it made me feel at home, and I had a great mind to ask them for the whereabouts of an omnibus, or the starting of the last Woolwich train. They looked for all the world as if somebody had packed them carefully in a box, with plenty of wadding and tissue-paper, and sent them down to St. Katharine's Wharf, with directions of 'This side up,' and 'Fragile—not to be roughly handled.' The men had fancy whips too, slight whalebone affairs, whose ephemeral existence half-an-hour's ride on a Cossack horse would most assuredly terminate. And their bright silver spurs had actually round rowels—good-natured inoffensive rowels, that reminded one of park nags and a decent canter across Dulwich Common. And the men's faces were round and jolly, red and white, and their chins as smooth as a real young lady's on her first coming out. While humbly replying to their stern questions, I looked at these men with undiminished astonishment, while they with a well-bred indifference, which it did my heart good to see, scanned and marked down my tarnished gold lace, rusty sword, and

unblackened boots, and slightly smiled at the haversack which dangled at my side, and the rough Cossack pony which shook its long mane in their smooth faces. That was some days ago. I have seen the men since with half their shine taken out of them by a couple of nights under canvas, and a few meals on (not at) our camp mess-table, the ground. Their blue and velvet bore traces of dust, their metal sheniths had suspicious spots about them, and their chins were darkened with a beard of two days' growth. They rode rough Cossack ponies, and groined under the weight of heavy haversacks, and, what is worse, their faces somewhat pale and jaundiced, gave indications of that terrible 'seediness' which affects new comers, which, if neglected, sends them either home on sick leave, or to some shunned spot outside the camp, where the turf is broken and the brown earth heaped in little hillocks—where the weary of the army take their long rest, whither no bugle call reaches, and no alarm gun sends its booming sounds."

There was hope however inspired, when, early in January, the camp heard that the railway expedition would certainly sail, and the accession of papers and letters from England was eagerly welcomed, in order to ascertain the progress of "the navvies." They were preceded by some of Messrs. Peto and Brassy's officers, who at once secured a wharf for the especial use of "the squadron," so that it might not be involved in the common confusion upon its arrival. This was a wise and essential measure, for loss of material and great delay would have infallibly befallen the undertaking, if once it became mixed up with either the army or navy service, or came under the control of the harbour-master, quartermaster-general, or any other head of anything there. Lord Raglan ordered the troops to give any assistance that might be requisite, and accordingly fatigue parties were employed to pull down some old buildings, so that the "navvies" might have a separate *locale* for themselves and their appurtenances. Great was the delight of these rough men when the vessel containing them weighed, and sailed from Blackwell. Captain Andrews had the ill-luck to tell them, in one of his excellent and judicious addresses, that "the eyes of Europe were upon them." It never occurred to them until then that their importance was so great, and their vanity was inflated to any dimensions. As they were all to be well armed with Colt's revolvers, they vowed marvellous things against the Russians, whom they were to assail with pick and pistol, and to demolish along with their stronghold. They constantly reechoed one another, if any exploit was projected, that "the eyes of Europe were upon them." Some such consciousness must have impelled them to

play the conspicuous part they did on their arrival at Gibraltar: they literally "stormed the rock," as they proposed to do. Great was the surprise with which the sentinels and officers saw these strangely apparelled and stalwart men climbing up the almost perpendicular face of the rock, and pushing their way into every conceivable place, however improper, which Gibraltar contained. The astonishment was mutual; the garrison and inhabitants in turn gazed at the novel visitors, who offered to treat all they met, "if there was any tidy place nigh:"—officers, soldiers, and civilians, were without distinction the objects of their benevolent intentions. After doing a good deal of unintended mischief, and completing a few fights among themselves, which did not appear to disturb their harmony much; and having offered various challenges to such persons as they met, Spaniards more particularly, to "try it on," they were collected on board again, and seriously rebuked for their wild behaviour. This took them more by surprise than the rock of Gibraltar itself, for they considered that they had performed all matters most handsomely; having given every one they met a friendly shake hands, and as friendly an offer to drink or fight with them as might best furnish their new acquaintances with an opportunity for pleasure. The Spanish residents literally ran away from them; the English were, on the whole, pleased with the harmless manifestation of home eccentricities. The navvies gave assurances to their superiors that they would be quite different men at the next place where they should land. On their arrival at Malta, however, they showed such tokens of excitement, that their superintendents would allow them to go ashore only upon the condition of taking no money with them. They acceded to this arrangement; but finding that at Malta, as well as everywhere else, money is a *sine quâ non*, they consulted together how to get a little of it. They hit upon a novel expedient thoroughly characteristic, and as thoroughly successful. They dispersed themselves about La Valetta, announcing that at a certain hour a magnificent display of the art of self-defence would be made, by real British pugilists, for the benefit of two distinguished professors of "the noble art." At the hour appointed the astonished people of Valetta and the garrison assembled in great numbers; the sparring came off with much *éclat*. The public were delighted, many of them never having seen the like before. Money was showered into the hats of the navvies by officers, soldiers, and seamen, and by all classes of the English, who were rather proud of the physical display made by their countrymen in the presence of the Maltese. The Maltese were quite satisfied that they had their money's

worth in the novel exhibition; and the navvies, replenished in pocket, thus baffled the plans of their superintendents, and made Valetta ring with the sounds of their jollification. They were in high favour with the seamen and soldiers, the whole proceeding being entirely to their taste. At Constantinople it was apprehended that their oddities would be anything but amusing to the stolid Turks, and it required no small address to prevent them from going on shore. They did not in the least appreciate the reason assigned for withholding the privilege, that "the place did not belong to the queen;" for they replied that "it ought to," and expressed their desire to lend a hand to bring about a consummation which would favour her ambition and their own amusement. When they arrived at Balaklava they were fed and lodged on board ship until the huts for their reception were completed, but they set to work with their own peculiar vigour. Their principal pastime was boxing and sparring; sometimes there were serious battles among them. The military authorities were for very stringent measures, being apprehensive of mischievous disturbances; but Mr. Peto's officers begged that the men would be left to them, and no inconvenience to the army should be experienced—and they were able to make good such an assurance. Notwithstanding the portentous efficiency of picks and revolvers, the Russians did not suffer at the hands of the navvies, otherwise than by the completion of the work which they had been sent out to perform. It was not until the end of January and the beginning of February that the draughts of railway men and material arrived, but as soon as they were fairly huddled, the work began and went on with rapidity.

Meanwhile, to supply the lack of horses—especially as the new importations died so fast—buffaloes were brought from Baltschick and Varna to the number of at least 200; some of them very soon died from the severity of the climate, and the irregularity and inadequacy of food, and soon after hard work killed more. A long row of sheds was erected for them between Balaklava and Kalikoi, which obtained the name of "Buffalo Town." In this spot the fugitives from Balaklava located themselves—Greeks, Jews, Maltese, Karites, Tartars, and Turks, displayed a curious *mélange* of nationalities; and cheated one another, and still more successfully cheated all the British visitors to Buffalo Town. There was no difficulty there, for either commissariat or transport service, in getting up huts and even houses. Mr. Woods, in describing this place, gives the following amusing and life-like picture:—"All the different branches of the English, French, and Turkish services, with other foreigners innumerable, may be met here

on Sunday, in every possible combination of winter costume, from the spruce, active, neat French soldier to our own men-of-war's men, with huge flowing beard and moustaches, greatcoats made of cow-hide, and trowsers of buffalo-skin; resembling, in fact, great bears, with nothing to remind you of our blue-jackets but their bold, rallocking, defiant spirit, which four long months in the trenches have not been able to subdue. The Turks frequent the long, gaudy line of tents, where, under the crescent and sultan's cipher, gin, raki, coffee, sweetmeats, and tobacco, are vended at the most exorbitant prices, and from which seductions the followers of the prophet always come away either discontented or drunk. The English haunt more extensive stores, where everything but the article of which you are in search can be obtained; and where, if one asks for preserved meats, he is sure to be told that they are all gone, but that some admirable teaspoons, tin kettles, and pocket-combs still remain on hand. The French have peculiar places of their own, in which, after much vociferation and many threats of appealing to the authorities, they generally wind up by expending to the amount of an English penny or so. Amid all this clamour and hurry, little Greek and Maltese boys rush in and out, laden with eggs, bridles, thick boots, gloves, pipes, sausages, and all the other little creature-comforts of which dwellers in the camp are supposed to stand so much in need, and generously offer them to passers-by for about one hundred times their actual value. Great was the astonishment and indignation of the 'navvies,' who were at Buffalo Town for the first time yesterday, to find the prices at which these things found eager purchasers here. Such was the scene at our new town on Sunday. Opposite the place where all the trade was going on, a large party of Turks were digging graves; while, a little below them were a party of our own men engaged in a similar melancholy duty; and along the road through the 'town' a long file of sick men from camp, coming in on cavalry horses, wrapped in their blankets, and scarcely able to sit in the saddle, completed the melancholy picture, and gave the 'navvies' a good idea of a Sunday in the Crimea."

"The long file of sick men," so touchingly described by Mr. Woods, continued to descend daily, until they reached the appalling number of 120 per diem for despatch to Scutari; while many, very many, died on board ship passing thither, in the horrid hospital at Balaklava, descending the bleak plateau from the camp, within the lines, and even in the trenches, they sunk from their work, weariness, and wretchedness, into the repose of death. The medical men bore unanimous

testimony at the end of January, that the warm clothing had come "too late." For the reinforcements the warm coats, strong boots, flannel shirts, and woollen hose, would be useful; but the ordeal of November, December, and January, had been too severe for the ragged host that shivered and wasted away for a faithless government. Quietness, rest, nourishment, nursing, could alone restore the worn-out soldiers; these were not found; but they did find in the water or snow-filled dyke, misnamed a trench, or on the steep acclivities of the wind-beaten hill, or in battle with the foe—death.

In a former chapter we treated upon the hospitals at Scutari, carrying our notices forward to January, and giving a general view of their condition during that month. It is only necessary, therefore, in this place to refer to the fact that up to the month of February, from the rigours of the climate in the Crimea, and the causes which Dr. Lyons specified in his report already mentioned, those hospitals continued to receive new accessions of diseased and mutilated men; and that in spite of Miss Nightingale and her excellent coadjutors, male and female, the horrors of the lazaret-houses on the Bosphorus continued. A contemporary writer, who is anonymous, thus sums up the frightful history of these receptacles of the diseased:—"When the old year had given place to the new, all alike found their prospects darkening. The horrors, although slightly changed in kind, were greater in aggregate amount at the end of January than they had been in November. This arose from the enormous number of invalids sent every week from the Crimea. At the end of January there were 5000 sick men at the camp alone; and as these accumulated too rapidly for the surgeons to attend to them, they were sent off by ship-loads to Scutari, where they added to a scene of confusion already overwhelming. Not only did the two hospitals at Scutari become filled almost to the doors, but seven other hospitals on different parts of the Turkish shores—that is, cavalry stables near the Barrack Hospital, fitted up with 150 beds; an hospital for 500 convalescents in the Sultan's Spring Palace, near the General Hospital; an hospital for 400 convalescents at Abydos, on the Dardanelles; another at Kulali, on the Bosphorus, at first appropriated to Russian prisoners, but afterwards made available for British sick by the removal of the Russians to the arsenal at Stambul; an hospital for convalescents at Smyrna; and two hospital ships in the Golden Horn; besides the Naval Hospital at Therapia—became almost equally crowded: and the open square of the Barrack Hospital was now fitted up with a structure for 1000 additional patients. The total number was not less than

6000, superadded to the 5000 at the camp. The glory of the victories no longer cheered the enfeebled and sickened soldiers; the wounded men, in November, had some prospect of recovery; but those wounded at a later date were kept down by dysentery and fever, and the wounds refusing to heal, the grave speedily claimed its own; or they arrived exhausted with chronic disease firmly rooted in their broken constitutions, and almost beyond the chance of successful treatment. An almost insupportable gloom now overspread the hospitals, multiplying the miseries already terrible enough. It may well be imagined that the position of Miss Nightingale and her companions became more trying as the difficulties accumulated in number."

Early in 1855 the Civil Hospital at Smyrna was instituted, and it proved a great benefit. It was confined to medical patients, which relieved the hospitals in the Bosphorus from a large class of patients less likely to be attended to there than any other at that juncture. It was at the close of December, 1854, that a plan for establishing an hospital, chiefly or exclusively under the care of civilians, was mooted, and in January the government resolved to carry it out. On the 10th of February, 1855, the Duke of Newcastle announced in the House of Lords—"It will be necessary, in spite of all opposition, and all professional feeling to the contrary, to introduce into the army hospitals the *civil element*." The government of Lord Aberdeen having fallen, the Duke of Newcastle surrendered the War-office to Lord Panmure, who followed up the scheme of his predecessor; and directed the following circular to the heads of the London hospitals, and appended a form of agreement for the signatures of such physicians as would consent to go out in the service of the government. We are particular in laying before our readers this circular and the agreement, that they may better judge of the subsequent extraordinary conduct of the British government:—

COPY OF LORD PANMURE'S LETTER TO THE GOVERNORS OF LONDON HOSPITALS.

War Department, February 17.

GENTLEMEN,—I am desired by Lord Panmure to request your immediate and earnest consideration of a subject which at this moment engages his lordship's most anxious attention—namely, the best means of rendering the vast professional resources of Great Britain, and more particularly of the metropolis, available for the medical relief of the British army at the seat of war. Lord Panmure is well aware that members of the medical profession, ever forward in a cause of humanity, no less than of patriotism, would not be wanting to respond to any appeal which might be addressed to them by the government; but his lordship is of opinion that the present necessities of the army call for medical assistance of an order which can only be insured by selection from individuals who have already given proof of their possession of the requisite skill, and whose antecedents gua-

rantee their experience; such individuals must be looked for first in the medical establishments of the great metropolitan hospitals.

I am directed by Lord Panmure to request your aid and concurrence in his organisation of a special civil medical staff to assist the military medical staff of the army at the seat of war. His lordship considers that this could be best effected by your selection of two or more medical gentlemen for the posts of physician and surgeon; of four or more other gentlemen, of a junior standing, as assistant physicians and surgeons; and of such proportion of advanced medical pupils as you may deem necessary to perform the duty of dressers; but his lordship considers that such an arrangement will fail to secure the services of the most highly qualified of your officers, unless you can at the same time, by an internal and private arrangement of your establishment, protect the gentlemen selected from a permanent professional loss, resulting from their humane exertions. This can probably be effected only by declaring that such offices as may be held by gentlemen volunteering to proceed to the seat of war, on temporary furloughs from the establishments to which they belong shall not be declared vacant during their absence; but that their duties shall be provisionally performed by other gentlemen, especially appointed for the purpose, and that they shall be reinstated in such offices on their return.

The remuneration which Lord Panmure would propose for these officers would be that already fixed for the civil medical officers at Smyrna, which is as follows, viz.: physicians and surgeons, £2 2s. per diem; assistant ditto, £1 5s. per diem. But his lordship will be ready to consider any suggestions you may desire to make on that head; and I am instructed to add, that to meet the case of gentlemen who may give up private practice to proceed to the East, it is his lordship's intention to propose that the salary to be paid by the government shall be continued for one year from the termination of the engagement, which it is hoped will enable those who may find their private practice wholly or partly passed into other hands, to bear with less inconvenience the interval that may elapse before they can recover it.

Lord Panmure proposes that the hospitals to be conducted by the civil staff shall be as much as possible distinct from and apart from those in charge of the military staff; nevertheless he proposes to give local medical rank to the gentlemen so engaged.

Lord Panmure is well aware that in the present infected state of the great hospital at Sentari a local removal of the sick is greatly to be wished. This subject presents many practical difficulties; but his attention has been given to the means of overcoming them; and he trusts that the infection in question will not remain to augment the difficulty of the duty.

COPY OF AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

Smyrna Hospital.

SIR,—We, the undersigned physicians and surgeons appointed to the Smyrna Civil Hospital engage to enter upon the discharge of our duties, to be defined by the medical superintendent for the time being, upon the following conditions:—A free passage out and home, lodgings, or lodging-money, and free rations. To serve a year, and to be guaranteed a year's pay, and, upon our services being dispensed with after the period of twelve months' service, to receive on retirement a gratuity of half-a-year's pay. Officers to give three months' notice of their intention to leave the service, the notice to be given on the first of any month. In the event of leaving within the first year of service, the pay to cease at the date of leaving, except in case of illness, when, upon report of a medical board, an officer shall be entitled to a free passage home, and three months' salary as a gratuity. In the event of death from disease contracted when on duty, the representatives of such officer to be entitled to receive the same gratuity as would be granted under the above regulations to an officer on retirement. Salary to be £2 2s. per diem.

To the Deputy Secretary at War.

The result of this appeal was like that of every other which government made to the

patriotism of the people: gentlemen of superior talents and attainments volunteered for the work, and bravely and nobly performed it; little supposing that they were to experience neglect, and be deprived of their just pecuniary claims at last. Among these gallant and generous-hearted men was Dr. Arthur Leared, of Finsbury Place South, a gentleman of scientific and literary acquirements, and high medical reputation, to whom these pages are indebted for the following brief notice:—

"The Smyrna Civil Hospital was projected at a time when, owing to overtaxed energies, the army surgeons were unable to meet the immense increase of their duties. The senior part of the staff consisted of three physicians and five surgeons, selected from men in practice, and holding hospital appointments chiefly in London. Many of the assistant physicians and surgeons also were connected with public hospitals; and great care was taken in the selection of all to obtain the best possible men, inducements in the way of pay being held out. Sir John Forbes, physician to her majesty's household, was appointed chief of this efficient staff; owing to illness, however, he resigned before leaving England, and was succeeded by Dr. Meyer, one of the physicians. Early in March, 1855, the civil staff arrived at Smyrna, and found that a great number of sick had been already sent from the Crimea, and were attended by military surgeons, who came with them. These gentlemen immediately handed over their charge. The hospital was a large Turkish barrack, erected for 2000 men, but a very diminished number of sick could be accommodated. It was finely situated, at the foot of Mount Pagus, and on the edge of the beautiful bay. The climate was good—extremely agreeable during the greater part of the year, but too warm at times in summer. A wind prevails from the sea during the day, called by residents the *inbat*, and this is of essential service; at night it fails, and it is then the heat is most oppressive. Supplies of all kinds were abundant at Smyrna. The Turkish population were very well disposed towards us, so that whenever any of the doctors appeared in the Turkish quarter they were sure to be greeted by the children with '*Ingles bono*;' sometimes was added, '*Frances bono—Muscor no bono.*' The Greeks evidently disliked us. The brigands were all Greeks; and they were most anxious to get hold of some of our staff. They said the queen would give a liberal ransom, if not, our heads should pay for it; we having come to oppose their brethren, the Russians. An English resident doctor, Dr. McGrath, was seized by these brigands while we were at Smyrna. They supposed him to be one of our staff, and demanded £3000 ransom, and proceeded to ill-use him, but as he understood Greek he suc-

ceeded in making better terms. After a week's captivity, during which he was almost worn out from constant travelling over rugged mountains during the night, he was released on payment of about £370 sterling. He witnessed some brutal acts. One old Turk—whose ass was seized for his use, as he was growing lame from fatigue—was shot dead in his presence. The interior of the country about Smyrna is extremely mountainous, which favours the brigands. Before we left, the band referred to was broken up—the chief shot, and several of the others (there were ten originally) taken and executed. One morning five were beheaded in the street. I saw the body of a man that had been brought in from the country, said to be that of a robber, but it was afterwards stated that he was a peasant shot by mistake. The Turks were by no means particular in these matters. The country people, however, were largely involved in the system; they supplied the robbers with food, &c. Other bands sprung up as soon as previous ones had been extirpated. The Turkish government repaid the ransom of Dr. McGrath lately: I believe they have done that in the case of all Europeans.

"The cases treated in the hospital were almost exclusively medical; it was found inconvenient to send the wounded so far: a large proportion were fever and scurvy cases. At first we were quite full of work—and hard work; but as the health of the army improved, we had much less to do. Fever proved very infectious; and many of our orderlies and nurses, and one dispenser, died. We had a number of lady nurses besides the paid nurses. These ladies devoted themselves to their work; and some of them narrowly escaped from the fever with which they were attacked, as well as some of the medical staff. The staff, consisting of three physicians, five surgeons, six assisting physicians, and eleven assistant surgeons, was at length too numerous for the wants of the hospital. Several were, therefore, sent to do duty in the Crimea, so that the staff was reduced to four seniors, and juniors in proportion. At the end of November it was thought proper to break up the establishment altogether, to make room for the Anglo-Swiss Legion, just at the time when the hospital was in a high state of perfection—a curious instance of vacillating policy. The experiment altogether was very costly. The hospital at Renqui was established subsequent to that of Smyrna."

Our readers cannot fail, on perusal of the above account, to observe how uniform the fate of everything which fell under government management. When this hospital had reached its highest state of efficiency it was abandoned, and yet another was almost immediately established! The hospital which had succeeded was

given up, to make room for a Swiss Legion, and the Osmanli horse, in British pay! Immediately upon the breaking up of the hospital an attempt was made to get rid of the medical men, without giving them the compensation they had a right to expect. Men like Dr. Leared and his compeers, who had given up lucrative and important positions, which it might not be so easy to resume, in the active competition which now fills every profession, should be honoured for their promptitude in going to a remote country, and incurring the perils of pestilence and brigands; and it should be the care of government to make such sacrifices lightly felt. Our country is not so poor that it cannot recompense the brave and the humane, whose conduct proves that they would, if needs were, serve her without recompence. But while millions are squandered upon the indolent, and the favourites of those who administer the high departments of the state, merit is seldom requited, unless in deference to public feeling, or from fear of public displeasure. The heads of the military medical staff in London were not favourable to these gentlemen—the civil hospital was regarded with envy, and even animosity. It was so superior to the Crimean and Scutari hospitals as to reproach the magnates of the army medical staff in London. It was resolved by the clique which manages these things to get rid of the institution altogether, and of the men who made it what it was. Even those civilians who were engaged as assistants to the military medical officers at Scutari and the Crimea received a superior remuneration, as if the more plainly to mark the invidiousness with which the gentlemen of the civil hospital were treated. The following extract will show our readers what the feeling of these gentlemen were in August, 1856, nine months after the hospital was abandoned:—

On considering the circumstances under which we went out, the arrangements we had made for a twelvemonth's absence, the expectations we had been led to form, and the course adopted by government in other similar cases, we feel that we have suffered an injustice.

It has already been shown that the original engagement seemed to ensure us *at least eighteen months' pay*, and that Lord Panmure's letter, which immediately followed, gave us, *who had made all the sacrifices to which he alluded*, strong grounds for expecting twelve months' gratuity subsequent to our twelve months' paid service. The following facts show that his lordship's intention has been acted on in other cases.

In consequence of his lordship's letter a number of civilians were sent to Scutari; they served a year, and have received, in addition to their year's pay, a twelvemonth's gratuity, although some of them had not the claim founded on the sacrifice of private practice, inasmuch as at the time of their appointment they were not thus engaged.

Again, the militia surgeons and assistant surgeons, who did not give up practice, many of whom had not commenced practice, and had only just completed their medical studies, who have not even been out of the country, have received a twelvemonth's gratuity in addition to their pay.

Lastly, we desire it to be understood that we found our claim for an enlargement of the gratuity awarded us, not on any special interpretation of the original agreement entered into with us by government, *and which some of us did not sign*, but on the general understanding created by Lord Panmure's letter; on the obviously just principle that all who made large sacrifices for the public service should be liberally treated; on the absolute loss we have suffered owing to our early dismissal from the hospital at Smyrna, which could not be anticipated; and, lastly, on the fact that the principle of remuneration for which we contend *has been acted on by government in regard to gentlemen whose claims are certainly less strong than our own*.

ARTHUR LEARED, M.D., *late Physician to the Royal Infirmary for Diseases of the Chest, &c.*
JOHN BARCLAY, M.D., *late Physician to the Leicester Infirmary.*

SERTIMUS GIBBON, M.D., *Assistant Physician to the London Hospital, &c.*

CARSTEN HOLTHOUSE, F.R.C.S., *Assistant Surgeon and Lecturer on Anatomy to the Westminster Hospital.*

One of the lady nurses of this institution has written a work entitled, *Ismeer; or, Smyrna and its British Hospital in 1855*. It is an extremely interesting publication, and furnishes much useful information as to the spirit of the patients and the administrative habits of our government. She thus records her own anxiety for one of her patients, and the tenderness of a poor Irish soldier—a class who made by far the best male nurses in the army:—“Next day, at an early hour, I stood at the door of the ward. How my heart beat, I had seen no one who could tell me whether he was alive or dead. At last I summoned courage, and went in, when I saw two orderlies standing by the bed, and D—— stretched on it, but whether alive or dead I could not tell, though he looked more like the latter. There I stood at the door, literally unable to move, until the orderly, who had been up all night, turned round and saw me; a smile broke over his face, as he exclaimed, ‘All right, ma’am; Jem’s alive!’ I am very sorry I have forgotten this orderly’s name; he was an Irishman and a soldier—one whose gentleness and attention equalled, indeed, almost surpassed, any woman’s I ever saw.”

Reviewing her life in the Smyrna Civil Hospital, she thus estimates her own labours and those of her benevolent sisterhood:—“I believe we were of use. Not in the way many people had a vague idea of at first—i.e. that we were constantly going about with a pocketful of lint and plaister, and a case of surgical instruments, perpetually dressing wounds (and I confess that I had a faint vision of this kind myself before I went to Smyrna), but in seeing the doctor’s orders carried out with discretion, in the spirit as well as the letter; that nothing was done out of time, overdone, or neglected; in keeping a systematic regularity; and, above all, in exercising a marvellous moral influence over the soldiers. That nurses—people from their own class—should be sent out to attend

them seemed natural enough; but that ladies—'real ladies,' as they used to say—should really come to see that they were taken good care of, filled them with surprise."

Upon this extract the *Medical Times and Gazette* observes, "That moral influence was the great point gained we entirely admit. We believe that many a British soldier has enduringly benefited from that influence. We have reason to know that its effects upon the most reckless men, whose vicious propensities seemed to be excited rather than quelled by suffering, were, as stated, marvellous. When we consider the aid thus afforded in maintaining order among men accustomed to the iron rule of military discipline, it must be admitted that the lady nurses played a useful part in the civil hospital system applied to soldiers."

Having devoted two chapters to the condition of the men in the Crimea, their sickness

and wants—the loss of their transport and cavalry horses, and the consequent aggravation of their miseries—the remedies devised for them and the sorrowful failure of most of them, because of the men and the measures adopted by the heads of departments, or the obstructions placed in the way of rational reform,—we shall bring the prosecution of the siege itself once more before the reader. Incidentally, it will be necessary again and again to refer to topics treated more largely in the last two chapters; for so terrible, so all-pervading were the distress, sickness, and suffering of our army, that whatever occurred in the way of military achievement was influenced by this disastrous condition of affairs. The siege itself, and the character of the combats waged around the barrier erected against us by Russian promptitude and energy, were fashioned by the one great all-influencing fact—the physical misery of the British army.

END OF VOL. I.

THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.

CHAPTER LIX.

PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE.—CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPPOSING ARMIES.—DESPATCHES,
SORTIES, COMBATS.

Alençon.

Lean raw-boned rascals. Who would e'er suppose
They had such courage and audacity?"

"One to ten.

SHAKSPERE. *Henry V.*

HAVING shown the state of the armies before Sebastopol—the manly endurance of “the raw-boned English”—the neglect to which, in the severe winter which opened 1855, they were exposed, and conducted our readers a second time to the hospitals and their dire scenes, we now proceed to relate the progress of the siege, its obstacles, successes, and the havoc which it made on all who shared its perils. Before entering upon any of the incidents of combat, we present to our readers an admirable paper, published in the *Constitutionnel*, upon the characteristics of the Russian army, and a comparative view of it and the armies of the allies. The paper was written about the middle of January, and was suggested by the aspect of affairs at the period of our narrative:—“The battles of the Alma and Inkerman, and the siege of Sebastopol, have enabled us to study the Russian army employed in the Crimea. Although this army is partly composed of troops from the Danube and the Caucasus, it is clumsy, not easily handled, and manœuvres badly in presence of an enterprising enemy. Its generals always place it for bivouac, as in the field of battle, in great masses, and they do not know how to deploy it after an attack, nor when to make it resist in a thin line. The Russian infantry is very badly armed. Some companies only have carbines made at Liege; the muskets—but recently transformed—badly kept, and with but-ends in white wood, do not last long in a campaign. This infantry will never attain the level of the French infantry, which is really the first in the world for making war in woody or hilly countries, where the general-in-chief leaves a great deal to the initiative of the soldiers and to the chiefs of corps and battalions. In the defensive, the preference must

be given to the English infantry, who, under the fire of the enemy, rest immovable as a rampart. In a level and exposed country our infantry will have to modify its manner of combatting, and to resume its old one. This consists in employing compact or thin order (*épais ou mince*), but it can only be employed with intelligent and experienced troops. Its superiority in arms and intelligence will, however, always give to our infantry the advantage over the Russian infantry, which will always lose half its value when obliged to change its place rapidly. On the Alma, entire Russian battalions took to flight in surprise at the Zouaves way of fighting, they having advanced on them in large bodies, deployed, having taken advantage of all the accidents of the ground to shelter themselves and to rally, and having made against the masses a terrible use of the peculiar arms confided to their skill. At Inkerman, in the upper part of the battle field, and on the line of the English, the Russian infantry bravely attacked the enemy, but did not know how to deploy its masses so as to bring more muskets into play, and when the French attacked their left flank entire battalions did not know how to change their position. The first ranks bravely resisted, but the following ranks fired in presenting arms. Surprised afterwards by the sharp attack of the Chasseurs d’Afrique, masses of men, instead of effecting their retreat by the crests of the hills, descended slowly to the lower parts of the ground and the ravines, where they allowed themselves to be crushed almost without defence by from 1000 to 1200 French. The English have so well understood the advantages which troops would have in attacking either artillery or masses of infantry in woody or hilly countries,

whilst preserving the order deployed by the first line, that at Inkerman they did not employ the order in columns, which caused them to lose so great a number of men on the Alma. On the Alma the Russian cavalry was worse than timid, not a charge did it attempt. At Inkerman the nature of the ground prevented it from taking part in the affair. At Balaklava, it did not dare to await the charge of two squadrons of *Chasseurs d'Afrique*. The famous Cossacks have, in fact, never attempted, even in the plain, to carry off our advanced posts, or the marauders who pass our lines; but it is said that this cavalry is but little esteemed even in Russia. As a set off to this, the Russians really possess great superiority, both over the French and the English, and especially over the French, in their artillery. The Emperor Nicholas, in no doubt, the expectation of a war against all the nations of the south of Europe, occupied himself a good deal with that arm, which has made great progress since the wars at the beginning of the century. The cannon are of a large calibre, the carriages and caissons well made and easily moved; the artillerymen are brave and accustomed to their service; the officers know perfectly well how to choose offensive and defensive positions; they occupy them with boldness, hold them a long time, and know how to leave them without leaving their guns. You will now understand why we are still before the walls of Sebastopol, and why that place would cost us so much blood if we were to make an assault before its unextinguished batteries. But we hope that the town will surrender in consequence of the difficulty it is under of obtaining supplies of provisions, or that we shall obtain its keys by giving a grand battle to the army in the field. The stores of ammunition in Sebastopol are inexhaustible, and as the investment is not complete, the garrison can be relieved and increased every day. Without being initiated in the secrets of the generals-in-chief, everything causes us to believe that they are waiting the arrival of the reinforcements which are on their way, in order to resume the attacks which, so to speak, have been suspended since the day of the battle at Inkerman. We shall have in the French and English trenches at least 300 pieces, which will open their fire, and it is more than probable that in the meantime the army of observation will destroy in a battle the Russian army in the field."

At this juncture the condition of the army was an all important consideration. Its state, and the state of the harbour and of the camp, we shall therefore present to our readers from a source upon which they may rely. A relative of the late, and of the present, Sir Andrew Agnew visited the Crimea in January, 1855, and addressed the following letter to some

friends at home. It may be well matter of astonishment to the reader how, in the condition of harbour, camp, hospital-tents, trenches, and troops, the siege could be conducted at all, so far as the English were concerned. The explanation consists in their indomitable self-reliance and heroic courage:—"Now for a description, if possible, though I fear I shall fail in the attempt. Until you almost touch the rocks you can hardly perceive an opening, and, when you at last reach the mouth of the harbour of Balaklava, it is not above sixty yards wide; and, after passing several men-of-war, transports, &c., all with the ends of their bowsprits nearly touching you, you get into rank, and add another to the number; and now the scene changes, about forty yards from our stern is the landing-place. The town—'did you say town?'—no, I mean a scattered number of wretched hovels—say 150. In the rear and in the front high precipitous rocks; on the face of the latter several tents with marines and a body of Highlanders; in fact, suppose a basin one quarter full of water placed on the table, and drop a wafer into it, and then you have a good idea of the position of a ship in the harbour of Balaklava. Yesterday being a beautiful day, I thought it a good opportunity to pay a visit to the camp, and as I had understood that the light division of the army occupied, together with the French, the nearest point to Sebastopol, to that place I determined to set out. An officer of the 19th, belonging to the division, who had come on board amongst a host of others 'foraging,' purchasing geese and turkeys, a guinea a-piece, and fowls 12s. 6d. a couple, kindly offered to put me in the right road, and invited me to dine with him in his tent. Now for it—I landed—my first step up to the very knees in mud; French, Turks, English, and camp-sutlers in glorious confusion; such swearing, shouting, and row you never heard in your life; artillery waggons, six and twelve horses attached to each; others with half-starved camels; cavalry horses whose riders and hard-worked steeds have probably not seen a comb or a brush for a month together; with Turks every here and there bearing the dead upon stretchers, all wading through a sea of mud, complete this picture until you emerge from the town. The crowd appears then to deploy over an interminable space. In the distance, on the right, are the mountains of the Crimea, covered with snow; at the foot several Russian encampments; nearer to us, the Balaklava battle-ground; on one of the slopes you see the remains of our light cavalry and their horse-hospital, not 100 effective animals left. The Scots Greys nearly as bad. How can it be otherwise? The poor creatures are worked all day with the artillery in dragging heavy loads to the trenches and camps, fastened up

to posts driven into the ground, and scarcely a morning breaks but the troopers drag out fourteen or fifteen out of the 'slush,' as they term it. On the left you see Lord Raglan's quarters, though all agree in saying they have not seen him for the last month; and, having proceeded over destroyed vineyards, every here and there dotted with dead horses emitting a most delightful perfume, you at last get upon higher ground and approach the French camp, extending miles on the left, having the Turks between them, and the British skirting the latter. I thought I would have a look at the French, so having paid a visit to several of the huts, and been very hospitably invited to partake of their contents, I passed on towards the light division. A little on the left of the French is the Picket-house, about a mile and a half from Sebastopol, into which a shell often drops, to the danger of all who are in it—and being a good look-out place, is seldom unoccupied by the curious endeavouring to get a glimpse at what is going on in the far-famed fortress in the distance. Being determined on exploring I still proceeded, and presently I heard firing right below me. The French were pitching their shot into the town, and the Russians returning three to one. Within 300 yards is the 40-gun battery, and directly opposite is the Russian, mounting much heavier metal. From this spot I first saw what they call the 'trenches'—I mean the actual working trenches. Now, suppose a soldier six feet high in the trench, in some places, if he stands upright, he gets shot at—his head appearing over the parapet, and then he is obliged to kneel down, with the mud and water up to his middle, to avoid the danger. This state of the trenches and laborious work that the poor soldiers undergo, being sometimes thirty hours thus employed, badly fed, badly clothed, and, I fear, much dispirited, tends to engender disease. We are losing on an average 160 men a-day, not including those who fall from the enemy's guns. I now had an opportunity of a good view into Sebastopol. Its appearance is both picturesque and beautiful, and, though I was within half a mile of it, and had a capital seven-guinea glass, I could not perceive any damage that had as yet occurred. On the contrary, I could see no marks of the cannonade that has now been going on for upwards of two months, though I believe that the portion directly opposite the French batteries is much cut up. After satisfying my curiosity, I returned to the light division camp; and now for a description of Mr. Gorham's tent (19th regiment). The tent inside is eight feet diameter, round the circumferences were a medley of boots, caps, kettles, empty bottles, and many other things of general daily utility; next was a soldier's bayonet stuck into the

ground for the purpose of a candlestick; next two beds, or rather hard-stuffed straw mattresses with a scanty coverlid, each on the bare ground. Dinner at length was brought in—two tin panikins with *soupe-maigre* that would frighten S—, followed by two pieces of hard salt beef of about half a pound each, a little rice (this was good), and a very, very hard biscuit. However, exercise sharpens appetite, so I set to, and having as a finale taken a glass of bad rum with my entertainers, I bid good-by to the officers of the light division, and taking a building in the distance as my landmark, I started for Balaklava. The sun had melted the hitherto execrable roads, and, together with the traffic, I shall never, to the longest day of my life, forget the walk back; suffice it to say that, having passed several fellows who were endeavouring to urge their worn-out horses to get up out of the mud where they had dropped down for the last time, I reached the *Charity*."

The numerical force of the troops in the British army actually able to serve at this time was variously computed; perhaps the estimate of Colonel, afterwards Major-general Windham, is as likely to receive credit as any other. In a speech delivered by him after the termination of his services in the Crimea, he made the following reference to the muster-roll at this period:—"Look too at what the troops had to go through. In the middle of the winter—and I see many officers here who can confirm what I say—we had not more than 12,000 bayonets to do duty, which would properly have required 36,000. Why, gentlemen, you might as well try in Norfolk to farm 1000 acres with capital for 300. Throughout the whole of the winter, however, notwithstanding the hardships to which they were exposed, the men discharged their duties without grumbling, and with a cheerful readiness which has justly elicited the admiration of the country."

Small as their numbers were, they were not all adequately armed, the Minié musket not having been universally distributed to the infantry; the fourth division, to some extent, still carrying the old "brown bess." Not only were they inadequately armed, but they were often obliged to turn out hungry, and literally tottering from weakness. The men sought death from the enemy as a relief.

The early despatches of Lord Raglan were at this time mere records of the weather, so that his lordship was sneeringly called at home the "weather-glass of the army." But there could be scarcely any subject of deeper interest to the commander or the troops committed to his care than the state of the weather; for on it not only depended the health of his ill-clad soldiers, but also the state of the road or rather rut from Balaklava, and the prospect of getting up food, ammunition, or, in fact, any-

thing that was wanting in the camp. On the 2nd of January, his lordship's despatch referred to the weather; on the 6th, a similar communication was made to the British war minister. Everything looked more gloomy as the overwhelmingly severe weather of January set in. The state, opinion, and feeling of the English soldiery may be gathered from the following letter from a non-commissioned officer to his friends in Glasgow:—"To tell you the truth, the beggar that wanders about the streets is better off than the British soldier in the Crimea. Winter has set in, the snow is about four feet deep, and we have received none of the winter clothing the papers say we have got, except four extra greatcoats for a company, instead of one to each man; and as for rations, we are on half—that is, half a pound of meat and biscuit, and half a gill of rum, *per diem*, and a little raw coffee. That is the British soldier's fare for a day, and even that we can't get cooked—no wood to be got. I cannot describe our miseries. When we are off duty we have nothing to shelter us but the tent, which lets in everything—wind, rain, and snow—often knee deep in mud, in which to lie down and rest our weary bones, after doing duty in the trenches, with only twelve hours off at a time. Our regiment left Dublin 800 strong, and, with deaths and sickness, we are now only 230. Other regiments are worse. Still, those who are left of us bear up bravely; we try to keep our spirits up, hoping for better days to come. Our neighbours, the French, are much better off than we are; they get their pay, and have canteens in all their camps, where they sell brandy, tea, sugar, bread, tobacco, &c. We could purchase of them too, but, unfortunately, we have no money, so we are done. The battle of Inkerman was fought on our side of the Tchernaya, about two miles from where our regiment is encamped. There are a number of dead Russians still lying about, but nobody takes notice of them. As for Lord Raglan, I have certainly seen him since I came here; but I suppose if you were to ask some of the soldiers how they liked him, they would ask you who he was. Sebastopol stands as strong as ever, and will do till we take it by storm, which ought to be done long ago. We have got scarcely a battery. On our 21-gun battery there are only three available guns. I must stop, as I have no more paper." Thus, ill-fed, ill-clothed, without fire-wood or coals, which we could have easily sent them—without good tents, or with rootless huts—with three endemic diseases, and great liability to dysentery, the brave soldiers of our army were pining and dying before Sebastopol, the victims of official inefficiency at home and in the camp, when called on to meet the various combats now about to ensue. It was of no avail for the government at home

to plead inexperience on their own behalf, or that of the officials; for, in the first place, it was not true as to the officials in all cases—many of them having, during other campaigns, served in the commissariat, or in the government offices at home; and the very men then at the helm of affairs were those who had composed, in greater or less proportions, most cabinets since the peace of 1815. When they pretended that the commons was the culprit, the reply was, that they held office knowing the commons were enfeebling the country by refusing such supplies as were adequate to the effective material of the army. The mere threat of a resignation or a dissolution would, on scores of occasions during that long period, have caused the commons to vote any supplies necessary for the full efficiency of the fleet and army.

Under these circumstances, many at home were in favour of raising the siege; and though personally fearing no danger, and quailing before no difficulty, there were officers in the Crimea who felt that, unless larger reinforcements arrived, and the army was immediately and amply supplied with the instrumentalities of warfare, the enterprise must be abandoned. The general feeling, however, in the camp was hopeful; and all were ardent to meet the enemy, despite sickness and neglect. In this feeling the French partook; they were full of confidence; many reinforcements were on the way, and, flushed with high hope, there existed throughout the French host the utmost eagerness for a bombardment which should prove the certain preliminary to an assault. The impression in the French camp was, that no good would come of delay; that Russia would only grow stronger by the arrival of new succours; and that as soon as the next cannonade should partially disable the batteries, they should be led to the assault. They addressed one another in the spirit of the language of Brutus to Cassius:—

"Our legions are brimful, our cause is ripe.
There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of our life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.
On such a full sea are we now afloat,
And we must take the current as it serves,
Or lose our ventures."

The French troops were much gratified with the acknowledgment of their services by their allies generally, but especially with that of the British queen, government, and people for their aid at Inkerman. General Canrobert opened the new year by the following "general order:—

Head-quarters before Sebastopol, Dec. 28.

The commander-in-chief is happy to have to communicate to the troops the expressions, most honorable for our arms, in which her Majesty the Queen of England appreciates their conduct at the battle of Inkerman.

The queen has remarked, with grateful satisfaction, on the vigour with which the troops of her ally, the Emperor of the French, came to the assistance of the divisions of the English army engaged in so unequal combat. Her majesty is profoundly sensible of the cordial co-operation of the commander-in-chief, General Canrobert, and of the valiant conduct of that distinguished officer, General Bosquet. She beholds in the cheers with which the soldiers of the two nations mutually encourage each other during the action proofs of the reciprocal esteem which this campaign, and the traits of bravery it has produced, have given rise to on both sides.

Her Majesty the Queen of England could not praise in a more flattering manner the attitude of the army at the battle of Inkerman. In marching to the aid of our brave allies, we fulfilled a duty which they themselves would fulfil towards us with that valour we know they possess, and so many proofs of which we have witnessed with our own eyes.

The Commander-in-chief,
CANROBERT.

His excellency signalled the opening of the year by another order less to his credit and to the interest of the army. All the correspondents of the French press were ordered out of the Crimea; even one gentleman, who was said to have an introduction from the emperor himself, was compelled to leave by a ship departing to Marseilles.

The Turkish army in the Crimea began now also to assume some importance; the name of Omar Pasha had a magic effect upon the drooping Osmanli, and the allied army regarded his arrival with the old army of the Danube as an element of speedy success. It had been rumoured that he was deposed, but the sultan took suitable opportunity of publicly proving that the great muschir was restored to favour, if ever he had been deprived of the light of the imperial countenance. By way of Constantinople, Paris, and London, in rapid succession, the following imposing documents arrived, and showed, beyond all doubt, that the sirdar was not only a great man, but a great power in the Ottoman empire:—

(HATTI HUMAYOUN).

TO MY SUPREME GENERAL AND ZEALOUS
MUSCHIR, OMAR PASHA.

As you will see by the annexed imperial firman, the laudable efforts you have made hitherto deserve the greatest praise and general approbation, and have raised you in my favour, as also the faithful and courageous conduct of the generals, officers, and soldiers of the imperial armies which have been placed under your command—conduct which gives proof of the zeal, fidelity, and valour which is natural to them, and which has given us unlimited satisfaction, and met with our approval. On this occasion also make every effort in the Crimea, as your zeal and fidelity require you to do, and placing full faith in the mercy and aid of the Lord Almighty of the universe to render great services, in order doubly to strengthen our favour towards you, endeavouring with great care to entertain a friendly intercourse with the generals, officers, and soldiers of the high powers my allies in this question, in which the good rights of my empire have by all been acknowledged, so that I may have fresh proofs of your inborn valour, and of your constant attachment to the execution, under all circumstances, of the fundamental military laws, and of your sincere sentiments towards us.

[Translation of the Firman]

TO THE MUSCHIR OF THE IMPERIAL ARMY OF
ROUMELIA, TO MY GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OMAR
PASHA, &c.

As soon as my high imperial signet will have reached thee, know that the principal and most respectable thing for me, and for every sage and intelligent person who faithfully loves his government, is to defend the power and independence of my empire, of my trusty subjects, and to maintain their prosperity and tranquillity: and in like way, that the laudable care that ever since the commencement of this war, of happy issue, which has been undertaken with that good intention, thou hast given, by thy intelligence, to the high administration of the army which thou commandest, having merited my praise and approval, have increased my imperial favour towards thee. In like manner, my victorious imperial troops, which are under thy orders, having displayed before the whole world a faithful conduct, and that abnegation which is part of the zeal, fidelity, and valour which are natural to them, and have again proved before friend and foe that they are the valorous descendants of those brave men, who, in the times of our glorious ancestors, and in their service, spilt their blood and sacrificed their lives in order to strengthen the foundations of the empire, and cause the country to prosper, equally shows that the confidence which we place in them with regard to the privations and fatigues of every kind, which they will bear with pride for the defence of the independence and glory of our empire and our fatherland, is based upon the truth of existing facts, and as they have completely and afresh regained the country high military glory, that conduct has obtained our extreme satisfaction, our goodwill, and our praise.

It is certain that, in our prayers, we constantly remember thy intelligent person, as also all the generals, officers, and soldiers, high and low, of our imperial army; that we never for a moment cease personally to occupy ourselves with solicitude, with what can solace the pains and increase the felicity and welfare of them all; and, finally, that wherever my imperial army may be, my favour and high attention for its welfare will accompany it.

It now happens that the service of my empire indispensably requires that a sufficient portion of the troops belonging to my imperial army of Roumelia should proceed with thee to the Crimea, rejoin thy victorious troops which have preceded them and the armies of the high powers, sincere and intimate allies of my empire, in order to combat the enemy. My eyes rest upon you. Place confidence in the help and mercy of the Lord Almighty of the universe, and add to your glorious precedents, by worthily serving the cause of the honour of the empire and nation. Take the greatest care to behave amicably and in harmony with the generals, officers, and the soldiers of the two high powers above-mentioned, my allies in the cause in which the good right of my empire is recognised by the whole world. Fortify thus doubly my imperial favour towards you. Give fresh proof of your inborn valour, of your well-known respect for the fundamental military laws, and of your sincere devotion to my imperial person.

My present all mighty firman has been expressly given by my imperial Divan, and graciously headed by my Hatti Humayoun, to command what precedes, and to honour thee and my imperial troops under thy command.

To convey to you, and also verbally to declare to you my lively satisfaction and my high imperial will, one of the high functionaries of my empire, Mahmoud Bey, mustichar of the ministry of foreign affairs, has been sent to you.

On his arrival, hasten to make known to, and proclaim my high will and my lively imperial satisfaction to all the generals, officers, and soldiers who stand under thy orders, and take care, day and night, as hitherto, of their welfare in every respect.

Know it thus, and believe in my noble sign.

Given in the 1st decade of the month of Rebiul Akhir, 1271.

In pursuance of the above, the dispatch of the redoubtable Omar and his gallant followers, as auxiliaries to the Western allies, was ef-

fects. In a previous chapter the departure of this expedition was noted; in a future page its efficiency will be recorded.

On the arrival of Omar at Varna, he requested the British commissioner to forward to the commander-in-chief the following handsome acknowledgment of the services rendered to the sultan by various British officers. This politic and just measure bespoke for the Turkish commander a greater measure of popularity with the English.

Varna, January 8th, 1855.

"MY LORD,—His Highness Omar Pasha has requested me to write to your lordship to return his best thanks for the services rendered to his army by Major Bent, of the Royal Engineers, and the detachment of sappers under his command.

"His highness desires me to express his regret at the losses which have been sustained by this small detachment, who, under the direction of Major Bent, have well sustained the character of the British army.

"His highness has already expressed to your lordship his regret at the loss of Lieutenant Burke, of the Royal Engineers, whom his highness considers to have been an officer of much merit.

"His highness desires me to inform your lordship that he has done himself the honour to write to the Turkish ambassador at the court of St. James's, expressing the desire of his majesty the sultan that Private Andrew Anderson, of the Royal Sappers and Miners, may receive and wear the decoration of the fourth class of the order of Medjidîé, in commemoration of his gallantry in recovering the body of Lieutenant Burke, after he was killed at the passing of the Danube, on the 12th of July last. In the meantime he has presented Private Anderson with the decoration, and trusts your lordship will allow him to wear it until the commands of her majesty may be received.

"His highness further desires me to express to your lordship his entire approbation of the manner in which Major Bent has conducted his duties. He desires me to inform your lordship that this officer showed great energy in his endeavours to enter Silistria before the siege was raised, and that he subsequently showed great gallantry."

The Russians were not less confident than their rivals; yet with their usual caution, despite the sternness of winter, they made preparations for the defence not only of Sebastopol but of the whole Crimea, believing that the arrival of reinforcements early in the spring would enable the allies to take the offensive, for the especial purpose of cutting off the supplies. The Russians were also

cognisant of the appointment of Omar, and the landing of the Turks at Eupatoria:—"In order to prevent a *coup de main* against Perekop, the division of General Pauloff, the brigade of General Wrangel, and four regiments of dragoons, were detached on the 18th ult. towards Arngansk, and took up a position on the road which commands the isthmus. The light division of Hulus, under General Kortf, was still holding its winter-quarters near Eupatoria, its head-quarters being at Saki. The 51st regiment of Cossacks of the Don had joined it, and these troops will in the early part of January, it is said, commence an offensive movement against Eupatoria. In the meantime, in order to secure the communications with Perekop, reinforcements are being brought up from Odessa. The total force now at Perekop, in cavalry and infantry, amounts to 50,000 men. The eighth division, which arrived at Bagtché Serai on the 28th of December, was immediately after reviewed by General Osten-Sacken, who complimented it on its fine appearance, and said, 'You have come by order of your august sovereign to maintain the glory of your ancestors and the honour of Russia, our sacred country, my children! It is unnecessary for me to tell you that the eyes of your sovereign, as well as those of your fellow-countrymen, are on you, as the defenders of the word of Jesus Christ, our Saviour. There are among you many whom I have already commanded on fields of battle in Persia, Poland, and Hungary: remember the past, and continue to behave as becomes brave Russians. The moment will soon arrive when you will leave no other choice to the enemy than death or captivity. Until that time, adieu.'"

A letter from Vienna to London gives the following brief sketch of Russian activity at this period:—"We have to-day no late news from the seat of war in the Crimea, beyond the usual despatch from Prince Menschikoff, stating that, except two trifling sorties attempted by the garrison, nothing important had happened before Sebastopol up to the 8th of January. The *New Prussian Gazette*, in a communication coming from an acknowledged Russian source, states that Prince Menschikoff has profited by the respite to fortify the exterior *enceinte* of Sebastopol with new works of fortification, and has transformed into redoubts 28 of the 350 houses of the town, in addition to the batteries erected on the barricades, and in the principal streets, and on the bastions, the 460 guns of which answer the fire of the allies. The Prussian paper supposes that there will be no assault till the place is completely invested."

On New-year's day our French allies effected a reconnaissance towards the village of Tchör-

gunn, and returned with only a loss of nine men. On the 6th the Russians showed great activity in the neighbourhood of the Tchernaya, towards the north side of which, and near Inkerman, there were three or four strong divisions of infantry, whose movements were unaccountable. The Russian general dispatched a considerable force of cavalry by the gorges to the east of Balaklava, and a strong body of infantry moved off northwards by the Inkerman tunnel. Silent movements on the part of the Muscovites, and silent vigilance on the part of the allies, were not destined to fill up the history of the day; the former opened fire from their new earthworks opposite the French right attack, and were replied to with spirit—the brawling guns kept up the noise of battle for hours. The English were not permitted to be mere spectators of this artillery practice, for a masked battery was opened against their advanced posts. Every night the French and Russians exchanged some cannon shots, and the riflemen on both sides did some execution. The camps of the allies were much annoyed with spies, who assumed every disguise with dexterity and success: sometimes that of a rifle officer was chosen, and one Russian officer actually imposed upon a party of the Rifle Brigade as an officer of their own corps. Another, as an officer of Zouaves, rode about Balaklava, escaping in the evening in the direction of Tchorgoum. Another personated a British officer of engineers, and escaped over the parapets of the trenches through a musketry fire from the men in the trenches. These Russians showed skill, courage, and a perfect mastery of dissimulation and self-possession. Desertions became very common, from both French and English; those from the former chiefly belonged to their foreign legion. On the 10th a private soldier of the Connaught Rangers, who had been captured in one of the sorties of December, made his escape; he arrived in the camp in a wretched condition—his feet and legs, hands and arms, all much lacerated by broken glass, which he represented as strewn thickly for a great distance around the enemy's works. His description of the woe-begone plight of the Russians encouraged his fellow-soldiers.

The French worked hard by day in assisting to make a road to the English camp. By night, their mortar batteries (which were much more numerous armed than those of the English, although the latter had mortars of much greater calibre) flung shells with much effect—it was afterwards heard from deserters—into the works of the enemy. On the 10th and 11th the French mortar fire was especially animated. The navvies, although so lately arrived, were engaged in earnest work. By the 10th of January the railway had been brought up a

considerable distance in the main street of Balaklava. The Turks were greatly surprised at this operation; they could not maintain their accustomed *sang froid* when they beheld the railway engine snorting and fuming along. The main street of Balaklava was not improved, however, by the presence of “the line”—as nearly its whole breadth was thus occupied, and the ordinary current of passengers was obliged to find vent in other directions still more encumbered than the old route had been.

Several British deserters were shot in their efforts to reach the enemy. These men were generally hard drinkers, and had deserved punishment, or were dishonest, and feared that their practices would be brought to light. Some, when caught, pleaded an unconquerable desire to see Sebastopol; this curiosity was found in the ranks of the Zouaves more than among the British. Shot, shell, and provisions, were brought up during the early days of January in considerable quantities, but at a very heavy cost to the poor soldiery. But for the assistance of the French, in men, mules, and ambulances, neither food nor ammunition could have been brought up to the camp, nor invalids brought down to Balaklava. Tea was served in the hospital tents in the latter place, and to the sick on board ship.

During the desultory cannonade, officers and men, especially among the French, experienced the most wonderful escapes. A correspondent of the *United Service Gazette* communicated the following adventure in the British trenches:—“The covering parties in the trenches who are not actually on sentry have excavated large holes in the bank, inside of the guns, to screen themselves from the cold wind. Two men had ensconced themselves in one of these holes, and were comfortably rolled in their blankets, when a large shell fell exactly between them without injuring either; one of the men, who happened to be awake, got out as quickly as he could, but the other poor fellow, who was sound asleep, remained quietly ‘taking his rest,’ wrapped up in his blankets, unconscious of his danger. Most fortunately the fusee had been extinguished in its flight, or had burnt out without reaching the inside, and the shell did not explode. Had it not been for this fortunate circumstance, the two men and some officers standing near, would in all probability have been killed or maimed on the spot. Our first impulse was to throw ourselves flat on the ground, as the only chance of escape, and we remained there some time before being satisfied that the fusee was not burning. We then awoke the man who had remained in the hole from his sleep, which was nearly proving his last, but who for some time did not appear to comprehend the danger

he had escaped, and after a little time, and rubbing his eyes, he said, 'I'll knock over a few more Russians for this trick that they have played me.' "

The general neglect which the staff-officers of the British army had hitherto exhibited was not now so apparent. Lord Raglan having started into life, his "aids," also became more animated. Indeed, if the general officers had done their duty, the divisional and general staff of the army—however incompetent many of the officers undoubtedly were—would at all events have shown more alacrity and more concern for the welfare of the men. "The Queen's Rules and Regulations for the Army" are very positive as to the duty of the chief officers on this head:—"General officers in command are to be very circumspect in their recommendation of officers for staff appointments of any kind, and are responsible that the officers on whose behalf they interest themselves are, by their previous personal services, as well as by their acquirements and character, qualified to discharge with advantage to the service the duties attached to the situation for which they are recommended."

There was some discontent shown about this time, arising from what was considered partial conduct on the part of Admiral Lyons. When the troops entered Balaklava, there were five mortars found in the old fort there. These were removed on board the *Agamemnon*, Admiral Lyons' ship, and ultimately on board the *Firebrand*, with the inscription on a brass plate, "Agamemnon, Balaklava, 1854." As the *Agamemnon* had shelled the heights, that circumstance was made a pretext for taking the credit of capturing the mortars. The Rifle Brigade were the real captors, for it was to them that the fort surrendered.

On the 12th of January (the Russian New Year's-day) the frost gave way, and a south wind setting in, the weather became unseasonably mild, and the plateau was once more a vast area of mud. This was the new year of the Russians, and they ushered it in with ostentatious gaiety. They lighted huge bonfires on the north side, and placed long rows of lights on the heights over the Tchernaya. The windows of Sebastopol were illuminated, and the light flashed over the heights occupied by the allies. At midnight, the bells of all the churches were rung in the manner the Russians are accustomed to perform that preliminary to a grand religious rite. At one o'clock a shout arose along the whole line of the Russian works and throughout the city. It was a loud cry, as of a host inspired by some joyous intelligence, or by some project of fanaticism. Soon after a tremendous cannonade burst forth from the whole of the Russian works, perhaps the heaviest experienced by

the allies since the bombardment of the 17th of October. The French and English replied, but not with the same violence and power; indeed, the French gunners had to take shelter in the trenches from the shells, shot, carcasses, and rockets, that flew in fiery crowds among them. Their riflemen, and especially those who, being in the advanced positions, were commonly called *enfants perdus*, kept up an incessant fire; and as few of the enemy's missiles fell among them, they were able to take very deliberate aim, and bring down the Russian gunners as they "showed" in the embrasures. A strong sortie was made against our allies; the Russians forced their way within the parapets of one of the mortar batteries, and succeeded in spiking several of the pieces with wooden plugs. The French rallied, took them in flank and front within the trench with a quick discharge of musketry, followed by a rushing bayonet charge and a cheer; the Russians recoiled; a fresh body of French pressed them with the bayonet, the retreating Russians fled in disorder; and so rapid and bold was the pursuit that many of the French entered with them within their lines. The French soldiers were with the greatest difficulty prevented by their commanders from penetrating beyond the advanced works of the enemy; and for many a day after they murmured, complaining that if their officers had only given the word, they would have captured Sebastopol. It does not appear, however, that they were the best judges in this case: they would have soon learned that the discretion of their officers was at least as useful as their own forward valour.

While the contest was yet raging in the lines of the French, a similar attack was made on the front and flank of the British left. As the Russians always take occasions of great festivals for their enterprises, both of the allied armies might have expected that the bell-ringing and illuminations would be followed by a sortie. It appeared that neither exercised sufficient vigilance. Mr. Russell represents the British authorities as taking every precaution. A steady sergeant, "one of the steadiest in the service," and twelve men, were posted on the point of probable attack, but "somehow or other, the enemy crept up upon the little party, surprised, and took them prisoners." The result of this was of course an unexpected advance upon the covering parties, compelling the detachments of the 68th and 21st regiments there on duty to retire, almost without firing a shot. These parties, forming upon the supports, opened fire rather slowly upon the assailants, and then advancing with the bayonet, drove them back, and continued the pursuit to the Russian advanced works, but lost six men who were shot dead, and nine men and an officer who were wounded. A

letter from the camp strongly contradicts Mr. Russell as to the precautionary vigilance of the English superior officers. The writer of the letter was a non-commissioned officer.

Camp above Sebastopol, Jan. 15.

"There was rather an unfortunate affair on the night of the 12th. The 68th found the guard for the advanced works, and gave 170 men for it. There ought not to have been less than 300 there. It was pitch dark. The Russians in large numbers made a sortie at about one o'clock in the morning, took the guard by surprise, wounded an officer and six men, and took a sergeant and thirteen men prisoners. After the Russians retired, a most tremendous fire was opened on the trenches, of round-shot, shell, and grape; but, as usual, though it sounds very awful, that sort of firing does little or no damage at night.

"Simultaneously with the attack on our advanced works, an attack was made on the French on our left, but, to show you how differently the French authorities act from ours, it appears that the 12th is the Russian New Year's-day, and it was perfectly well known by the authorities, both French and English, that an attack would most likely be made to usher in the new year. The French gave their people a hint to be on the alert, and to show that they were in earnest, doubled all their advanced guards. Our bright people, having just the same opportunity of learning as the French, never took the trouble even to remind us that it was the Russian New Year's-eve—a fact of which we were totally ignorant. I merely mention this little instance to let you see the sort of stupid, quiet, confident way in which some people go on."

This affair was followed by a despatch from Lord Raglan, in which he communicates an error as to the casualties; the correct account was given above.

Before Sebastopol, Jan. 13.

MY LORD DUKE,—The weather continues very severe, and to-day it blows a gale of wind, with drifting snow.

Although I have not received the official report from the officer commanding the fourth division, the officer of the quartermaster-general's department, whose duty it is to visit the advanced posts at daylight, has brought in an account of a sortie made by the Russians in the course of last night upon our right and left attack, the enemy advancing, under protection of a heavy cannonade, along the Woronzoff Road and the ravine on our extreme left.

The enemy succeeded in driving in the troops in the advanced trench, which was not re-occupied until the reserves were brought forward from the second parallel.

A party in pits on the right of the advanced trench, consisting of one sergeant and thirteen rank and file, are missing, and one officer and thirty-six privates are stated to be wounded. The time for the dispatch of the mail being at hand, I am very sorry that I shall not be able to send you grace to-day a more accurate statement of this affair. I inclose a return of casualties between the 8th and 11th. Great progress is making in disembarking and issuing to the troops vast quantities of warm clothing of all descriptions, and I believe I may assert that every man in this army has received a second blanket, a jersey

frock, flannel drawers, and socks, and some kind of winter coat, in addition to the ordinary greatcoat. The provision of fuel is still a great difficulty. Every effort is making, and with tolerable success, in landing and putting up the huts; their great weight (2½ tons each) is a serious obstacle to their conveyance to the camp with our limited transport. Each hut requires three stripped artillery waggons, with from eight to ten horses each, or 189 men. Much sickness continues to prevail.

I have, &c,
RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c.

It will be seen from this despatch that the warm clothing was beginning to afford some comfort to the shivering troops. His lordship was, however, misinformed as to the extent of the distribution; until more than a week after the day he wrote but little progress was made in this respect. The reader will observe that the statement of his lordship about the difficulty of obtaining fuel is at variance with the facts, that masses of timber were floating or frozen up in the harbour of Balaklava (according to the weather), and that vast piles of portable patent fuel were stowed carelessly away in Balaklava, under piles of dirt and rubbish, which had been allowed to accumulate above them. Difficulty indeed there was, but that difficulty was created by the neglect and want of capacity for organisation at headquarters.

His lordship manifested considerable activity at this juncture, and began to show something of the old alacrity and spirit which characterised him when on the staff of the Duke of Wellington in the Iberian peninsula, and in France. The *Moniteur de l'Armée* published a letter from the French camp, dated the 19th of January, exemplifying this, and giving a very correct account of the habits of the English troops:—"Lord Raglan came this morning to our head-quarters. He is a good rider, and does not appear to feel the want of the arm which he left at Waterloo. He looks well, has a good colour, with a beard a little grey. He came without any ceremony, wearing a cap covered with oilskin. The English are the most free and easy men we know. The following, which occur under our eyes, will appear, perhaps, scarcely credible. In the trenches they light a fire, make their tea, and then, sitting down on the back of the trench, quietly smoke. The sentinel now and then goes and looks over the parapet, and, if he sees nothing, he comes down again amongst his comrades. A shell falls, but no one takes any notice of it. If one of the party should be hit, two of his comrades raise him up and carry him away with the greatest coolness; the others do not stir. With us we are careful not to make any fire. We suffer more in the trenches from this circumstance, but we have less casualties, as the smoke of a fire forms a good mark for the enemy's batteries. The engineers continue to surround Sebastopol with

their trenches, which are now at ninety metres from the place. It is at this distance that the third parallel is placed. We are prepared to establish ourselves by main force in the Flagstaff Bastion as soon as the English artillery shall be ready to support ours in silencing the cross fire of the enemy."

Our allies were very free, yet on the whole very generous, in their critiques upon the ways of the English soldiery and officers; but the private letters both of officers and men among the French found much fault with the general constitution of the British army, and expressed very much admiration of its regimental system. That which seems most to have fixed itself upon the attention of our allies was the want of encouragement to the private soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and the promotion of commissioned officers by purchase, which seemed to them utterly irreconcilable with justice, sound sense, or military efficiency. The following document arriving in the camps pleased both our men and their allies:—

COPY FOR THE INFORMATION OF REGIMENTS
AND DEPOTS, ETC.

SIR,—Her majesty having been graciously pleased to extend her previous royal warrants for the special purpose of granting rewards for distinguished and meritorious service, and gallant conduct in the field, I am directed to transmit herewith a copy of a warrant which has been issued for that purpose, and to request that you will immediately make it known to the regiment under your command.

The sergeant to be selected for the annuity of £20 is to be the individual whom you may consider to be most deserving of such a reward, and which, when granted, is at once to be at his own disposal, though he may be still serving.

I am further directed to observe that, in selecting individuals for the gratuities to be awarded for distinguished service or gallant conduct in the field, you are not to be fettered in your selection by any consideration as to length of service—the general good conduct of the individual (and especially in the late operations) being alone the qualification to entitle him to this reward.

I have, &c.,

B. HAWES.

To Officers commanding Regiments, &c., under
Field-marshal Lord Raglan.

Mr. Russell relates an anecdote which shows how much the men required both assistance and encouragement:—"As a newly-arrived and freshly-mounted officer was riding along one of the narrow paths to the camp he called out to a man who was toiling along with a sack of biscuit on his shoulders, the last of a long file similarly engaged, 'Now, then, soldier, out of the way, if you please.' The man turned his head round, and, with an expression I never shall forget, exclaimed, 'Sajer, indeed! Enix, we're no sajers! we're only poor broken down commissariat mules!'"

At last the central depots for provisions were established, and some slight symptoms of decrease in the sickness which prevailed appeared; it continued, however, very heavy—the rate of

mortality through many dreary weeks being still frightful. The establishment of the provision depots near the camp had a very salutary effect.

About this date 800 Croats left Constantinople for the Crimea to work as labourers; they proved to be strong burly men, rude and barbarous in the extreme, slow and slovenly, but having a good deal of "wear and tear" in them. They, however, fell before the climate rather fast on their arrival. Attempts to engage the Tartars as labourers were not successful; they could not endure the cold. They would give up the labour assigned to them, and sit down, huddled together in the mud or snow, until the sleep of death crept over them, and left them in groups, as if slain by the bursting shell or close encounter. Generally they were removed in a state of torpidity or extreme exhaustion to the hospital tents, to die there.

On the 14th, the 39th regiment was landed, marched up to the head of the creek at Badaklava, and placed on ground previously occupied by the Royal Irish regiment of the line. They suffered severely, encamped beneath the cold sky of a Crimean January day. They had one hut among them all! there were many fragments, but the whole came up in a confused way, and such wretched progress was made in the arrangements for their shelter that many sickened and died.

The French lent waggons, which were as much required as freely and generously accorded. Shot and powder were in this way brought up to the lines. Our own artillery waggons were hosed by French mules (if the Hibernicism may be pardoned), and brought up by French commissariat drivers, laden with useful material of all sorts. The drifting snow impeded these auxiliary agencies; but our allies bravely worked on, and their mules seemed animated also by the *entente cordiale*, for they exerted themselves vigorously to pull up the heavy loads which our needy camp demanded. Several of the men of the French commissariat and waggon train fell, stricken with the prevailing sickness, or exhausted with fatigue, or paralysed with cold, while rendering us these invaluable services.

The weather now became truly formidable; snow fell in large quantities, and the cold tried the troops to the uttermost. The preparations for a renewed bombardment did not intermit, except as heavy falls of snow impeded the track for transport, and rendered all trench-work impossible. Fifty-three new 32-pound guns, thirteen of the largest mortars, and a number of siege-guns of the largest calibre, were by this date placed in the camp depot, ready for mounting; and all who were cognisant of these awful preparations for a cannonade

began to feel sanguine as to the result. Vast stores of ammunition for these engines of destruction were also brought up.

The arrival of the *Trent*, with a cargo of Spanish mules from Barcelona, was an important event, affording hope that we should be less dependent upon our allies for the means of transport.

The despatches of Lord Raglan were very meagre, and afforded to the British public no true conception of the state of things. Many important incidents in the progress of the siege are to be learned from the despatches of General Canrobert, concerning which Lord Raglan was silent; and some of these incidents nearly affected the honour of England and her army, and the relation of both to France and to the army of France before Sebastopol. The following were the despatches of the British commander at this juncture:—

Before Sebastopol, Jan. 16, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE,—I have the honour to lay before your grace the copy of a despatch* from Lieutenant-colonel Simmons, which he wrote by desire of Omar Pasha, expressing his highness's approbation of the services of Major Bent, of the Royal Engineers, and the detachment of sappers which I lent him in the summer; his regret at the loss of Lieutenant Burke, of the Royal Engineers, and his high sense of the conduct and exertions of Lieutenant Glyn, of the Royal Navy, and His Serene Highness Prince Ernest, of Saxe-Leiningen, and of the detachment of seamen of her majesty's fleet, employed in the construction of the bridge across the Danube, the success of which he attributes in a great measure to their well-planned dispositions. Colonel Simmons, your grace will perceive, has further been desired by Omar Pasha to say, that it would be very gratifying to him if her majesty should be graciously pleased to reward these officers for the able services they have rendered to the Ottoman army and the common cause. I think it right to mention that the Hon. Major Gage, of the Royal Horse Artillery, was the officer who conducted these detachments to Rustchuk from Varna. I appointed him to this duty, having previously sent him to examine the armament at the former place, and being satisfied that the employment of his services on the occasion would be advantageous. I beg your grace will be so good as to obtain her majesty's permission for Private Andrew Anderson, of the Royal Sappers and Miners, to accept and wear the decoration of the fourth class of the Order of Medjidie, in consideration of his gallantry.

I have, &c.,
RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c.

Before Sebastopol, Jan. 23, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE,—Nothing has occurred of importance in our front; but the enemy has occasionally opened a fire upon our left attack, and Mr. Spalding, a fine young man, an acting mate of her majesty's ship *London*, and in charge of the battery, was unfortunately killed by a round-shot the day before yesterday. The weather has become milder, but the country is still in a dreadful state from melted snow. The army is well supplied with warm clothing, and if the commissariat were adequately provided with transport, and the huts could be at once brought up, there would be no other cause of suffering than the severity of a Crimean winter, and the duties imposed of carrying on a siege in such a climate at this season of the year.

I have, &c.,
RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c.

* For the despatch referred to see p. 6.

From the despatches of General Canrobert, and the official communications made to him by his staff, we perceive that the most serious correspondence was going on through the whole of January between the French and English commanders, as to the unpreparedness of the latter to undertake any important operation against the enemy, and between the French chief and the war minister of his emperor, on the same subject:—"I do everything to assist our brave allies, who are far from being ready," writes General Canrobert, in a despatch dated in December; "while all our batteries await only the signal for opening their fire. This situation is painful, and even dangerous, if the enemy, becoming aware of it, should shower his projectiles upon our batteries, thus forced to be silent." He adds, subsequently:—"Our excavations towards the town having been necessarily suspended, I have directed the general of engineers to prolong them towards our left, in a course parallel to the defences of the enemy; and we have already reached the bottom of the Quarantine Bay, and occupy the lazaretto upon its southern shore."

The Baron de Bazancourt, the emperor's commissioner to his own army, makes this observation upon the correspondence then going on between the allied commanders in the Crimea:—"It was already to be foreseen, that in order to effect the completion of the plan of attack, the French, whose troops were the most numerous and their means of transport the most considerable, would be obliged to assume a part of the works comprised in the English lines. This was a serious matter; and the chief of the English army, far from declaring plainly his inability to complete the portion of the siege allotted to him, gave no reply which could lead to any new decision; but allowed these precious days thus to elapse."

Ultimately Lord Raglan was obliged to do what he incurred delay, and danger to the cause, and entailed suffering upon his army, by not doing earlier. In the meantime, the despatches of Canrobert to his master are—with perfect courtesy and kindness on his part—chapters of humiliation for England:—"The English army," writes the general-in-chief, "undergoes privations and sufferings, which, unhappily, it is not in my power to relieve. Its effective strength diminishes to such a degree, its draught and saddle horses are so enfeebled, their numbers are so reduced,—that it has great difficulty in transporting to its camp even the necessary supplies of food: it cannot therefore,—even with the addition of the assistance which we are so happy to give it,—arm and man its batteries as should be done, in order to act efficaciously in concert with our army." "In answer to my pressing requests,"

writes General Canrobert, in a private despatch dated the 9th of January, "Lord Raglan and the lieutenant-general commanding the English engineers have just addressed to me some very detailed documents, from which it appears necessary for our army to undertake a part of the siege which had been originally allotted to our allies. Strong arms and hearty goodwill will not be wanting on our part; and, from the time that the state of the roads will permit it, I shall occupy myself directly with this new attack, and shall neglect nothing to enable it to give assistance to our own, without which the latter are paralysed." In another despatch the general again wrote:—"The assault to be made by the French upon that part of the town situated in front of them, to the west of the southern harbour, cannot be crowned with success, but upon the condition of having previously silenced the fire of the enormous batteries, called the Arsenal and Redan, situated to the east of the southern harbour, in front of the English; and this part of the harbour is disposed in such a manner, that even admitting the success of our columns of assault and the capture of the town (properly so called), we could not retain it but upon the condition of the capture of this eastern part also. Everything requires me, in the interest of the common cause, to occupy myself directly (by the consent of Lord Raglan) with the English works. But until the return of the fine weather, this will be difficult, and even impossible."

Another of these despatches of the French general will show still more plainly the light in which he regarded the position of his allies. This feeling was well known to Lord Raglan, and was not unconnected with the ultimate resignation, by General Canrobert, of the command of the French army:—"My general plan is the taking of Sebastopol. This is not a result of calculation, it is a result of necessity. Since we have accumulated an immense *matériel* before the place; since we want means of transport, and the soil absolutely refuses to admit of long continued movement; while the existence of our army depends for supplies upon the presence of the fleet; while this army has to operate in the depth of winter; and its allies, from whom it cannot, and ought not to separate, are not in a condition to undertake anything;—the force of circumstances binds it down to the definite object in the way of which it meets this host of difficulties. This definite object is the stronghold of Sebastopol. We must capture it; for circumstances render it impossible for us to attack the relieving army, at the risk of abandoning the fleet, the harbour, and the means of subsistence."

During the whole month of January the combats of the French were incessant. The

correspondents of the English press from the Crimea represent the month as one of inaction. Colonel Hamley passes over lightly all the sorties and conflicts before the lines, which the French repelled and maintained; but the colonel spent most of the time on the shores of the Bosphorus, in the discharge of other duties, and trusted to hearsay—a very uncertain guide at that time; for, as one of the correspondents of the London daily papers observed, "the troops are worked so hard that no one has time to learn anything that transpires out of his own regiment, and sometimes not even out of his own company; the camp is a bad place in which to look for news." Mr. Woods, as well as Colonel Hamley, underrates the combats of January; he also having been absent from the Crimea, could not have personal knowledge of what occurred. Mr. Russell's account is more full; but his notices of the skirmishes and sorties between the French and Russians are imperfect, some of the most "stirring affairs" being omitted. The fighting between the "French rifles," as Mr. Russell calls them, and the Russians was incessant during the whole month. The men designated "rifles" by the English correspondents were from various corps of the most different constitutions, and were all volunteers; they received in the French army the name of "scouts." Their position was dangerous, being kept in front, yet the only difficulty the French chiefs had in obtaining them depended upon selection—so much more numerous were the volunteers than the men required. The following is the constitution of this corps (for such it may be termed) according to French documents:—

SERVICE OF VOLUNTEER SCOUTS.

The object of this organisation is:—

1st. To know all that passes in front of the intrenchments of the enemy; 2nd, to be warned of the sorties, and to harass them; 3rd, to take possession of any posts, parties of men, &c., who are outside of the place; 4th, to destroy all the hiding-places of the Russian marksmen, and the obstacles which might oppose themselves to the march of our columns; to attack the fougades and to spike the guns, &c.

For that purpose, the companies will be subdivided into thirty brigades of five men each; each officer of this company will have ten brigades, of which five are to be in reserve and five placed in advance on the most favourable points to observe the enemy's movements.

When there will be occasion to make a *coup de main* of small importance, but which will require promptitude, the officers must make use of the brigades which they will have in reserve, under their hands, without however disturbing the small posts already placed in front of the trenches.

For an operation of any importance, the engineer commanding the trenches will seek instructions.

The service of Scouts is divided into two very distinct parts, which it is necessary not to confound. The first, invariable; that of the small posts placed here and there in advance of the trenches which it is necessary always to maintain there. This is the service of every night which must have no interruption. The second, intended for *coup de main*, composed of several brigades, can act according to circumstances. The commander of engineers on duty may command its services.

The French commissioner, writing of the month of January, observes that "it was fertile in partial combats, and sudden but sanguinary and obstinate struggle." How irreconcilable such a statement with Mr. Woods' remarks—"At the commencement of the severe weather hostilities almost ceased. English and French soldiers showed themselves without hesitation outside the parallels and beyond the batteries, and were seldom molested while they searched about for little sticks with which to make a fire. The French, well fed, well housed, and with an army twice too numerous for the duties it had to perform, were enabled to continue their siege works, and to strengthen the parapets and replace the ordnance in the batteries they had already constructed. Little skirmishes took place each night between parties of their riflemen and the enemy's, but without any permanent advantage to either side."

According to M. Bazancourt, there was very great disadvantage to the French in these "sanguinary and obstinate combats," for the French troops were harassed, and their works impeded. Neither were they able to inflict that punishment upon the enemy which might compensate for the injury; for, although the Muscovite loss was numerically more severe, yet they so managed, by signal, that generally when the French pursued in force, they were exposed to showers of grape from the Russians. The latter lost very heavily in brave and intelligent officers in these skirmishes and sorties. Undoubtedly the French would have paid a more extensive penalty had it not been for their excellent arrangements. Colonel Raoult, major of the trenches, much distinguished himself in carrying out the organisation of defence there. All the French trenches converged from what was called the Clock Tower, which was night and day the centre of most active scenes. At that spot the battalions going on guard mustered each morning. There the soldiers and workmen received supplies and directions. When night arrived, the large beacon of this tower was lighted, and served as a guide to the files sent to the depot of the trenches, and to the litters which all passed by when removing the sick and wounded—and, alas! not unfrequently the dead—to the rear. From that spot a vigilant look out was always kept, lest in any part of the trenches a surprise was being attempted, when immediately the detection was followed by the alarm trumpet, and that was followed by rockets signalling the point of attack. These rocket signals were so organised as that misapprehension was next to impossible. *Stars* indicated a left attack, *squibs* a centre attack, and *serpents* directed attention to the right. Two of these rockets were fixed for the *garde à vous*; three for the *rappel*;

four for the *assemblée*. In an instant, upon sound of the trumpet, some of these pyrotechnic signals ensued; and these, according to the directions intimated, brought forth the picket battalion, followed by other battalions, according to the supposed extent of the danger. The *garde à vous* gave the alarm; the *rappel* declared a real attack; the *assemblée*, that the attack was serious.

The following is a copy of the French order of the "Service in the Trenches," as organised by Colonel Raoult. In January, 1855, this was the mode in which the trench service of our allies was conducted:—

SERVICE IN THE TRENCHES.

Every twenty-four hours, night and day, there is a picket battalion in its camp, taken from the corps the nearest to the Clock Tower (the quarters of the major of the trenches), and always ready to march at the first signal. The battalion sends, at from eight to nine o'clock in the evening, two companies to form the picket of the Clock Tower itself. (Up to the month of January there was only one battalion of reserve at the Clock Tower; in the month of January this battalion of reserve gave place to a picket battalion.) There is besides a battalion of reserve, placed on the left, in the rear of the batteries 1 and 2, forming an effective strength of 450 to 500 men.

Every day there are seven battalions on guard in the trenches, in addition to a battalion of Foot Chasseurs, employed as sharpshooters, and placed along the whole extent of the most advanced parallel, in order to maintain a fire of musketry. Besides which, a company of marksmen, of about 150 men, is generally scattered upon different points, favourable for their purpose. A post of 200 men is placed in the English ravine in order to unite our right attacks to the English left attacks.

Every day workmen are ordered,—in the divers corps,—for the work of the trenches, to the number of about 300, and are equally distributed upon different points, either to make new lateral trenches for intercommunication, or to construct the site of new batteries, or repair the parapets damaged by the enemy's fire. The whole number varies according to the urgency of the need, and, at a certain time, often exceeded 4000.

It may be easily imagined how necessary it was to employ a considerable number of workmen, if we reflect upon the results obtained, and the gigantic extent of our trenches from the first to the third parallels; that is to say from the Quarantine, which forms the extreme left, to the English battery, forming the extreme right.

Two companies of the volunteer battalion (composed of six companies) are on duty every night in the quality of scouts. They have no fixed post, and their position varies according to circumstances.

We do not pretend to give here any but the principal arrangements. The general of the trenches modified these arrangements according to the apprehension of attack upon such or such a point, or any unexpected necessity, but without altering their basis.

The guard of the trenches is divided into three commands: the right, the centre, and the left; devolving upon colonels or lieutenant-colonels.

Each day a general of the trenches is named from among the brigades of the siege corps.

The siege works on the side of the French include two attacks—the right and the left. This last extends very nearly from the Quarantine to the Central Bastion. The right attack extends from the Central Bastion to the Barrack Battery. In the interior of this line is the Flagstaff Battery.

In view of the extreme care taken for every thing, and the steady and generous supplies afforded to the French soldier, well might a high authority on the French staff boast—

"The soldier feels his courage and resolution redoubled, in seeing his chiefs at all hours partaking of his perils, inquiring after his wants, and saying to him, in passing, a few kind words, while the bullets whistle around him and the projectiles are bounding over the parapets."

As specimens of the French contests in the front during the bitter nights of January, the following will be sufficient to narrate—all would neither be practicable nor necessary:—

On the 7th a Russian detachment, or as the French reports rather pompously style it, "column" of more than 300 men dashed with sudden impetuosity against the French trenches. There was no warning given from the Clock Tower, no symptom of their approach was observed. A number of the assailants were within the trench works before their occupants could make any resistance. The Commandant Julien, at the head of three companies of the 46th regiment of the line, in a desperate hand to hand encounter, killed, captured, or expelled the intruders. Fresh assailants soon overwhelmed the brave 46th; their Voltigeur company was in reserve, and took the assailants in flank; a young sub-lieutenant, Kerdado, scarcely twenty-one years of age, was the first to fall upon this section of the enemy, and, sword in hand, he performed prodigies of bravery; he was followed by his little Voltigeurs so promptly and well, that the Russians retreated with precipitation, but not without giving to their gunners the usual signal, who opened a fire of grape upon the pursuing Voltigeurs, compelling them, with severe loss, to re-enter the trenches. Had this feat been performed by a young English ensign, he would be praised and taken no further notice of—as in the case of the gallant young Massey, who, some months later, displayed far more heroism at the storming of the Redan; but not so in the French service—heroism is sought for and fostered. Three days after the exploit of the young French subaltern, the commander-in-chief published an order of the day, thanking the regiment, and appended to it the following:—"In the name of the Emperor, I confer the Cross of the Legion of Honour upon Sub-lieutenant Kerdado, who, still very young, has shown on this occasion the self-possession and energy of an old soldier, in conducting his Voltigeurs."

On the night of the 11th and 12th a similar attack was defeated in a similar manner by the bravery and presence of mind of Lieutenant Esparbet, of the 80th regiment of the line (5th light); and he also, and his brave men, were noticed in the order of the day, and rewards conferred upon him, and Sub-lieutenant de la Jollet, his second in command—both were named Chevaliers of the Legion of Honour.

La Jollet had, on the 8th, rushed to the relief of the pickets on the extreme left of the English in the ravine, or, as the Russians call it, "valley." He had only forty men, but, anticipating the Russians, who were creeping up upon the English, he attacked them with the bayonet; the enemy were three to one, and a furious fight ensued, the French, *à l'Anglais*, using the butt-end of their muskets until the foe was precipitated to the bottom of the ravine, where some fell under the random fire of the French, and the rest skulked back to their lines as best they could.

On the night of the 14th and 15th a very sanguinary combat was maintained by the 74th French regiment of the line. Some noises were heard before midnight of the 14th, and the picket was on the alert; these noises continued to advance and recede until about two o'clock on the morning of the 15th, when the pickets of both armies were scarcely able to hold their muskets, so severe was the cold. The wind was north, and blew one of those cutting gales which in January sweep along from the Arctic regions over Southern Russia. The snow descended in thick broad flakes, as though it would soon wrap city and camp, invaders and invaded, in one white burial. At two o'clock the noises which had puzzled and disturbed the pickets ceased, and all was silent except the artillery, which reverberated among the glens and rocks in a manner to which the hour and the season lent a peculiar awe. The wind now rose higher and blew in gusts, sweeping with a shrill noise down from the plateau over the French trenches. The Russians, taking advantage of this new chance of approaching without being heard, crept along in a crouching posture, and came in front in an imposing column, as their dark figures appeared, looming and gigantic, amidst the whiteness which covered the earth, and partly covered, and for a time concealed, the column. Two more columns (as our French neighbours style large detachments) issued forth from the ravine where the extreme of the second French parallel rested. Fortunately the "scouts" who, bad as the weather was, were lying upon the ground in front and amidst the stunted brushwood of the ravine, discovered the approach of the enemy in time to raise the alarm. As the scouts fell back upon the trenches the enemy were close upon them, and ascended the parapets with them. The French were well on the watch, every one musket in hand and the trigger already touched, so that the first line of assailants fell under a fire murderously close, but the Russians pressed on, bayoneting the defenders of a small lateral trench which they entered in great force. Every Frenchman fell there, except three grenadiers and a corporal who

headed them, named Guillemin. The corporal and his three men fought with desperate tenacity against a host; but this side trench was so narrow that a few men could hold it against the attempts of many, and on this spot the gallant Guillemin made a miniature Thermopylæ. The strongest portion of the column threw itself into another branch of the trench, defended by Captain Castleman (an Irish officer in the French service), who fell pierced with thirteen bayonet wounds; having killed with his own hand a number of the Russians, he literally fell dead upon a pile of enemies sacrificed to his swordsmanship and valour. He was a great favourite with his company, who, made furious by his loss, precipitated themselves on the enemy led by Lieutenant Regaud, who cried, "Avenge our captain!" and setting the example, seconded by Commandant Roumé-Joux, in ten minutes cleared the trench. Poor Roumé-Joux fell mortally wounded by a bayonet thrust below the heart. The trench and the glacis were literally piled with dead. The French, as customary, pursued the foe too hotly; the Russians, as usual, left nothing to chance, but had a grand reserve of nearly 1200 men—a force with which they might have speedily recaptured the trench, and done innumerable mischief. This reserve opened a well-directed fire of musketry upon the pursuers, by which many fell, and which completely covered the retreat of the vanquished. Several brave officers fell on both sides. Of almost the first shots fired by the assaulting force two entered the heart of Captain Bouton, who had the honour of being the first officer to receive the enemy and the first to fall. One Russian officer showed great courage and capacity to handle his sword; he encountered Sub-lieutenant Brochet in a narrow trench, wounding him in the sword-arm and bringing him to his knee, but recovering himself speedily, Brochet gave point, and pierced his enemy's heart. The loss on both sides was heavy, especially in officers and non-commissioned officers. One Russian officer carried no weapon but a hammer, he had the other hand filled with nails; his object was to spike the cannon; he fell dead into the trench under the first fire from its defenders, and the next morning his hands were stiffened upon the hammer and nails he had carried with so eager a purpose. The loss inflicted upon our allies by the cannonade in the works and by these nightly sorties and combats was very heavy. In three months 23 officers were killed, 171 wounded, 3 were missing; 464 men were killed, 128 missing, and 3392 wounded. This was independent of contusions, accidents from tools, magazines, and falls, and exclusive of all cases of sickness. Thus, on an average, every night two or three officers and about 50 men were put *hors de combat*.

It was observed that the column which attacked the works on the 14th was attended by platoons of sailors and workmen, who carried boat-hooks and drag-hooks. These men literally harpooned many of the French soldiers, sometimes dragging away only their knapsacks or caps, sometimes lacerating them, and in several instances making them prisoners. Long ropes were ingeniously stretched across in certain directions, to trip up the French soldiers in pursuit. These means of offence had been employed before on a very limited scale, but on the night of the 14th and 15th they were extensively and effectually used. A curious correspondence arose out of this circumstance between Generals Canrobert and Osten-Sacken:—

"Permit me, Monsieur le Gouverneur, to direct your attention to a fact of which you are doubtless not aware. It has been reported to me that in the combats which have taken place before our trenches, officers and soldiers have been dragged down by means of ropes or hooked poles. Our soldiers have no other arms than the musket, the bayonet, and the sword; and without wishing to affirm that the employment of these means is contrary to the rules of war, I may be allowed to say, in the words of an old French expression, 'that those are certainly not the arms of courtesy.' It is for you to judge of this. "CANROBERT."

To this rather puerile effusion the Russian made the following artful rejoinder:—

"Our soldiers are recommended to make prisoners rather than to kill unnecessarily. As to the instruments which you mention, it is very possible that the labourers who usually accompany the sorties have employed their tools to defend themselves. Beyond this, the letters which I have forwarded to the staff of the French army, from your own officers who are now prisoners with us, must sufficiently attest the manner in which they are treated in their captivity. It is for *you*, in turn, to judge of this. "OSTEN SACKEN."

On the 19th and 20th the French parallels were attacked on two different points. One of these attacks was on the left of the most advanced trench of circumvallation, which descended to the Quarantine Bay; the other on that part of the left of the French works called the "T" from its shape. On both points the enemy, in spite of "scouts," reached the trenches, and on both points were at once driven out by the bayonet with considerable slaughter, pursued hotly by the French, who, as in other combats, fell fast under the fire of the Russian guns and of the musketry of their reserve infantry detachments. These hot pursuits, although causing sacrifices to the French,

compelled the enemy to send out strong reserves to support the assailing parties, and thus increased the harassing effect of service upon their own troops. On occasion of the attack of the 19th and 20th the snow was very heavy in the front; the Russians, who lay on the ground a long time watching for a favourable moment of attack, suffered intensely—some never rose again, the cold sleep of the benumbed crept over them, and they answered the bugle-call no more; many could not fire off their muskets, their hands were rendered incapable by the frost—hence the attack was one of bayonets. The loss of the Muscovites was sore. Although harder than either the French or the English, they did not bear the cold as well as might be expected from the severity of the climate in which they were born, and to which it was expected they would have been sufficiently inured. Notwithstanding the frigid weather, night after night the “Muscovs” crouched like leopards waiting for the spring. On one occasion they entered the French works so stealthily that not a shot was fired—the bayonet decided the contest against them after a short and decisive trial of battle at its point; the traverse of the trench assailed was choked with the slain. Generally the “volunteer scouts” deserted the couchant enemy before they came on to the assault, the eyes of these watchers became preternaturally capable of seeing objects in deep shadow. Their painful vigilance through long dark nights gave them an experience which the Russians found it difficult to elude.

On the 21st the troops in front observed many demonstrations of some unusual excitement in the city. The bells were rung, guns were fired—not this time at the allies, but on the northern heights; musketry repeatedly gave a *feu de joie*; blue lights were burned; and rockets startled the quiet and sullen air. A deserter coming in before daylight circulated a report that the czar had arrived, which, however, was soon found to have no foundation; another of the same class diffused the joyful intelligence that a treaty of peace was signed, and Sebastopol was to be delivered up to the allies—news too good to be so soon true. The excitement in the city remained unaccounted for. On the 22nd the correspondent of the *Daily News* gave the following sketch of affairs:—

Balaklava, January 22nd.

“On the evening of Friday, the 19th inst., we had another intimation that we are not in the midst of peace. For a newcomer might imagine we were at peace, if he landed at Balaklava in the dark, on one of the usual nights, when nothing is heard but the occasional ‘All’s well,’ or the challenge of a sentinel. On Friday evening the inhabitants

of Balaklava, and the early sleepers in the camps around, were alarmed by what appeared to be a heavy cannonade, and a near one too, followed by loud, frequent, and heavy volleys of musketry. The day had been mild and muddy beyond all imaginings; and so peculiar was the state of the air that even old soldiers, grown grey in the wars of India, believed that the firing was from our Marine Battery, which commands the plain close to Balaklava. Each shot was heard with a distinctness which made the most experienced campaigners swear that the piece must have gone off within a mile or two from the place where they stood. Windows rattled, and the motion of the air was plainly felt by all who, in hot haste, rushed to the stables and picketing grounds to saddle their nags and be off to the scene of the contest. But those who rode out in the darkest night I ever saw, or rather in which I could not see, got nothing but a few ugly tumbles and splashes for their pains,—for the firing, though seemingly so near, was far off, and the whole affair was in fact a sortie against the French lines, which some time ago were so frequent that one hardly thought of mentioning them. And the more so as, thanks to the vigilance and gallantry of our allies, the Russians have always to go back fewer in numbers and in worse condition than when they came out. In all the attacks upon the French lines, it always comes to the same result. The Russians, rather the worse for liquor, come out and meet with a very hot reception; and, not liking this, and thoroughly sobered down, they go back.

“Our allies, who have long felt that our numbers are too small for the extent of ground we occupy, and that our men are overworked, have for the last few days come to relieve us in part of our lines. The edge of Sebastopol plateau overlooking the plain has been occupied by them, and they now furnish the pickets which guard the rear of our Sebastopol front. In this manner they relieve a considerable number of our men, whom we were hitherto obliged to lay out in our rear. French troops are also preparing to occupy the Inkerman position on our extreme right, thus relieving the second division, who are to remove their camp to the rear of the third division. This relief too will do much to lighten the work of our troops in the trenches, for the second division, instead of guarding the extreme right, will now assist the third and fourth divisions in furnishing guards for the trenches. The whole of our army will benefit by the change, and the greatest satisfaction is felt at this very timely and friendly relief. The French, too, are again making strenuous efforts to improve the condition of the roads between Balaklava and the front. For the last two or

three days large fatigue parties have been at work, and the roads, which were out of all condition, are soon likely to be, if not good, at least tolerable. General Bosquet mustered our light division on the 19th inst. Both men and officers were highly elated with the interest the French general took in their condition and prospects.

"On the 20th a council of war was held at Lord Raglan's quarters, in consequence, it was said, of important despatches which had arrived from home. Nothing whatever is known of the subject of the despatches, or the result of the council of war, but, as usual, the camp is full of the wildest rumours. A change in the chief command of the army, an armistice, a resumption of active operations, and the donation of a year's pay to the troops, have been successively mentioned—and all, I make bold to say, with equal truth and reason. Dark whispers fly about the camp, that Sir Edmund Lyons is going to attempt something wonderful and unheard-of, and general officers have been known to say that marvels will come to light in the next few days. In short, curiosity is on the alert—invention is active, and begets the most monstrous reports. In the meantime the mild weather is reviving our troops, who suffered severely from the late frosts. Now that their work is lighter, if they could be but properly rationed, even the 'seedy' among them might possibly pull through. But what with the heaviness of the roads, and the want of sufficient transport, and the disorder in Balaklava harbour, provisions in camp are still scarce, nor is their quality of such a kind as to restore and strengthen the suffering. A ration of tea has however, with some corps, been substituted for that of coffee, which, in the green berry, is almost useless to the troops in front. Another supply of fresh vegetables too came lately in the *Albatross*, to be given away to such of the troops as could manage to send down for them. Great was the joy in the camp when the good news became known. There is really no reason why every vessel sent down to Constantinople should not bring up a supply of vegetables for our men. They want them, and as they can be got, they should have them.

"Among the goods lately unshipped from the harbour is an enormous wooden house, the property of Mr. Oppenheim, a merchant from Paris, who for a long time past has conferred a great boon on the army, and who, between October and December, cleared a sum of about £10,000 by keeping a store of necessities and luxuries in Balaklava. Mr. Oppenheim's wooden house is to be put up in Kadikoi, and the rumour goes that it will contain a store, an hotel, and a coffee and reading-room for officers. Mr. Oppenheim deserves public thanks for his well-timed enterprise.

"Some days ago an incident came to my notice which strongly illustrates the difficulty of gaining information in a camp where, as in ours, each corps is very hard worked, while there is but very little communication between the various branches of the service. Captain Mitchell, of the Grenadier Guards, and some brother officers, saw one day in the commencement of last week a Russian steamer leaving the harbour and standing out for the open sea. One of the allied ships—whether French or English Captain Mitchell could not tell—went in chase, and after some hard steaming came within range of the Russian. A cannonade ensued, the Russian all the while endeavouring to escape. The chase was watched with intense interest, but the result remained a mystery, for the two ships, steaming hard and exchanging shots, disappeared at last on the verge of the horizon. The officers who saw the affair made all inquiries as to the facts and the final result of the engagement, but to no purpose. I too have since endeavoured to learn the particulars of the matter, but I too could gain no positive information. The fact is, we have all got so accustomed to hard knocks, that a partial affair makes no impression and usually excites no curiosity whatever, and it is only by chancing to fall in with one of the men actually engaged that a vague account of particulars can be obtained. The fact is, our troops are precociously *blasé* as to the general incidents of the campaign, and the final result alone is what is steadily and hopefully looked for. Whether that final result be the capture of Sebastopol, or the very doubtful adhesion of the German powers to the alliance against Russia, it is sure to excite interest, and to be canvassed with all the warmth and the smashing phrases natural to people who do the roughest of work in the roughest of weathers. But all minor details are looked upon with profound indifference."

It will be seen from the above that the coffee was still distributed to the troops in the green berry. It was generally believed that Mr. Commissary Filder was responsible for this; but the Chelsea Commission (referred to in a previous page), in its decision or report published after the war terminated, exonerated Mr. Filder, and most justly; for on the evidence it was palpable that the pedantic meddling of certain officials at home connected with the Treasury caused that mischievous error. The secretary of one office, the clerk of another, *et id genus omne*, interfered perpetually in matters beyond their proper cognisance, while the strict business of their departments was neglected or inadequately performed.

Deserters from the enemy came in pretty numerously the remainder of January, and although these men were generally very igno-

rant, their information was occasionally available. Some of these men made their way from the army in the rear, scrambling along the cliffs from Baidar; they generally arrived cut, bruised, and exhausted, and had to be sent to hospital. They for the most part professed to be Poles, but nearly all Russian soldiers, whether deserters or prisoners, did so, under the impression that they would receive better treatment. The deserters informed our engineers and artillery that the part of Sebastopol built on the ground sloping to the sea had suffered but little from our projectiles, which did not reach the top of the hill whence the slope descended to the water. The houses and works upon the slope descending towards the allies was battered and burned in every direction. The ships found shelter close in, under the former slope, and the sailors and part of the troops found security in the fine strong houses and public edifices by which it was covered.

Mr. Russell for several days successively at this period made what he calls "reconnaissances of the siege," by ascending the heights most convenient for that purpose, and using an excellent glass: the following are extracts from his descriptions of what he saw:—

"The Flagstaff Fort was knocked to atoms long ago, and the large buildings around it are all in ruins; but, on looking towards the ridge behind it, from which the streets of the town descend rapidly towards Fort Nicholas, and which shelters that part of the place from our fire, I could see but little difference between its present appearance and that which it presented on the 26th of September last year. People were walking about the streets, and relief parties were coming up from the sea-side towards the front carrying baskets of provisions. Between the rear of the Flagstaff Battery and this ridge, the presence of earthworks, covered ways, and various defensive works could be detected in the openings along the lines of streets; and immediately behind the first Russian intrenchment is a formidable work armed with guns, which at two o'clock convinced us they had pretty good range and were very well laid, by thundering forth an astounding broadside in answer to some insulting fire from the French lines. The balls tore up the ground in piles of earth and dust, and dashed into the parapets, or, plunging over their top, went rearing across the works in the rear. In an instant there was a rattling fire of rifles from the French *enfants perdus* directed at the embrasures, and the Russians slackened their fire in a few minutes, and replied to the sharpshooters only. When the smoke cleared away, I could see the enemy and the French carrying away a few bodies on each side to the rear. The Russians not only

use 'cohorns' against the advanced French line, but they annoy our allies very considerably by a constant fire of grenades—a projectile which seems rather neglected in our service, though there are great authorities in favour of its use when the enemy has approached very closely.

"Our own batteries were silent. The Redan and Garden Batteries, our old enemies, were silent also. The houses near them, as well as those in front of the right attack and in the rear of the Malakoff, are in ruins. The part of the city beyond them seems untouched. To the rear of the Round Tower of Malakoff, which is still split up and rent from top to bottom, as it was the first day of our fire, there is a perfect miracle of engineering. It is impossible to speak too highly of the apparent solidity, workmanship, and finish of the lines of formidable earthworks, armed with about eighty heavy guns, which the Russians have thrown up to enfilade our attack and to defend this position, which is, indeed, the key of their works in front of us. One line of battery is neatly revetted with tin boxes, supposed to be empty powder-cases. This is mere wantonness and surplusage of abundant labour. Behind this work I could see about 2000 soldiers and workmen labouring with the greatest zeal at a new line of batteries, and labouring undisturbedly.

"There is a camp at the rear of Malakoff, and another camp is visible at the other side of the creek, close to the citadel, on the north side. Most of the men-of-war and steamers were lying with topgallantmasts and yards down, under the spot of land inside Fort Constantine. Our third parallel, which is within a few hundred yards of the enemy's advanced works, seems unoccupied, except by riflemen and sharpshooters, who keep up a constant fire in the place, but from my position over the British lines, I could not see so well into our approaches as I could look upon those of the French from the mounds in front of their picket-house. On the whole the suburbs are destroyed, though still susceptible of being used by the enemy to check our advance."

On the 22nd and 24th, General Canrobert directed despatches to Marshal Vaillant, informing him of the repulse given to the enemy's sortie on the 19th, and expressing his hope in the future. The first of these shows how particular the commander-in-chief of our ally was, to record every action of the brave:—

Head-quarters before Sebastopol, Jan. 22, 1855.

During the night of the 19th the enemy assailed our parallels on two different points. On the left the attack was received by the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of the Foreign Legion, vigorously commanded by the Chef de Bataillon Pellerin. The impetuosity of the attack, favoured by the bad weather, was broken by the energy displayed by the Grenadiers of the 1st company, the Voltigeurs, and the 5th company. Captain Arnoux and Rossez, Lieutenants Chate and Saussier, Sergeant Devalé,

Grenadiers Hogelucht and Seignmund, Voltigeur Rischard, Fusilier Deglin, conducted themselves very valiantly, and the colours of the 2nd regiment of the Foreign Legion figured with honour in this lively and brilliant combat. On the right was the 46th, which I found facing the enemy with its accustomed energy. At the call of its commander, Captain Thomas, the 2nd battalion of the 46th cast itself impetuously on the enemy, and repulsed them to a considerable distance. Captain Dufour, the Sub-lieutenant Comboud, the Voltigeurs Antexier, Commel, and Bruseau, the Fusiliers Monnés, Bünzet, and Boyer, gave the most honourable proof of their valour.

The general commanding-in-chief,
CANROBERT.

Before Sebastopol, Jan. 24.

The weather has become much milder and finer. The troops have supported the trying days we have just gone through with admirable courage. Their confidence was never shaken for one moment by the extreme severity of the temperature. We have reason to hope that the depth of winter in the Crimea is passed. We resume our work before the town with renewed activity.

CANROBERT.

The *Courier de Marseille* (which often contained important and early intelligence from the East), published a letter from a French officer in the Crimea, dated the 25th, who thus narrates events then passing:—"I have only one fact worth communicating to you: General Canrobert is going to lend our friends, the English, two of our divisions to strengthen them in their positions. It is an excellent measure, which will have the double effect of reinforcing our allies and augmenting the general security. Our regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique are already installed on the right of the English intrenchments. I have not yet heard where the regiments of infantry are to be stationed. On the morning of the 21st the weather was so mild that the bands of the Chasseurs played several French airs, which seemed greatly to please the English, who had been a long time deprived of that recreation. The sound of our instruments must have been heard in Sebastopol. The Russians were, no doubt, surprised to find us so merry, and replying to their infernal uproar by melodious symphonies. Our regiment has suffered little. We are lodged in subterranean excavations, from which we contrive to keep out the cold. We sleep little, but smoke a great deal. Our cookery fills with its vapours our uncivilised and primitive abode, and our physical appearance is quite in keeping with it. Our beards have grown freely, and acquired a development calculated to excite the envy of the oldest *sapeur*. As for our accoutrements, thanks to the distribution of furs, they have become as comfortable as possible. Cleanliness, however, is out of the question. One of our sergeants, who had received the military medal for his first exploits in the Crimea, has been named Chevalier of the Legion of Honour. This brave soldier has been wounded thirteen times, and is as ready as ever to meet the Cossacks. He will soon have that satisfaction, for we occupy

the most advanced position. The plan of our generals evidently tends to invest the city as completely as possible. It is indispensable, if we wish to obtain at last a result, to isolate the garrison, which has hitherto been able to renew its *personnel* and supplies of every description."

To the same source we are indebted for a letter written from the French camp a day later:—"General Canrobert visited yesterday the works thrown up by the navy along the coast. He appeared greatly satisfied with the promptitude and skill with which those works were constructed, and addressed to our men his warmest congratulations for the devotedness and activity they displayed there, and on every other point where their services were required. Our seamen were electrified by the soul-stirring language of the general-in-chief, and loudly cheered him. I must do Canrobert the justice to say that he takes every opportunity of rendering justice to our navy, whose immense services he duly appreciates. On that account, whenever he gives an order it is immediately executed by our sailors with inconceivable alacrity. I have just returned from a visit to the camps, where I felt quite overpowered by the inexpressible feeling of pride and emotion excited in me by the manner in which our soldiers supported their sufferings. At the first ray of the magnificent sun we have enjoyed during the last day, all seemed to have forgotten the past misery, and, like the swans shaking off the rain that has fallen on their feathers, our brave fellows shook off the cold, the rain, and the snow, and they now laugh, sing, and await with eagerness an opportunity to cross bayonets with the enemy. Everybody will tell you also that if Admiral Bruat watches day and night with the utmost solicitude over the welfare of his seamen, General Canrobert exercises the same vigilance, and attends with equal care to the health and comfort of his soldiers. Those two men wish to see everything with their own eyes, and nothing escapes them. Thus, General Canrobert issued an order on the 23rd, expelling from the coast of Kamiesch, and sending back to France, the sutlers who had the infamy to sell to our men adulterated and unwholesome beverages. Everybody landed that wise measure, which was instantly carried into effect."

The extreme concern for his troops, and the active personal superintendence of everything by the French general, is borne out by the testimony of the imperial agent in attendance upon his army, who describes General Canrobert and his lieutenants as often distributing apparel and various comforts with their own hands. He thus writes of the French commander-in-chief assembling his soldiers to bestow upon them the rewards and honours

decreed by the emperor for their good conduct and valour:—"It was a grand and noble solemnity. The troops in their dress of every day, stained and sullied, but not unworthily, by their life in the trenches, were assembled upon that soil, torn up by balls, amid the wrecks of battle, and close beside the ground where those whom death had struck down slept their last sleep. General Canrobert passed them in review, to the roar of cannon and of musketry; pausing frequently before the soldiers, speaking with them, and smiling upon them gratefully and kindly. The review ended, the officers formed in circle, and the general addressed them with that manly energy and sincere feeling which are proper to his character. He told them, that which was his belief and hope—that success would soon crown courage so noble and so persistent. He spoke of their absent country, of the justifiable pride of their return, of the grand spectacle presented by the army of the Crimea to the world; and, raising his voice that his words might reach the listening soldiers, he said—"I thank you all, in the name of France and of the emperor!"

It will be perceived that a great change took place in the weather towards the latter end of January, which was favourable to the troops in every way, and to the progress of the siege. The enemy also profited by the change; they had been greatly impeded by the frost, snow, and all-penetrating north winds, but as soon as the sun exercised some genial power, they set to work with their accustomed industry and promptitude upon the defence. It was a singular circumstance, that deserters to the enemy rather increased in number when the weather improved. On the 20th, one of these snowed singular hardihood. Leading a bāt-horse, he coolly went over to the Russian lines. He was perceived by the men in No. 4 battery, who fired several musket shots at him without effect. At last a gun was "laid on," and a ball bounding near him drove the earth about his person. He then altered his slow pace to a trot; another shot went equally near to him, but he escaped, amidst the cheers of the enemy who looked on. Among the grievances of the army, the irregularities of the post-office were very harassing. The passion of the men to hear from home was intense, but the disgraceful neglect of the letters by the post-office officials tried the officers and men, as well as their relations at home, to the quick. Remonstrances were useless; the most respectable persons were subjected to the coarsest insult, as is so commonly the case at home, by these post-office magnates. Mr. McCormick, Mr. Russell, Mr. Woods, and many other civilians then in the Crimea, bear a bitter testimony against the whole post-office

management. Remonstrances to the home authorities were as useless as to those on the spot.

The warm weather which characterised the close of January, not only revived the exertions of the besiegers and besieged, but infused activity also into the Russian field force, and the troops of Bosquet and Sir Colin Campbell, by whom they were so vigilantly watched and skilfully thwarted. The Russians brought vast quantities of stores into the beleaguered place. Lord Raglan thus described the efforts of the English:—

Before Sebastopol, Jan. 27, 1855.

MY LORD DUCKE,—I have the satisfaction to acquaint your grace that the weather continues fine. There are severe frosts at night; but the sun shines brightly through the day, and there is an absence of wind, which, whilst it continued, added considerably to the sufferings of the troops.

Every exertion is making by public transport, and individually, in getting huts up; but this is a most difficult operation, and the ground is still so rotten that it is a most arduous labour to pass along it.

The extremely confined space of Balaklava, and the vast accumulation of stores, has obliged me to erect huts at some distance outside the town for their reception.

I enclose the list of casualties to the 25th instant inclusive.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c., &c.

At the same date Admiral Lyons sent home a despatch, which, relating to the state of the army, is appropriate here:—

Agionemnon, off Sebastopol, Jan. 27, 1855.

SIR,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, that since my last general letter of the 23rd inst. (No. 60) the weather has been particularly fine. The health of the army has been much benefited by the change. A good deal of progress has been made in hitting the troops and distributing the clothing which has been so liberally sent out from England—so that the men express themselves as being comfortable.

2. The health of the Fleet and of the Naval Brigade is excellent. The men are well supplied with fresh meat and vegetables, and also with oranges sent from Malta by Rear-admiral Stewart.

3. The fire from the batteries of the allies has increased during the last week, and that of the enemy has not slackened. New guns have been mounted in our batteries during the last four days.

4. On the 24th instant I passed the day at Balaklava, to make inquiries and examine into matters connected with the duties of the port and the transport service. I met Lord Raglan there, by appointment, and we made some arrangements which will, I trust, have a beneficial effect.

I have, &c.,

E. C. LYONS,

Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

In the renewed toil of the trenches, the English, always labouring under some impediment which the least order or foresight might have prevented, were much hindered by want of tools, and by the inferior quality of those they possessed. In one company, Mr. Russell declares there were but three "pick heads," no handles; two spades, "one broken in two;" no bill-hooks; and that requisitions for these essential matters were returned scratched

out! No wonder that slow progress was made in the English trenches. It was a joyful announcement to the men at this time that the coffee would be served to them roasted—how much greater the boon had they received it in this condition during the cold weather, which for a time had passed away! The following curious story was related by Mr. Russell, as illustrating the tales current in the camp at this period:—"Some time ago an English officer, who is now a prisoner at Simpheropol, received letters from his friends in England, who were at that time ignorant of his fate. It is a rule to forward all letters to prisoners after they have been opened and read. One of those sent to the gentleman in question was from a young lady. She requested the officer to take Sebastopol as soon as possible, and to be sure and capture Prince Menschikoff in person, adding that she expected to receive a button off the prince's coat, as a proof of the young gentleman's prowess. When this letter was delivered to the officer, it was accompanied by another from the prince, enclosing a button, and stating that he had read the young lady's letter, and regretted he could not accede to her views as regarded the taking of Sebastopol or himself, but that he was happy to be enabled to meet her wishes on a third point, and that he begged to enclose a button from his coat, which he requested the gentleman to forward to the lady who was so anxious to possess it."

Although the British authorities discouraged the presence of the soldiers' wives, some of them had been of great service not only to their husbands, but to the corps with which their husbands were connected. In the Crimea they had a better opportunity of rendering useful aid, which was not afforded them when the troops were quartered at Scutari, and they were free from the temptations which abounded in the latter place. There were very few who went to the Crimea, but their good conduct justified the predictions which under such circumstances were written concerning them in a smart little book by the wife of a field-officer:—"Mrs. Wilding, wife of a corporal of the Royal Artillery, was one of three women who were allowed to land with her husband's corps at Old Fort, in the Crimea. She was present with her husband at the battle of the Alma, marched by his side across the country to Balaklava, and was present at the battle of Balaklava, where she took a horse from a Russian officer. During her residence in the camp she earned by washing an average amount of 20s. per diem, and saved a considerable sum. Her invariable companion during the war was an excellent revolver, which she much prizes. Corporal Wilding, with his brave wife, survived the chances of disease and battle, and after the war were in

garrison together in England." The lady of an officer of cavalry showed equal spirit and as devoted affection. Alas! how often is the devotion of woman, even by the gallant soldier, too little prized! Fidelity and affection under all circumstances, however adverse, are expected from her as a matter of course, and her virtues and her endurance receive not the honour and reverence they deserve. The virtues of man are paraded forth before the world, and the trumpet summons its attention to his glory; but woman, unnoticed, offers her little strength a willing sacrifice, and lives and dies, stricken at home by disconsolate loss, or falling in the brave attempt—beyond her powers—to share the loved one's bitterest fortunes. She too often suffers unknown, unnoticed, and almost forgot.

On the 28th there was another desperate sortie against the French works. The fighting in the trenches was long and furious, but too much like the encounters previously recorded to require a particular account. Among the dead was an officer of the Russian navy, splendidly attired, and his breast glittering with many orders. His body was sent back to the town. A deserter announced that the ringing of bells, and firing of rockets, which took place some nights before, was caused by the return of the grand dukes.

On the heights of the Tchernaya the increasing numbers of watchfires which lit up the whole heavens, proved that reinforcements had arrived to the enemy, and that fresh operations in the field might be expected if the weather allowed. No one who knew the climate of the Crimea hoped for a continuance of the mild season. "General February" was regarded by the czar as one of his most reliable auxiliaries; and he might have considered March as no enemy, if characterised by his usual roughness in that climate.

The last day of January was signalled by a desperate attempt to spike the French cannon. A body of men volunteered for this service to the amount of 400. They were all men of many combats, and their leader, Captain Birulleff, of the navy, was a bold and enterprising man. They came along a track which had been recently opened by their engineers close to the third French parallel. A body of "volunteer scouts" had taken possession of an ambuscade which the Russians had abandoned a few nights before, and this spot gave an excellent opportunity to its occupants for firing upon the attacking party by surprise. Accordingly, as the men of the assault came on, a prompt and galling fire met them when they least expected it; reinforced from their reserves, they pushed boldly on at the charge—the scouts fell back, the French trumpets brayed the alarm, the signal rockets shot up

in columns of fire, and fell in sparkling showers over the dark camp, and the tramp of men hurrying to the defence shook the earth. On came the Russians again and again, supported by fresh troops, the intrepid Biruleff at their head; he knew every inch of the ground, having repeatedly stolen up alone to reconnoitre the French lines. His influence over the men, many of whom were sailors, was great; he urged them on with eloquent words, and his own sword waved in the van. Before they reached the trenches the French, shoulder to shoulder, were drawn up to receive them, their muskets double-cartridged, and shot and slugs shaken in upon the double charge. The volley from their muskets was terrible; the enemy went down in crowds before it. The parapet, however, was low, and Biruleff, unharmed, cleared it sword in hand, bravely followed by his volunteers—those who could not get in hurled heavy pieces of rock upon the French, for they came on with unloaded muskets, trusting to the bayonet for their work. Biruleff and his immediate followers drove back the defenders. Captain Fourcade, of the French engineers, had by this time collected his workmen, and led them on, sword in hand, against the flank of the assailants; but at that moment his thigh was broken by a ball from his retreating friends. The major of the night attack, Sarlat, of the engineers, placed himself at the head of the workmen, and shouting "*Vive l'Empereur!*"—the cry which had so often rallied Frenchmen to victory—he hurled his party upon the enemy. He was fortunately sup-

ported by several companies of the first battalion of the 42nd, and the foe was swept from the trenches upon their reserves. Instead of pursuing them in the usual way, and being decimated by grape from the Russian batteries, they fell back upon the trenches firing, while two fieldpieces coming up, opened upon the Russian reserves, scattering death among the column, and changing the retreat into precipitate flight. A stray shot from the retreating foe entered the brain of the gallant Sarlat, who fell dead across the parapet of the trench he had so skilfully and bravely won. Many French officers fell that night, but none more regretted than Fourcade. He was a veteran in experience, although but thirty-five years of age. He had distinguished himself at the Polytechnic as a student, and in Africa as a warrior, especially under "*Chef de bataillon*" Pelissier, at the caves of Iléah. His thigh was amputated on the night he was wounded, but the blow was mortal.

Thus terminated the first month of 1855 before Sebastopol. The men of the British army rejoiced in returning sunshine, but they did not then know that sickle climate. February was at hand with its cold, snows, sudden penetrating thaws, and bleak winds sweeping over steppe and hill to the desolated plateau. Before the brave invading armies there yet remained an herculean task—labours, perils, privations, still awaited them; there was work for the most vigorous to conquer, and dangers for the bravest to dare. In the gallant armies of the allies were found the men for all that was to be endured or attempted.

CHAPTER LX.

HOME EVENTS IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE BEARING UPON THE WAR DURING THE EARLIER MONTHS OF 1855.—RUMOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND JEALOUSY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE IN REGARD TO THEM.—PUBLIC INDIGNATION IN ENGLAND AGAINST THE ABERDEEN MINISTRY.—ITS FALL.—INQUIRIES CONCERNING THE SUFFERING OF THE TROOPS IN THE CRIMEA.

"On all sides, from innumerable tongues,
A dismal, universal hiss, the sound
Of public scorn."

MILTON.

The year 1855 opened upon the Western nations gloomily. A deep distrust of their government had sunk into the heart of the English people, and the expressions of discontent were loud and universal. Rumours of negotiations about to be opened at Vienna filled the public mind; and it was suspected that the government was about to make peace at any price. Everything published concerning the peace and the designs of Russia was eagerly bought up by the multitude; and a desire to prosecute the war, despite the government, animated all ranks, except perhaps the very highest. Negotiations were indeed about to

open in Vienna, superior in gravity to any that had yet taken place in that capital of protocols and procrastination; and, notwithstanding ministerial revolutions at home, and treaties of warlike alliance all over Europe, speculations upon the prospects of peace were naturally rife in London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. There were formidable obstacles in the way of such a hope; but still peace was more likely in the existing conjuncture of affairs than it had been at any past period of diplomatic labour, since the haughty demands of Prince Menschikoff led the Turk to stroke his beard, and touch his scimitar, and call on Allah to

aid him in the conflict. Looking at other signs of the times, War seemed still likely to stand proudly in his chariot, and cast his bolt, and wing the arrow of his vengeance around the confines of that strange empire which had invoked the demon from his sleep of years. The czar had summoned the whole population to arms; he was erecting fortifications of great strength upon the Volga, along the shores of the Baltic, and in certain other positions judiciously selected for the obstruction of invading forces from Southern and Western Europe. Wherever an assailing army might push its way, either from the Austrian frontier, across the Turkish line of the Danube, or through Prussia, in case of a Western alliance with that kingdom, or even in spite of its resistance, every point was made as secure as engineering skill and vast military means could effect.

Whatever might be the naval preparations of England and France for the Baltic, Russia was also preparing for defence. From Tornea to Abo, around the Gulf of Finland to Revel, and to the Prussian frontier, fortifications bristled; new works were also erected to meet our gunboats in the shallow waters, where their effect, during the last naval expedition, would have been decisive, but where they would now be met by well adapted and formidable means of resistance.

Watchful of what might be expected from our Austrian alliance, Russia was well prepared to resist an invasion from that frontier, from Cracow to Galatz and Reni on the Danube; while from Galatz to the mouth of the Danube no Turkish force, such as the sultan was able to send, could penetrate to that line of attack; and as long as Odessa remained a *point d'appui* for the defence of her frontier upon the principalities, she could resist any aggression which it was possible for the allies to direct against her in that quarter. From Tornea, in the Gulf of Bothnia, to the entrance to the Sea of Azoff, her whole European frontier was in a condition of defence; and on the line of the Caucasus, and on her entire Asiatic frontier, she was protected by well-provisioned forts and garrisons, or by partizan tribes attached to her by pay or fanaticism. Add to all this that her people were as one man: not indeed the newly-conquered provinces, but all Russia proper, comprising a population of fifty millions of persons, was as one body, of which the czar was the vigorous and directing head. The delusion which the English press helped to propagate at the beginning of the war, and against which we have protested in this History, that the Russian people were dissatisfied with their condition, and would revolt, had been dispelled, and England at last knew that she had to fight against an empire of zealots, by whom the czar himself was

quickened to the energy he displayed. It had often been said "the finance of Russia will not hold out, it is not to be compared to that of the allies." This is true, but the resources of Russia had been husbanded during forty years, for such an occasion as at length offered for their employment. While England had been spending in works of peace and the extravagance of bad government—while Austria had been wasting herself in financial folly and provincial oppression—while France had been squandering her supplies upon revolutions, and a false commercial policy,—Russia had gathered all her disposable productions for this struggle. We had to contend against all her ordinary resources, such as they were, and forty years of her accumulated military strength, aided by that of every nation that she had within that time conquered and drained of its wealth. Mr. Cobden was not so far wrong in saying that we could "crumple up" Russia, in the sense in which he used the expression; but it was not the Russia of one year's growth, nor of two, with which we waged this contest—but one having the treasures of forty years stored up in the forms most available for her purpose. Even with all these advantages, it was plain to the thinking public she could be repelled, unless some great revolution took place in Europe, or a disagreement among the allies, or some other unaccountable disaster, should give her a chance, by a sudden swoop, to strike Eastern Europe down before help could be mustered by her disconcerted and temporarily defeated allies. Upon some such chance the emperor calculated; he thought not at that time of making the conquest of Europe, but he did think, ere the vast stores of so many laborious years were expended, to seize a great prey, give up some portion as the price of peace, and hold the rest until fresh stores of material and strength of men enabled him to play over again the same game. Russia cannot expend men so freely as other powers; she can call out a greater number for an emergency, but at a heavier ultimate expense. In the recent ukase for embodying a militia of the whole population, the emperor declared that he had no desire for bloodshed! Likely enough, unless it be as at Sinope, that of a defenceless fleet, or of some vanquished province overrun by his savage hordes. Such bloodshed as that of Alma, Inkerman, and Balaklava, and within Sebastopol itself, was not welcome to him: neither had he a desire to see his forces carried off captives by thousands, as at Bomarsund, or as they would be if Sebastopol should be invested or stormed. Spring too was approaching, when he must cover with troops his whole frontier, which, strong as it was, if attacked on all points by the covenanted nations, would

require such an amount of men, munitions, and provisions, as would speedily draw out the heart of Russian strength and resources.

Prussia had not wholly slipped through the fingers of the diplomatist. Brought more immediately into negotiations with the Western powers, she soon found it a different thing from playing fast and loose with Austria at rival German capitals. If Prussia failed to fulfil her newly-incurred obligations, she would incur the risk of having to stand to her arms on the Rhine—and she knew well that her whole Rhenish provinces would declare for France; while in the Baltic she must suffer, whether Riga, Revel, or Cronstadt stood or fell. It was the hope of sanguine politicians, that by engaging the alliance of Prussia and the minor German states, the allies would menace the Russian frontier, from Memel on the Baltic to the southern point of Silesia, and thus complete the circle of steel and fire by which vengeance would flash upon the robber of neighbouring nations, and the disturber of the world.

If recruits were slowly obtained at home, England could get men—Turks, Sardinians, and Swiss, recruited on the French and Sardinian frontiers, in spite of government prohibitions in Switzerland; and ultimately Portuguese, if she insisted upon them, and all, under her auspices, equal at least to Russian soldiers. France, Austria, and Prussia, could pour upon the Russian confines swarming legions, to which she might indeed offer a protracted resistance, because everywhere so well prepared; but the more protracted that resistance, the more prostrated must be her power in the inevitable result. Thus numbers reasoned in England, and the whole people felt that if this war should foster a public opinion that to invade the territories of other nations is not glory but plunder—that conquest has no prerogatives, and is a crime—that every nation has a right to arrange its own government, and the relations of its sects and citizens, as it pleases,—there would be a great achievement wrought for the cause of human liberty, of which national independence is an important element. The war was regarded throughout Great Britain as a war of freedom, even though despots waged it, or professed alliance with the powers actually in the contest. The French and Austrian despotic governments were, by a mysterious providential force, constrained to give expression to this great first principle of national relationship, and free nations hailed the sign. It was as plainly a war of national independence, founded in necessity and right, as if it were so written upon the clouds, and the awakened nations, looking up to heaven, beheld it and rejoiced. Hence every diplomatic movement was closely watched by

the people, and the mind of the nation was prepared to insist upon the firm policy pursued in reference to the Vienna conferences. These hopes and views, and the jealousy excited by the rumours of a disposition on the part of the Western governments to make peace too cheaply, entered with other elements into the force of public opinion, which was so soon to overwhelm the Aberdeen government.

Such was the state of feeling in England, when, on the 23rd of January, the parliament reassembled after the Christmas recess. Mr. Layard questioned the government as to the state of the peace negotiations, about which the mind of the nation was so much disturbed. Lord John Russell replied in the name of the cabinet, referring to the conduct of Austria in very peculiar terms, which were quoted in our last chapter on diplomacy. Mr. Roebuck gave notice of a motion for inquiry into the number and condition of the army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of government which were responsible for the efficiency of that army. This notice produced the gravest consequences; the house was thrown into a high state of excitement, and the treasury benches especially partook of it. It is marvellous that the government did not prepare itself for some such occurrence, but, as in the management of the war, so in the management of the house, they were always “too late”—so that the nickname of “the late ministry” was bestowed upon them while yet they held, with whatever firmness they at any time possessed, the reins of power.

On Monday evening, the 25th of January, it was announced in both houses that Lord John Russell had resigned his connection with the ministry. Both houses adjourned to the next evening, in order to learn the grounds upon which Lord John had come to that determination. Rumours on Thursday evening prevailed extensively that Lord John Russell had resigned his connection with the ministry, and on grounds of the most startling and alarming nature. The evening papers came out earlier than usual, acknowledging the fact, and commenting upon it according to the spirit of their respective party bias. Having the *entrée* of the houses, the author of this History hurried to the Palace at Westminster. Vast crowds surrounded it, and public excitement and expectation were at a very high pitch. It will no doubt interest the distant readers of this History to have a peep, as it were, into both houses, as far as a sketch of what the author saw and heard on those two eventful evenings can afford it. Even the mannerisms of the place, and its frequenters, must to those remote from the metropolis have a certain interest, especially as they are brought out by remarkable occasions. It will not therefore be con-

sidered beneath the dignity of history to glance at what we witnessed, and the mode in which the events passed off, while we record the grave issues of the scene. The first notability that caught our eye on the Monday evening was the Earl of Shaftesbury. He sauntered carelessly in front of the reporters' entrance, and seemed, from the expression of his countenance, to be more busied with some theological or moral reflection than with the fate of empires, the conduct of war, and the downfall of a ministry. Upon entering the House of Commons, we observed that Mr. Brotherton, the member for Salford, was by far the most fussey gentleman on the ministerial benches, although many members were fidgety and restless. Mr. Brotherton's rubicund face was whirling about like a globe on fire, as if all his wonted placidity was turned into inextinguishable excitement. He popped up and down between the Speaker and the secretary of the Treasury; now whispering to the one, and anon to the other, as though he were the connecting medium between them, and between the ministry and the house. Be it known to our readers, that no member of the House of Commons out of the ministry—we had almost said out of the cabinet—has more influence with the secretary of the Treasury than Mr. Brotherton; his influence with the Speaker too is very potent. With all his apparent plainness of mind and manners he is, like the rest of human nature, a little vain. To be seen dodging about the Speaker's chair, and in familiar converse with "Hayter," is his great ambition, and he is very useful to both; he assists in arranging private bills—proposes them in a sort of offhand wholesale way; and as his enunciation has a muffled sound, and he speaks in a somewhat broad Lancashire accent, few can hear what bill it is that is on the tapis, which is often a great convenience to the ministry, to the managers of private bills, and to *quiet* transactions in general. Mr. Brotherton is less indisposed to a little manœuvring than is generally thought. "Honest Joe," as his constituents very sincerely and very justly call him, has with an assumption of directness which is rather bluntly maintained, a cautious, knowing look, which is a true index to his inner man—for he is up to every little scrap of ministerial management which in a small way may be required. Not that the idea of government patronising him ever occurs to the honourable member—he patronises them. On the memorable evening of our visit he was in his glory; he fussed as if the business of the country was left to him, while all the rest of the house was engaged in the mere work of looking after the fragments of a broken cabinet. Mr. Hayter, the repository of so much substantial patronage, looked most rueful, especially when he rose and made

the announcement of Lord John's resignation. The muster of members was not as great as was expected; and not maintaining their usual strictness in the order of sitting, some droll juxtapositions took place. Amongst these was one in the gallery on the opposition side of the house. Mr. Wilson Patten, of Warrington, the respected conservative member for North Lancashire, got somehow seated alone by the side of "King Hudson," who looked as jolly and simple as if he had never learned anything but the old song,—

"I prythee begone dull care,
I prythee begone from me."

He was in this respect a great contrast to his neighbour, Mr. Patten. One would think that Wilson Patten had managed all the railway boards, and cooked all the railway accounts, and that such things lay heavy upon his conscience; while his neighbour appeared as if an angel—one of those chubby cherubs in the pictures, grown old—had been sent down to keep watch over him, lest he should commit suicide. The house was soon "up," and the M.P.'s crowded to the Lords, but the chancellor not having taken his place upon the woolsack, the lobby was a lounge for awhile, and many eager and animated discussions took place there, under the influence of the general excitement. Here a reporter and an M.P. were engaged in confidential converse, the senator evidently making a request which he did not want to be overheard. There Colonel Forrester is resisting the hopeless appeals of a clerical-looking gentleman for a pass to enter the House of Lords. In that corner, Captain Gossett assures somebody that Lord Charles Russell, the sergeant-at-arms, will do no such thing. Close by the passage leading to one of the rooms for the reporters, a notable member of the press is laying down matters in a vein of fun and wit, which greatly delights an old conservative member, and a judge of an insolvent debtors' court. He leaves that group, and tells an ex-editor of the *Leader* some news, which the other communicates to a barrister, and an honourable Mr.—we could not catch either names. There by the door leading to "the house" is Mr. Knox, the editor of the *Herald*, standing with the chief reporter of the *Times*, who has lately succeeded Mr. Dodd, the leader of the reporters' gallery, and the author of *Dodd's Peerage*, &c.; they converse very eagerly, and Mr. Knox, with a grave and gentlemanly air, disposes of the matter. That large man, evidently from Yorkshire, says its the "hoit of impudence for their member to do it," and the member's friend is using his best persuasives to appease the indignant Yorkshireman; the member's friend is an occupant himself of the liberal benches, and

has a fellow-feeling. Amongst all the excited throng who crowded the lobby, there was one very conspicuous for his uneasy bearing: he moved to and fro, as if eager to force an entrance to the lords. This unhappy wight was her majesty's solicitor-general. He afforded some amusement to a commoner, the most gentlemanly-looking man we observed amongst the wanderers of the lobby, Fitzstephen French, the member for Roscommon. While observing some young men from Westminster School, apparently bent upon mischief, and who were fluttering their caps and gowns about, the deputy sergeant-at-arms keeping an eye on them, our time came for entering the House of Lords. The chancellor took his place on the woolsack, and the House of Lords, with a dull gravity, began its business. The proceedings were important, from the announcement made and the explanation given by the Duke of Newcastle, the minister of war. His bearing was gentlemanly, and there was an air of conciliation about it which bespoke the thoroughbred gentleman. His voice was low, and his manner in speaking ungainly; an awkward and finicking gesture with the right hand below the table, to which he advanced when speaking, gave an idea of pettiness of thought, which his manner in other respects added. The Earls of Winchelsea and Fitzwilliam seemed very desirous to have something to say; no one seemed willing to listen, and at last, by Lord Derby's interposition, they were "quieted down." Lord Ellenborough manifested most activity on the opposition side of the house, and what he said was spoken with energy, self-confidence, and commanding manner. Lord Lansdowne was the most active person on the ministerial benches, he moved about with a grace and affability which account for his great popularity in the house. His mode of putting down the pertinacity of Lord Fitzwilliam and Lord Winchelsea was authoritative, yet courteous, and in a few epigrammatic sentences he disposed of them. The most interesting sight was, however, old Lord Lyndhurst, who rose to give notice of his already famous motion concerning the conduct of the war. The house was very full of spectators. When his lordship rose, the silence was profound, and his venerable years, the magnitude of the question which his notice involved, his vast reputation, and his dignified and judicial manner, inspired a respect which manifestly pervaded every part of the house. The crowd around the throne seemed especially solicitous to observe his lordship when he rose. We could not avoid contrasting the intellectual features of the old ex-chancellor with the contracted expression of the present occupant of the woolsack, and wondering what the latter would be like at the age of eighty-four, to

which Lord Lyndhurst has arrived. The important event of Lord John Russell's resignation, announced by the Duke of Newcastle, prevented the discussion of Lord Lyndhurst's motion, and caused the house to break up early.

On the next evening, Lord Aberdeen's statement in the peers was almost as eagerly looked for as Lord John Russell's statement in the commons. The earl declared that he hardly knew why the noble president of the council retired from his colleagues, on the eve of a discussion concerning events in connection with which he fully shared their responsibility. He read to the house a letter which he had received a few days before from the noble lord:—

Chesham Place, Jan. 23, 1855.

"MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,—Mr. Roebuck has given notice of a motion for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war. I do not see how this motion is to be resisted; but, as it involves a censure upon the war departments conducted by my colleagues, my only course is to tender my resignation. I have therefore to request that you will lay my humble resignation of the office which I have the honour to hold before the queen, with the expression of my gratitude for her majesty's kindness for many years past.

"I remain, my dear Lord Aberdeen,

"Yours very truly,

"J. RUSSELL."

The premier admitted that he had been aware that the noble president of the council had been dissatisfied with the conduct of the war; that he had expressed that dissatisfaction, and had made certain proposals concerning the occupation of the War-office, with which he (Lord Aberdeen) did not think it his duty to comply; that he, and the government of which he was the head, would resist Mr. Roebuck's motion, which he considered a vote of censure upon the ministry. The premier's address was cold, stiff, haughty, and quietly defiant, but did not appear to make the least impression upon the peers, who were, like the rest of the public, burning with impatience to know the terms and result of Lord John's explanation in the commons. We did not remain in the House of Peers, being more anxious, like their lordships, about what was announced to occur in the other house. A chance business gave us an opportunity of speaking with Lord William Russell, "the sergeant," and his deputy, Colonel Forrester. The former is a thorough gentleman, with many years upon his head, and a quiet but rather aristocratic manner. Colonel Forrester is the *beau idéal* of an off-hand, gentlemanly-agreeable man, and does his part of deputy to admiration. There was a great crowd assembled, so as to almost obstruct the Speaker's passage—the mace-bearer was certainly interrupted in

his course. The Speaker is a fine specimen of a man, and of the chairman of a popular assembly. His personal appearance, his urbane manner, and his apparent interest in all that goes on, are much to his advantage. After the preliminary business of Mr. Brotherton's attentions to the Speaker, and Mr. Hayter's routine, Lord John Russell made his famous statement. Perhaps no statement was ever made in parliament which excited so profound an interest. Every nook in the house was full, except a small portion of the ministerial gallery. The most conspicuous persons were two Parsee merchants, dressed in a showy oriental costume, who occupied the first bench in the Speaker's gallery, and who, the previous evening, were admitted behind the throne in the lords. Lord John was nearly inaudible at first, his elocution throughout the speech was inferior, and utterly unworthy of his great name as a speaker. He was listened to with evident partiality, and every period which told at all against the conduct of the war elicited cheers from the opposition, and the ministerial benches were far from silent on these occasions. After his lordship sat down, Lord Palmerston arose, on behalf of the government, amidst breathless expectations. His adroitness was extraordinary, and his intellectual superiority to his notable compeer obvious; but it was equally obvious that Lord John's moral influence was in the ascendant, and the latter part of Lord Palmerston's statement was heard with impatience, which extended to the galleries, although the order of the house was more than once invaded by expressions of approbation to the anti-ministerial remarks of Lord John. It became evident from Lord Palmerston's address, that his lordship would be installed in the War-office, if the motion of Mr. Roebuck failed. Mr. Roebuck did not speak with his usual energy, but although illness incapacitated him, his voice rang out as clear as a bell, and every tone told upon the whole house. His speech was devoid of that acrimony which pervades so generally the matter and the manner of the honourable member for Sheffield. The government seemed indisposed to reply; but loud calls from all sides for Sidney Herbert, provoked the right honourable secretary to one of his best elocutionary efforts. We were certainly most unfavourably impressed with his deportment all through the evening. There was a bitterness of expression in his countenance while Lord John was speaking, and a sneer and a whisper to his colleagues whenever Lord John made a good hit, which argued a consciousness of error, and a bad spirit with it. His speech was mere clap-trap, and was torn to shreds by Mr. Drummond, who, with that strange mixture of common sense, apt repartee, classical taste, sound argument, and irresistible fun, for which the

speeches of this gentleman have obtained celebrity, confused and ridiculed, by turns, all that Sidney Herbert, with so much self-sufficiency and red-tapist mannerism, advanced. But Mr. Layard utterly demolished the case of Mr. Herbert, and with a gravity of purpose, fulness of information, discreet distribution of subject, and logical cogency, which mark that gentleman as one of the most rising men in the commons, and in the country. The government were literally overwhelmed with his speech. The impressions of the oldest observers of parliamentary proceedings whom we met, declared that they had never witnessed such a moral defeat.

Of course, the first interest of the proceedings in the House of Commons turned upon the validity of Lord John Russell's explanations. A few passages from his speech are essential to a proper understanding of the gist of his lordship's conduct, and of the character of the impression produced upon the house and the country. "On Tuesday last," said the noble lord, "when I was present in this house, the honourable and learned gentleman, the member for Sheffield, gave notice of a motion for 'a select committee to inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the government whose duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army.' Sir, I of course thought that it would be probable some member might move for an inquiry of this kind. I had not, however, fully made up my mind what course to pursue." His lordship then entered into an examination and statement of the various kinds of procedure open under such circumstances to a person in his situation. He thought that either the government should be prepared with a bold and honest denial of the allegations concerning the sufferings of the army, or admitting them, they should be prepared to account for them in a way honourable to the administration. His lordship, being unable to do either of these things, had only the alternative of resigning his office of president of the council. He then used the following remarkable words:—"No one can deny the melancholy condition of our army before Sebastopol. The accounts which arrive from that quarter every week are not only painful, but horrible and heart-rending; and I am sure no one would oppose for a moment any measure that would be likely not only to cure, but to do anything to mitigate those evils. Sir, I must say that there is something, with all the official knowledge to which I have had access, that to me is inexplicable in the state of our army. If I had been told as a reason against the expedition to the Crimea last year that your troops would be seven miles from the sea, seven miles from a secure port—which at that time, when we had

in contemplation the expedition, we hardly hoped to possess—and that at that seven miles' distance they would be in want of food, of clothes, and of shelter, to such a degree that they would perish at the rate of from ninety to a hundred a day. I should have considered such a prediction as utterly preposterous, and such a picture of the expedition as entirely fanciful and absurd. We are all, however, free to confess the notoriety of that melancholy state of things. It was not, therefore, by denying the existence of the evils that I could hope to induce this house to reject the proposition of the honourable and learned gentleman; but I had further to reflect that I was in a position not to give a faint 'No' to the proposal, not to express in vague and equivocal language a wish that the motion should not be carried, or to use any evasion with respect to the letter of its terms with a view to defeat it."

The two sentences printed in italics in the foregoing extract produced an extraordinary sensation in the house. The elocution and delivery of his lordship were very inferior, but there was a tone of seriousness and deep emotion in his enunciation of the words "horrible and heart-rending" which thrilled through the house. But when with obvious sincerity, and in a manner expressive of his own surprise and indignation, he added the other sentence given in italic letters, a murmur of amazement and sympathy with the speaker floated around the benches, both ministerial and opposition. His lordship, after dwelling upon various matters more interesting to himself personally, and to the party concerns of the hour, than to history, gave the following account of the cabinet movements and discussions which, step by step, placed him at last in the position which he then occupied:—"When the office of secretary of state for war was separated from the office of secretary of state for the colonies, Lord Aberdeen thought it right to propose to the Duke of Newcastle to keep which of the two offices he should most desire. The Duke of Newcastle, with a commendable ambition, as I think, replied that having exerted himself in fitting out a very large expedition, he should, of course, like to remain at the head of the department which should have the direction of the orders for that expedition and the general management of the war. Lord Aberdeen consented to that arrangement, and I was a consenting party to the appointment. At the end of the session the various members of the government, especially those who are members of this house, dispersed, as they usually do; and it appears to me that that dispersion, after the excessive labours of this house, is necessary to the due performance of their duties; and no one, unless he has to discharge very urgent duties,

is to blame for resorting, for purposes of health, to distant parts of the country. I was not in any office which obliged me to take any part in the conduct of the war; but, during my absence, there was scarcely a day in which I did not both receive from and write a letter to my noble friend the secretary of state for foreign affairs with respect to the occurrences that were daily taking place."

Having digressed to explain various matters, personal to himself as to the way his time had been occupied while holding the presidency of the council, he resumed his narrative of cabinet transactions, from which it appeared that during the parliamentary recess the whole cabinet was dispersed throughout the country (excepting the minister of war), and that Lord John Russell urged their reassembling to consider the affairs of the campaign, the premier interposing some delay. On the 17th of October, however, a cabinet meeting was at last held. During October misgiving gradually crept over the mind of the noble lord as to the war management, and from the beginning of November he was apprehensive and uneasy. A correspondence ensued between the premier and the president as to whether the Duke of Newcastle was suitable for the office of secretary of war. In this correspondence the noble commoner urged upon the premier the appointment of a person with the rank of a privy councillor, upon whom should devolve the duty of proposing the war estimates, and who should be an authority when difficult questions should be put in the commons as to the expenditure, and as to the supplies of all the materials of war to the army in the field. The noble lord then addressed the house as follows, reading the correspondence which took place between him and the Earl of Aberdeen, which is essential to a clear comprehension by the reader of the state of the cabinet, and their utter incompetency to conduct the vast undertaking upon which they had entered, and to which they had committed the country:—

"In a letter addressed to the Earl of Aberdeen on the 17th of November, 1854, I said, 'From the other point of view the prospect is equally clear. We are in the midst of a great war. In order to carry on that war with efficiency, either the prime-minister must be constantly urging, hastening, completing the military preparations, or the minister of war must be strong enough to control other departments. Every objection of other ministers—the plea of foreign interests to be attended to, of naval preparations not yet complete, and a thousand others, justifiable in the separate heads of departments, must be forced to yield to the paramount necessity of carrying on the war with efficiency of each service, and completeness of means to the end in view. . . .

If, therefore, the first considerations here presented lead to the conclusion that the secretary of state for the war department must be in the House of Commons, the latter considerations point to the necessity of having in that office a man who, from experience of military details, from inherent vigour of mind, and from weight with the House of Commons, can be expected to guide the great operations of war with authority and success. There is only one person belonging to the government who combines these advantages—my conclusion is, that before parliament meets Lord Palmerston should be intrusted with the seals of the war department.' That is the opinion I gave, confidentially, to the Earl of Aberdeen. Before I read the Earl of Aberdeen's answer, I have to say that, the Earl of Aberdeen having requested some days to consider a matter of such importance, I wrote to him again on the 18th of November, stating that I concurred in that delay, adding—'I wish however that, before you decide, you would show my letter to the Duke of Newcastle. It was my intention in writing the letter to avoid throwing any blame upon him. Indeed, I think he deserves very great credit for the exertions he has made. But he has not had the authority requisite for so great a sphere, and has not been able to do all that might have been done with larger powers of control.' To my letter Lord Aberdeen replied—misstating my proposition I must say—that he could not acquiesce in the proposal I had made. On the 21st of November he writes thus:—'Your proposal being founded on the supposed impropriety of Herbert moving the estimates, and the consequent necessity of the secretary of state for war being in the House of Commons, renders the removal of the Duke of Newcastle from his present office unavoidable. But, although you would regard this as the inevitable result of an official arrangement, it is not to be supposed that it would be considered in this light by the public, or indeed by any impartial person. The dislocation of the government would be so great, and the reason assigned for it apparently so inadequate, that it could only be considered as a mode of substituting one man for another. Although you may be far from entertaining any such desire, the transaction could receive no other interpretation. In justice to the duke, I do not think that his colleagues, without very strong grounds, would wish to place him in such a position.' In the other parts of his letter, Lord Aberdeen stated that he did not think any man would undertake the duties which I proposed should be undertaken by one person—viz., those of secretary of state for the war department, and, at the same time, secretary at war. He considered it to be necessary that a privy councillor's office should be maintained, and that

that office should be held in connection with the finances of the army, independently of the secretary of state for the war department. He stated also—a consideration well deserving of attention—that it might be desirable that hereafter some military chief who was in the House of Lords should have the office, and therefore it could not be always held by a member of the House of Commons. I considered the various objections of Lord Aberdeen, and on the 28th of November I wrote as follows:—'I come, therefore, having cleared the ground of all these obstructions, to the real question—What are the requirements of the great war in which we are engaged? Setting aside all historical references, both on your part and mine, I think it is clear either that the prime-minister must be himself the active and moving spirit of the whole machine, or the minister of war must have delegated authority to control other departments. Neither is the case under the present arrangement.' I went on to give some instances of errors that had been committed owing to that want of power and control. I then said, 'The cabinet has, it is true, in its recent meetings, done much to repair omissions; but a cabinet is a cumbrous and unwieldy instrument for carrying on war. It can furnish suggestions, or make a decision upon a measure submitted to it, but it cannot administer. What you want, therefore, I repeat, is a minister of war of vigour and authority. As the welfare of the empire and the success of our present conflict are concerned, I have no scruple in saying so. Keep up, if you think right, as a temporary arrangement, a secretary at war. Make it clear that it is temporary—that is to say, only to last till more complete consolidation can take place; but let parliament and the country be assured that you have placed the conduct of the war in the hands of the fittest man who can be found for that duty.' In answer to this, I received a long letter from Lord Aberdeen, which I shall read to the house. It is dated November 30th, 1854, and is as follows:—'After all, I think your letter plainly reduces the question to the simple issue of a personal preference, and the substitution of one man for another. In answer to my suggestion that some consideration was due to the duke on the part of his colleagues, you say that you understood the administration was founded on the principle of doing what was best for the public service, without regard to the self-love or even the acquired position of individuals. Undoubtedly this was the case; and I fully agree in thinking that the Duke of Newcastle would be the last man to wish for any exception to this rule in his favour. But I must observe that at the formation of the government, no such office as the war department was contemplated; and when, subse-

quently, the Colonial-office was divided, no objection whatever was made to the choice of the war department by the duke; nor, as far as I am aware up to this moment, to his management of the office. Now, I think you will admit that, although another person might perhaps have been preferred on the first constitution of an office, it is a very different thing to displace a man who has discharged its duties ably and honourably, merely in the belief that another might be found still more efficient. Undoubtedly the public service must be the first object; but, in the absence of any proved defect, or alleged incapacity, I can see no sufficient reason for such a change, which, indeed, I think is forbidden by a sense of justice and good faith. . . . On the whole, then, believing that any change like that proposed would be of doubtful advantage to the public, feeling very strongly that it would be an act of unfairness and injustice towards a colleague, and thinking, also, that all such changes, unless absolutely necessary, only tend to weaken a government, I must repeat that I could not honestly recommend it to the queen.' Lord Aberdeen spoke to me afterwards on this subject, and asked me when I intended to bring the question before the cabinet; and I, certainly after a good deal of hesitation, told him that, as he had said he could not honestly recommend that change to the queen, and as I did not wish to do anything which might tend to disturb his government and remove him from office, I should not press the matter further. I should say that my hesitation arose very much in consequence of the opinion of other high authorities, with whom I for years—during the whole of my political life perhaps—have been living in the closest intimacy, who told me they thought the change unadvisable, and that it would weaken that which I meant to strengthen, and who advised that I should not press it. Now, when I stand here to justify my resignation, and when I am told, as I have been, that I have acted prematurely, I own that the doubt that presses on my mind is whether I ought not, at that time, to have brought the question of this change to an issue. But among those who urged me not to do so was the noble lord himself, the secretary of state for the home department, who at the time when the correspondence took place was absent, and to whom I afterwards read it. He urged me, considering the objection which had been made, not to press the matter any further. However, that being the case with respect to men, I have further to consider what was the case with respect to measures. I have reminded the house that last year a pledge was given that a new arrangement would be made of the military departments, with a view of rendering them more efficient.

I myself had the honour of serving on two commissions having for their object the consolidation and improvement of those departments. Various commissions reported from time to time, and it is now, I think, twenty-two years since the first of them was appointed. At the commencement of the war then, that which before had been expedient, became urgent and necessary, and that consideration to which I have referred was due to the interests of the public and to the expectations of this house. The only change I was able to announce in the session before Christmas was, that the commissariat was placed under the war minister. With respect to any further change, I heard no mention, until a proposal was made in the cabinet—I think on Saturday last. I reflected on that proposal, and then I went to my noble friend at the head of the government, and told him that, after considering the proposal, I thought it incomplete and inefficient. I gave him also a paper containing my own views on the subject. This, the house will observe, was very lately; but I had no reason to expect that my views would be adopted. I had therefore to consider, when I came to reflect upon the Tuesday evening, on the course to be taken on the following Thursday, whether I could fairly and honestly say, 'It is true that evils have arisen; it is true that the brave men who fought at the Alma, at Inkerman, and at Balaklava, are perishing many of them from neglect; it is true that the heart of the whole of England throbs with anxiety and sympathy on this subject; but I can tell you that such arrangements have been made—that a man of such vigour and efficiency has taken the conduct of the war department, with such a consolidation of offices as enable him to have the entire and instant control of the whole of the war-offices, so that any supply may be immediately furnished, and any abuse instantly remedied.' I felt I could not honestly make such a declaration. I could not say, after what I had written, that there was a person with such power and control, and of sufficient energy of mind and acquaintance with details, at the head of the war department. I could not say either that the arrangement which had been proposed on Saturday last—that the consolidation of the military departments had either been carried into effect, or was in prospect in such a way that I could pledge the faith of government to the efficiency of the arrangement. Well, feeling this—giving the matter the most painful attention—feeling also, as I have already said, that I could give no faint or faltering opposition to the proposition of the honourable and learned member for Sheffield, and that I must get up, if I opposed it at all, and stand in the way of that which many would think might afford a remedy for those sufferings and distresses which

had been complained of, or, at least, if it failed in doing that, might point out a way for their correction and remedy—feeling, too, that many members of this house would look for an assurance on my part which they would be ready to act upon, as they did so far honour me with their confidence, that efficient alterations had been made, I was conscious that I should be repaying that confidence with treachery if I gave an assurance of the kind, knowing it not to be true. Well, it appeared to me, no doubt, that the members of the government could hardly remain in office if such a committee as the one proposed were appointed; that it would not be, I will not say dignified, but consistent with the practical good working of our institutions, that there should be a minister sitting on that bench to govern the war, and that the military departments should be at the same time constantly overlooked and checked by a committee sitting upstairs; and that the minister for war should have not only to consider what he was to do in order to provide for the ordinary necessities of the war, and to attend to applications from day to day, but must also consider the evidence to be adduced with respect to his conduct five or six months ago. Such a state of things could not be consistent with the efficiency of our administrative system. I therefore felt that I could come only to one conclusion, and that, as I could not resist inquiry, by giving the only assurances which I thought sufficient to prevent it, my duty was not to remain any longer a member of the government. It would be competent for others, if they thought either that everything necessary had already been done, or would be done, consistently to oppose the motion for inquiry; but for my own part I felt that I could not do so, and I therefore wrote in very short terms, not quite accurately stating the terms of Mr. Roebuck's motion, a note to the following effect"—(the note read by Lord Aberdeen in the House of Lords was then read). His lordship then gave his opinions upon the prospects of the war in a very protracted speech. There was nothing original or remarkable in the views expressed by his lordship.

The general impression in the house was undoubtedly in favour of Lord John after his explanation, but out of doors it was otherwise. He was regarded by many as having slyly abandoned his colleagues, when he saw, from his knowledge of the state of feeling in the house as a parliamentary leader, that the government was doomed. By another large class his whole conduct was considered an intrigue for the premiership. It may be that there was truth in both surmises; there was certainly sufficient in Lord John's conduct to justify either. It cannot be denied, however, that

there was a sense of responsibility displayed by him as to the way in which the war was carried on, which did not appear in the conduct of any of his colleagues. Lord Aberdeen was plainly told by his correspondent, that either the war minister must have more power, energy, and experience, or the War-office have a different occupant; or Lord Aberdeen, as chief of the government, must bestir himself to control all the departments, and wield the nation's instrumentalities for conducting war with a prompt and firm hand. The easy-going earl would not propose measures in the cabinet or in the parliament, to enable the minister of war to exercise the authority demanded for him by Lord John, nor would he hand over the War-office to any more competent person than the Duke of Newcastle. He refused either arrangement, and any modification of either arrangement. He took no notice of Lord John's hints, suggestions, and even entreaties, that he would, as premier, look more after matters himself. Inert, haughty, indisposed to change—jealous of the whig section of the cabinet, and anxious to keep the whole management of the war in the hands of his own—the Peelite section of it—he did nothing; and it must be plain to every observant man that he was not likely to do anything but temporise, trim, and patch up in a way unworthy of a statesman, and still more unworthy of a statesman occupying the most responsible post known to the British constitution. What the duty of Lord John Russell was in October or November, is not so easily determined as his censors supposed. The ministry did not act like the ministry of a country engaged in a vast and complicated war. They resorted to their marine lodges and country seats; never meeting for cabinet councils, but literally abandoning the war to chance. Lord Aberdeen, it is true, did not go to a distance from London, but satisfied himself with a breezy residence at Blackheath, so that he might be at hand if wanted. His lordship might as well have been in the Black Hole of Calcutta, as at Blackheath, for any use he was—unless to sign a public document, or play the part of a courtier. The truth is, he was a victim, and made the country a victim, to the *doctrinaire* conceit of the little clique of Peelite red-tapists—the petty satellites of the late Sir Robert Peel, who believed that they only could govern the country; that they alone understood the principles of government; and that all governments looked to them as at once practical reformers and conservatives of order—the teachers of politics and political economy to all nations. The fact that these men held many enlightened views, and had acquired under Sir Robert the habit of dextrously copying and appropriating the practical views of more enlightened,

liberal, and experienced men, only exasperated their self-esteem, and made them more intolerably arrogant, without being proportionately useful. Lord Aberdeen was quite sure that his Peelite lieutenants were equal to the duties of their departments; that they were the chief men of their school; and that the school, narrow as its circle was, comprehended the political philosophers of the age—the English *juste milieu* party—the small but enlightened section of politicians, without whose support no government could conduct the business of the country. He felt quite sure that his friend, the Emperor Nicholas, and all other foreign potentates whatsoever—unless indeed the incorrigible King of Naples—kept their eye upon Lord Aberdeen's sage circle, to study their policy, and to profit by it as far as circumstances would admit; and that by-and-by, when he had gained a great battle or two, and his dignity would admit of the like, the czar would return to the intellectual loyalty which he owed to the great English party, to whom it was reserved to solve the problem of government, which required that as little as possible should be conceded to the public good, and yet as much as was necessary to keep the public quiet. This party had, undoubtedly, the merit of profiting under the guidance of their astute founder, and they had the folly of mistaking their attainments in this direction for great political capacity and high statesmanship.

While Lord Aberdeen thus leaned upon the broken reed of the philosophical and practical aptitude of his Peelite coadjutors, none of them was much occupied about what was going on except the Duke of Newcastle. He laboured with assiduity at the War-office, in work of which he had no experience; for which, although possessed of both industry and business capacity, he was not qualified—at a juncture when energies and endowments were required by a man in his position to which he had no pretension; and to all these difficulties was added a profound ignorance on his part of what was required, and what was amiss. The army in the Crimea was commanded so lazily, and such reserve was practised by all at head-quarters, that the minister of war was not duly informed of what took place; he could not, therefore, inform Lord Aberdeen of the destitution and misery of the army; and so little did either know about the condition of camp or hospital, that the latter confessed, in his examination before the Sebastopol Committee, that his first intimation of the awful condition of affairs was obtained through the newspapers!

Had Lord John resigned earlier he would have served his country better; but it is doubtful whether in doing so in October or Novem-

ber, he would have received such support from the country as would enable him to rectify the abuses of which he complained. At all events he had not faith in the country. He resorted naturally enough to old colleagues for advice. Lord Pannure agreed with him in the main, but advised him to do nothing rashly; Lord Palmerston advised him to do nothing at all. Whether that sagacious man suspected the purity of Lord John's motives, or looked forward with certainty to the defeat of the Aberdeen ministry, and foresaw his own advent to power, it is impossible to determine; but he had no ambition to direct Lord John's movements, and evidently thought the "pear was not ripe" for any action of his own. It is difficult to account for Lord Palmerston's acquiescence in the conduct of the Aberdeen cabinet, and the spirit of the Aberdeen policy,—except upon the ground, that as it was professedly a coalition cabinet, with the consent of parliament and the country, he confined himself to his own ministerial department, the Home-office, and knew still less of the condition of the army than either the president of the council, the minister of war, the secretary at war, or the premier. Many believed, and with good reason, that while Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston were dissatisfied with the management of the war, they saw no hope of remedying the mischief until events should strengthen their hands, and no prospect of receiving support in parliament, or in the country, by which they could form a government on their own views if the Aberdeen cabinet were overthrown. The well-known jealousy of the two whig magnates themselves formed a further obstacle to any simultaneous action.

It may be readily believed that Lord John Russell's speech prepared the way for Mr. Roebuck's motion. The "honourable and learned member" was in bad health, but although unable to express all he had intended to lay before the commons, he produced a decided impression upon the house. The fact of being unable to continue his speech from weakness rather added to the effect; so that Mr. Disraeli truly said that, were not the house aware of the learned member's illness, the abrupt termination of his address on such a plea, and at such a moment, might appear an ingenious and rhetorical artifice. In his argument, Mr. Roebuck charged the government the officials at home, and those in command abroad, with incapacity, conceit, and indifference to the welfare of the soldiery. When at last the house divided, the motion was supported by 305 members, and opposed by only 148, leaving a majority of 157—one of the largest, on a great public question involving the fate of a government, ever known in the House of Commons. The announcement was

received with exultant cheers from both sides of the house. The extinction of the ministry was decided; the house and the country accepted the vote, not merely as an expression of want of confidence politically, but as a vote of censure morally and politically. Yet in this grave emergency the house adjourned, in order to observe the anniversary of "King Charles the Martyr!" Incredible as this may appear, while the country was in the most imminent peril, such was the fact.

A cabinet council was called, and the ministry, of course, resolved to resign. The queen and court were in great suspense and excitement, being very unwilling to accept the resignation of the cabinet. They were the prince's friends and favourites, and her majesty therefore was disinclined to their forfeiture of office, and was prepared for any constitutional measure which would give back to them the possession of place and power. When the noble earl at the head of the government resigned the seals of office, he recommended her majesty to seek advice from the Earl of Derby. This noble earl had made some of the best speeches he had ever delivered, during the war debates, and his views on the subject showed superior information and superior judgment to what the ministry, in their aggregate capacity, possessed in connection with foreign politics and war. When the lords again assembled, the premier, in a poor and rapid speech, informed them of the occurrences recorded above. The Duke of Newcastle, in a speech of some vehemence, but more dignity, assailed Lord John Russell, and replied generally to "the break up speech" (as it was called) of the illustrious commoner. The duke had asked and obtained her majesty's permission to make known the state secrets of the occasion; but nothing very particular was elicited from his grace's explication, except a statement as to the cabinet plan for aiding the War-office. He, however, gave most satisfactory proof to the house and to the country that, to the uttermost extent of his capacity and power, he had laboured indefatigably in the performance of his duty. There appeared in the speech of the duke a desire to fix a personal quarrel upon Lord John, and to brand him with motives and inconsistencies, which the facts of the case did not warrant. The courtesy of Lord Russell was not preserved in the oration of Lord Newcastle. He endeavoured to convince the peers that the leader of the commons was actuated by ambition, by party spirit, by envy of the duke himself, and other probable feelings, but of which there was really no evidence. Lord John wanted, according to his grace's representations, to get rid of him, and therefore was so urgent upon the premier: *si possis suaviter; si non, quocunque modo.*

In the course of the duke's speech, however, the nature of the proposed measures for correcting the disorder of the departments was communicated to the house and the country, and when our readers attentively peruse it, they will, from all it makes known and all it implies, be at no loss to account for the confusion and impromptitude which pervaded all our martial procedure:—"Now, my lords, having thus disposed of the personal part of the question, the noble lord proceeded to discuss in his place in the house the question of measures, and he said that he should have been glad to have opposed the motion of the honourable member for Sheffield, but that he was unable to do so, because he could not say that 'measures had been taken, or that arrangements were in progress by which those evils would be remedied, and by which the administration of the war would be vigorously prosecuted.' I think that the fair and just inference from that statement is, that the noble lord had proposed to his colleagues measures and arrangements which we had been unwilling to adopt. My lords, I know of no measures ever proposed by the noble lord which were rejected; I know of no proposals which he made which were not accepted, unless it be one. That proposal he refers to himself, in this form. He said that, at a cabinet which was held on the Saturday before the day of Mr. Roebuck's notice and the noble lord's resignation, arrangements were made by which the mode in which the business of the war department had been for some time conducted, viz., by calling together the heads of the military departments to my office, and conducting the business somewhat in the form of a board, though not with the formalities and strict rules of a board, was to be altered. A discussion having taken place in the cabinet that day, and an agreement having been made that greater formality should be given to those boards, and that they should be regularly constituted, either by a minute or by an order in council, I stated that I differed from the noble lord as to the propriety of such boards. His opinion, however, prevailed, and it was agreed that, either by a minute or an order in council, those boards should be constituted, consisting of the secretary of state for war, the secretary at war, the commander-in-chief, and the master-general of the ordnance. The noble lord said that that question had been brought before the cabinet, and he implied that it had been decided upon adversely to his opinion. That was not exactly expressed by the noble lord, but it is, I think, the inference which is to be drawn. Instead of that, however, the proposal was brought forward by the noble lord himself, it was agreed to after a discussion, and I had every reason to believe that the noble lord was entirely a consenting

party; but in the course of that meeting he sent to my noble friend at the head of the government a proposal to which he also referred, but which he did not quote. As it is of some importance to my case, however, I fear that I must read it. It is as follows:—

ARMY DEPARTMENTS.

January 22nd, 1855.

“The committee of the House of Commons on army and navy expenditure recommended that the army departments should be simplified and consolidated. What is now proposed is, that there should be a board consisting of—1, secretary of state; 2, secretary at war; 3, master-general of ordnance; 4, commander-in-chief; 5, inspector-general of fortifications.

“It is contemplated that there shall exist at the same time a board of ordnance, consisting of—1, the master-general; 2, the store-keeper-general; 3, the surveyor-general; 4, the clerk of the ordnance; under whose directions the inspector-general of fortifications will remain. It seems obvious that these two boards, acting at one and the same time, instead of consolidation and simplification, would produce complication, disorder, and delay. There are but two modes by which unity of direction and rapidity of action can be procured. The one is to give the secretary of state the entire direction of all existing offices and boards connected with the army; the other is to make a board, with the secretary of state at the head, absorbing the board of ordnance, and controlling the whole civil management of our military force. The constitution of this board and its functions would be—

“1. The secretary of state, to preside over the board and be responsible to parliament.

“2. The secretary at war, to pay the army and control its finances.

“3. The master-general of the ordnance, to arm the army and the navy.

“4. The commander-in-chief, to command the army.

“5. The clerk, storekeeper, and surveyor of the ordnance, all in one, to lodge the army.

“6. The commissary-general, to clothe and feed the army.

“This is nearly the Duke of Richmond’s plan.

“‘J. RUSSELL.’

The noble lord said in his statement in the other house that he had no reason to think that his views would be adopted. Now, I can only say most positively, in answer to that statement from the noble lord, that I had no reason to think that his views would be rejected; because the first step which my noble friend took, upon receiving the communication which I have read, accompanied by an intimation from the noble lord that he should propose it on a subse-

quent day—on the evening of which he eventually resigned—was, after having shown it, I think, to the secretary at war, to send it to me for my opinion. My answer was, that there were but two proposals in that paper which differed from the arrangements in the cabinet of Saturday—one was to do away with the board of ordnance, in consequence of the constitution of a superior board; and the other was to add two more members to the board beyond those which were proposed in the cabinet. I said, as regarded the first proposal, that I thought that it was manifestly right. It was in accordance with my own views, and I added that, if it were proposed to constitute a superior board for the purpose of doing away with an inferior one, I would support it. With regard to the second proposal, for placing two additional members on the board, I said that I thought that it would be unadvisable. I did not think two of the officers named to be necessary; and, as regarded the sixth member—the commissary-general—no such officer existed, the office having been abolished some years ago. Therefore, so far as the main and principal portion of the noble lord’s proposition was concerned, it met with entire approval; and, as regarded the second portion, the only reason against its being carried into effect with respect to one of the appointments was, that it was impracticable. My lords, upon such an important question as the conduct of the war, differences of opinion on incidental matters of course took place; but if I were to point out that member of the cabinet from whom I have received the most general assent to my views, it would be the noble lord. I received the most kind and generous support from all my colleagues upon all occasions; but, as regards identity of views, I should be inclined to say that upon all questions which were raised there was a more complete identity between the noble lord and myself than between any other members of the cabinet.”

At the close of his speech the duke admitted that he had come to the conclusion, previous to the propositions of Mr. Roebuck, that the war department of the government had lost the public confidence; and he had in consequence resolved, whether the government succeeded in resisting an adverse vote, or were covered with censure and obloquy, to resign the post which, to the best of his ability, he had occupied. At length the parliamentary debates came to an end, and public interest was concentrated upon the efforts to form a ministry which various parties were exerting. The Earl of Derby was obliged to decline the task, as he had no hope of commanding a majority in the commons. Lord Derby, it was represented, and generally believed, advised her majesty to send for Lord Palmerston as the most likely person to secure the confidence of

the country. To this her majesty, it was alleged, was energetically opposed; her own will, and the influence of the prince, being alike adverse to his lordship's direction of public affairs. The reasons assigned for this were various, but they all resolved themselves into this, that the prince consort, and Lord Palmerston, when foreign minister, gave the queen the most opposite advice on foreign policy, and her majesty preferred that of the prince. On all questions connected with Austria, and the relations of that power—more especially to Italy—their opinions were said to be diverse. His royal highness sympathised with Austria, and the conservative foreign policy so well represented by Lord Aberdeen; while Lord Palmerston regarded that power with distrust, and considered its proceedings inimical to English influence in Europe, to Europe itself, and to constitutional liberty everywhere. In regard to Russia, also, it was said that the court disagreed with the noble viscount; the imperial Nicholas being personally regarded by the queen as “a marvellously proper man,” and being the object of cordial esteem and respect by the prince. It was supposed that the premier in perspective was desirous to abridge the czar's power, and was troubled by a sort of Russophobia; while the English court had no wish to see that of Russia humbled, nor to abridge substantially Russian influence. It was also represented that the court feared, in case of the advent of Lord Palmerston to power, that a rupture would take place between England and the German governments, who might be driven by the too energetic Englishman into hostilities on the side of Russia. All these apprehensions, if entertained, were groundless; that they existed to some extent there can be but little doubt—at all events, such was the universal impression of the public. The prince was said to be very favourable to a Derby administration, if only the noble earl would pledge himself to a free-trade policy—Sir Robert Peel, when in office, having thoroughly inoculated the mind of the prince with his free-trade opinions. Her majesty was said to have a decided preference for the old whig party—that of her august sire; of her uncle, the Duke of Sussex; and of her faithful friend and servant, Lord Melbourne, under whose auspicious ministry government affairs were conducted during the early years of her reign; and who safely guided the bark of her majesty's royal interests through troubled waters, steering clear of many a rock, and doubling many a dangerous cape. She, accordingly, of her own judgment it was alleged, sent for Lord Lansdowne, who most fitly represented the whig party on this occasion. After many exertions and much fruitless delay, during which the country was passing through a perilous crisis, Lord Lansdowne recommended

her majesty to send for Lord John Russell. It had been well known that Lord Lansdowne sympathised with him through the complications which brought the marquiss into her majesty's presence as an especial adviser. His opinion was that Lord John should have the opportunity of forming a ministry—an opinion which did not meet with public favour, but which was represented to be not unacceptable to the court, although the news of Lord John's recent conduct had not been well received there. His lordship soon found that none of his previous colleagues would co-operate with him, and he abandoned the attempt. Her majesty then sent for Lord Palmerston, who undertook the onerous task of constructing a ministry. Her majesty's mode of procedure was regarded as strictly constitutional in every step of these difficult proceedings; and, whatever her private feelings, she acted to the new premier with her well-known honour and good faith. Lord Palmerston, after some difficulty, succeeded in forming a government, which was in fact but a reconstruction of the old one. Lord Aberdeen, the Duke of Newcastle, and Lord John Russell, were left out; and the only accession was Lord Panmure, who was nominated secretary of war. This nobleman was better known to the country, and perhaps to other countries, as the Honourable Fox Maule. He had considerable experience in ministerial matters, and was regarded both by statesmen and by the public as an upright and amiable man. From 1846 to 1852 he served in the Russell administration as secretary at war: he afterwards served as president of the Board of Control, until the breaking up of the Russell ministry. On Tuesday, the 8th of February, the new ministry was completed, and was thus arranged:—

First Lord of the Treasury . . .	Viscount Palmerston.
Lord Chancellor	Lord Cranworth.
President of the Council . . .	Earl Granville.
Privy Seal	Duke of Argyle.
Foreign Secretary	Earl of Clarendon.
Home Secretary	Rt. Hon. S. Herbert.
Colonial Secretary	Sir George Grey.
Minister of War	Lord Panmure.
Chancellor of the Exchequer .	Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone.
First Lord of the Admiralty .	Sir James Graham.
Public Works	Sir W. Molesworth.
In the Cabinet, but without office	The Marquis of Lansdowne.
President of the Board of Control	Sir Charles Wood.

On the 16th of February the house met for the transaction of business, and very eager was the public ear for the words that should fall from the lips of the new premier. He informed the house, with brevity and clearness, of the circumstances which placed him in the situation he then held; and bespoke in energetic, self-reliant, and courteous terms, the confidence of the commons of England. The *suaviter in*

modo and the *fortiter in re* were blended in the tone, style, and substance of the premier's speech, as they are in his character. The house and the public were solicitous to hear his opinion and purpose concerning the appointment of Mr. Roebuck's committee, the resolution for the necessity of which had been so triumphantly carried. On this subject his lordship's words were—"I will not attempt to disguise that I feel the same objection to the appointment of the committee of which he has given notice as I expressed when the subject was first under discussion. My opinion is, that such a committee would, in its action, not be in accordance with the true and just principles of the constitution, and that it would not be, for the effectual accomplishment of its purpose, a sufficient instrument." He proposed to institute a strict government investigation, which, under the new *régime*, he concluded would satisfy the country. But it did not satisfy the country; and all the efforts of the premier and the cabinet to evade the searching and public scrutiny of a select committee of the people's representatives were in vain. The premier presented a long list of contemplated improvements in the management of warlike matters; among others, he announced the commission of Sir John McNeil and Colonel Tulloch, to which anticipatory reference has been made in this book. His lordship declared that this commission should have not only the right to inquire into the facts and causes of commissariat deficiencies, but also the power to apply remedies. Faith was hardly kept with the public in this particular, for no power to correct abuses was delegated, and the right to inquire was so vaguely given, that the commissioners were met with an undisguised disrespect by the quartermaster-general's department. It was also stated that Major-general Simpson would be sent out as chief of the staff, and in the exercise of the functions of that office relieve Lord Raglan of multiform inconveniences connected with detail,—from which the French general-in-chief was exempt, and from which every general-in-chief ought to be exempt. The selection of General Simpson was, however, so well understood to be a matter of favouritism on the part of Lord Panmure, that unpleasant impressions about the new administration of the War-office were prevalent. Lord Panmure was, however, incapable of selecting an incompetent man, notwithstanding any prepossession he might have for him; and there could be no doubt that General Simpson was a man of integrity and diligence, whatever his military parts might prove to be on so extensive a field of operations. Many of the improvements, indeed most of them, which redeemed the position and gave efficiency to the army in the Crimea, were

shadowed forth in the military programme of the new premier.

It was generally known that negotiations were about to be opened in Vienna, with a view to a treaty of peace. Lord Palmerston took the country, if not the house, by surprise in announcing that he had chosen Lord John Russell as the representative of England at the conference about to ensue. This gave public satisfaction, as Lord John Russell's recent conduct, and the general disclosure upon the breaking up of the cabinet, showed that his lordship had been a very warlike member of it. It was also well known that Lord John had chosen the appointment of president of the council when he was designated to that office, because he was dissatisfied with the Peelite section of the cabinet as to their war policy, or, at all events, as to their war practice; and that he might have an opportunity, such as no other office could give him, of expressing freely his opinion as to the conduct of the War-office. The speeches of Lord John were also the most martial delivered by any civilian of the day, reminding people of Sidney Smith's remark about him, that he would not hesitate to take the command of the channel fleet. It seemed also wise of Lord Palmerston to neutralise the opposition of (perhaps to enlist) the section of the liberal party that adhered to Lord John Russell *per fas et nefas*. On the whole, therefore, the appointment was well received. Yet men of intelligence had great misgivings. These arose from two causes: one was the inexperience of Lord John in diplomatic engagements; the other, the tendency which appeared so constantly in his conduct to "out-general" himself. That he meant well by his country was not doubted, but that he would take the most direct way to attain her objects was doubted; while any other, with a man not a professed diplomatist, was not likely to be successful in the presence of the faithless and well-practised agents of Russia and Austria. Thus in the more reflecting circles of English society the feeling about Lord John's appointment was chequered. The premier concluded his statements by the following appeal, which was received by the house, and by the people, with hope:—

"If we succeed in obtaining peace on terms which afford security for the future against the recurrence of those disturbances of the peace of Europe which have led to the war, we shall feel that our first desire in undertaking the government at this moment has been accomplished in a manner as satisfactory to the country as to ourselves. But if, on the other hand, we fail, then the country will feel that we have no alternative but to go on with the war; and I am convinced that the country will, with greater zeal than ever, give its support to a government which, having made

every possible attempt to obtain peace, and having failed in doing so, has been compelled to carry on the war for the purpose of obtaining those results which the sense and judgment of the country have approved. We shall, then, throw ourselves upon the generous support of parliament and the country, and that generous support I am confident we shall not ask in vain. I feel sure, that in such a state of things all minor differences, all mere party shades of distinction, will vanish; and that men of all sides will feel that they ought to support the government of this country, and show the world the noble and glorious spectacle that a free people and a constitutional government can exhibit a life, a spirit, and an energy, a power of endurance, and a vigour of action, that would be vainly sought for under despotic rule and arbitrary sway."

Never was political speculation so rife in reference to the probable fortunes of a new ministry. At no period, hitherto, was public confidence in the capacity of a minister more complete; it was never more the interest of the nation to be unanimous, and to strengthen the hands of a competent minister; mere party was never so much out of fashion, and never before altogether impracticable; and yet doubts, misgivings, and forebodings in reference to the intentions of the minister, the stability of the ministry, and the management of the public business, haunted the heart of the whole people. This was a state of things which ought to have been speedily removed by him, who, humanly speaking, alone could remove it—Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston. Let us analyse this state of mingled hesitancy, faith, and expectation. It is evident that the basis of it all was the view universally taken by men of the premier. His intellectual reputation was higher than his moral. No one can be surprised at that who is acquainted with his political history, or even watches him in a party debate. During the ministerial crisis, when he rose, on the part of the ministry, to reply to Lord John Russell, there was a *sang froid* about his air and demeanour very peculiar, and calculated to leave the impression that he "knew all about it;" that what had happened was only what he had expected; that it had all entered into his calculations, and he knew how to turn it to account. He seemed to regard Lord John as a very clever little thing, who was able to outwit himself; and who, without any sort of acknowledgment from the noble viscount, was to be allowed latitude enough to serve the expectant premier's purposes. The author of these pages listened earnestly to that debate, and he felt that there was a want of serious intent, and of earnest belief of things, in all Lord Palmerston's speech, which it appeared to him the house perceived. Yet this air of

nonchalance vanishes, and the smile of intelligent and light intrigue which plays upon his face disappears, as soon as he takes a part in any great question where the national dignity is to be maintained in the face of foreign insolence or assumption. Only let the subject of his speech be England and her greatness and her glory, and he rises to the dignity of a glowing patriotism and an epic eloquence. If he have to act as well as speak, his deeds are as prompt as his words are heroic, and the bolt of English power flies from his hand with true aim and terrible certainty. There is no escape from his piercing perception of the emergency, and of the thing that ought to be done; and no way of diplomatic wriggling from his masterly *exposé* of motive and object, however subtle the antagonist with whom he has to deal. No aristocratic sympathies, or diplomatic confraternity, will tempt him aside from a manly expression of opinion, and a direct English action, when the honour or interests of an English subject is invaded by a foreign state. This creates for him two classes of opponents at home—one is "the-peace-at-all-price" people. Messrs. Cobden and Bright, and all their immediate party, preach down and write down Lord Palmerston as a reckless politician, with a passion for war. They know that if an Englishman be injured in Austria, or Russia, or elsewhere, with the speed of lightning Lord Palmerston searches out the real character of the aggression, and demands redress; whereas this party is for handing over such matters to the ordinary tribunals of the country where they occur, or of hushing them up altogether, leaving the individual to suffer, or at most to receive a money settlement of the matter. In this the Peelites agree with the Brightites, and both are heart and soul opposed to the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston in matters of individual redress, as well as where great principles of national honour and character are at stake. The other party opposed to him in these respects is the high tory. The Derbyites will never inconvenience an absolute government to redress the wrongs of a British subject. The minister and consuls chosen from among that party are too pleasantly situated at absolute courts to disturb themselves, or allow the embroilment of their despotic friends—with whom in heart they sympathise—because of any Bible-distributing young lady, or liberty-loving Englishman—at all events if their rank be beneath that of the aristocracy. With Lord Palmerston it matters not who offers the insult, or how insignificant the object of it, or in what remote portion of British territory he was born—the affront must be atoned for, and the honour of England, in the humblest of her subjects, be maintained. With a party who regards no British subject unless he be rich or well

born, such a mode of dealing with incidents and questions of that order is "dangerous to the interests of peace," and of good fellowship with foreign tyrants. We have had of late years some striking exemplifications of the opposite mode of dealing in these matters—of Lord Palmerston on the one hand, and both the Pechile and Derbyite actions of the conservatives on the other. Contrast the energy, justice, and national spirit of Lord Palmerston, in the case of Don Pacifico, with the tameness, timidity, and indifference to national honour of Lord Aberdeen in his transactions with M. Guizot, the French foreign minister of Louis Philippe, in the case of Mr. Pritchard, our consul at Tahiti. Never, in a time of peace, did one nation offer such gross outrage to another as did France through her minister, M. Guizot, offer to England then; and never did a great nation piddle and cringe to avoid a resort to arms as did England, through her then minister for foreign affairs, Lord Aberdeen. Probably Lord Aberdeen was influenced by his religious peculiarities, in the indifference he then displayed to the wrongs of Mr. Pritchard, the murder of the Rev. Mr. M'Kean, and the invasion of a country whose only offence was loving England, and looking to her for religious instruction and protection. With Lord Palmerston it makes no difference what the religion of the wronged Englishman may be—an Irish Roman Catholic, a Hindoo Brahmin, or an English bishop, would be protected with the same spirit. Again, contrast the conduct of Lords Palmerston and Malmesbury in the case of the Austrian outrage which was perpetrated a few years ago in Florence. A young gentleman, named Mather, was cut down in the streets by the sabre of an Austrian officer, because he was an Englishman—as Englishmen were then presumed to favour Italian liberty. Mr. Mather was a youth of some seventeen years of age, perfectly inoffensive, and, as was afterwards admitted on all hands, offering in no way the slightest grounds for suspicion that he meddled with anything, or mixed with any persons, or did any action calculated to give umbrage to Austria. He was a peaceable English gentleman, and was an object of Austrian revenge and resentment, because his country sympathised with the nationalities which Austria oppressed. Mr. Mather's father, a gentleman known to the writer of these pages to be a man of unblemished honour, a patriot, a philanthropist, and a most public-spirited, useful English citizen, hastened to the scene of the outrage; and instead of finding Mr. Scarlett, our *chargé d'affaires*, protecting the English youth and affirming English honour, he was using his best exertions to induce young Mr. Mather to surrender his national rights and dignity, and attempting to suppress the

whole case by transferring it to the local tribunals, where he knew no redress would be obtained. So sure was he of effecting this, that he wrote so to Lord Malmesbury, and it was triumphantly announced by the ministry in parliament that the matter was taken out of their hands. This of course had to be contradicted. Mr. Mather demanded investigation and redress on behalf of his son, and that the honour of his country should be vindicated. Pecuniary compensation was offered him, which he refused to accept, unless an apology on the part of the Austrian government, and the punishment of the officer, were ensured. The result was that Lord Malmesbury, who was more the minister of Austria than of England in the transaction, informed parliament that an apology was made, but of what sort, or in what terms, no information was given. The Austrian officer who perpetrated the cowardly outrage was *never punished, but petted and supported by his government, while Mr. Mather was deserted by his*. The wounded youth, as he slowly recovered, might see any day the epauletted ruffian who aimed at his life, swaggering about Florence in the uniform he dishonoured, but to the more open dishonour of the English name. As this occurred just upon the change of government at home, Lord Palmerston had to do with a part of the transaction, and, as usual, his part was full of English spirit and honour. He expressed, in terms of unmistakeable censure, his views of the conduct of our Foreign-office and our minister in Tuscany. To use his own words, the "Messrs. Mather were the only persons who acted properly in the whole transaction." Finally, Mr. Mather was again offered a money compensation, which he indignantly spurned, on the principle that the outrage was upon his country, and unless her honour was vindicated, he could not accept a personal amend of any sort.

Such instances of the superiority of Lord Palmerston to the usual school of foreign ministers, secretaries, and *employées* accounted for the confidence entertained in his vigour and patriotism. But there was an impression that he would be hampered by his colleagues, and that he would trust too much to time-serving and exprieness in managing them himself. The employment of Mr. Frederick Peel was generally regarded as boding no good. Already Lord Palmerston's colleagues had overruled him in several matters; and there were not wanting symptoms of officialism, routine, and delay, calculated to damage his ministry at the very outset. The country was involved in a conflict of terrible omen, and surrounded by perils that met not the popular eye, and it required all the vigilance and activity on her part, possessed by her for, to come with safety and honour through the crisis. Unless Lord Palmer-

ston overruled the obstructions of his cabinet, and the pro-Russian feeling that lingered there, it was feared that his government must perish, or the nation stand upon the verge of ruin. His selection of Lord John Russell as her majesty's plenipotentiary at Vienna, was considered at all events adroit, as a piece of government and parliamentary address; but his resistance of Mr. Roebuck's motion, how-

ever necessary to the protection of the members of his cabinet, and therefore necessary to his position, weakened public confidence. The expectation of the people was that he would trust to them; and borne to power already by their moral force, they were able to bear him back again in case of his dismissal, if he would only be true to them, and surround himself by men entitled to the esteem of the country.

CHAPTER LXI.

HOME EVENTS CONTINUED.—CLASS JEALOUSIES IN ENGLAND.—SECESSION OF THE PEELITES FROM THE PALMERSTON CABINET.—AGITATION BY THE PEACE PARTY.—EFFORTS OF KOSSUTH, MAZZINI, AND THE FRIENDS OF THE NATIONALITIES TO INDUCE ENGLAND TO WIDEN THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR.—DISPATCH OF REINFORCEMENTS TO THE ARMIES OF THE ALLIES, ETC.

"There is a secret socialism—a good, a pure, a sacred thing—constantly at work for the advantage of the nation, and its recognition by all would speedily destroy that anti-social error which has split society into fragments, and diffused the pernicious fallacy that the degradation and bondage of one class are necessary to the elevation and freedom of another."—REV. WM. LEASK, D.D.

How happy would it be for our England, if the truth of this motto were felt and understood throughout her empire! It was not so during the opening months of the year 1855. The populace in England were intensely jealous of the influence of the aristocracy; and the latter were alarmed lest the mismanagement of the war should set the people upon depriving them of the almost exclusive possession of the government. There was a general disposition to merge *mere party* for the public good, but the spirit of class would make no concession.

Dr. Leask has eloquently written:—"Visible socialism—a confederacy which should destroy the natural and artificial classifications of society, would do violence to the very idea of the social compact. This kind of socialism has failed wherever it has been tried. It deserved to fail. It was chaotic. It sought the world's suffrage without maturing its claims. It bounded to conclusions without an examination of the intermediate steps. It pretended to renovate society before it had tested the influences at its disposal. It assumed the existence of a material in human nature which experience said was not forthcoming. It propounded doctrines which had no practical counterpart. It announced a path through the dark forests of habit, custom, and tradition, whilst it rejected the clearest light within the reach of man to guide it to the poetic paradise on the other side. With the light of Christianity, which is the best exponent of humanity as it is, we may go far to develop the true ideas of socialism, to see what are our individual and what are our social interests, to what extent they are identified and where they are separable, wherein they take shape and colouring from the great community, and

wherein they are sacred and individual. But without this light we shall fail, and go back to the age of feudalism, and confound might with right, and powerlessness with criminality. A community whose members look upon each other as equally privileged citizens of a free state, and hail each other as partakers of the same humanity, whilst the honestly reached successes of one imply no injury to the interests of another, comes up to the idea of this true theory. But a community demanding uniformity as one of its leading characteristics, in the position of men differently endowed and of diverse character, has to contend with difficulties, both mental and moral, which it cannot surmount."

The spirit commended and the policy proclaimed to be necessary in these words did not animate the governing septs in England; they regarded the war from a selfish, home point of view. Their constant apprehension was, how far its course would bring the middle and lower classes into power. On the other hand, every unhappy circumstance which occurred in the Crimea, or in connection with the expedition—if it were ever so plainly attributable to individual failing, or unforeseen and fortuitous antecedents—was set down to the influence of the aristocracy; although none could deny that they were prodigal alike of their blood and treasure for the nation's glory. It cannot be matter of surprise if, with such a pulse in the public heart, the motion of Mr. Roebuck, referred to in the last chapter, should affect all the exigencies of party, and fire all the jealousy of class. The efforts of the Palmerston government to stave off the inquiry, to humour the house, and cajole Mr. Roebuck, were all futile. He would have his committee appointed, and the house would appoint it; and Lord Palmer-

ston had no alternative to submission to the fiat of the commons, except resignation of office. He was too patriotic, and yet too ambitious, to adopt that alternative. He resolved to fall in with the appointment of a committee, but at the same time to modify its composition, so as to avert, if possible, any strong resolutions or report against his late and present colleagues. He was himself exempt from danger, as every one knew that Lord Aberdeen and his clique had studiously kept Lord Palmerston from all active connection, either with the management of foreign affairs or of the war.

On the 22nd February the House of Commons was astounded to learn from the premier that several of the leading members of his cabinet had resigned: these were Sir James Graham, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sidney Herbert, and it was announced that the next evening they would assign their reasons for that step. On the 23rd, accordingly, these gentlemen again appeared before the house as ex-ministers, offering explanations which were in substance, that they supposed their joining a new ministry cancelled the old responsibility; that the committee of inquiry was unconstitutional; it was the business of the queen and her government to look into abuses, and not the representatives of the people, who were thus impinging upon the rights of the crown and the dignity of office. Sir James Graham threw out something like a menace that the French emperor would be offended, as no inquiry could take place which would not bring out certain matters connected with our ally tending to disturb the *entente cordiale*. The speech of Sir James Graham was cunning and clear; that of Mr. Sidney Herbert, proud and impudent; that of Mr. Gladstone, casuistical and sophistical: all failed to produce any moral influence upon the house. The committee was appointed; the original list of Mr. Roebuck having been opposed by the premier as *ex parte*, another was substituted, which consisted of Mr. Roebuck, Mr. Drummond, Sir J. Pakington, Mr. Layard, Colonel Lindsay, Mr. Elliot, Lord Seymour, Sir G. C. Lewis, Mr. Ball, and Mr. Branstons.

Lord Palmerston obtained Sir Charles Wood in place of Sir G. Graham, a man of inferior talents, but superior moral weight. Sir G. Cornwall Lewis became chancellor of the exchequer, who was much inferior to Mr. Gladstone in that post, but a man of more direct mind and reliable opinions. Mr. Vernon Smith was made president of the Board of Control. Lord John Russell, who was (as before noticed) nominated to the Vienna conference, accepted the Colonial-office, which Sir George Grey occupied *ad interim*, as well as the Home-office, which he accepted *en permanence*. The secession of those men from the cabinet, to whom our military disasters were mainly attributable, was a

great moral gain to the administration, and in the long run saved the premiership of Lord Palmerston. We admit to a certain extent the administrative abilities of Sir James Graham, but he is not the man in this respect which he formerly was; he never merited all the eulogy for his administration of the navy which, by common consent, was conceded to him. He was showy and dextrous as an administrator, just as he is in debate and in the cabinet; but his agility, like that of the elephant, is counterbalanced by a certain heaviness. In the cabinet he is more crafty than wise, more to be consulted in reference to party tactics than the fate of nations. In parliament his oratory is flowery, and has a certain specious persuasiveness and trick of debate; while his manner is heavy, his features dull, and no lofty conception, or original thought, or sound and settled principle, ever characterises his displays. At the Admiralty his administration was in character with the man elsewhere. There was a want of principle in his promotions, a want of farsightedness in his plans, and of late there had been a want of general efficiency; while all that he did was very showy, and with a certain slight-of-hand air of performance which has gained him credit for other qualities—such as promptitude and readiness, to which he never had much claim. With all his cunning, he is a rash man—rash often in his parliamentary and party speeches, and in his administrative capacity. The imprudence of his celebrated Education Bill, which he brought forward with such ostentatious vigour, and which, after disturbing the whole country by its means, he was obliged ignominiously to withdraw, is an exemplification. In character with this was his speech at the dinner of the Reform Club, when Sir C. Napier was entertained previous to taking command of the Baltic fleet—a speech as imprudent as ever was delivered by any English statesman, excepting Sir James Graham himself. If the charges of Sir Charles Napier be true, the secession of Sir James Graham was no loss to the cabinet or the Admiralty. No man was more addicted to official insolence than Sir James (unless it be Mr. Herbert), and we believe him, therefore, quite capable of the affronts and the tyranny attributed to him by Sir C. Napier. No reliance can be placed on Sir James. During the discussion of the corn laws, the provost of a certain city, whom he professed greatly to respect, received from him a letter in which he admitted that the city and town population of Great Britain were in favour of the repeal, but that he did not recognise theirs as public opinion; when, however, he advocated the entire abolition of the corn duties, one of the arguments most insisted upon by him was, the opinion of the great

cities, as the public opinion of the nation. He has been in politics a radical, a whig, a conservative whig, radical whig, conservative, democrat, and an aristocrat, and spoke with the same invidious and rancorous personality as the advocate of each. In political economy he has been a free-trader and a protectionist, a whig fixed-duty man, a Peelite sliding-scale man, and an absolute repealer of all taxes on corn. Who can forget his descriptions of rural life and of rustic happiness in England, in his speeches for the "country party," at the very time he was plotting to undermine their monopoly? His monetary schemes comprehend all systems, and the destruction of every system. He was a champion of the Birmingham school, and of its antagonist the Manchester school; has defended bank monopoly, and thundered for free-banking; has denounced "rag-money," and pleaded for an extension of a paper system. In religion his versatility has been equally evident. He has favoured free-thinking, and denounced infidelity; has made speeches against the high church party, and yet drew up a plan for placing the system of education entirely in their hands; has spoken for the rights of dissent, and put a clause in his Education Bill empowering a policeman to enter the educational premises of dissenters, and report concerning them. Mr. Herbert was too pert an official, and his insolent defiance of the House of Commons was the most contemptuous and insulting thing ever offered to that house. Instead of bemoaning the fact which he alleged, that the mismanagement of the war was beyond investigation, he, in a tone of triumph, "defied" the house to find it out. The house was at last on its mettle, and its prestige must have followed that of the military and civil departments, if the aristocratic insolence of Mr. Herbert had failed to rouse its members to a sense of their dignity and power as the people's representatives.

Mr. Gladstone was, with all his peculiarities, a loss to the government. He was not a bad chancellor of the exchequer, and although he shared with Sir James Graham and Mr. Hayter the odium of the wretched transport mismanagement,—the Treasury, and the chancellor of the exchequer, partaking with the Admiralty in that matter,—yet he had attended with ability to that which was more properly his own department. Lord Palmerston had a high opinion of Mr. Gladstone's parts; yet after all he went on better without his aid, for the country no longer trusted him. The premier took a wise course. He knew well when forming his cabinet that it would be weeded for him by Mr. Roebuck's motion, and with his usual foresight and inimitable tact he acted accordingly. The country now had a more homogeneous ministry, while the seceders

could have no just excuse for opposing Lord Palmerston. To get rid of them on such terms was the very perfection of management, and the noble premier stood before the country in a more popular position, associated with more popular men.

These ministerial changes, and the discussions to which they led, greatly disturbed the country, and injured its moral influence abroad. The reputations of public men in England, both as to capacity and integrity, became much impaired, both at home, in our extensive colonies, and beyond the limits of the empire. It would have been strange if the two parties at home opposed to the war did not take advantage of the ministerial interregnum, and the difficulties of forming a cabinet, to press their views upon the public; possibly expecting that the political tinge of the new administration, before quite settled down in office, might be taken from their light, in which they exhibited the national interests and honour. The peace party made excessive exertions to show that the real evil was the war itself, that for its existence we were as a nation responsible, and that whatever ministry obtained peace for us ought to be supported.

The other party was that which was influenced by Kossuth, Mazzini, and their English copyists. They did not denounce a war with Russia, but rather the object for which it was waged. They would have the British people forget altogether the original cause of the quarrel, and to wage battle on new moral and political grounds, demanding the recognition of the nationalities from all invaders and despots, and allowing of no peace until Poland, Hungary, and Italy, were independent. The result of these agitations was that a confused notion began to creep among the lower orders of the people that the contest was without definite aim, and it was no uncommon thing to hear the inquiry among thinking men among the working classes, "Why have we gone to war?" It is necessary to notice the operation of these parties, because all through the conflict they tried to embarrass the government, and those by whom the government was morally and politically sustained; and their action will explain the course which debates frequently took in the House of Commons, which would otherwise be scarcely intelligible to persons abroad, or in the colonies.

It was not surprising that much ignorance and delusion existed, when the nonsense talked at public meetings by men who considered themselves politicians, and the absurdities propounded by a portion of the press—from which better sense might be expected—concerning the nationalities, were taken into account. Russia is a despotic state; her ruler is an autocrat, her people are slaves; and the orators and

writers we refer to, imagined that our object ought to have been to abridge the power of Russia because of her despotism. As well might we go to war with the Pope, because there is an absolute ecclesiastical authority represented by the triple crown; or with the United States, because one-seventh of her population are slaves. Every state has a right to regulate its own social and political condition, irrespective of other states; and it would be as much a violation of the true principles of freedom to force upon any country our ideas of government, as it would to enslave a portion of our own citizens. If the principle of interference with the internal regulations of independent states be allowed at all, the absolute governments of Europe have clearly as good a relative right to interfere for absolutism as the American Union for republicanism, or the United Kingdom for constitutionalism. Our only justification for interference is, where some other foreign state lends force to one of the parties in an intestine struggle, and we, justly jealous for the security of our own principles of government, prove by arms our friendship for the other contending party, or prevent the aid of the foreign element opposed to our own sympathies. It was the violation of this clear rule of national relations, on the part of both Russia and France towards Turkey, that constrained our interposition after every method conceivable was used to avoid the *dernier resort*. We had nothing to do with the forms of government or religious belief of our enemies or allies in the war. It was not the less just, because we were allied with despots, heretics, or infidels; nor the more just, because our opponent governed with a ruthless tyranny the nations ranged beneath his sway.

It has become popular of late years, through the exertions of the peace party, to sneer at the "balance of power," as if it were one of the exploded motives of national conflict, or only existed in the nood-up brains of jaded diplomats, and English foreign secretaries. But if war can be justified on any ground, the preservation of this balance must ever be the concern of nations, even with the alternative of the sword. England was herself the object of European jealousy, because of her great maritime ascendancy, until the loss of her American provinces reassured the mind of Europe—it being (erroneously) supposed that the independence of those provinces would be a deadly blow to England's empire of the seas. Rude a state as is Persia, and barbarous as are the petty despotisms of Central Asia, they have all acuity enough to see that the adjustment of this very balance, where England, through her Indian empire, or Russia, may kick the beam, must be the all-influencing consideration of their national existence. All the vacillations

of Persia, during this war and this century, were attributable to a cunning perception of this fact, and a feeble dealing with it, and not to the mere ignorance and fickleness which it is the fashion of many political writers to ascribe to her. Tippoo Saib perished in a daring attempt to turn the scale against England; and no thoughtful man can judge otherwise than in favour of the sagacity, as well as courage, of that politic and powerful prince. He foresaw that French influence in India must retire step by step before the superior resources of England, and it was more to his interest to aid the former—for if with his assistance the greater force were expelled, he might ultimately assail the weaker in turn with better prospect of success. In the conduct and spirit of the Americans, we see how even free nations will be jealous of one another, with a rational and well-founded jealousy, which identity of language, religion, and blood can only mollify, but not heal. The United States sympathised to some extent with Russia in the war, and necessarily. The union of the great naval powers for the regulation of political boundary on this continent, may be followed by a similar action on that. In the union of these two proud and potent powers, one of them an American as well as a European power, the United States must see danger, and she would strengthen herself as she best can against any prospect of dictation to herself from such a source. Were the United States forced into a war with allied England and France, her whole sea-board would be crushed by the thunder of their fleets, her coasts ravaged, her commerce destroyed, and her progress immensely retarded. That these so great rivals, as she deems them, should be occupied nearer home, secures her from such peril. Would that we could say that her government did not, in a selfish and ambitious policy, desire the occupation of France and England in a European war, that she might have freer scope for the designs of aggrandisement entertained by a certain portion of her citizens. If then our statesmen armed the country against the encroachments of a formidable military and naval nation, they did not plunge it into an unnecessary or even avoidable conflict—unless all the motives for war, even self-defence, be unchristian. Assuming, for argument's sake at least, that defensive war is defensible, then it was politic to conduct it rather on the banks of the Pruth than of the Thames, on the shores of the Crimea rather than in the Channel.

Allowing that here there was a general concurrence, yet the popular feeling as to the objects that should be held in view needed correction. It was urged that, being at war with Russia, we ought to settle every question, pre-

sent and possible, before we concede a peace—the liberation of Poland, the surrender of Finland to Sweden, the abrogation of the Russo-Danish treaty, the cession of the provinces lately torn from Persia, the surrender of all the conquests made within this century from Turkey, and that Russia should retire a thousand miles along her eastern boundaries, so that she might be placed far remote from the possible invasion at any time of our Eastern dominions. Such arguments were urged with the more vehemence as it was supposed that Lord John Russell ought to receive from the premier such directions in reference to the conference at Vienna as conform to this spirit. The Kossuth and Mazzini agitators forgot that although all these things might be admitted to be *desiderati* by our statesmen, they were not all possible. If all the powers in Europe should stand by, and leave us to fight it out with Russia, we could not hope to effect such changes unaided in this generation, if the like could ever be effected by us. If the other powers of Europe would not be mere spectators, it is plain that they would take a part in common with their own interest, and perhaps their sense of justice in some cases. Had we demanded the liberation of Poland, the demand would have been tantamount to a declaration of war against Austria and Prussia as well as Russia; and however well able to defeat all three, if our assailants, we could never accomplish such an object as their assailants. For defence, we can defy a world in arms; for attack our power is limited by the nature of our demand, and the vulnerability of that which is attacked. We could not have conquered Poland from the Northern powers—Louis Kossuth's own speeches furnished proof of this; and it was hardly considerate of that noble and generous man to look at such a question from a Hungarian point of view only or chiefly. We must, when so loudly called upon to act, regard it both from a British point of view, and in the comprehensiveness of European policy and universal principles. We cannot demand the cession of Finland, while the Swede hesitates to join us in the demand; we cannot proclaim the independence of a people who cannot maintain it; we cannot make Finland a province of our own empire without a war with Northern Europe. As to the Russo-Danish treaty of dynasty, the most we could in justice attempt would be the protection of the people of Denmark in repudiating it, or attack Russia whenever she essays to enter upon possession. As to the limitation of Russian power in the East, our demands should be measured by the will of the countries which Russia has plundered, by the disposition of the provinces she has appropriated, by the relative strength this war might reveal, and by the policy of our allies. We cannot do everything

everywhere just as we like, from Petropaulovski to St. Petersburg; and it is unfortunate that the egotism of our people expends so much time upon such injurious bravado.

What our statesmen and allies really aimed at in this war should have been understood by our people from the beginning. The independence of Turkey, as far as Russian protection and special treaties were concerned, and the free navigation of the Danube and the Euxine, comprised the objects of the contest on our part. Upon these the unanimity of allies and the good wishes of the governments and citizens of Europe were secured. If our demands had been widened before new events clearly and indisputably required, division among the allies would have resulted, and among such parties at home as, for the purpose of the war actually waged, were united. The great duty was to prosecute the enterprise upon which the nation had set out with singleness of eye, until Russia was made to feel that the day of her encroachments was over, and that upon any attempt to widen her bounds, confederated Europe would demand fresh guarantees, by contracting her territory, or permanently weakening her offensive position.

During the early part of March some further changes took place in the ministry. Sir Robert Peel, Bart., accepted the office of a lord of the Admiralty, rendered vacant by the Hon. W. Cooper, who was appointed to the under-secretaryship of the Home department. The other appointments were subsidiary to these. It was very gratifying to the country that Sir Robert Peel accepted office. He was regarded as the most able man of the Peel family, and not a mere copyist of his father, or an adherent to the Peelite faction, but an independent thinker and a liberal politician.

One of the last acts of the Aberdeen ministry was very popular, but it was not followed up zealously and generously by the new administration. It was the institution of a cross for military merit, and the badge was to be bestowed upon the judgment of the peers of the candidate for the honour.

Having described the political and parliamentary agitations, and the ministerial changes by which the mode of carrying on the war was undoubtedly affected, the reader's attention can be more easily directed to various other home matters influencing the war, or arising out of it. Very warm discussions arose in connection with the religious views of Miss Nightingale and "the sisters." While all admired their self-denial, there was a numerous class who supposed them to be influenced by what is called Puseyite opinions, in their zeal for spreading which in the army they were led to incur so many hardships, privations, and risks. A lady under these apprehensions having written

to Mrs. Herbert on the subject, received from her the following reply:—

"MADAM,—By this post I send you a *Christian Times* of Friday week last, by which you will see how cruel and unjust are the reports you mention about Miss Nightingale and her noble work. Since then we have sent forty-seven more nurses, of which I enclose you a list.

"It is melancholy to think that in Christian England no one can undertake anything without these most uncharitable and sectarian attacks; and, had you not told me so, I should scarcely have believed that a clergyman of the Established Church could have been the mouth-piece of slander.

"Miss Nightingale is a member of the Established Church of England, and what is called Low-Church. But ever since she went to Scutari her religious opinions and character have been assailed on all points; one person writes to upbraid us for having sent her, 'understanding she is a Unitarian,' another, 'that she is a Roman Catholic,' and so on. It is a cruel return to make towards one to whom all England owes so much.

"As to the charge of no Protestant nurses being sent, the subjoined list will convince you of its fallacy. We made no distinctions of creed; any one who was a good and skilful nurse, and understood the practice in surgical wards, was accepted—provided, of course, that we had their friends' consent, and that in other respects, as far as one could judge, they were of unexceptionable character.

"A large proportion of the wounded being Roman Catholics, we accepted the services of some of the Sisters of Charity from St. Stephen's Hospital, in Dublin.

"I have now told you all, and feel sure that you will do your utmost to set these facts plainly before those whose minds have been disquieted by these unfair and false accusations.

"I should have thought that the names of Mr. and Mrs. Bracebridge, who accompanied and are remaining with Miss Nightingale, would have been sufficient guarantees of the evangelical nature of the work. But it seems nothing can stop the stream of sectarian bitterness. I remain, madam, yours very faithful,

"ELIZABETH HERBERT."

"If you wish for any more numbers of the *Christian Times*, I can send them to you.

LIST.

"The first party of nurses sent out on the 23rd of October, were Miss Nightingale and 38, viz.:—

From St. John's House	6
From Miss Sellon's	8
Selected hospital nurses	14
Roman Catholic Sisters of Charity	10

—38

"The second party of nurses, sent out on the 2nd of December, were 47, viz.:—

From St. John's House	2
Protestant ladies	10
Selected hospital nurses (Protestant)	20
Roman Catholic Sisters of Charity	15

—47

"Total, 86 nurses; of whom 60 are Protestants, and 26 Roman Catholics."

Another of the discussions which engaged the public mind at home was one raised by the Earl of Dundonald. His lordship professed to be in possession of a secret, by which he could blow up the fortresses of Sebastopol, Cronstadt, or any other, however stupendous. It would be impossible to lay the merits of his lordship's proposals before the reader except in his own words. The following communication of the gallant and noble sailor was made to a London daily journal:—

March 10, 1855.

"SIR,—Peace being desirable not only for the interests of our country, but for those of the world at large, and the negotiations now pending being doubtless injuriously influenced by the obstinate resistance of Sebastopol (which could be overcome in a day), and by the impossibility of successfully attacking Cronstadt by naval means (which might be as speedily reduced), I have drawn up a petition to parliament, in order that secrecy and silence on my part, and deficiency of information on that of the public, may no longer prove injurious to the success of our arms. Hostilities having proceeded so far, assuredly it is more expedient to reduce a restless nation to a third or fourth-rate power than be ourselves reduced.

"Let not my motive be mistaken. I have no wish to command a fleet of 100-gun ships, or to attack first-rate fortresses by encased batteries or steam gun-boats; that which I desire is, first, secretly to demonstrate to competent persons the efficiency of my plans, and then to obtain authority (during eight or ten days of fine weather) to put them in execution.

"The means I contemplate are simple, cheap, and sure in execution. They would spare thousands of lives, millions of money, great havoc, and uncertainty of results. Their consequences might, and probably would, effect the emancipation of Poland and give freedom to the usurped territories of Sweden.

"Those who judge unfavourably of all aged naval commanders assuredly do not reflect that the useful employment of the energies of thousands and tens of thousands of men can best be developed and directed by a mind instructed by long observation, matured by reflection; an advantage to which physical power—that could clear its way by a broadsword—can bear no comparison. My unsupported opinion,

in regard to a naval enterprise in 1809, proved to be correct. Every other undertaking in the British service, in which I was concerned, and as commander-in-chief in Chili, Peru, Brazil, and Greece, was successful, and so would the protracted and unaccomplished undertaking, so injurious to the result of negotiation, have succeeded, had I possessed sufficient influence to be patiently listened to.

"I am, sir,

"Your obliged and obedient servant,

"DUNDONALD."

[Presented March 9, 1855.]

TO THE HON. THE COMMONS IN PARLIAMENT
ASSEMBLED.

The Petition of Thomas Earl of Dundonald, Admiral of the White,

HUMBLY sheweth,—That in the year 1811 your petitioner discovered, and after deliberate consideration had the honour, in the year 1812, to disclose to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent a simple, yet irresistible means, whereby ordinary implements in war might be dispensed with, and speedy and successful results ensured.

That his royal highness was pleased to appoint a commission to investigate the subject, consisting of the most competent persons of that period, whose report was so favourable that his royal highness ordered the attendance of your petitioner, and commanded secrecy, which had been imposed on Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth, and on General and Colonel Congreve, his Royal Highness the Duke of York being president of the commission.

That with this injunction your petitioner faithfully complied, although he could have put his plans in execution in foreign service to his own great personal advantage. That after your petitioner's return from abroad, and when an apprehension of war had again arisen at home, your petitioner presented his plans to his majesty King William (who had honoured your petitioner in early life with favour), and whose professional knowledge enabled him to judge of their applicability.

That his majesty, satisfied therewith, was pleased, in the most flattering manner, to manifest the high estimation in which he held the loyalty and disinterested conduct of your petitioner.

That on a subsequent threat of war since the accession of her present majesty, the question of the merits of your petitioner's plan was on a similar occasion submitted to the most honourable the cabinet council, wherein ingenious and expanded minds, impressed with sentiments similar to those which actuated his late majesty, recommended and obtained a gracious manifestation of royal justice.

That in February and in July, last year, your petitioner again offered his said plans, and sanctioned their reference to a secret commission of naval officers, in order that a professional report might be made as to their practicability and efficiency, which report, however, was confined to an opinion as to their expediency, perhaps originating in an erroneous impression as to the endurance of iron-bound floating batteries, all of which your petitioner will engage to subdue, even were they added to the defences of Cronstadt.

That your petitioner, foreseeing the impracticability of capturing numerous and powerful fortifications by the means now in preparation, again most respectfully offers his plans and his services to accomplish these objects, reserving the encased batteries and steam gun-boats entire, and ready for the brief and easy task of destroying the hostile fleet.

That your petitioner begs that, should these premises and the prayer hereunto annexed seem to your honourable house exaggerated or unreasonable, you will be pleased to take into your consideration that, had electric communication and photographic delineation been privately known and publicly announced, these incontestable realities would have been received as an insult to the understanding.

Therefore your petitioner humbly prays, that your

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honourable house will be pleased, by a searching inquiry, to ascertain whether the aforesaid secret plans are capable, speedily, certainly, and cheaply to surmount obstacles which our gallant, persevering, and costly armies and fleets have failed to accomplish.

DUNDONALD.

Another discussion, which produced considerable excitement, was as to the state of our fortifications. Some years before, the Duke of Wellington and Sir John Burgoyne had called attention to the fact, that our country was almost defenceless against any sudden invasion by a great military power such as France. These distinguished men were opposed vehemently by the peace party, as urging upon the nation an unnecessary cost, and provoking a spirit of aggression on the part of France by the disposition to distrust her. Parliament also received coldly these propositions. The disasters in the Crimea awakened the national anxiety, and the discussion assumed new force. Earl Grey brought the subject before the House of Lords, and strongly urged upon the government that all works of fortification should be suspended until a general committee of scientific and military men should inspect them, and pronounce upon their efficiency. A remarkable letter was published by Mr. Fergusson, whose writings on earthworks in fortifications had attracted so much attention. This letter startled the public, and gave a new stimulus to the discussions prevailing on the subject:—

Langham Place, March 17.

" The Royal Engineers have the privilege of keeping their works secret till it is too late to remedy them, and even then no documents are published which would enable the general public to judge for itself of the correctness of any assertion, or to refute or support any argument which may be adduced.

"It is probable that Earl Grey, from his position, is fully aware of the facts of the case, and spoke from intimate knowledge of the subject, at least from personal inspection of nearly all the works now being erected for the defence of our coasts; I can vouch for the accuracy of every word he said. With scarcely an exception, they are masonry buildings, and in plan and profile belong to the antiquated systems of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

"The fort, for instance, recently erected for the defence of Liverpool is a little stone castle, with a battery of ten or twelve guns, so closely jammed together in masonry embrasures, that one broadside from a line-of-battle ship would dismount the whole; or, if the ship chose to pass the fort—which she could easily do at the distance of 1200 or 1500 yards—at the rate of ten or twelve knots an hour, the chances are very much against a single shot striking her. Our recent experience in the Black Sea and Baltic, has proved that she might safely calculate on doing this with scarcely the loss of a

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single man, and, having done it, Liverpool is at her mercy; yet, for a very small sum of money, properly applied, this town might be made perfectly secure against such attacks. The forts recently erected in the Isle of Wight are even worse than this. Fort Victoria is so placed that a ship may easily pass it out of effective range of its guns, or, if attacking it, there is deep water within 150 yards of its guns, and they are so badly placed that only one out of its principal battery of twenty-one guns can see, or fire at, the attacking vessel. Like another small fort erecting at the cliff's end, it is wholly of brickwork, and both are so constructed that they would crumble to pieces far more rapidly than the towers of Bomarsund. Yet this is not the worst. These forts are utterly incapable of defence on the land side, and, in consequence, a strong redoubt is now being erected at Freshwater to protect their rear, and every bay in the Isle of Wight must have its redoubt, or all our pains will be thrown away—for the enemy would certainly choose those places which are undefended in preference to those which are more or less fortified. The same system is being pursued at Portsmouth and along the Sussex coast. Small forts incapable of defending themselves are erected on certain spots, and then other forts are erected to protect them, and these must be multiplied *ad infinitum* before we get to the end of the chain.

"If these forts were merely 'shell-traps,' as Earl Grey most properly termed them, it would be a small evil; but they are also, unfortunately, 'man-traps,' and as each will require scientific and thoroughly trained soldiers to defend it, we shall find when they are all garrisoned, as they must be, that nearly the whole available strength of the regiment of artillery is parcelled out into bodies of 50, 100, or 200 men, and when once they are snugly locked up in these innumerable fortlets the country is open to the enemy.

"If the military history of Europe has proved one thing during the last three centuries, it is that this parcelling out of an army into small detached garrisons is the surest way of facilitating the invasion of a country; yet we are pursuing this course on a more lulliputian scale than ever was adopted before, and if we continue in the same path, we shall render the invasion of this country one of the easiest problems imaginable.

"It is only by works on the scale of intrenched camps, which your correspondent asserts have never been taken since the Thirty Years' war, that such a country as this can be defended.

"It is certainly incorrect, however, to call Sebastopol an intrenched camp, unless we apply the same term to Portsmouth, Devonport,

Chatham, or any other fortified town of the same extent. The fortifications of Sebastopol are drawn as closely round the houses as in any of these places, and are, in fact, both in form and extent, very similar to those of Portsmouth and its dependencies; yet if the armies now engaged in the defence and attack of Sebastopol were playing the same parts at Portsmouth, nothing could have saved that town after three weeks or a month of open trenches, notwithstanding the enormous sums spent on its fortifications. After five months of open trenches the unfortified town of Sebastopol still resists, and, though it may fall by assault, it cannot be taken by all the boasted resources of the science of attack before which every regular fortification inevitably falls within its prescribed time.

"The truth is, and it cannot be known and appreciated too soon, that the Russian engineers have adopted a new system of defence; they have thrown aside routine, and all the antiquated systems of the schools, and have applied to the defence of places all those principles which have been hitherto so invariably successful for the attack; and they have done this with such success as to prove beyond the shadow of doubt the possibility of rendering the science of defence superior to that of attack, especially when the defence is carefully prepared for beforehand, in time of peace.

"The one question that remains is,—Will our engineers admit this view of the case, and are they prepared to act upon it? I fear not; at least I can assert from my own personal experience how unwillingly this will be done—inasmuch as for the last ten years I have been earnestly endeavouring, by every means in my power, to press these identical views on their attention, with singularly little success. And now that the Russians have proved by experience all that I said or wrote, will they confess their error and be content to be taught by their enemies? If the public and the press take up the subject they must do so; but if they do not, it is to be feared that routine will still sleep on in happy ignorance of the existence of the nineteenth century.

"At all events, they have not shown any appreciation of the facts hitherto, but every Royal Engineer has, probably, something to say in defence of the old system; and while the Russians are pulling down with their own hands the Malakoff Tower, the last remnant of their masonry defences, to replace it with earthworks, our engineers are building expensive masonry forts whenever they can find money and a site—and this in spite of all the experience and information daily arriving from the seat of war.

"Until these new discoveries are thoroughly investigated by the light of the experience we

are gaining, I would earnestly pray, with Lord Grey, that all works of fortification be suspended—feeling convinced that the whole system must be altered; and not only that all new works will have to be designed on totally different principles, but all that has been done lately must be undone again, and immense delay and expense be incurred in consequence.

“Your obedient servant,

“JAMES FERGUSSON.”

The navy and army estimates for the year 1855, showed that the cabinet was alive to the importance of the crisis; but still the proposed strength of both the navy and army was beneath the requirements of the country. It is to be regretted that the amount of men thus proposed was never raised for the military branch of the service. In peace and war the number of men actually engaged for the service is always greatly beneath that authorised by the votes. The estimates proposed this year, as compared with those previous to the war for many years, were very large, and showed the country the cost of real active warfare. The naval and military estimates were usually, in the aggregate, between 15,000,000*l.* and 16,000,000*l.* The proportion was about equal to the army and navy, 6,000,000*l.* to each, and about half the amount of either for the ordnance. Yet in the beginning of February, after a twelvemonth's war only, the increase was from 6,000,000 to 15,897,803*l.* for the navy, and from the same amount to 13,721,158*l.* for the army, amounting together to 29,618,961*l.* The excess of expenditure above estimates in government outlay is always, as in the case of architects and builders, very considerable. It was generally calculated that the excess on both services would not be much less than 20,000,000*l.* The increase of expenditure from the peace to the war estimates, may best be seen by a comparison of the years 1854 and 1855. In the former year the land force cost 4,723,288*l.*; for the latter it was estimated at 7,353,804*l.* In 1854 the troops provided were 142,776; in 1855, 193,595. There were likewise 136,323 of the militia force, making a total increase in our military strength numerically of about 200,000 men. The force maintained in India at the expense of the Company was 29,629, constituting a grand total of 359,547 men. If to this number the amount of native and European troops in the service of the Company, and of certain colonial regiments, be added, it will bring the numerical force of the army available for the honour and interests of England to an amount considerably exceeding half a million. The mode in which the English government had proceeded in the augmentation of its forces, showed the want of earnest-

ness on the part of the Aberdeen government in conducting the war. The first vote in the palmy days of the Aberdeen government, in answer to the Russian invasion of the Danubian provinces, was for 10,000 men, the next was for 15,000. Then the militia was called out, and ultimately foreign enlistment was resorted to, with jealousy and reluctance on the part of the nation. It was but too truly said at the time:—“We have neither been going too far nor too fast in this increase; on the contrary, we now see by the light of experience, that these additions would have been wisely made this time last year, and that a good reserve might have saved us more than its cost, both in men and money. It cannot be said indeed, that, like the foolish king, we did not count the cost before going to war, for we made our reckoning accurately enough; but we altogether miscalculated the dimensions and exigencies of the struggle. We were not crippled for means or for men; there was both a will and a way if *we had turned them to account*, but the true nature of the emergency was not discerned.” It was the business of the government to have discerned it—perhaps even to have foreseen its approach, and to have been prepared to meet it. They had been well warned. All persons conversant with Russian policy and principles, and with the signs of the times in Russia, had predicted what happened, and many persons of influence besought the government to prepare, but in vain: nursed in their own pride and self-sufficiency, and having confidence in a government with whose principles they sympathised, they were blind to every movement of Russia, and duped by even her most transparent artifices.

The minor items of the votes were very instructive. For the staff of the army in the field, a large portion of which had proved itself to be so little competent, there was a vote of 76,226*l.* For the public departments connected with the army at home, 153,588*l.* For the military college, 17,795*l.* A leading journal which did much for military reform, made the following comment upon these minor votes:—“Now, what, we beg to inquire, is to be the return to the country for this outlay? We presume the estimates are liberally framed, and we are sure that if more was wanted it would be cheerfully given. But what is the use of our military school or our staff allowances? On paper, and in the public accounts, we are represented as possessing those very things of which we so acutely feel the want, and which we regard with envy when we see them in the possession of others. Why should our army not have a good staff at this moment? We are paying for it—paying not only for the men themselves, but for the means of making

them. What can be the meaning of a minister rising in his place and regretting that the army wanted officers acquainted with something more than mere routine and regimental duties, when votes like these are brought before parliament? What becomes of the '180 gentlemen cadets' maintained under the special care and instruction of an able staff of governors and instructors?"

The votes for the ordnance were proposed in order soon after the foregoing. The total amount for the effective service required was 7,610,385*l.* The total amount for the non-effective service, 197,657*l.* The increase upon the previous year was 1,822,380*l.*

The items of the estimates of the sum required for the effective service were as follows, viz.:—1,117,833*l.* for the pay allowances, and contingencies of 22,346 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, composing the several ordnance military corps; 1,406,883*l.* for commissariat and barrack supplies for her majesty's forces, greatcoats for the army, and clothing for the militia; 75,604*l.* for the Ordnance-office; 303,149*l.* for ordnance establishments at home and abroad; 368,872*l.* for the wages of artificers, &c., at home and abroad; 2,792,348*l.* for ordnance stores for land and sea services; 1,387,500*l.* for works, buildings, and repairs at home and abroad; and 158,196*l.* for the scientific branch. The item of 1,117,833*l.* for pay and allowances is thus subdivided, viz.:—776,240*l.* for pay; 97,535*l.* for additional pay (for length of service and good conduct); 37,716*l.* for allowances; 54,028*l.* for clothing; 320*l.* for hospital expenses; 751*l.* for divine service; 1632*l.* for libraries and schools; 20,637*l.* for movement of troops; 116,32*l.* for recruiting; 8326*l.* for agency; 500*l.* for regimental savings-banks; and 1232*l.* for miscellaneous charges. The charge for each corp, exclusive of heads of service, which cannot be apportioned, is as follows, viz.:—Royal Engineers, 123,007*l.*; Royal Sappers and Miners, 81,170*l.*; Regiment of Artillery, 684,803*l.*; Royal Horse Artillery, 58,88*l.*; Riding-house Troop, 2107*l.*; master gunners, 4102*l.*; field-train department, 9167*l.*; and medical department, 12,737*l.*

The charge for clothing amounts to 523,030*l.*, and includes the following items, viz., 215,000*l.* for greatcoats for the army; 80,000*l.* for "fatigue" clothing for militia; 90,000*l.* for the clothing of the "Foreign Legion;" and 120,000*l.* for warm and waterproof clothing, and articles for the troops, and for summer clothing.

The charges for commissariat and barrack supplies amounted to 123,993*l.* and 760,760*l.* respectively.

The charge of 2,792,348*l.* for "stores" in-

cluded 800,000 for the supply and repair of small arms; 40,000*l.* for the small arm factory at Enfield; 235,134*l.* for iron ordnance, shot, and shell; 1,448,247*l.* for the purchase of ordnance stores of all kinds at the Tower and Woolwich; 125,000*l.* to complete the huts for 50,000 men to be erected in garrisons at Aldershot; 36,270*l.* for accoutrements and colours for militia; 50,000*l.* for accoutrements and knapsacks for the Foreign Legion; 42,300*l.* for packing, freight, and carriage of arms and stores, &c.; and 11,234*l.* for the building and repair of ordnance vessels, boats, and the supply of sails.

The charge for works and buildings included an item of 30,000*l.* for the defences of Dover and the coast of Kent; 60,000*l.* for a new barrack at the western heights of Dover; 48,170*l.* for improving the fortifications of the Channel Islands; 24,163*l.* for new barracks at Devonport; 39,047*l.* for additional barracks at Cambridge; 61,000*l.* for barracks at Gosport; 10,000*l.* for the defences of the coast of Sussex; 48,597*l.* for the defence of commercial harbours; and 250,000*l.* for new barracks at Aldershot. These sums were only those required for the year. There were numerous items of sums required for the erection of forts and batteries.

The amount required for works and buildings at home is thus divided, viz.:—295,215*l.* for fortifications, 109,999*l.* for civil buildings, and 623,624*l.* for barracks.

The charge for the scientific branch includes 122,000*l.* for surveys in the United Kingdom; 27,975*l.* for the Military Academy at Woolwich; and 6109*l.* for the establishment at Chatham for instructing engineers, &c.

The expense of unforeseen and urgent services unprovided by parliament, but authorised by the Treasury, up to the 31st of December last, amounted to 100,819*l.*

It will now be seen that the grand total amount of the army, navy, ordnance, and transport estimates for the ensuing year was estimated at 37,427,003*l.*, viz.:—13,721,158*l.* for the army, 10,716,388*l.* for the navy, 5,181,465*l.* for the transport service, and 7,808,042*l.* for the ordnance department.

The navy estimates offered many details interesting to the nation. The augmentation of our sea forces proposed was 6000 seamen and 500 marines. This was much too small for the requirements of the service, especially as to marines—a force which, from their capacity to serve by sea or land, may be made especially valuable to a country like England, which maintains a comparatively small standing army. Sir James Graham, however, stated the important fact, in explanation, that while steam-ships were more costly than sailing ships, they were worked by fewer hands, and consequently at less expense. At the close

of the previous war there had been 100 ships of the line in commission, manned by 147,000 seamen. One third the number could now man a fleet of greater power. It appeared that the expenses of the navy were greatly augmented by the high price of provisions and clothing, and that more wages must in future be paid. A new rating was also instituted; a class of "leading seamen" were to be selected on higher pay. Men were to be employed for ten years' service at an increased allowance, instead of the short service system, caused by the plan of "paying off" ships.

Sir James informed the house that the fleet for the Baltic would consist entirely of steamers, and that 100 vessels should be speedily in the waters of the czar.

A debate arose, on presenting the naval estimates, concerning the sparing of Odessa, which evoked from Mr. Layard one of his most able and severe addresses. Sir James Graham's replies were equivocating and deceptive on the subject of Odessa, as events ultimately proved. The house and the country were indignant with the tone which the "first lord" adopted concerning the Baltic expedition. His gratulations as to what was accomplished were immeasurably impudent, when it was recollected that vessels of a character calculated to inflict damage upon the fortifications of the czar were not sent out in 1854, nor were any adequate preparations then making to send out in 1855 the sort of vessels, without which the proud fleet of England could merely sail in sight of the enemy's batteries.

While the estimates were under discussion in the commons, and in society, a very remarkable letter was addressed to the *Times* by Sir Francis Head, which excited some attention:—

Oxendon, Northampton.

"In 1834, on my return to England from the Brunnens of Nassau, I called on Lord Fitzroy Somerset at the Horse Guards with some notes I had just made in the camp of instruction of the Prussian army, and although as an officer of Engineers I did not belong to his department, he nevertheless, apparently with great interest, listened to the brief account I gave him of the mode in which the Prussian army was studying the art of war in cantonments, *en bivouac*, and under canvas; how their artillery and pontoon-train were learning to transport guns and boats across rough country, ravines, streams, &c.; how the cavalry were learning to swim their horses, with other accomplishments equally useful on active service; how the infantry were instructed in making fascines, gabions, &c., and in rapidly throwing up field-works of various sorts, the defensive advantages of which they were made clearly to understand; how officers

and soldiers of every service, not only, as in real war, were practised in field-of-battle manoeuvres, but, under the direction of a well-educated staff and of admirably appointed field departments, were taught the far more important acquirements necessary for moving large masses of cavalry, infantry, and artillery many miles across a country, so as to reach given points at given times with the whole force, and in proper order. After having given the above outline of the system under which the great nations of Europe scientifically and at great cost provide themselves not only with young skilful generals, but with subordinate officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, all more or less proficient in the higher branches of their profession, as well as in the minutest details necessary for the subsistence and movement of an army in the field, I emphatically asked Lord Fitzroy Somerset (with whom I was but very little acquainted) what objection could possibly exist to the British army, by a similar course of instruction, learning the practical duties of their profession? For some seconds he appeared either unwilling or unable to answer my plain question; at last, calmly shrugging up his left shoulder and the stump of his right arm, he replied, with a look of dutiful submission, 'Joseph Hume.'

"Twenty-one years afterwards—namely, on Saturday last—you inserted in the *Times* the following paragraph:—

"'We are concerned to learn that Mr. Hume is so seriously indisposed as to be unable to leave his seat in Norfolk. The absence of Mr. Hume is the more to be regretted when army reform is under consideration. Few men have given so much attention to the subject, and his practical experience would now be invaluable.'

"Now, Lord Raglan and the Duke of Newcastle may be guilty of the numerous acts of omission which in your columns have been so graphically described. Lord Raglan may be destitute of forethought and contrivance, and in every way incompetent to contend with the extraordinary difficulties that have assailed him; but, as it is undeniable, first, that Mr. Hume's well-intentioned measures of economy, which have been enforced by the House of Commons, have, bit by bit, and limb by limb, gradually dismembered the British army of all its field-departments; and, secondly, that it has been for want of a well-educated staff and of well organised field departments that our army in the Crimea of 54,000 brave men have, by hunger and cold, been starved down to about 12,000 effective bayonets. I submit to the judgment of the country that it is unjust to shield the House of Commons from, and to

place wholly upon the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Raglan, the consequences of those fatal parliamentary measures of retrenchment which Lord Raglan and the Duke of Wellington obediently but most seriously disapproved.

"Confident that the nation will, sooner or later, come to a just conclusion on this lamentable subject,

"I am, sir, your obedient servant,

"F. B. HEAD."

If Lord Raglan spoke and acted as Sir Francis represents, it is only another proof that he was never fit for the position to which he was selected. The country actually did vote vast sums annually, which were seldom put to an economical or efficient use. That circumstance gave to Mr. Hume his power; but the commons were always ready to vote what was required, if only convinced that the object for which the vote was demanded was really of value. Mr. Hume himself, with all his stringent lectures on the necessity of economy, did not resist estimates when the government showed a disposition to employ the money for the necessary requisites of efficient forces. Both Lord Raglan and Sir F. Head ought to have known that had not the country resisted the extravagant outlay which it was the interest of the officials to promote, and which the Horse Guards never restrained, the nation would not have been able to sustain the career of improvement and retrenchment it was able to pursue during the peace, nor to bear with such ease the strains and pressure of war. To be prepared for war, it is necessary to remit taxes, remove the fetters from industry which taxes impose, and husband the national wealth, while peace admits of such economical processes. It was not Joseph Hume, as Lord Raglan ignorantly alleged, or alleged under the influence of a party spirit, who caused the public service to be inefficient; but it was the want of confidence which the nation felt in the government, the heads of the army, the whole tribe of officials, and the whole system of management in military affairs, which in any degree restrained the liberality of the commons. Enough was always voted to have provided an efficient army; and Lord Raglan, and Sir F. Head, were the calumniators of the people, and abettors of abuse and extravagance, in thus reflecting upon the men who struggled to save the country from the consequences of the reckless extravagance into which the clouds of military departments were always ready to plunge it.

While all these votes were prepared and passed, and all these discussions were sifting the public mind, supplies and reinforcements were directed to the seats of war. Mr. Maclean, of Manchester, built iron vessels of the

order commonly called lighters, of a new and useful type, for the purpose of landing commissariat stores in the Black Sea. Troops were ordered from India to the Crimea, via Egypt. The 10th Hussars, and the 80th regiment of infantry proceeded from Bombay to Suez, marched from Suez to Cairo, and proceeded down the Nile, remaining some weeks at Alexandria. The efforts to send out supplies, especially where those efforts depended on individual enterprise, were very great; but the want of good organisation in the departments continually exposed the country to loss. The following appeared in the papers at that time:—"On Saturday the *Pioneer*, a handsome new clipper-built screw-steamer, of about 800 tons burthen, and fitted with an engine of 120-horse power, took her departure from the Irongate Wharf near the Tower of London, freighted with a cargo of almost inestimable value, consisting of warm clothing, comforts, and conveniences of almost every description, intended to mitigate the privations and to sustain the courage and spirit of our brave army before Sebastopol, and collected or purchased under the auspices of the committee for managing the Crimean Army Fund, of which the Earl of Ellesmere is at the head. The donations presented to them for this object by a grateful and a generous country, including all ranks of the people, from royalty to the peasant, in addition to their own, have gone on accumulating in the short period which has since elapsed, until they amount to £20,000, exclusive of other acts of munificence, the worth of which is scarcely to be estimated in money. It may be interesting to our readers, and still more to the intended recipients in the Crimea, to note some of the principal articles of which the *Pioneer's* cargo is composed. There are, first of all, 400 cases of potted provisions, including venison and other articles, and a quantity of ale, generously presented by his grace the Duke of Portland; 37 cases of potted deer from Teymouth, and 800 gallons of whisky, the equally munificent gift of the Marquis of Breadalbane; a hogshhead of whisky from each of the distillers of Campbelltown, packed in cases of two dozen each, for easy transit from Balaklava to the camp, and a hogshhead of port wine from each of the principal distillers in London, similarly packed; 400 patent stoves, peculiarly adapted for use in the Crimea, and an immense quantity of candles and lamps—in all about 710 cases—the handsome donation of Price's Patent Candle Company, whose workmen, by the way, have given £150 to the fund, being one-half of a day's pay; great quantities of Gloucestershire cheese, the gift of residents in that county; and other donations, amounting to several hundred bales of woollen goods, blankets, je seys,

drawers, shirts, stockings, together with as many muffatees as will furnish two or three pairs to each officer and soldier in the army; and contributions of game preserved at Gunter's and Batty's. Besides these donations, the committee themselves have purchased a large quantity of provisions, comforts, and useful implements and utensils, which also form part of the freight. These include, among other things, regimental boots, shoes, leather, and shoemakers' tools; £150 worth of tobacco and clay pipes, cocoa-nut fibre matting for the floors of tents, blankets, railway-rugs, Australian jackets, waterproof clothing, stationery, oatmeal, pearl-barley, half-salt butter, essence of coffee, cocoa, chocolate, Parmesan cheese, turnery, brushes and combs, gridirons, sauce-pans, frying-pans, conical beer-warmers, milkmen's pails and yokes for carrying water, water-filters, saws, hatchets, hammers, six gross of iron spoons, 200 tea-pots, Welsh wigs, portable fuel, a great number of interesting books, 250,000 rations of patent, compressed vegetable soup (French), an exceedingly agreeable and nutritious article; a large quantity of preserved vegetables, and last, but perhaps not least useful, one street baked-potato machine, more of which would have been sent, but the idea of forwarding them did not occur to the committee until the eve of the vessel's sailing, when time did not permit of their being procured. The ship, on touching at Malta, will also take on board a number of oranges and lemons.—Such are the principal articles, weighing in the aggregate between 600 and 700 tons.

"We have since learned that on going down the river, off Cuckold's Point, the *Pioneer* came in contact with a large barque, with such force that her foremast went by the board, her bowsprit and jib-boom were carried away, and she was obliged to be taken into the East India Dock for repair, which will have the effect of delaying the vessel's departure for several days."

Courtesies between France and England tended to strengthen the alliance by fostering its spirit. The ambassador of France at London, having communicated to Lord Clarendon the speech of the president of the Legislative Corps to the emperor, on the occasion of the vote of the bill on the loan, as also the reply of his majesty, the following letter from the principal secretary of state of her Britannic majesty was addressed to the ambassador:—

Foreign Office, Jan. 2.

MONSIEUR L'AMBAassadeUR,—I have received the letter which your excellency did me the honour to address to me on the 30th of December last, transmitting to me, by order of his majesty the Emperor of the French, a copy of the *Moniteur*, containing the speech pronounced by the president of the Legislative Corps on the occasion of

the unanimous vote of that assembly on the Loan Bill, as well as the reply of his majesty.

I have placed your excellency's communication before the queen, and her majesty orders me to make known to you how much she appreciates the terms, full of cordiality, in which the speech of the president of the Legislative Corps, and the reply of his imperial majesty express themselves on the concurrence of the English land and sea forces, who share the hardships and dangers of the soldiers and sailors of France.

May I also be allowed to address to your excellency the thanks of the members of the government of her majesty for the communication of which you have been the interpreter? Your excellency knows with what perfect reciprocity the British parliament and nation entertain towards the French army and navy the sentiments of sympathy and gratitude which the speech of the president of the Legislative Corps, and the reply of the emperor, have so happily expressed towards the land and sea forces of the queen.

I have the honour, &c.

CLARENDON.

The French Canadians, who, like other inhabitants of the British colonies, contributed liberally to the Patriotic Fund, desired one-half of their contribution to be appropriated to the aid of the soldiers of France. When the English minister communicated this to the French emperor, it excited in the French court and in France most pleasurable feelings, and was responded to in the following manner. The letter was addressed to the Earl of Clarendon:—

Palace of the Tuileries, Feb. 27.

MY LORD,—I thank you for having communicated to me the address of the legislative council and legislative assembly of Canada to the queen of England. It would be difficult for them to associate themselves in a more patriotic or touching manner with the success of our arms in the East, and with the disasters inseparable from this great struggle. Moved like myself, believe me, by the eloquent testimony of so vivid a sympathy, our country will not see without gratitude that to the memory of its French origin the population of Canada has not wished to separate, in its congratulations and in its offerings, those who are so nobly united by a community of danger. I beg of you to be the interpreter to the legislative council, and to the legislative assembly of Canada of my sentiments, as I believe I am of those of France.

Receive, my lord, the assurance of my high esteem.

NAPOLEON.

During February, immediately after the change of government, much solicitude was manifested concerning the more rapid communications of intelligence from the seat of war. The government was mortified by the circumstance that they were so frequently indebted to the correspondents of the press for their first intelligence of the most important events, and they determined upon establishing a telegraphic communication. The screw steamer *Black Sea*, which had been detained in the South Dock of Sunderland harbour by the heavy sea caused by a strong north-east wind, which blew for a considerable time in the early spring, left the Wear with "the Balaklava and Varna submarine telegraph cable" on board, and Messrs. Newall and Co.'s staff of workpeople, who were employed to submerge it. She had every prospect of a quick run out. She was ordered to call at Malta to take up Mr. Liddell, C.E., and Captain Dun-

can of the Royal Engineers, and then to proceed to the Crimea, or Varna, as might be most convenient, to submerge the cable. The managers made due precaution not to be delayed by government officials, as they took everything out with them—carts, huts, &c., for their use while laying down the land portion of their work, and had four non-commissioned officers of the Sappers and Miners with them aboard the steamer, who were instructed how to work the apparatus when completed. The weight of the 400 miles of cable was 100 tons, and the contract was stated to be £20,000. The system upon which the Black Sea telegraph was intended to be wrought was Morse's, but with an important modification by Mr. Carl Frischen, of Hanover, which was patented by Messrs. Newall and Co. Morse's apparatus prints messages upon long slips of paper as they are received into the office, and thus avoids the slow process of copying by pencil into slips: Mr. Frischen's invention further extends the usefulness of the system, by making it possible for messages to be sent along one wire from both ends at the same instant of time. Thus a clerk telegraphing at Varna can be receiving by the same wire by which he is sending his communication, and at the same instant, a message from Balaklava. The single wire by Mr. Frischen's process conveys several messages from either end at the same moment; and a clerk can be engaged telegraphing at the time that he is receiving a message. Messrs. Newall and Co., the contractors for the Black Sea telegraph, have laid down every submarine telegraph in service in the world. The Mediterranean telegraph, which remains incomplete, was not made by them. The more important lines of submarine cables manufactured by this firm are—the Dover and Calais, the Belgian, the Hague, the Portpatrick, the Holyhead and Queenstown, the Zuyder Zee, the Great and Little Belt, the Cronstadt, the Perth and Dundee, the New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, the Eumen and Zealand, the St. Lawrence, and the Mississippi, which are all now at work. The circumstances under which the Black Sea telegraph was put on board a first-class steam-vessel, in its passage out, are strikingly illustrative of the energy of the English character when under wise and able direction. The contractors only received final instructions from the government to make the 400 miles of cable on the 15th of December. The vessel that received it on board was on the stocks at Yarrow, in February, not half finished; but by the middle of the week previous to sailing she had been launched, her engines put on board, and she had steamed round to Sunderland, and before the Saturday night's bell had rung in the Monkwearmouth

Works, for closing the week, she had her coals and stores on board, her crew shipped and ready for sea, and 400 miles of telegraph cable stowed away in her hold; with a vast number of packages and bales of clothing, thrust into every available corner, for the use of the soldiers in the Crimea; and was in time to be swung for the purpose of having her compasses adjusted.

It is to be regretted, for the honour of our country, that a practice which in the early months of the war required official notice, and, finally, official interference, was resorted to in 1855 also, by which private advantage was sought at the expense of the public good. Machinery adapted to navigation was fitted out for the enemy in English ports. The authors of this crime alleged that they designed the work for certain neutral powers; there was no doubt, however, that it was intended ultimately for the service of the enemy. The following proclamation at once checked the proceeding, and awed the perpetrators.

BY THE QUEEN.

A PROCLAMATION.

VICTORIA R.

Whereas information has been received that certain acts of a highly treasonable nature have been, or are about to be done or attempted by certain British subjects adhering to the queen's enemies, either within her majesty's dominions, or in parts beyond the seas; such as building, or aiding and assisting in building or equipping, ships of war, providing stores or tackling, arms and ammunition, for such ships, or manufacturing, or fitting, or aiding or assisting in manufacturing or fitting steam machinery, either for such ships or for other warlike purposes; or by entering into contracts, engagements or agreements for some of the aforesaid purposes, or otherwise adhering to, aiding, assisting, or abetting the queen's enemies in parts beyond seas, in levying or carrying on war against her majesty; now her majesty, by this her royal proclamation, doth warn all such persons engaging in any such treasonable designs or attempts as aforesaid, or otherwise adhering to, assisting, aiding or abetting, the queen's enemies, that they will be liable to be apprehended and dealt with as traitors, and will be proceeded against with the utmost rigour of the law.

Given at our court, at Windsor, this eighth day of February, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-five, and in the eighteenth year of our reign.

GOD SAVE THE QUEEN.

During the first three months of 1855, invalids and wounded soldiers from the Crimea and Scutari returned in considerable numbers, and, so far as depended upon the generosity of the public, they were most kindly received; but however bitter the confession when made by an English citizen, it is unhappily true that in the government hospitals to which they were consigned, their treatment was thoroughly and utterly discreditable. Her majesty took a deep interest in the wounded soldiers, and visited the hospitals repeatedly. For these occasions matters were got up, so that her majesty might be satisfied with the treatment of her brave troops. The state of things at

Chatham, in this respect, was such as to merit public reprobation in some departments, although in others too much praise to the hospital authorities could hardly be accorded. The following communication places the whole matter in a light more instructive than agreeable:—

“The Queen of England has lately paid a visit of womanly solicitude and maternal sympathy to the brave men whose mutilated limbs, and shattered but still noble frames, show with melancholy clearness how they have fought and suffered for their country and her crown. To most, if not all, of them, from her woman’s heart, and with her winning voice, were spoken—for so they love to tell—words which are now repeated with honest pride in the sick-ward to the listening stranger, and will be told again and again to wife and children for many a year in many a cottage home of England. Nay, on returning to her palace her thoughts were still on the brave she had left, and her order was forthwith dispatched for a nominal return of all the wounded in the Chatham hospitals, with details, so far as possible, of each case. Nor were the medical authorities forgotten, for not only did her majesty personally express, as well she might, her satisfaction at all she saw, but they were further honoured, as indeed they deserved, with a written communication, expressing how much the queen was gratified by the care bestowed upon their patients, and the condition of the hospitals in Fort Pitt and the Brompton Barracks.

“It is simply an act of justice to add, that the state in which her majesty found these hospitals was their every-day condition, and that one of the surgeons at Fort Pitt may well congratulate himself on not having lost a man of his numerous charge. But here is an obscure, if not a dark, side to this picture, as well as a bright one. Her majesty did not see all; she did not see what she ought to have seen above all. She did not see what she could not have seen with any other feeling than sorrow, if not indignation; and yet she was within eight minutes’ drive of the buildings where it may be seen! There, sir, are the casemate, or St. Mary’s Barracks, about a mile from the Brompton, at the south-east extremity of a marshy level on the banks of the Medway, significantly called ‘Tom-all-alones.’ Their atmospheric fitness for invalids may be judged of from the fact that the cold on the upper story, with boarded floors, is so great that the clerks of the pay-office petitioned to be removed from it, and had their request granted. As for water, it is supplied to the officers there from cisterns which serve a twofold purpose in the cheapest and shortest, but filthiest, and foulest way possible. For the men there is, indeed,

a pump near, but then ‘it is no good,’ and so with their weak bodies and disabled limbs they had to fetch all they wanted in the late frost and snow from another pump or well some 300 yards off. It is asserted, too, that these barracks have already been condemned by more than one board as altogether unfit for invalids, and men of ordinary humanity would declare that the vaults—rooms they cannot be called—which are now occupied by the Crimean convalescents are not fit habitations even for robust health. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that the cells of the military prison at Fort Clarence are much more comfortable and wholesome than the lodgings of the men whom the queen delights to honour; for the latter are from sixty to seventy feet long by about thirteen broad, banked up at the back with earth above the level of the ceiling, with only one fireplace in each, and this not in the middle, but at the extreme end, and no ventilation at all except by the door and windows, conveniently fronting the north-west, for the exhalations from the mud of the Medway. The floors are paved with Yorkshire stone up the middle, and bricks at the sides, laid on the natural earth, on which stand the iron bedsteads about thirteen inches high, with straw mattresses to match, and not a bit of straw or matting anywhere else. Into these cold clammy caves are put invalids—convalescents perhaps they are called—men, women, and children, from Gibraltar, or even a warmer climate. In them may now be found men pierced and cut all over, who have escaped with life from Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman, and are fresh from the exhaustions of Scutari, or just recovering from wounds and fever through the care and comfort which they had enjoyed in the hospitals of Fort Pitt and Brompton. In one of them especially may be found, by night and by day, five or six families of married couples with their children. All this her majesty *should* have seen; and a local reply to an observation to this effect was, ‘They would not let her!’ Whether this be true or not, it is impossible to say, although it is a fact that the inmates of these places were removed from them for inspection elsewhere; but whatever ‘the reason why,’ the public may be unanimous in thinking that the nation is disgraced by such a state of things, and that if humanity and gratitude are of no avail to prevent such treatment of her bravest sons in their ‘hour of need,’ still the health and the lives of her soldiers are far too precious and costly to be endangered, if not destroyed, in the miserable caves of a bombproof powder magazine.”

As public attention and indignation were roused these matters were rectified. It was the desire of Lord Palmerston, and, in some measure, of his government, to satisfy the demands of the country, and to do justice for

its own sake. All these things, in the home events which bore upon the war, confirm the sentiments of an able public writer:—"The country must be governed not only *for*, but *by* the public; and that not merely at certain crises, by outbreaks of national feeling, having the character almost of an insurrection, but constantly, regularly, and in detail." Among the efforts for the more satisfactory treatment of the wounded and invalids was the mission of Mr. W. S. Lindsay, M.P., to the East. In February he visited France, and held frequent communications with the French government, the object of which was to obtain its co-operation for the organisation of a regular service of transports for the sick from the Crimea direct to Marseilles, and to establish hospitals along the coast. The French ministers of marine and foreign affairs lent a very favourable ear to his projects. From some cause these excellent ideas did not find the practical application intended.

The return of the Duke of Cambridge was prominent among the home incidents connected with the war which interested the English people. His gallant conduct gave great satisfaction to the country; and his arrival at home, after so many perils and such distinguished services, was met with acclaim. He landed at Dover on the 30th of January, and proceeded to the Ship Hotel, the populace cheering with hearty enthusiasm. He was soon waited upon by the mayor and corporation, for the purpose of presenting him with an address congratulating him on his safe return. The address was frank and pertinent, and received from his royal highness a reply of a very remarkable character, in which some notable opinions were expressed of the generalship under which the army suffered so much, notwithstanding the courage and skill of the generals of division and brigade. His royal highness also expressed himself concerning the common soldiery in a way which the army and the country felt to be as true as it was tersely and strikingly expressed:—"Mr. Mayor and Gentlemen,—I thank you for the gratification you have rendered me in presenting me with the present address. I assure you that any inconvenience or discomfort which I have experienced in the Crimea has been amply repaid by the bravery of the troops. All a general can do is to lead, and my humble services have been given cheerfully; but it has not been a war of generalship—the campaign has been a soldier's, and nothing but a soldier's, campaign. Led on as they have been by their indomitable courage, these troops have performed prodigies of valour; and I can assure you a finer set of fellows do not exist in the world than the men who are fighting the battles of Britain in the Crimea, and who have done everything in their power to

sustain the honour of their country. Mr. Mayor and gentlemen, I again thank you." The same evening his royal highness arrived in London, where there were but few persons aware of his having landed in England, but nevertheless a considerable crowd collected at the terminus, and welcomed him with lively demonstrations of satisfaction. When the knowledge of his safe arrival at Kew Lodge spread through London and its vicinity, public addresses to him and to her Royal Highness the Duchess of Cambridge (his mother), were very loyally and promptly presented. The reception met with by the royal duke from her majesty and the court, was most grateful to his feelings.

The exertions of our neighbours and allies were on a scale commensurate with the great undertaking. Men and arms were sent away during January and February for the Crimea, and preparations during the first three months of the year were put forth for the ensuing naval campaign in the Baltic, which showed the earnestness of the emperor in prosecuting the war.

In France there was but little popular enthusiasm for the contest as compared with England, but there was nevertheless a resolute will to bring down the pride of the foe. In the early part of January the port of the Joliette (Marseilles) was crowded with ships of war and large English steamers awaiting men and munitions; by the end of January the port was nearly empty: all these naval leviathans had departed laden with soldiers, stores, ammunition, &c. Among the troops sailed Generals Pelissier, Rivet, and Desvilliers. The first of these officers was destined to play a brilliant part in the great drama before Sebastopol. A letter written from Marseilles, at the time, thus described the *personnel* of that remarkable man:—"General Pelissier landed here from Oran on the preceding Monday. He is of the middle size, with broad shoulders, a rather care-worn countenance, and appears to be about sixty years of age. He is remarkably neat in his dress, and expects his officers to imitate his example. He has passed the greater part of his life in Algeria, and has earned there a reputation of extraordinary energy. His friends say that his appointment to a command in the army in the Crimea was communicated to him by the minister of war in the most flattering terms. He was told that the command offered to him was not equal to his merits, but that, by his acceptance of it, he will have imposed an additional debt on his country, of which the government will not be forgetful. He looks like a man who will either bring back a marshal's baton from the Crimea, or find a soldier's grave there. General Rivet is chief of the staff

of the first division, and General Desvilliers is to command a brigade in the ninth division of the army of the East. Some of the letters received here from the French camp before Sebastopol, dated the 12th instant, speak of the condition of the French army in terms almost as discouraging as those published in the London papers with regard to the English."

Some idea may be formed of the activity in the French arsenals in January, by the following paragraph from the *Sentinelles Toulonnaises*:—"The loading of *matériel* of war, a moment suspended, recommenced to-day with considerable activity. On the 1st and 2nd the artillery-waggons brought to the arsenal of the navy upwards of 1100 shells, which were immediately conveyed on board the liner, *Duperré*. The *Labrador*, steam-frigate, is now undergoing repair. The construction of the gun-boats on the new system is progressing rapidly. They will be launched in February, and completely armed and ready to put to sea towards the 15th of April. A portion of them will join the squadron in the Black Sea, and another that of the Baltic, next May, when grand and definite operations by sea and land will recommence with redoubled vigour, should peace not be concluded."

Amongst other troops dispatched during that month, were 1200 men of the Imperial Guard. To these the emperor delivered an address characteristic of the war and of the epoch:—"The French nation, by its sovereign will, has resuscitated many things which they thought for ever dead, and to-day the empire is reconstituted; an intimate alliance exists with our ancient enemies; the flag of France waves with honour on those distant shores where the bold flight of our eagles had not before ventured; the Imperial Guard, the heroic representation of military glory and honour, is now before me, surrounding the emperor as formerly, wearing the same uniform, carrying the same standards, and having especially in their hearts the same sentiments of devotion to their country. Receive then these standards, which will lead you to victory as they led your fathers, as they have just led your comrades. Go, and take your share of what still remains of danger to be overcome and glory to be earned; you will soon have received the noble baptism which is your ambition, and you will have lent your assistance to plant our eagles upon the walls of Sebastopol."

During February these exertions continued as if no such vast transactions had taken place the previous month. The *Moniteur* of February the 4th thus describes the opening of the month in this particular:—"Within the last few days there have been forwarded to the Crimea, for the army of the East, 150 officers'

huts and 950 privates' huts, for 30,000 men, made at Toulon and Marseilles; 450 officers' huts and 1500 privates' huts, for 39,000 men, ordered from England; and 210 hut-stables, for 10,000 horses, ordered in Paris." The activity of the French dockyard arsenals for a month after were of the same character: ships, stores, men, munitions of war, were sent out; and addresses were delivered to the soldiers by persons of eminence, calling on them, in the name of French glory, to terminate the war by victory.

The monetary exertions of the people were on a scale proportional to these military enterprises. A loan of great magnitude was raised, and so rapid were the offers, that the only difficulty was, how to receive the proffered sums. The credit of the French government, and the resources of the French people, were greatly elevated in Europe; and the tidings of the ready and abundant supply of such vast funds by the people of France carried dismay to the court of St. Petersburg, while they were hailed in England with triumph. A Paris correspondent thus describes the issue of this financial victory:—"The subscription to the new loan terminated yesterday at five in the afternoon. The anxiety to subscribe was, if possible, greater during the last few days than previously. At the Treasury, in the Rue de Rivoli, many persons passed the night under the arcades, and before daybreak they were *queues* at all the Mairies, at the Recette Centrale, Rue Neuve des Mathurins, and at the Caisse d'Amortissement. It was deemed necessary to send detachments of infantry to all these places to preserve order. A number of persons, despairing of having their subscriptions accepted at Paris, went by railway to different towns in the provinces. But in all parts of the country the desire to subscribe was just as great as at Paris. In fact, the eagerness of the public to take part in this national operation was far greater than on the preceding occasion in March last. Fifteen hundred millions have already been subscribed, and it is estimated that four times that amount could be provided if it were required. If it be necessary, therefore, to continue the war, the sinews will not be wanting."

Besides this indication of the prosperity of France, there was another also very decisive—the increase of the ordinary revenue, over the expenditure of the year, was several millions of francs. The loan and the budget alike showed that France was able to go to war, and even if she had not counted the cost was able to meet it.

It was remarkable how every incident which took place in England relating to military things was noticed by the French press. General Evans having been received in the British

parliament with the homage due to his bravery and military genius, the *Siccle*, so often accustomed to find fault with England, thus commented upon the scene:—"England, indeed, has a right to be proud of a man who, entitled to such homage, receives it from his fellow-citizens in the full plenitude of their constitutional prerogative. General Evans neither gave way to a sentiment of extravagant pride, nor to expressions of satisfaction confined to himself. Covered with honour himself, he vindicated the right of his division—the second—to a still greater share of the national gratitude, from the fact of its having lost one half of its number in repulsing the Russians in three different engagements. He called to the recollection of the house that at Inkerman this heroic division had supported alone, for several hours, the united attack of 50,000 of the enemy. And if it be permitted to us to mingle our humble voice in so magnificent a scene, we would say that even in the misfortunes it has undergone, the English army has proved itself as worthy as ever to share the crown of glory with the army of France."

The spirit of France to her enemy was as worthy as that which she cherished to her ally. There was an absence of all animosity to Russia in the national spirit, and the prisoners were treated not only with kindness but with hospitality. The following is an extract from a letter on this subject in February:—"There are at present 300 Russian prisoners confined in Fort La Malgue; sixty of them are now employed in constructing huts for the army in the East. Amongst the prisoners is a sergeant-major, decorated with a Russian order, whom they treat with great respect, and blindly obey. The prisoners receive daily a ration of bread and twopence for their food, which they are allowed to purchase in town, under the surveillance of some French soldiers. They appear to be well pleased with their treatment, and not to regret their position. The Poles would willingly enter the French service."

In the St. Petersburg press, and in that of Germany and Belgium under the influence of Russian pay, it was alleged that the Turks treated the Russian prisoners more generously than the French; and that the latter refused to the poor prisoners the consolations of their religion, while the former provided Greek chaplains to attend them. The *Moniteur* replied to these calumnies in the following terms:—"As far as regards their spiritual affairs, the Russian prisoners, since their arrival at Aix, have been allowed—those of the Greek communion—the visits of the Arch-prêtre Wassilleff; and the Catholics, those of the Abbé Jelowski. These two ministers exercised their mission without any impediment, until it was ascertained that they attended less to religion than to politics. The minister of war, in order to secure the comfort of the Russian prisoners, decided that in addition to their pay they should have the complete ration of provisions, as given to the French soldier, namely, white bread, 1000 grammes; fresh meat, 250 grammes; dry vegetables, 60 grammes; and salt, 16 grammes. These arrangements extended to all the Russian prisoners, both in France and at Constantinople. The pay of the officers has been increased nearly one-half more than regulated by former ordinances, and is now 333f. 33c. per month for a general of division, 250f. for a general of brigade, 200f. for superior officers; captains, lieutenants, and sub-lieutenants, 100f.; the wife of an officer, 50f. By order of the emperor, the officers have been allowed to retain their arms, and to choose their place of residence. Tours has been chosen by them, and they are authorised to remove thither on the 2nd instant. They are allowed to take their orderlies with them."

Thus France stood beside her great ally, great also for this contest; great in skill, resources, valour, and magnanimity. Such was the attitude of the Western nations at home in the first months of 1855.

CHAPTER LXII.

RUSSIA AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF 1855—HER POWERFUL POSITION—INCREASED INFLUENCE, AND ACCESSION OF TERRITORY IN ASIA—UNSUBDUED BY THE EVENTS OF 1854—PREPARATIONS TO RESIST THE ALLIES—ARROGANT AND FANATICAL SPIRIT OF HER PEOPLE INCREASED BY THE WAR.

"Sic volo sic jubeo."

MUCH as public alarm had been awakened, and public effort stimulated by that alarm, previous to the war, in the contemplation of Russian aggression, and by her dogged and stubborn resistance to the allies, a very vague notion was all that existed in the general mind in Europe as to the terrible extent of her

military preparations and resources, and the advantageous military position she had acquired. We call it terrible for no purpose of "strong writing," and for no party project of peace or war, but because that such was the actual fact, as proved by her resistance to a coalition of such magnitude and power, and because

her aggressive facilities were to a great extent unnoticed in England. Russia had been developing herself upon all contiguous territory, and with an energy, vigilance, and intrigue never surpassed—never equalled—in the history of the world. If Russia had encouraged the arts of peace, it was only to subserve the purposes of war; if she had welcomed science, it was only that the military art might flourish; if she had brought out her own natural resources, the main object was to store up appliances of strength for arsenals the most colossal. For this the labour of her serfs, the timber of her forests, the corn, and flax, and hemp, the products of her fields, the arms, and cordage, and clothing of her foundries and her factories, and the gold of the Ural mountains had, since the peace of 1815, been collecting. In this way her wars with the Persians, Circassians, Georgians, Daghestans, Turks, Poles, had been sustained, and still from the resources of so vast an empire these armouries and depositories of strength were replenished with an energy and prodigality that spared nothing. Proud of her enormous military means, she had frequently displayed her strength by magnificent reviews, dazzling even to the other first-rate military governments, and adopted a haughty tone unknown to diplomacy even in seasons of triumphant conquest. *Sic volo sic jubeo* had been the spirit of all Russia's dealings with Austria, Prussia, Turkey, Persia, the nations of Central Asia, and the once proud and fearless Scandinavian states. Even now, when resisted by the greatest empires, she was an assailant in some directions, and preparing, by vast arrangements and numbers, to resist on all theatres of action the powerful assaults directed against her. In the Crimea she had held her own with tenacity, and drawn upon her resources of men and material like an empire that did not fear to spend itself profusely in the outpourings of war. Through seas of mud, over steppes covered with snow, hungered, frost-struck, and way-worn, legions followed legions to the field of her defeat around Sebastopol; and as they fell in numbers upon its ramparts they were succeeded by others, as if from without men were innumerable, while within munitions were exhaustless.

Such was the attitude of Russia at the beginning of 1855. It became evident that if, beneath the bursting shell, the red-hot ball, and the heavy shock, the beleaguered city should be rent, consumed, and broken, and over the piles of her slaughtered defenders the soldiers of England and France should press to the conquest, it would be at an expense of blood and money which was appalling to contemplate. Without noticing here the progress of this, or the result of former wars as affected Turkey, it may be with cer-

tainty said, that, end how this war might for Russia as to her relation with the allies, Turkey must be permanently weakened, and Russia relatively strengthened, unless the allies should deprive her of a Turkish boundary, and raise between the two empires the ramparts of independent states. The Asiatic scene of the war especially exemplified this: Georgia had already become Russian; Circassia and Daghestan had been all but subjugated; from Persia a territory as large as England had been torn; from the Black Sea, and the Caspian, Russia had pushed on her influence and her armies, until the King of Bokhara in his remote regions became either a trembling ally or a submissive tributary. The Khan of Khiva was forced into reluctant treaties; victories were gained by a handful of Russian troops over the irregular forces of Kohan, and the khan of that country was actually recruiting at Peshawur, with the consent of the East India Company. No person acquainted with the public sentiment in India, and the fears and feelings upon its frontier, had any doubt that a Russian force had penetrated far into Central Asia, and was forming alliances and attaching to it large bodies of irregular troops. Her ascendancy was again felt in the Persian capital, and Cabul heard, as it were, the footsteps of her approach. Numbers in England and India thought it not impossible that the forces of the Company and the czar might measure swords at last.

Perhaps the most gigantic preparations of Russia were those which she directed to the Baltic. She organised in that direction the best equipped army she ever produced, and its *morale* was as much above the average of her armies as its material. Finland, that so lately had been a Swedish province, was studded with Russian fortresses; and Denmark, which had so often sent its sea-kings as conquerors to these islands, and which has kept a name of independence and renown ever since, became a piece of reversionary property which, by a treaty England recognises, may one day fall to the house of Romanoff. But beyond all these fields of action, Russia, with ever-widening circle, had spread her presence and her power. The repulse of the allied squadron at Petropaulovski, and in the Arctic Sea, filled her with hope and pride. On every frontier, from every shore to which her confines reach, she had stretched out the arm of grasping ambition and vigorous attack. Within the last year she had appropriated the Northern Manchou Province, a territory larger than New England, and watered by the Seghalian, a river scarcely inferior in extent and volume to the Mississippi. By this means she had not only secured a rich country but new resources in men. She can pour from thence hordes of Tartars into China, and when opportunity

allows, carry her conquests to Peking. She, in this appropriation, obtained a military and naval position on the eastern shores of the Pacific, which will be felt by English commerce over a vast extent where our trade prospers, and our power is respected and feared.

After nine months of war with the Western powers, Russia was not humbled, she had even gained territory. Her influence seemed felt everywhere—her eagle was planted upon the snows of the frigid zones, and it basked in the light of the sunniest lands. It spreads its wings over the sandy plains where the Tartar and the Cossack roam wildly through endless solitudes, and it looked forth, from the mast and the arsenal, over many and far-spreading seas. It became obvious to all men that the time had come when England must step back from her foremost position of power, or Russia must recede before the brave old flag which for a thousand years had floated over the breeze and the battle, the ensign of civilisation, freedom, and victory.

Some recent publications have revealed in minute detail the territorial accessions of Russia, even since the offensive mission of Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople, and represent them as increasing her power to a vast extent. In the sixth number of Dr. Petermann's *Mittheilungen über wichtige neue Erforschungen auf dem Gesamtgebiete der Geographie*, there is an interesting article on West Siberia, its physical nature, industrial products, and geographical importance. According to this description, the Siberia of now-a-days, in consequence of the constant advance of the Russians towards the south, contains regions that may be called the Italy of Siberia, and in climatic respects do in fact equal the Italy of Europe. The territory that the Russians have taken possession of during the last ten years, between the Caspian Sea and the empire of China, in the direction of our Indian possessions, is more extensive than Great Britain, France, Turkey, and all Germany, including Prussia and Austria, put together, and gives into their hands the keys of the fluvial territory of the Jaxartes and the Oxus, within the confines of which the ancient realms of Bokhara and Kokan lie. Petermann's description of the extent, population, and political importance of West Siberia is rendered more graphic by two maps of the seven *gubernia*, or governments, into which it is divided. The first exhibits the density of the population by a systematic gradation of the colouring of the maps; the second divides West Siberia, also by its varied colouring, into four separate regions, which he distinguishes as the regions of agriculture, of mining, of fishing, or the chase, and of cattle-breeding, or the region of steppe: to these is added a fifth region—that of the salt lakes.

The czar's determination to prosecute the war with vigour animated all Russia. At the beginning of the year 1855, the people of Western Europe were made acquainted with a manifesto published by the autocrat, in an extraordinary supplement of the *Journal of St. Petersburg* shortly before, and quoted in p. 694 of our first volume. It is characterised by the usual assumption of piety, and the usual pride and arrogance of such documents. Its real object was to preserve the courage of the people by pretending to thank God for successes not vouchsafed, and by exaggerating even in the expressions of gratitude to the Almighty any advantages really gained.

When the combats of January had caused heavy losses to the defenders of Sebastopol, the ire of the czar was intensely roused, and his determination to drive the allies into the sea was expressed with passionate energy to those most immediately in his confidence. Accordingly, all Russia was called to arms, and the court expected that this would fill the allies with dismay. At the close of January the emperor put forth a new manifesto, demanding the armed services of all Russians:—

Our loyal and beloved subjects well know how ardently we desired and desire to obtain, without force of arms and without further effusion of blood, the end we have constantly proposed: namely, to defend the rights of our co-religionists, indeed those of Christianity throughout the East. That wish is known to all who have impartially watched the march of events, and the invariable tendency of our acts. We remain, as ever, stranger to every other motive than this, and to any other view in the matter of faith and conscience. Faithful to these principles, we announced our assent to the opening of negotiations with the Western powers, who had formed with the Ottoman government a hostile alliance against us. We believe that our moderation and justice entitled us to expect from them the same sincerity and disinterested intentions. We have not yet lost hope of a restoration of that peace which is so desirable and so valuable to the whole Christian world. However, in the face of the forces they themselves have gathered, other preparations are making for the struggle against us, which, despite pending negotiations, are not suspended, nay, daily acquire more vast proportions. We are constrained to think that the increase of means which God has given us to defend our native country, will oppose an insurmountable barrier to hostile attempts against Russia, to projects threatening her security and greatness. We fulfil the first of our duties by invoking the support of the Almighty, with entire faith in his grace, and full confidence in the love of our subjects, animated by the same feelings of devotion to our creed, to our orthodox church, and to our dear country. We, therefore, address this new appeal to all classes of our subjects, ordaining that the formation of the general arming of the population of the empire be proceeded with.

More than once have we experienced painful trials. Yet, blessed Russia always found her salvation in her humble reliance on Heaven, in the ties uniting the sovereign to his beloved subjects; and, as formerly, so it will be now. God, who rears hearts, blesses your intention, and will grant you his aid.

NICHOLAS.

Given at St. Petersburg, Jan. 29 (Feb. 9), 1855.

The following ukase was addressed to the directing senate, requiring it to proceed with the general arming ordered in the manifesto:—

WHEREAS, by our proclamation of this day, we have called out all ranks of the empire for the defence of the orthodox faith, the throne, and the country, we command you firstly, to carry out and organise the general arming of the country according to the accompanying regulation confirmed by us; and secondly, to take steps for completing the equipment and arming of the combatants in the governments, that will be designated by us to that end in special ukases. The directing senate will not fail to make the necessary arrangements for carrying the above into execution.

St. Petersburg, Jan. 29, 1855.

NICHOLAS.

Shortly after the issue of these documents, the *Invalide Russe* published the regulation, prepared by the directing senate, and ratified by the czar, for the organisation of "the Imperial Mobile Militia," as the new corps decreed in the recent manifesto was called. The ordinance was divided into nine sections and ninety-two paragraphs; and in the original filled seven folio columns. The first clause declared that the corps was raised for the immediate necessities of the defence of the empire, of the throne, and of the faith. It enacted that military exemptions allowed formerly should not apply in the present case; but that all men liable to the capitation tax, or its equivalent, should be liable to be called upon to serve. Yet there were these especial exemptions appended: merchants, Jews, and foreign colonists, who had been invited to settle on Russian territory, and had consequently received grants of land. The new corps were ordered to be divided into battalions of *druschines*, each consisting of four companies. Each *druschine* was to be commanded by a staff-officer, and to comprise four captains, a staff-captain, a proportionate number of subalterns, eighteen musicians, and 1000 rank and file.

In order to hasten the formation of these battalions, a governing militia committee was formed in every government, and within fourteen days after the receipt of the manifesto the nobles were to assemble and appoint the rendezvous of the several battalions, and to make arrangements for their supply and equipment. The expenses of raising, arming, and equipping the new corps, were to be defrayed by voluntary subscriptions, and all persons were called upon to contribute, in terms that admitted of no doubt that the subscription was to be made *volens volens*. The prescribed age of the soldiers was to be within twenty and forty-five, but on no account to be under the former age. This was a wise provision, as it was found by the English in the Crimea, that all youths under twenty-one or twenty-two years of age died off very fast from the effects of the climate, and the sudden change in their manner of living. Inhabitants of the same village were as much as possible to be kept together in the formation of companies. The men were requested to procure each a stand of arms at their own cost. The employ-

ment of this militia was to be primarily to defend the soil of Russia; but, at the pleasure of the czar, they were to be launched across the boundaries of the empire to attack its enemies. At the termination of the war all persons were to be allowed to go back to their homes. Should any fall in battle, their families would obtain a certificate absolving them from the obligation to furnish a recruit at the next levy. Every conceivable effort was made that the levies, new and old, should be supplied with the materials of war. Nor were these efforts unsuccessful: uniforms, accoutrements, and arms, were manufactured on a vast scale, and distributed throughout the empire.

The correspondent of the *Berlin National* wrote as follows from St. Petersburg, under date of the 19th of January:—"The military administration has ordered enormous quantities of warlike stores. The arsenals, workshops, and depots, have received fresh orders, and the commissariat has been directed to proceed with rigour against all contractors and purveyors who are not punctual. The severity with which some authorities have proceeded against such persons has rather damped their spirit of enterprise, and thus raised prices for want of competition. The dockyard administration has made a demand for 50,000 pud of hemp for rigging, and 1000 tons of suet. The arsenal of Briansk has furnished 22,000 pud of artillery stores; and 45,000 pud of cannon have been sent from Dubow to Rostoff, on the Don, as the frost facilitates the transport. Tula has furnished about 300,000 pud of arms, which have been conveyed to different depots. Enormous quantities of hospital stores have been sent to Brjesc-Liteffski, on the Bug, to Kiyeff, Wilna, Minsk, Grodno, &c. In short, the most restless military activity prevails throughout the whole empire."

A letter from St. Petersburg of the 3rd of February, published in the *Constitutionnel*, made the following statements:—"The preparations for defence which are being made on all the strategical points of our frontiers show that, up to the present time, the Russian cabinet does not flatter itself with the hope of obtaining a pacific solution at Vienna. I can assure you that at Gatschina the court is convinced that the attitude of Austria towards Russia is less the result of necessity than the consequence of the warlike sentiments which animate the young emperor, Francis Joseph. The government continues to do all it can to render the war popular. The czar himself does not allow any opportunity to escape of encouraging voluntary contributions, and of making himself agreeable to the donors. Only ten days ago, he addressed the following rescript of thanks to the community of Riga:—

TO OUR WELL-BELOVED COMMUNITY OF RIGA.

The governor-general, Prince Suwaroff, has announced to us that the community of Riga offered him, on the 18th of December last, a sum of 50,000 roubles (the rouble is upwards of 4*l*.) towards the expenses of the war. In accepting this gift as a proof of the devotedness of the community of Riga, it is extremely agreeable to us to express to it on this occasion our warm and sincere gratitude.

NICHOLAS.

A Prussian subject, who has long been established here as a jeweller, has, in his love for Russia, placed at the disposal of the empress jewels to the value of 2768 roubles. The empress gave that sum to her sons, charging them to distribute it to the garrison of Sebastopol. Addresses expressive of devotedness have been received from Smolonsko and Kharkoff. The minister of the interior has just issued two decrees, which are not without importance; the first is for the improvement of the navigation of the Volga, from Astracan to the Caspian Sea, and the second forms a new joint-stock company, under the name of the Golden Fleece, for working the gold mines of Siberia."

Early in January three Belgian manufacturers undertook to found a rifle manufactory at Warsaw. The Belgians throughout the war showed a marked sympathy with Russia against the allies, arising from the favour in which despotic principles is held by a large and bigoted section of the Belgian people. The activity of the emperor during this month was extraordinary. Attended by Prince Paskiewitch, he made a tour of inspection, which was intended to include all the head-quarters of the active army corps, and which did comprise many. General von Dehn was deputed to inspect all the fortifications of the kingdom of Poland, and to make an especial report. The emperor and his suite, as well as the engineer-general, Von Dehn, were checked in their progress by the heavy snowstorms which, during January and part of February, fell all over Russia, and which was felt in the south of that empire with unusual severity.

The Finns and Volhynians received very especial attentions from the imperial court, in order to animate their zeal against the allied fleets, expected in the spring to appear once more in the Baltic. The emperor formed regiments of reserve for his Life Guards from the Volhynians and Finns, and at their head attended divine worship, having personally inspected them in the minutest manner, thanked officers and men for their attention and discipline, and bestowed a silver rouble upon every private soldier.

The emperor not only showed the greatest activity and industry, he also preserved the most imperturbable coolness and courage on all public occasions, although he was frequently irritable to the last degree in private. When called upon to transact public business, he

especially manifested self-possession. On a despatch arriving from Vienna, announcing that an Austrian general had been sent to Paris on a military mission, he was engaged with his private secretary and Prince Paskiewitch. The emperor ordered the aide-de-camp who brought the despatch to read it—a very unusual proceeding, and in this case probably intended to show his coolness, and set an example to his officers. As the aide-de-camp read, the prince manifested considerable uneasiness, when the emperor turned to him (as the reading of the despatch closed), and asked, "Is that all?—there is nothing changed in the situation." The imperial impassibility produced great surprise in those present. All this, however self-possessed and resolute it appeared, must have been assumed, for the worm of remorse and disappointment already preyed upon his heart. The most absurd falsehoods were resorted to by the pro-Russian press in Europe to magnify the new levies. One of these organs of despotism made known that the crown serfs had offered the emperor a contingent of 60,000 men, to be employed as sharp-shooters, "among them all the ermine hunters, estimated at 20,000, who pass their whole lives on the banks of the Oura, or the Oby, in the chase of the fox and the beaver as well as the ermine, they must be skilful marksmen, as this animal (the ermine) can only be aimed at from a considerable distance, and must be hit on the nose to avoid injuring the skin. The whole of these are to be immediately organised, and sent to the Crimea, armed with the Minié rifle." It is needless to say the ermine hunters never made their appearance—the contingent of 60,000 sharp-shooters only existing in the form of the falsehood in which the story was couched. These bravadoes were disregarded by Europe, and when the emperor, himself their chief author and abettor, perceived that they were laughed at, he was filled with mortification and chagrin.

All the gigantic efforts put forth by Russia were necessary to make up for the drain of men. A report in the *Journal of St. Petersburg*, published in January, 1855, stated that from the 5th of October to the 17th of November, the naval loss sustained in Sebastopol was—killed, 4 superior officers, 14 subalterns, 789 sub-officers and sailors; wounded, 24 superior officers, 104 subalterns, and 2934 sub-officers and sailors. At the same period the *Cologne Gazette* published a letter written from Warsaw, alleging that "the grand active army engaged upon the Danube and in Bessarabia in 1854, lost in killed, 29,204 men; wounded, 55,304; deserters, 6420; disease, 16,156; making a total of 111,132 men." The letter gave no intimation whether these numbers included officers, which it is most probable they did not. If this

computation be correct, it will be seen that the Russian army of Prince Paskiewitch lost heavily by desertion: only a small number of these joined the allied armies, they must, therefore, have mingled with the people of Bulgaria, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and have been sheltered and concealed by them. Sickness also must have pressed heavily upon the ranks of the army of the material guarantee, while within the confines of the territory usurped. This account did not include the numbers lost in the repeated razzias across the borders after the Austrian occupation.

The Russians kept to the end of the war a very firm front on the Danubian frontier of Bessarabia. Thus, on the 13th of January, this state of things was thus described:—"The *Danube* learns from Akerman that Prince Gortschakoff was at this place on the 13th, in the course of a tour of inspection. The Russians retain possession of the *tête de pont* at the Kilia arms, and have two batteries there. The Russian steamers cruise uninterruptedly on the river near Isatchka and Tultscha."

On the 23rd of the same month the *Journal of St. Petersburg* gave an account of a reconnaissance by Russian troops across the Danube:—"The troops were commanded by General Ouschakoff, and consisted of four battalions, two squadrons, six sotnias of Don Cossacks, four pieces of cannon, and a Cossack battery of horse artillery. The Turkish detachment was driven out of Babadagh, with a loss of 263 killed, and 83 prisoners. A flag and an ammunition train were also captured. 'On our side,' continues the report, 'one Cossack was wounded!'" Of course no person believed the perpetually recurring story of the "one Cossack" killed or wounded. The Russian loss on these predatory excursions was frequently severe. It is likely that the accounts given above of the numbers sacrificed in the Danubian warfare are much below the truth.

The January number of the *Russian Marine Magazine* contained a report drawn up by the état-major of the Russian Baltic fleet, which reveals a sacrifice of human life, and an occurrence of human suffering, which could not have been believed in England on any but a Russian authority:—"The fitting out of the first and second division of the fleet commenced in March, and lasted till the end of April, at which time there was still one foot deep of ice in every ship's hold; the weather had been extremely wretched the whole time of getting ready for sea, accompanied by violent E. and N.W. winds. On the 5th of May, the *Emperor Peter I.* got under weigh, and was followed within the next three days by all the rest of the vessels, but their evolutions were confined in all to two reconnaissances. Nevertheless, in spite of careful treatment, such as

fresh meat and vegetables, new bread and warm tea three times a week, the severities of the weather and the exhalations from the frozen bilge-water thawing in the hold, produced inflamed eyes, cholera, typhus, diarrhœa, catarrhal and gastric fevers. Scrofula showed itself in very few vessels, but inflammation of the eyes forms twenty per cent. of the whole number of cases, and they were almost exclusively on board ships that remained in the harbour: on board the sailing vessels the cases of illness, in proportion to the number of the crew, were as follows, viz.:—on board the *Smolensk*, 206 per cent.; *Krasnoi*, 108 per cent.; *Empress Alexandra*, 104 per cent.; *Valagos*, 103 per cent.; *Beresina* and *Netron Mena*, 102 per cent.; with the rest the proportion gradually decreased to 40 per cent., which was the rate of sickness on board a vessel that was only eight weeks altogether at sea. On board the steamers the proportion was, on board the *Oraton*, 202 per cent.; *Grosaschtschi*, 170 per cent.; *Owasehni*, 140 per cent.; *Rurick*, 149 per cent.; *Palkan*, 98 per cent.; and *Kamtschatka*, 60 per cent. The cases of inflammation of the eyes amounted, on board the *Smolensk* alone, to 104 per cent. of the crew; the whole number of cases of sickness amounted to 60 per cent. of the whole force. And yet the one squadron was only at sea from the 9th to the 15th of July; the other from the 21st to the 27th of August (o.s.) The author of the report recommends that in future the vessels shall not be fitted out so early, nor manned until they are quite free from ice; it is suggested also that the new hands should not be put on board until they have been a little acclimatized. The newly organised marine force, which did not, properly speaking, come into active service, lost 7 per cent. by death during the summer."

Throughout January, February, and part of March, the reliable intelligence from nearly every province of the Russian empire exhibited an amount of hardship and suffering shocking to humanity. The Russian army in the field in the Crimea shivered under threadbare tents, and were often tentless, and sorely stricken with disease. The recruiting, or rather conscription, was felt all over the empire; but more particularly in Poland, from which more than 60,000 men had been torn away from their families to serve in the Crimea, in Asia, or on the shores of the Baltic. The streets of the towns and villages of Poland were filled with lamentation and woe—mothers weeping, and beyond all comfort, ran shrieking through the streets, until dragged to prison or struck down by the Russian soldiery; fathers selling everything they possessed to buy off their sons were robbed of their "smart money," and of their children as well. In the neigh-

bourhood of Kielecé, a man of respectable position was deprived by the conscription of his eldest son, who was engaged that day to be married; a younger brother nobly volunteered to serve in his stead. The father brought the lad to the chief authority, and offered him as the substitute of the betrothed one: being a fine healthy young man, he was the fitter of the two for the severities of a soldier's life, so the authorities thought—they *accepted him and retained the other*, robbing the altar and the parental home at one stroke. The father died in three days, and was speedily followed by the bereaved mother. The accounts furnish no intelligence of her agonies, or her fate, who was widowed on the altar's steps. No feeling, no compassion was shown by the ruthless authorities who wielded the conscription in Poland—they delighted to be barbarous. The conscripts were treated with the uttermost contumely and severity at Kielecé; while the glass was below zero, these poor fellows were placed quite naked in rows in the streets to be examined by the medical men.

The requisitions for supplies of all kinds were grinding and oppressive to the last degree, particularly in Poland, Podolia, and the Ukraine. Podolia suffered exactions to the amount of four millions of silver roubles, while several thousands of vehicles were provided upon requisition, besides horses and drivers for the conveyance of troops, luggage, and stores: many of these never returned—the carts were broken up for fire-wood, the horses seized for the artillery, the men drawn into the conscription. In every frontier-town, several hundreds of vehicles were constantly kept in readiness to carry, at a moment's notice into the interior, the public treasures, garrison, stores, *employés*, &c. One of the greatest hardships was connected with the military colleges; these were drained of their students, who were sent to join various corps of the army garrisoning the interior, and their places were supplied to a great extent by Jewish children, torn from their parents at the tender age of ten and even of eight years. Sometimes a large ransom, or a considerable bribe to the officials, enabled the poor Jew to gain exemption for his children; but generally this resort was useless, as another swoop was made by the hand of power to bear their crying from them. No honour, honesty, sympathy, or compassion, guided the conduct of the Russian authorities, or even mollified the stern discipline of their official acts.

The spirit manifested by the Russian government and nation, in reference to the war, was unworthy of any civilised people. Early in January it was resolved, by a decree at Warsaw, that every Frenchman and Englishman who had taken service with Russia during the peace, within the kingdom of Poland, should

be forthwith dismissed from his employment, and conducted with contumely to the Austrian and French frontiers. All natives of France or England engaged in any forge, factory, workshop, or domestic service, were to be brought under this proscription. The grooms employed by Russians of rank were generally English; these were all to be dismissed, to the great inconvenience of their owners. It was intended to extend the decree to all Russia; circumstances arose, however, to modify this proscription; but there was no modification of the angry spirit of czar, soldier, priest, or peasant—all united in grim hatred against whatever thwarted in the least the designs of Russian bigotry and ambition.

The government stimulated the military spirit of the nation by liberal rewards to all by whom any martial service was rendered. Rear-admiral Savoyko received the order of St. George, third class, for the defence of Petropaulovski. Rewards in the Crimean army, and to the navy quartered there, were lavish, and scarcely less so upon the shores of the Baltic. Even the army of reserve, which had no opportunity of winning laurels, partook of the promotions and honours so profusely scattered. General Samskoi, in command of the cavalry of reserve formed at the beginning of the year, and Generals Pawelskoff, Golowine, Germer, and Krause, commanding divisions or brigades, were promoted as an encouragement to the reserve troops to desire removal to the active armies on the frontiers. Hope was also held out to the friends of soldiers in the active armies that communication with them by letter would be made more cheap and frequent; a service of *malles-postes* from St. Petersburg to Simpheropol was organised in January, and commenced running as soon as the weather allowed.

The animosity cherished to England throughout the Russian empire would pass all belief, if not so well authenticated. Some pretence was made of a better feeling to France, although in reality the hostile *animus* was little less to that country. England was, however, believed by the government to be the more powerful antagonist, and hence the attempts to excite a fanatical enthusiasm against her were the more constant. The efforts of the press in this way are very amusing to an English reader, revealing the extreme ignorance and credulity of even the newspaper-reading population of Russia. The following is a specimen from a paper professing to be an authority on commercial matters—in fact, a journal of commerce. It affords some indication from its remarks, where France is concerned, of being wiser than it cared to appear to its readers:—
“The crop of corn has been insufficient throughout all the states of Europe, and 8,000,000 of

quarters of wheat not being forthcoming in consequence of its export being prohibited—a prohibition which appears to threaten the Prussian government itself—no doubt can be entertained that England must sue for peace in order to obtain bread. But if Europe is to feel difficulties and sufferings, we in our turn shall have to support the privation of all articles of luxuries, particularly French wines, which we have been in the habit of purchasing with the proceeds of our corn. It is true that a Russian writer, M. Boulgarine, has endeavoured to prove that the wines of the Crimea are at least as valuable as those of France, Spain, Hungary, and the Rhine. That, however, will not prevent foreign wines from holding the first rank on the tables of St. Petersburg and Moscow. Even at Tobolsk, the wines of the Crimea will not replace champagne or claret. Notwithstanding the efforts of persons in office to revive our hatred against France, it was seen that, during the *fêtes* of Christmas, the productions of that country were so sought after that the dealers completely exhausted all their various stocks of French articles. How can it be reasonably expected that M. Boulgarine should ever succeed in causing the wines of the Crimea to replace those of France?"

A correspondent of a Paris paper, writing from Russia, remarked:—"Among the other extravagancies of the Russian press, I will mention the publication of a kind of dialogue between the shade of Napoleon I. and France. The illustrious shade asks France whether she madly flatters herself that she can dictate conditions to Russia, now so differently situated as regards her power from what she was in 1812? As to England, she is represented as being irresistibly led away on the tracks of the followers of Kossuth and Mazzini, and as having entered into an alliance with France with a view to commercial speculations."

The general tone of the Russian people towards England during the war has been admirably sketched in a work entitled the *Englishwoman in Russia*. This lady seems to have been introduced to the *élite* of St. Petersburg society, and she represents the English—even ladies—as the objects of rage and hatred on the part of persons who held with them close intimacies, and of long standing:—"I was well acquainted," says the *Englishwoman*, with a lady who resided in one of the institutes in St. Petersburg, and I was in the habit of frequently calling to see her. Before the declaration of war I was always met with smiles, and, according to the established custom, the young persons used to bow as they passed us; but as soon as they knew the war had commenced, we heard them continually make the remark one to another, '*Né la saluez pas, ma chère, c'est une Anglaise.*'"

The following were some of the common expressions used by persons in the best society:—"There will be plenty of English blood shed this year, thank God!" "We must have some new hospitals built for the wounded when the British fleet is destroyed!" "Count Besborodku has made a present of cannon to the emperor, to shoot those swine when they approach us!" "There won't be many of the British fleet that will ever return home again!"

The real design of Russia in her conduct to Turkey was often candidly admitted in the hearing of the *Englishwoman*, and even boastingly avowed. They would say:—" '*Quant à Constantinople nous l'aurons, soyez tranquille.*' " "Turkey is ours." "There is no such country as Turkey now, and no longer a sultan; for, henceforward, the game will be played by France and England." . . . "They will never," says the authoress, "forgive us for the check they have received."

The spirit of idle gasconade in which the nobility and officers of the army indulged she thus depicts. While at Odessa she met a select company on one occasion,—"During the whole dinner (at which were some generals, other officers, and ladies of rank), nothing was talked of but the wonderful triumph of the Russian arms. I am convinced that there was not one single person there who believed it; but who could venture to doubt the imperial words? Evil would have befallen him who had dared to do so."

The following curious exemplification of the mixed feeling to England which the populace entertained is given by this lady:—"The Russians expressed great friendship for Lord Aberdeen, and intense hatred of Lord Palmerston, whom they blamed as the prime mover of public affairs, and as the author indirectly of all their misfortunes. I may mention, *en passant*, that the names of Napier and Palmerston inspired the lower classes with so great a terror, that the women used to frighten the children by saying that the English admiral was coming! And among the common men, after exhausting all the opprobrious terms they could think of (and the Russian language is singularly rich in that respect), one would turn to the other and say, 'You are an English dog!' Then followed a few more civilities, which they would finish by calling each other 'Palmerston!' without having the remotest idea of what the word meant; but, as the climax of hatred and revenge, they would bawl out 'Napier!' as if he were fifty times worse than Satan himself. From being favourites in St. Petersburg, the English are now especial objects of hatred, and from our stupid bombardment of Odessa, also of contempt. Notwithstanding their antipathy to us, it appears that

the lower classes of Russia have an idea that if we take St. Petersburg they will be no longer slaves, and will have no more poll-tax to pay. This is an opinion that ought to be encouraged, as it might be turned to good account."

The main hope of the Russian government, for sustaining the enthusiasm of the people, was in religious fanaticism. Never was the religious feeling of a people made so basely the subject of political speculation. The following letter, dated the 6th of January, 1855, will throw some light upon this conduct:—"The festivities have taken their customary physiognomy, and religious ceremonies, visits, *gulfanie*, and dinner-parties, are the order of the day and night. A Christmas tree of unusual magnificence has been dispatched to Prince Menschikoff. The town of Sebastopol has also received a gift. Scarfs, embroidered with laurels, are at present the fashion, and even children's playthings show the prevailing warlike mania. In these games, all representing military scenes, the English and French, as you may imagine, get much the worst of it—a Cossack is, for instance, represented in full charge, with half-a-dozen red-coats and Frenchmen transfixed by his lance! Can what is reported to-day be true—that the court is inclined towards peace? Or is it a brilliant but hollow glass bubble, to be hung on the Christmas tree of the people? If we merely obtain time by peace conferences, whereby Austria is of course prevented from action, and must for months sacrifice her pecuniary resources to the support of the army, the gain for us will be immense. Both here and in Gatchina church parades have taken place. In the following year a universal war tax is to be collected, but in what manner has not been decided in the ministry of war."

The members of the royal family seldom visited any government or garrison without making a present of religious relics or pictures: the following brief announcement in a St. Petersburg paper illustrates this:—"The Commandant of Woronege, Rubzoff, made a present to the Grand-dukes Nicholas and Michael of two images of saints for Fort Alexander, at Sebastopol."

The insurrections in Greece, the discontents in Servia, and the marauding expeditions of Montenegro, were all kept up in a similar manner: bells, pictures, and baubles, associated with religion, were profusely bestowed; and the emperor of all the Russias was made to appear as a tender and watchful father over the interests of the only orthodox church (the Greek), destined by heaven to fill the earth, and erect Constantinople as the capital of its holy and glorious empire. This is the secret of the Russian soldier's dogged indifference to life or death in the service of the czar whom

he believes to be the minister of heaven, and the avenger of the one, true, holy, orthodox and catholic church—the Greek. The condition and spirit of the Russian soldiery, in this respect, and of the masses of the Russian people from among whom they are taken, may be judged of by an incident among the prisoners captured at Bomarsund, and held in custody in England. The Rev. Mr. Stallybrass, a native of Siberia, of English parents, visited the prisoners at Plymouth. He gave this account of his visit:—"I proceeded to some of the wards, and held conversation with many of the men, all of whom seemed pleased to see me. I felt the advantage of having spent twenty-four years in Russia, and endeavoured to speak to their hearts, and hope that in some good measure I succeeded. I found that all who can read have copies of the New Testament, either in Russ, or in some other language which they know, and that they received these on their first arrival at Sheerness. This afforded me an opportunity for speaking of the privilege of possessing the New Testament, and their duty and interest in making themselves acquainted with its contents, and obtaining an interest in the blessings it reveals. One man wished to raise a discussion as to the cause of the war, asserting that whereas the English rely on the French, the French on the English, and the Turks on both, their czar relies on God alone, and is fighting only in the cause of religion—a delusion into which these poor fellows have been cheated. I declined to discuss the point with them, but reminded them of the fact that, by the providence of God, they are here, and have important time and opportunities afforded them, which I besought them diligently and faithfully to improve. I repeated my visit to them in the afternoon, with similar results."

This little narrative strikingly portrays the temper of the Russian army and people. These soldiers, although possessing the New Testament, and men of a much superior class to the average soldiery of Russia, yet clung to the idea of the divine mission of their czar; lost sight of their own sufferings and wrongs in loyalty to that mission; and regarded the oceans of blood shed, and the countless horrors perpetrated, as only accidents to the great process of making the world orthodox by the sword of St. Petersburg, and as too trivial to be taken into account when the glorious conquest of the world by the Greek church—through the arms of its chief and representative, the czar—was the object to be attained. The will of the autocrat was the law and the religion of the people, reminding one of the indignant and awful language of the prophet of old—"The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people will have it so, saith the Lord of Hosts."

CHAPTER LXIII.

TURKEY DURING THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1855.—SUFFERINGS FROM SCARCITY OF FOOD, AND FROM SICKNESS IN THE CAPITAL.—BAD CONDUCT OF THE SAILORS ASHORE.—ASSASSINATIONS OF ENGLISH AND FRENCHMEN BY GREEKS.—THE TURKISH CONTINGENT—SKIRMISHES ON THE DANUBE.—EARTHQUAKE AT BROUSSA.—RELUCTANCE OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE.

"Alack! what mischief might be set abroad
In shadow of such greatness."—SHAKESPEARE. *Henry IV.*

THE winter of 1854-5 pressed heavily on Turkey, European and Asiatic; the waste of war was universally felt. Corn, which was six piastres a measure on the northern shores of the Danube, was sixty at Constantinople. There was scarcity of food in the capital of the great empire of the sultan, and hunger began to pinch both Osmanli and Christians. The Russians were unaccountably permitted to hold the frontier fortresses, and the Bessarabian bank of the Danube; and they would not permit the exportation of corn, which became a drug in the provinces, while the inhabitants of the sultan's capital were in peril of starvation. The winter, too, was a severe one—much like that in the Crimea; alternate snow and mud tormented the lazy dwellers in Stamboul, and offered no small obstacles to the transaction of business by the officers and agents of the allies. One who experienced the winter of 1854-5 on the Bosphorus, thus wrote in January:—"The dreary winter at Constantinople has at length set in, and the streets are a mass of snow and mud. From the crowds of strangers who have lately been collected from all parts of the world within the limits of the European quarter, there is an air of animation in the narrow and dirty streets, but an animation without gaiety, and more resembling the bustle of some dingy and populous neighbourhood of London. The great street of Pera is a dirty lane, formed by high irregular houses, and destitute of all pavement for foot passengers, who must clamber and slip over the pointed blocks of stone, among horses and asses, porters carrying heavy weights by means of long poles, and crowds of the rabble of the Levant smelling of garlic, and meditating theft. Without large boots or goloshes no one ventures to quit his home, and as rain may be expected at intervals of about two hours, each traveller is armed with an umbrella. When the whole of these are extended at the approach of a shower, the collisions are incessant, and the pathway almost choked. The most conspicuous figures are the French officers, who are met at every turn. The British are almost entirely confined to the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus."

It will surprise none, that with a variable and severe winter, scarcity of food, and an

over-crowded state of the population, Constantinople was unhealthy. A new and very fatal disease made its appearance, which it was generally believed was imported from the Crimea. The body of the patient after death, and even before death, became livid; this led many to call it cholera, but it was proved to be a different disease, although at Balaklava many who died of it were said to have been struck down by cholera. The suddenness of decease was another resemblance to that disease, which led to the mistake. Many of the Turkish and Greek population of the capital were carried away during the winter by this mysterious complaint.

The state of society at Constantinople was not the best during this period. The French and English naval and military officers who happened to be there on their way to the Crimea, or with the reserves, or in charge of stores and *matériel* of war, no doubt found opportunities of agreeable intercourse; but the general condition of the place, physically, morally, and socially, was utterly bad. The English and French sailors contributed, by their intemperance, to disturb the tranquillity of the city; and the lower classes of the Greeks—a vile herd of robbers and assassins, yet desperately bigoted in religion—lost no chance that was afforded them of assassinating and plundering the rude mariners, or indeed whoever exposed himself to the chance of insult, personal injury, or depredation.

The special correspondent of the *Daily News*, a gentleman of candour and ability, thus describes the state of things as he witnessed it:—"It is to be hoped that the authorities here will take some means for the protection of our men-of-warships while on shore, otherwise I fear something very fearful will be the result. There are now a great many vessels—in fact, I believe all the sailing vessels from the fleet—lying here, or within a few miles. Occasionally these men get leave of absence, and, when on shore, scarcely a day passes without some serious disturbance. Many of the men have been stabbed by the Greeks, and I fear many more will share the same fate unless something is done to check these rows. There are a number of low drinking shops kept by the Greeks in and about Galata, where they sell the worst

description of intoxicating beverages. These fellows entice the sailors in, getting them to drink till they become in a state of helpless intoxication. They are then turned out into the street, these rascals having taken care to clear their pockets first of all their money. The consequence is, that when they come to their senses, they accuse the man of having robbed them; this he indignantly denies; however, Jack is not to be put off in that way, so away he goes and collects a number of his companions, and they make a fearful assault upon the house, breaking the windows and trying to force the doors. The Greeks watch their opportunity and sally out in large numbers with clubs and knives, and make a furious attack on the sailors. The consequence is, that these men being unprovided with any weapons are literally mowed down, and when on the ground three or four of these cowardly ruffians set upon one man. Last Sunday night there were three of these men killed just opposite to the house in which I was. A representation of the fact was made to the consul here by some civilians; but whether he has reported to the admiral of the port I am not aware. There is scarcely a day passes without a similar disturbance. It is said, and I believe with some truth, that these fellows drug the drink, in order to afford them a better opportunity to rob their victims. Another instance of this kind occurred on Saturday last. A sailor from the *Britannia* came on shore and went into one of these low Greek houses. He was a man described as being a most sober, steady fellow. After he had been there a short time, and partaken of two or three glasses of grog, he fell down dead. His companions arriving, suspicion naturally arose that he had been poisoned; one of the officers of the ship came, and the Greeks were taken into custody by the Turkish police. Everybody thought that under such circumstances there would be a *post-mortem* examination; but this morning I learnt that, instead of such being the case, they merely buried the man without any inquiry whatever. One very suspicious fact was that the man had received a month's pay the day before, and on searching his pockets not a shilling was to be found. These or similar affairs are almost of daily occurrence. If the men are to be allowed leave there ought undoubtedly to be some means adopted for securing their safety from these fellows while on shore. It may be said that if a man gets intoxicated he must pay the penalty of his folly; but one would imagine that it would be very easy to have a patrol of half English and half French in these streets to preserve order when these men were on shore, and this would operate as a safeguard against the designs of these harpies, and protect the men; as to placing any reliance on the

Turkish police, that is out of the question. If they were to take a man into custody charged with any offence, no matter how serious the charges are, he would be at large in a few days. I have heard several instances, from captains of sailing transports, of the men, after having been on shore, coming off to the vessels in a state of insensibility, evidently produced by drugging."

The correspondent of the *Morning Chronicle* describes the outrages of the English in such terms, that it is marvellous the Turks did not fly to arms to resent such insult. When it is recollected the sacredness with which Turks, and all orientals, invest the decorum of females, and the sternness with which they insist upon a deferential and modest deportment to them, no person can wonder that the presence of the "infidels," as they might well call us, was hateful to them:—"Just at present the local interest here is limited to the daily and nightly brawls of British and French sailors, amongst themselves and with the peaceable inhabitants. These freaks have frightened away the Turkish women from the Christian portions of Constantinople. Formerly they might be seen, especially on Fridays (the Turkish Sunday), in great numbers, crowding about the shops at Pera, or gathering in groups round any object that by its novelty excited their curiosity; whilst those of the upper classes used to make a drive through Pera streets quite the Sunday excursion. They have now almost wholly disappeared from the Christian suburbs—and no wonder. It was only last week that four sailors hoisted an unfortunate Turkish lady upon their brawny shoulders, and carried her in great glee and triumph from the centre of Galata to the great wooden bridge that spans the Golden Horn, in spite of her most earnest entreaties to be released. Finally, they let her fall, and fortunately she was not hurt. These kind of practical jokes are not relished. The Turks are furious at these proceedings, but swallow their wrath, in the knowledge of their helpless position. There is some talk of establishing a European police at Pera; it would be very well, as the Turkish *cavasses* do not much like interfering with their allies when the worse for liquor. There was a row at the theatre the other night, and several heads were broken."

As the winter advanced, the pranks of the Western sailors, and assassinations by Greeks increased; although the French, always superior to us in organisation, made arrangements to check excesses, and to bring to light the criminals whose daggers were so often steeped in the blood of the rough brave hearts that trusted to the treacherous race. Even when considerably repressed, the evils existed sufficiently to endanger life, disturb the tranquillity

of the city, and shock every principle and prejudice of the Osman race. A gentleman, whose mission to Turkey was of a religious nature, thus describes the moral aspect of the place when winter was expiring, and there was hope that the dark nights would not much longer afford obscurity to the wrong-doers:—"Our intemperate habits are procuring contempt and hatred for us in the Turkish capital. British and French war vessels are there under repair, and the English and French sailors are drunken and riotous to such a degree, as proves not merely horrifying but dangerous to the sober and peaceful Turks. In their drunken quarrels heads are broken and windows smashed, and every feeling of decent propriety completely outraged. The Turkish women have been frightened away by their mad freaks from every quarter where the Christian populations abound. The old men shake their heads, and invoke explanations from Allah. The Turks are goaded to fury by their conduct, but are unwilling to deal hardly by their allies. The French and English authorities ought instantly to interfere. How dreadful! The Cross, as represented by our blue jackets, must be execrated by the men of the Crescent."

These things contributed much to the loss of that respect which had undoubtedly attended the English name in the capital of the Turkish empire. The blunders and disorganisation which occurred before the eyes of the Turks, the treatment of the wounded and sick, the irreverent burial of the dead, the sufferings of the troops in the Crimea, the condition of neglect and misery in which British ships brought the invalided thence to the Bosphorus, the tidings of government abuse in England, and, finally, of the fall of the Aberdeen cabinet amidst the execrations of the English people, led the inhabitants of Stamboul to believe that the days of England's greatness were numbered, and the last struggling light of her glory fast fading away. All eyes were turned to France; the war was called the battle of the two emperors—Napoleon and Nicholas: the Turks had ceased to hope for any advantage for themselves; whichever won—French or Russ, Latin or Greek—there seemed in their eyes only humiliation for the faith and the land of the prophet. England was considered as drawn into the war by the superior skill and power of the French emperor, who needed the assistance of her fleet. The *prestige* of her ambassador still continued, because his official power had become something like an institution of the country; but his misconduct in reference to the Asiatic campaign, and his neglect of the sick in the hospitals of Scutari, lowered his personal influence. The Turks could not understand how, after such things, he could continue to represent the majesty of Great Britain,

unless there were some new and inexplicable evil working at the root of English government and English greatness.

The proposal for a Turkish contingent to increase the British army acted in opposite ways upon English influence. On the one hand, it was accepted as a proof of cordiality; and as the soldiers of England occupied the first place in the lists of valour in the esteem of the Turk, he felt honoured by the proposal to rank with such. On the other hand, it was asked how could England be a great nation, and men be scarce? Were not men the pride and wealth of an empire? How could England be rich if poor in warriors? France had not to resort to such means of gaining numbers for her legions; was she not then greater than England? Throughout all Asiatic, as well as European, Turkey, this train of reflection presented itself to the minds of the Osmans. Whatever the feelings excited, the sultan's government entered into a convention with that of Great Britain, empowering it to raise a military force of 20,000 men, to be employed in conjunction with the British army in the Crimea, or elsewhere, in the prosecution of the war to which the sultan was committed. It was intended to officer these troops to some extent with experienced foreigners, and to a greater extent with gentlemen holding the commission of the Hon. East India Company. The work of raising these troops was not prosecuted with good order, or an energetic spirit. Difficulties, some of which were foreseen, impeded the object; but these were slowly but finally overcome, and the Turkish contingent was at last organised. The troops, however, were not, as at first proposed, entirely Turkish: Poles, Hungarians, Italians, and men of other nations joined the force; and in England it was openly recruited for, and a regular depot for recruits established at Woolwich. The writer of these pages visited Woolwich, from the interest he took in the undertaking, and felt in every respect disappointed in the character of the accessions there embodied. Mere "raw lads," taken from the lowest possible condition in life, and without much physical vigour, constituted the bulk of the gathering for the contingent at Woolwich. Their conduct there was such as their appearance would lead a visitor to expect—brawls and outrages abounded, and some cowardly assaults were perpetrated by the stronger and bolder of the party upon the others. The foreign recruits for the contingent were generally morally and physically superior, although many of these also were not to be made a subject of boasting. On other pages of this History further notices of the Turkish contingent will be appropriately made.

While England was enlisting the Moham-medan subjects of the sultan, Russia was enlist-

ing his Christian subjects. A Greek contingent was much more eagerly sought by Russia than the Mussulman corps by Great Britain. Many Greeks found their way to Russia, and entered the czar's service. Most of these were drafted off to the Crimea, according to their own desire—as they almost to a man volunteered to be led at once against “the allies of Mohammed;” they could see the war only as one for their faith. About 4000 of these Greek volunteers were numbered among the reinforcements which arrived for the defence of Sebastopol, during the severe weather which marked the opening of the year 1855. At Sebastopol they fought bravely. Among the volunteers for the sorties, Greeks were always prominent; and many fell, both in the French and English trenches, fighting with all the desperation of a fanatical contempt of death. Armenians also entered into the czar's service, especially in Asia; but they were for the most part serviceable as spies, commissaries, and civil agents, rather than soldiers,—seldom exhibiting the Greek alacrity to meet the enemy.

A deep depression marked the minds of the more thoughtful Turks, while rage and a burning desire for revenge animated the more fanatical followers of “the prophet”—in consequence of the efforts made by the ministers of the Western powers to obtain concessions for the Christians, whose tone was insolent and offensive to the last degree. Nor could it be said that the Christians of any creed felt grateful to the West for interposition in their favour. They attributed any advantages which they derived, or were likely to derive, to Russia; because, had not Russia gone to war for the disenthralment of the Greek church from the Mohammedan yoke, the Western nations would have made no efforts for their redemption. The French were especially urgent that “the Greek Catholics,” and Franks, and Armenian proselytes to “the Western church,” should have certain liberties guaranteed; and our allies did not appear to be very particular as to the tone and temper in which their requests, or rather requisitions, were urged. A leading paper in Constantinople surprised and scandalised the adherents of “the prophet,” by the following announcement in one of its issues:—“It is known that the construction of a new Christian church at Sentari, in Albania, has been authorised by a recent resolution of the Ottoman Porte. The following are the principal passages of the firman addressed on this occasion to the Mussulman functionaries of the pashalic:—‘The Catholic population of the town of Sentari having implored my imperial permission to build a church in the interior of the city, in which they might perform divine service, I have issued in writing this sacred order granting

that permission. It is useless to call to mind that the tranquillity and welfare of the subjects of my sublime Porte are one of the dearest objects of my imperial solicitude. I have, therefore, issued an order emanating from my imperial grace to all concerned, to afford due help and assistance in this work.’”

It was not only on the subject of concession to the Christians that the Porte manifested an unwillingness to negotiate—this reluctance extended to the proposed conferences at Vienna for a treaty of peace. The Turks felt that all negotiations had somehow ended, of late years, in new concessions to the enemies of their religious ascendancy in their own empire, and territorial loss to the encroaching power which now waged a causeless war upon them. They also constantly referred to the case of the celebrated Vienna note, when France and England fell into the Austrian trap, or else united with Austria to ensnare Turkey. They cherished vividly the recollection, that to the firmness of their own divan was to be attributed the escape of the empire from what would have proved a virtual surrender to Russia. These memories and feelings so worked upon the mind of the Ottoman people, that public opinion was very adverse to any negotiations at all. They desired the allies not to interfere with the internal affairs of the empire in any way; and they expected that if the integrity of the Turkish empire was an affair of European policy, that the war should be urged on, until Russia, baffled and beaten, should sue for peace on the conditions which the allies were willing to vouchsafe.

That these feelings should prevail was the more to be expected as the Danubian frontier was still in an unsatisfactory condition. Austria held an armed occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, but oppressed and plundered the people, and did not prevent the Russian troops from making infamous razzias across the Pruth. The Turkish troops had been prevented by Austria from pursuing the fugitive Russians, and capturing, as they then would have been able to do, the strong positions on the Danube, where that river separates Bessarabia and the Dobrudscha. The Russians made incursions across the Danube as well as the Pruth, and the Turkish territory of Bulgaria was harassed; while the sultan's provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia were harried by Russian bands, and plundered in legal form, and under pretence of protection, by Austrian generals. The Turkish authorities, meanwhile, took measures for maintaining a line of observation along the banks of the Danube. Troops were quartered at Satcha, Matschin, Silistria, Rustchuk, Giurgevo, and Widdin, amounting to twenty-three battalions of infantry, while twenty-eight battalions were held in reserve

at Shumla; eleven batteries of artillery, and eight regiments of cavalry were allotted to this observation. Ismail Pasha, the hero of Kalafat, received the command of the army in Roumelia, assisted by Merze Said Pasha and Kel Hassan Pasha. Yaya Pasha and Achmet Pasha held the command in Bulgaria, at Shumla, and on the river frontier of Bessarabia. These arrangements were very effectual, as the Russians were severely punished in several of their forays, called by themselves reconnaissances. The *Journal de Constantinople* published early in February several paragraphs similar to the following, showing the penalty paid by the Russians for their temerity on the Danube, and proving the loyalty of the Danubian provinces to the sultan's throne:—"News has reached us by way of Matschin and Braila, that the Russian expeditionary corps in the Dobrudscha, wishing to force the passage of a river, has been beaten, with heavy loss, after a combat of some hours, by the rearguard of Yaya Pasha, and that it has already crossed the Danube at Tultseha and Ismail. For the last four or five days all the Turkish forces at Braila and the neighbourhood, under the command of Achmet Pasha, have been leaving, in order to cross the Danube at Gouva-Valonitza over to the right bank. At the very pressing request of Yaya Pasha, Prince Stirbey has caused to be purchased and sent on to Rustchuk and Silistria 650 draught oxen and buffaloes for conveying the baggage of the Turkish army. This is a great sacrifice in the present exhausted state of the country, which has lost 100,000 head of horned cattle through the forced exactions of the Russians. Prince Stirbey, desirous as ever of proving his devotion to the cause of his sovereign, acceded without the least hesitation to the demand of Yaya Pasha."

The Turkish expedition to Eupatoria, under the command of Omar Pasha, produced a good effect upon the military spirit of the country. The insults to which the Tunisian and other Islam soldiery were subjected in the Crimea, ever since the battle of Balaklava, had stung the heart of the whole people; for the strangest exaggerations of the ill-usage visited upon them by the Giaours, were circulated through European and Asiatic Turkey. General expectation was now entertained, that, under the auspices of Omar, in the new expedition, feats of arms redounding to the glory of the old Osmanli name would be performed.

Among the incidents which created much uneasiness at Constantinople, was the fire at the French hospital. Some of the patients, it was alleged, were buried or suffocated; and the French authorities, by hushing the matter up, stimulated public curiosity, and caused many exaggerated rumours to be put into circulation. The truth was, no loss of life took

place, although severe injuries were received. It was an exciting scene when the flames, gaining ascendancy, enveloped the building, and the Turkish and French soldiers exposed themselves bravely to danger in order to secure the invalids, who had to be borne away during a night of piercing cold, and deep darkness, to the asylums opened to receive them. The Turks, ever mindful of the dead, bent their way fearlessly through the flames, and carried off some bodies of French soldiers who had recently died. This circumstance gave rise to the report of more than twenty invalids having been burned in their beds. There were 500 sick unable to do anything for their own removal when the fire burst forth—a knowledge of this fact carried a thrill of horror through the whole population, Turk and Frank, and stimulated the energies of all who took part in the rescue. It was very generally remarked as singular, that the French, so orderly and accustomed to precise method in their organisations, should have been the cause and the chief victims of three great fires since the landing at Gallipoli: namely, the fire at Varna, which nearly destroyed the town where were the allied head-quarters; that at the arsenal, in which a vast store of provisions for the French army were consumed; and this at the hospital. Our allies did not allow these losses to incommode them, their habits of organisation and dispatch in all military matters came to their aid: wherever an open space could be found at Constantinople sheds were run up, and converted into stores or hospitals, and the strictest economy was united with perfect subordination and extensive efficiency. In these respects the English suffered in Constantinople, as everywhere else during the campaign; a correspondent of the *Times*, writing at the beginning of March, observes:—"This capital has few large buildings, except those belonging to the government, and those are required more than ever by the Turks themselves. We have had for months a ship of 1100 tons in harbour used as a naval store, at a cost of nearly 30s. per ton per month, or about £16,000 a-year. This sum would pay for the erection of iron stores large enough to contain a hundred times as much beef and pork as can be held by the *Canterbury*. The ground might easily be obtained from the Turks, and the materials used, after serving all purposes during the war, would be worth nearly their original price after it is over. Constantinople must be the heart of the great system of warfare in the East, and, unless preparations be made for the convenient and effective transaction of business and reception of troops and supplies here, it cannot be doubted but that confusion will prevail at every spot where the war may be actually carried on."

The French obtained better sites for their stores, hospitals, and camps throughout the war. This seems especially to have been the case in reference to hospitals. A writer, cognisant of the facts, thus discussed it in a leading London periodical:—"The two stations of Scutari and Kulali are most conveniently situated for the transport of wounded and sick from the vessels to the hospital, and are also far removed from the close and tobacco-laden atmosphere of Pera. But the inconvenience which results from their being placed on the opposite shore of an arm of the sea, liable to sudden squalls at all times, and in winter almost impassable, is more than equivalent to these advantages. The officers who have the management of our hospitals are obliged to have recourse to a miserable caique whenever they wish to consult with the authorities on this side of the water; for, though a steamer has been established to ply across, it is not suited to the necessities of men who may be detained for an unlimited time, or summoned at a moment's notice to make the journey. The consequence is, that the British authorities are accustomed to do as much business as possible in a single visit, and, with the exception of the naval officers and a few belonging to regiments just arrived, very few of our countrymen are to be met with within the limits of the capital. The French, however, are to be found everywhere, and their tasteful uniforms add much to the liveliness of the streets on a fine day, which, in this changeful climate, may be expected occasionally even in the depth of winter."

As it is necessary to give some information concerning our hospitals, in addition to what our last chapters on that subject contained, it can no where be more appropriately introduced than in a chapter on Turkey. The following letter was written by a medical officer, and it is interesting, as affording not only additional light as to the state of the sick and wounded, but as to the spirit subsisting in the early months of 1855 between the Turks and British. The letter is dated Constantinople, the 14th of February, 1855:—"I came down here with sick and wounded. I was asked to take charge of some of them. I consented, and 110 cases of fever, cholera, and dysentery, in every stage of weakness or prostration, were placed in my hands. You have no conception of the horrors of a ship full of such cases. We throw overboard daily three or four dead bodies. We have sick and dead in every regiment, particularly the unfortunate 63rd. I recognised many of them as Dublin carmen. Often have I given them sixpence for a set down, or threepence to bring me to Sandymount. 'Do you want a car, your honour?' and 'One seat here, sir,' are to them now for-

gotten words. The regiment is quite broken up. Nine hundred came to the Crimea, but when we left only forty could muster—660 gone for ever—fine brave fellows! These forty have been ordered to leave the camp, and it is said that the officers will be drafted into other regiments. It is extraordinary how one becomes accustomed to horrid sights and dreadful stories. Everywhere one goes dead or dying horses offend the eyes and nose. Such also is the case at Varna, where the camp was. The dogs and vultures are busy at work, tearing away at the carcasses, revelling in their revolting carnival; but I wish we had more of them with sharp appetites, that they might eat up the horses as quickly as they die. I saw William Russell, the *Times*' correspondent; he is a very agreeable fellow, full of fun, wit, and manliness. We brought here some Turks and some Russians who had deserted; our men could not endure the Turks. They would not allow them to sleep in the room in which they slept; but they at once fraternised with the Russians. This feeling against the Turk is countenanced by the officers, many of whom act in a very unkind manner to the poor creatures. I saw Omar Pasha at Varna. When he came to Balaklava he was greatly enraged at seeing the Turkish soldiers compelled by the allies to act as beasts of burden. I have always found the Turks civil and obliging. Do not credit the opinion that they are not brave. The crescent has waved as boldly and triumphantly in the battle as the banner of France or England."

A week later Miss Nightingale wrote to the London *Times*, and Mrs. Bracebridge to the Messrs. Cuthbert, in connection with the supplies sent to the hospitals. Both letters are dated Scutari.

"Miss Nightingale presents her compliments to the editor of the *Times*, and begs that he will allow her to acknowledge, in its columns, a few of the presents from the benevolent which she has received. The greater number have been sent anonymously, or referred to in letters which it is not possible to connect with letters received months previously. Messrs. Cuthbert have announced sixty-eight tons of goods by the *Harlequin*, not yet arrived, and goods are invoiced by the *Crasus*, *Karnac*, *Lebanon*, *Chester*, *Snowdon*, *Hollander*, *Amity*, *Stately*, &c.—vessels not yet in the harbour of Constantinople.

"Packages have been received from Mrs. Portal, 3, Wilton Place; Mrs. Rice, High Street, Croydon, shirts and old linen; Mrs. Williams, Rue de Pont Neuf, Nice Maritime, list shoes and linen; Mrs. Findley, Easterhill, and Mrs. Maclath, Dalldown, Lanarkshire; Lady Manners, Dowager Lady Napier, Mrs.

Jodsell, Mrs. Gundry, of Hyde; collection—Miss Capell, Floore, near Weedon; friends of Captain May, of the brig *Star* of Sunderland; the ladies round Wakefield, and Mr. Smyth, Heath Hall; Eaton Rectory; Coleshill, Warwickshire; Atherstone, Warwickshire; Colonel Napier, Portsmouth; H. Baker & Co., 111, New Bond Street; Mrs. De Berfor and Mrs. Billings, 16, St. Germain's Place, Blackheath; collected by Captain and Mrs. Balfour, Blackheath, books, linen, shirts, stockings, and bandages; ladies of Needham Market, collected by Miss E. Diggins, linen, tracts, sundries; Brighton, one piece of flannel, pillows, jerseys, linen, &c.; Mrs. Dennett, Worthing, shirts and sheets, fifty pocket-handkerchiefs, books, tapes, thread and pins, &c.; Richmond, Surrey; Dr. Bullar, warm clothing, contributed by the ladies of Southampton, thirty-six pillows, camphor, and five parcels of lozenges; Edward May, Esq., Mrs. William White, Newport; Mrs. Pennington, books; J. Danks, Esq., Sherwood Hall, Nottingham; Dr. Beddingfield, lint and bandages; Mrs. Rawlinson; Royal Hotel, Bodmin, Cornwall; Miss Catt, West Street, Brighton; D. G. Douglass, Southampton, a tin of arrowroot; collection by Mr. Bell and Mrs. Baillie; two dozen old Marsala, London, anonymous; Mrs. Foot, Alderbury House, Salisbury; two bales from Bonchurch; X. Y. Z., 45, Baker Street, Portman Square, a box containing shirts, stockings, a cheese, preserves, potatoes, onions, stationery, books, camphor, &c.; Shurmacher, pillows, preserves, flannel shirts, sheets, shirts, comforters, &c."

Scutari Hospital, Feb. 22.

"DEAR SIRS,—Will you be so kind as to announce that the *Eagle*, *Army and Navy*, *Durham*, *Teneriffe*, and other ships have arrived here, with numerous packages and gifts of the benevolent for Scutari?"

"Her majesty's gifts came in the *Eagle*. Mr. Gamble sent a large assortment of potted meat. A celebrated wine-merchant (name concealed) thirty dozen of port. Messrs. Gardener and Co., of Palermo, fifty boxes of lemons and fifty boxes of oranges, for the sick and wounded, and the same to the French.

"We must tax our friends' patience as to acknowledging particular cases. Many have lately been found by Mr. Barber in Custom House and merchants' stores, and sent over, but some are gone to Bordeaux, and some are lost. By another post I will acknowledge a large number. Many cannot be acknowledged, as we have no means of comparing packages with letters received long ago.

"Yours obediently,

"H. BRACEBRIDGE."

"Messrs. Cuthbert."

In a publication written by one of the lady nurses, the state of the hospitals in Turkey is given at a still later period. This lady acknowledges the services and ability of Mr. Stowe, who succeeded Mr. Macdonald in the administration of the *Times'* Fund. Mr. Stowe went to the Crimea for the reasons assigned by this lady, and perished there, a victim to the cruelty of the medical staff of the army. His loss at that juncture was a serious one to the army, and brands with barbarity and selfishness the men and the measures by which he met with so deplorable an end. The lady nurse writes:—"We applied to Mr. Stowe, the *Times'* commissioner, for brushes and combs, and many other articles we required for the men. He sent them immediately. We gladly availed ourselves of his offer to give us any help we required from the *Times'* Fund, and we can thankfully bear witness to numberless comforts and necessities supplied by the fund to the sick. Mr. Stowe appeared a person admirably suited for his post. He visited the hospital constantly and thoroughly, gaining a complete insight into its working. There were other visitors to the hospital, who paid their visits once a fortnight or so, attended by a long train of authorities; and though doubtless it was meant for the best, yet it seemed impossible for these to gain such a knowledge of the real wants of the hospitals as a man who came and went at any hour and without observation. Great was my astonishment on being told one day by a distinguished person, that the *Times'* commissioner was a 'dangerous person.' I made no answer to the remark. Living, as we then were, amid scenes of sickness and death, tending the wasted forms of those whom want and neglect had brought to this dire extremity—seeing, as we hourly did, the flower of the British army cut down in the prime of their youth and strength, my heart was too sick and weary to enter into any controversy about the authorities and the *Times'* commissioner. I only knew, one let the men die for want of things—the other provided them; the one *talked*, and the other *acted*. I could not help thinking that I cared not where the things came from, so that they did come somehow. So I went straight to the 'dangerous person,' who was pacing up and down the barrack-yard, with an air as if he cared very little what people thought of him, and laid a list of our present wants before him. 'These things are promised,' I said, 'but we shall have to wait very long for them, even if we do get them at all.' Mr. Stowe wrote them down in his note-book, and by that time the next day they were on the spot. This energy was one of Mr. Stowe's characteristics. A thing once mentioned to him he never forgot, and never rested till it was done. He was particularly anxious on the subject of washing.

It was a great evil, but at that time there was no remedy. Mr. Stowe asked if we thought washing-machines from England would be useful; but we told him there would be no place to put them in, and then the plan would require much superintendence, for which we had no time to spare. We had not even time to search into the full extent of the abuse itself. However, his attention having been once called to it, he never lost sight of it. If Mr. Stowe had lived to return to Constantinople, he would have found Kulali much improved in that as well as in all other respects. The last visit Mr. Stowe paid us was when the fruit was just coming into season, strawberries especially. We told him how the men longed for them, and he gave us leave to gather as many as we wanted. The new purveyor-in-chief being then in office, Mr. Stowe seemed to feel his services were no longer wanted to the same extent. He said he knew Mr. Robertson would see that every requisite was furnished, and that matters would soon be on a different footing. He went to the camp, and among the many who regretted the untimely death of one so talented were some at Kulali, who will ever remember his untiring exertions in his country's cause, his extreme courtesy, and the kind and friendly manner in which he cheered on the sinking hearts that had struggled through that time of misfortune."

The earthquake at Broussa, by which such physical injury was inflicted, produced a great sensation in the Turkish empire. Both Turks and Christians regarded it as an omen. The superstitious of every creed are apt to connect great national calamities as portents of war, and the downfall of states and empires. It was so in the present case: the Mohammedans revived every faded prophecy of the ultimate downfall of their dominion which had ever gained currency among them; and the Christians considered the event as the indication of the speedy and violent dissolution of the Turkish empire. Events which produce these strong moral impressions among a people should never be overlooked by the historian, even if trivial in themselves. The earthquake at Broussa was, however, a terrible calamity, although exaggerated by the reports which reached Western Europe. At the instant the first great shock was felt at Constantinople, Broussa was shaken to its foundations; in a few seconds after a portion of the town was demolished, and 300 inhabitants buried beneath the ruins. The shock lasted about forty seconds; the oscillations came from the south-east, and were rapid and short. The city was partly surrounded by a wall which was erected by the early Ottoman princes, who held their court there "before Adrianople had been raised to an equality with the old capital." This

wall was thick and solid, and many of the poorer classes built their houses against it for economy and support. It swayed to and fro for several seconds, like a tree bending to the storm, during which the weaker portions of the upper part gave way, falling through the miserable dwellings beneath it; but when the last oscillation came, which ended the shock, a great portion of the wall all round fell at once, and scores of houses, and their inhabitants, were instantly crushed. The houses of the more opulent classes were much dilapidated, and many of these persons were bruised and mutilated, but the loss of life was wholly, or nearly so, among the poor. The mosques, 125 in number, were to a considerable extent demolished; of those not totally destroyed, scarcely a minaret remained; and not a single public building of any sort entirely escaped. A silk factory fell at the first shock, in which sixty females were working—all were killed. The people of the Turkish capital were in great trepidation after the sensation of the shocks there, as the universal expectation was, that the hour for its downfall had come, and that with it the glory of the once proud empire of Othman would sink for ever. The Turks besought Allah and the prophet that it should not be so, and that any visitation of their anger should be confined to the infidels; the Christians were suppliant to the Virgin, and all the saints, that the ruin might be speedy to the followers of the false prophet, and to heretics, but that the orthodox believers might be spared! Several shocks were felt at Constantinople for two days after the fearful visitation at Broussa, and the apprehensions and devotions of the inhabitants, both believers and unbelievers, were both very much enlivened. Whatever might be thought by the superstitious, the Turkish empire, in Asia more especially, was everywhere disturbed, and the British government did not seem aware of the magnitude of the peril, or of the well-concatenated efforts of Russia.

It was bitterly remarked by an able reviewer of public affairs in the columns of the *Christian Weekly News*—"Whilst our oligarchy look with monstrous fatuity upon the break-down of our military organisation, and the shortcomings of our representative institutions—whilst, in the midst of unprecedented perils, the government of this country is carrying on the jogg-trot of routine and red-tape policy, the autocrat displays a feverish activity, and prepares for a gigantic effort, which Turkey and the whole East must feel. Untrammelled by bureaucratic pedantry, he throws to the winds all scruples in the choice of means. At home, in holy Russia, he brings into action the rudest fanaticism of his orthodox serfs. Around the frontiers of his empire he prepares the materials for a

universal Eastern commotion. He works with unremitting activity for a convulsion of all the countries in the vicinity of the Caspian, the Ganges, and the Danube. On the banks of the Tigris the flame of revolt, lighted by Russian hands, has already burst forth against Turkish rule. In Independent Tartary, Muscovite influence grows apace. The seditions of Cabul and Candahar appear to be the prelude only of pro-Russian movements against the adjacent British territory. In European Turkey the surprising activity of Greco-Sclavonian emissaries prepares a resumption of the Hellenist disturbances of last year. And, in the presence of these vast machinations of the czar, we still allow ourselves to be amused with idle diplomatic gossip respecting the four points, and other hollow schemes of peace! Looking to Asia we find, at this moment, invasion and

revolt. In Kurdistan, those nomadic tribes inhabiting the territory between the south-eastern slopes of the Armenian highlands, the Tigris, and the Zagros mountains, have ever been unmanageable subjects of the Porte. Though confessors of Islamism, they never scruple to disavow the sovereignty of Turkey. The diplomacy of St. Petersburg has taken advantage of this disposition at the present juncture; for the Russian high road to Bagdad lies through the land of the Kurds. Commanding this position, the czar could outflank the Turkish force in Asia, and interpose his own armies between it and the Dardanelles. Armenia is at the czar's mercy, or nearly so; and everywhere in Asiatic Turkey his name is feared, and the authority of the sultan slighted. A great moral earthquake upheaves the still vast and once mighty empire of the sultan and padishaw."

CHAPTER LXIV.

ALLIANCE OF SARDINIA WITH THE COALITION AGAINST RUSSIA.

" 'Tis sweet
When the voice of man lies hush'd, subdued,
To hear thy mountain voice, so rude,
Break silence."—*Ballads of Ireland.*

THE diplomacy of the early months of 1855 was particularly dry and uninteresting, except to those who love to study human nature in the intrigues of the governments of states. The conduct and policy of Sardinia was not marked by the tricks to which Russia and the German powers resorted. There was a frankness and nobleness about it to the lasting honour of that gallant little kingdom. Immediately upon the opening of the new year, the desire of Sardinia to enter the alliance against Russia assumed a practical shape, and it was proclaimed to the world that her army would be united to the armies of the allies against the common foe. On the 26th of January, "the act of acceptance," on the accession of his majesty the king of Sardinia to the convention of the 10th of April, 1854, was signed and ratified on the 4th of March. The basis of the alliance of the Western powers with Sardinia was not the treaty of the 2nd of December, in which Austria principally figured, but the convention of the 10th of the preceding April, which appeared in our columns in its appropriate place.* In the *Moniteur* of the 13th of March the following appeared:—"His majesty

the King of Sardinia having acceded to the convention concluded at London on the 10th of April, 1854, and our envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to his said majesty having, in virtue of our full powers and in our name, accepted the said accession, the respective ratifications were exchanged at Turin on the 4th of the present month of March; and, in consequence, the said act of acceptance of the accession and the military convention concluded between France and Great Britain and Sardinia will receive full and entire execution."

The minister of the French marine addressed at the same time the following circular to all the commanders-in-chief of the French naval forces, and to the captains of ships of war at sea:—"Sardinia, by a treaty signed on the 26th ult., having acceded to the treaty of alliance concluded on the 10th of April, 1854, between France and Great Britain for the protection of the Ottoman empire, now finds herself at war with Russia. You will, consequently, have to extend in future to the Sardinian navy the support and kind offices you are bound to render the French and English navies; and when you chance to meet ships of war of his majesty the king of Sardinia, you will concert measures, and establish with their commanders the same relations of intimacy as with the commanders of the ships of war of her majesty the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain. Please to acknowledge the receipt of this circular."

* The fifth article of the convention is so short, and so necessary to the clearness of the narrative, that it is here subjoined:—"Their majesties the queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the emperor of the French, will readily admit into their alliance, in order to co-operate for the proposed object, such of the other powers of Europe as may be desirous of becoming parties to it."

The English government published documents so similar that their quotation is unnecessary. The Sardinian government issued two state papers in connection with these transactions remarkable for their perspicacity, and a certain exalted tone of feeling. On the 4th of March the *Piedmontese Gazette*, in an extraordinary number of the day, published the manifesto of His Majesty Victor Emanuel II:—

Turin, March 4, 1855.

For a long time Europe has regarded with just and jealous suspicion the continual aggrandisement of Russia, the progressive application of that system which Peter the Great inaugurated, more naturalised in the nation perhaps than in the Muscovite sovereigns, and tending with all the forces, visible and invisible, to the conquest of Constantinople, not as a final end, but as a beginning and step to new and more unmeasured ambitions.

These projects of Russia, subversive of the equilibrium of Europe, threatening to the liberties of peoples and the independence of nations, never revealed themselves, perhaps, so clearly as in the unjust invasion of the Danubian provinces, and in the diplomatic acts preceding and following it. It was with good right, then, that France and England, after a long and useless attempt at means of conciliation, had recourse to arms to support the Ottoman empire against the aggressions of its powerful neighbour.

On the solution of the oriental question depend the destinies, not immediate, but future, of Europe, and of Asia, and, more directly and proximately, of those states bordering the Mediterranean Sea, which cannot therefore remain indifferent spectators of a struggle in which their own vital interests are concerned, which will determine whether they remain free and independent, or become vassals, in fact if not in name, of the colossal Russian empire.

The justice of the cause espoused by the generous defenders of the Sublime Porte, the considerations which tell so powerfully always on the heart of the king, of the dignity and of the national independence, have determined his majesty the King of Sardinia, after the formal invitation which he has received from the two great Western powers, to accede, by the act of the 12th of last January, to the alliance, offensive and defensive, stipulated on the 10th of April, 1854, between their majesties the Emperor of the French and the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. But before that necessary and indispensable completion by the exchange of ratifications—before, therefore, it could in any way be put in execution, the Emperor Nicholas, lamenting, with language not devoid of bitterness, that the rights of nations had been violated by us by having (as he supposed) without previous declaration of war sent an expedition to the Crimea—accusing the king, besides, of ingratitude in having forgotten the ancient proofs of friendship and sympathy given by Russia to Sardinia—hastens himself to declare war.

Without stopping at the supposed violation of the rights of nations, which could only be an error of the Chancery, we will derive that, with the ancient memories of friendly correspondence passed between the predecessors of his imperial majesty and those of his Sardinian majesty, the emperor might have compared other more recent and personal recollections of his own behaviour for the last eight years towards the kings Carlo Alberto and Vittorio Emanuele Secondo. But, first of all, he should have reproached himself that his majesty approached this alliance not through forgetfulness of ancient friendships, nor through resentment for recent offences, but from the deep conviction of being imperiously driven to it, both by the general interests of Europe and the particular interests of that nation whose destinies Divine Providence has committed to him; and it is therefore that, in taking part in a new war, the king never doubts the answer to his appeal from the old faith of his beloved people, the bravery of his soldiers, and, as he confides, in the protection of that God who in the course of eight centuries has so often supported the monarchy of Savoy in

severe trials, and guided it to glorious successes. His majesty is secure in the conviction of having done his duty, nor will so many severe and cruel afflictions diminish his resolution and constancy in the defence, with all his power, against all aggressions whatsoever on the sacred interests of the people and the imprescriptible rights of the crown.

While the king desires that the negotiations for peace already initiated in the city of Vienna may be successful, in fulfilment, however, of the obligations contracted towards France, England, and Turkey, he has ordered the undersigned minister to declare, in virtue of the above-mentioned act of accession, his land and sea forces to be in a state of war with the Russian empire.

The undersigned declares, besides, the orders of his majesty that the *exequatur* accorded to the Russian consuls in the royal states should be revoked; the property and persons of Russian subjects nevertheless to be scrupulously respected, and a competent term accorded to Russian ships to leave Sardinian ports.

C. CAVOUR, *the President of the Council, Minister of Foreign Affairs.*

At the same time, the Sardinian government issued the following circular to the foreign ministers accredited to its own court, and to its own agents abroad:—

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit herewith some copies of the manifesto by which the government of his majesty the King of Sardinia, in the name of the king, declares war to his majesty the Emperor of Russia.

When the treaty of alliance of the 10th of April, 1854, between France and England was officially communicated to Sardinia, the government of the king, while recognising the right and duty of the great Western powers to oppose the invasions of Russia, and to defend the Ottoman empire against unjust aggression—while openly declaring that its most lively sympathies were with the cause which France and England had generously undertaken to defend—thought it right, nevertheless, to abstain for the moment from availing itself of the stipulated reserve in the 5th article of the treaty.

Now, however, the war has taken such considerable proportions in the East and in the Baltic, and the whole world has been able to convince itself that the question which agitates the East is a European question, all agree in recognising that if the great powers have a more direct interest in it, the states of the second order are no less menaced in their commerce, and, what is more, in their independence, by the ambitious projects of Russia. The moment is arrived, then, to oppose to those vast means of action of which she can dispose, and to the enormous advantages of her geographical position, the united efforts of the powers who, devoid of all ambitious thoughts, only aspire to ward off dangers which later might be unavoidable, and to assure the triumph of the eternal principles of justice and equity.

These considerations have determined his majesty the King of Sardinia to accept the invitation addressed to him by their majesties the Emperor of the French and the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to accede to the treaty of the 10th of April, 1854. The act of accession, as well as the two conventions referring to it, having been signed on the 26th of January last, and ratified this day, his majesty, in consequence of the stipulations therein contained, now declares war to Russia.

His majesty has not seen without painful surprise that while the act of accession, unratified, had not yet any absolute legal value, and was in no ways exoneratory, the Emperor Nicholas, by a note of Count Nesselrode's, and in language full of bitterness, taking the initiative in hostilities, has accused him of violating the rights of nations, by sending an expedition to the Crimea without a previous declaration of war, and reproached him with forgetfulness of the marks of friendship shown in past times by Russia to Sardinia.

Concerning the pretended violation of the rights of nations, it is sufficient to compare the date of Count Nesselrode's circular (5th (17th) of January last) with that of the ratification of the act of accession (4th of March),

to be convinced of the astonishing flippancy with which the chancellor of the Russian empire has advanced so grave an accusation, and which is so inappropriate to the princes of Savoy, and, above all, to a monarch to whom the voice of the whole people has accorded the title of loyal.

As to the reproach of ingratitude, the Emperor Nicholas, instead of recalling the marks of friendship which two of his predecessors formerly showed towards Sardinia, ought to have recollected that in 1848, without any personal motive, he withdrew his minister from the court of Turin, and hastily sent the Sardinian representative at St. Petersburg his passports; that in 1849 he refused to receive the letter of notification of the accession to the throne of King Victor Emanuel II., a refusal highly injurious, which finds few precedents in the history of diplomacy, and which appears to indicate, on the part of the czar, the strange pretension to interfere in our interior affairs, affecting not to recognise the transformation, not revolutionary, but legal, which had been made in our political institutions.

After having added these short explanations, in order to place the conduct of the king our august sovereign in its true light, and on referring to the motives exhibited in the accompanying manifesto, I beg you to transmit a copy of the present despatch to the minister of foreign affairs of the government to which you are accredited; and I beg you to receive, sir, the renewed assurances of my very distinguished consideration.

C. CAVOUR.

Almost contemporaneous with those publications by the cabinet of Turin, the court of Russia issued the following declaration of war in the form of a circular to other courts:—

St. Petersburg, Feb. 17.

THE court of — will, we doubt not, share the opinion of the emperor upon the policy of his majesty the King of Sardinia, at a moment when that sovereign, without any ostensible motive, without any legitimate cause of complaint, and without even the shadow of the smallest infringement upon the direct interests of his country, has placed at the disposal of England a *corps d'armée* of 15,000 men for the invasion of the Crimea. In taking this step the Sardinian government appears to have left it to the care of the public journals to warn us of an aggression which it has not thought fit to justify by a declaration of war. We understand the motive of this silence.

The court of Turin, we admit it, would have had some difficulty in conciliating its policy with the national sentiment of its country; it would have experienced equal difficulty in making its present conduct harmonise with the ancient *souvenirs* of the house of Savoy. In consulting the annals of its history, it might cite the incident of a Russian army crossing the Alps; but, it is true, it was to defend Piedmont, and not to invade it. In the councils of the cabinets of Europe, in the reign of the Emperor Alexander, of glorious memory, it is again Russia who lent her faithful support to the independence of Sardinia, when the house of Savoy was reinstated on the throne of its ancestors. Must we finally recall to mind that, at the same period, if Genoa was re-united to the kingdom of Sardinia, it is because the imperial cabinet recognised the necessity of assuring at the same time the commercial prosperity and the greatness of the country which the arms of Russia had contributed to deliver from a foreign yoke? To-day, sinking in oblivion the lessons of the past, the court of Turin is about to direct against us, from that self-same port of Genoa, a hostile enterprise, which Russia has the conscientious satisfaction of knowing was not provoked by her.

The attitude thus assumed by Sardinia, without a formal declaration of war, as we have stated, would make us doubt what name we ought to give to the auxiliary troops destined to invade our frontiers under the flag of a country with which we have hitherto been living in peace. However, if the court of Turin loses sight of the principles and customs consecrated by the law of nations, as the immutable rule of the international relations of states,

the emperor, for his part, is resolved to observe them. With this intention, his imperial majesty feels it incumbent upon him to declare that peace is *de jure* and *de facto* broken by this flagrant act of hostility, the whole blame of which recoils upon the Sardinian government. We leave it to bear the entire responsibility thereof, in the face of the opinion of its country, and of all Europe.

It behoves especially the allied powers to appreciate the conduct of the court of Sardinia, when it has deemed it opportune and loyal to turn its arms against us at the very moment when the imperial cabinet entered into a deliberation at Vienna, destined to open the path to the re-establishment of peace.

The wishes which tend towards the accomplishment of that work of pacification seem to have been strangely misunderstood by the cabinet of Turin. In fact, whilst the governments of Central Europe wisely interposed their legitimate authority to prevent one of the belligerent powers from recruiting its legions in the states who insist on having their neutrality respected, the Sardinian government, less chary of the blood of Italy, consents to pour it out for a cause foreign to the political and religious interests of its nation. For, in good faith, it cannot be pretended that by unfolding her banner by the side of the Crescent, Sardinia fancies she at all serves the cause of Christianity. Nor can it be affirmed that she seeks to defend the weak against the strong when she joins her arms to those of France and England.

It is this latter power, if we are rightly informed, which takes the Sardinian troops under its command—we will not say in its pay, as we wish to abstain from wounding the national feelings of a country with which, to our regret, we are about to be at war.

Notwithstanding this necessity, the emperor will still afford protection to the private interests of Sardinian subjects, who entertain ancient commercial relations with Russia. They shall not suffer from the errors of their government. They are at liberty to remain in the empire in all security, under the protection of our laws, as long as they do not infringe them. But the Sardinian flag will henceforth cease to enjoy the prerogatives accorded solely to the mercantile navy of neutral states. A term shall be fixed for the departure of Sardinian vessels that may be actually in Russian ports. The *czechatur* will be at once withdrawn from Sardinian consuls in Russia. The Russian agents at Genoa and Nice will also receive orders to suspend the exercise of their functions, peace between the two countries having been broken by the court of Sardinia from the moment it acceded to the treaty of alliance concluded on the 10th of April, 1854, between Great Britain and France.

The emperor has deigned to charge me to communicate these determinations to all friendly powers.

NESSELRODE.

The motive of Sardinia in entering into the anti-Russian alliance, there is every reason to believe, was unselfish. The character of Victor Emanuel and of Count Cavour prove as much. The men by whom the prince and his chief minister surrounded themselves were of a similar stamp. Throne and ministry sympathised on principle with liberal government, and equitable international relations. Yet it admirably suited the policy of Sardinia to join the coalition. Austria and France had been gradually drawing closer, and it was rumoured all over Europe that a secret treaty was concluded between the emperor and the kaiser on the 24th of December, by which the former pledged himself to the integrity of the Austrian dominions in Italy, and, in alliance with Austria, to preserve the then existing territorial circumscription of all the Italian states. That the French policy was misled by a strong pro-Austrian bias could not be concealed from

Victor Emanuel, nor be a subject of indifference to him. This was the more alarming as the policy of the Buonapartists in Italy from 1848 up to 1853, and even up to the time when the convention with England was signed in the spring of 1854, was bitterly anti-Austrian. It had necessarily been so, for Austria did her best to thwart and humiliate Louis Napoleon. She prevented his recognition by Russia, and his forming a German marriage alliance; while the press of Vienna was perpetually repeating the epithet *parem*, which Louis Napoleon, by a happy audacity, had applied to himself. Accordingly, French agents had been at work all through Italy abusing Austria, forming French connections, proclaiming that France was the natural protector of Italian liberty, and the natural avenger of Italian wrongs, and that between the two empires there could be no alliance. The name of Murat was evoked in Naples; the king of Rome was talked of in Romagna; and the kingdom of Italy was a pet phrase at Milan in the mouth of every Frenchman. Italy was assured by every form of persuasive that she had no hope but in France, and that she must look to the magnanimity of a Buonaparte, whose heart was filled from Italian fountains, for her rescue and her future glory. All this suddenly ceased when the English alliance came into being. The Aberdeen ministry was Austrian in its sympathies as much as the pure whig ministry that preceded it was the reverse. Lord Aberdeen was just what he described, in the House of Lords, as being very amusing, that he should be thought "a sort of an Austro-Russian." Louis Napoleon followed the track of the English policy in his pro-Austrian proceedings, but he went further than the Aberdeen government, *as a whole*, intended—the whig portion of it being adverse to the *degree* of favour shown by the Peelites to Austria. The game played by the French emperor obviously was, to adopt only such a line of policy as England would initiate, or at least approve, but to cut out a path for himself in that road, and work with agency peculiar to his own aims and objects—the establishment of his dynasty, the conciliation of the despotic courts, and the consolidation of his influence in Europe. It was therefore wise for the Sardinian king not to look on quietly while the bonds of Austrian amity were drawn tighter by the hands of France, feeling, as Sardinia ever must feel, that Austria is the deadly enemy of her independence and prosperity. To anticipate Austria, and step further into the alliance, was a wise and bold policy, and was crowned with success. She agreed to keep up a force of 15,000 men in the field, under the command of the British chief; and a loan of one million sterling was to be afforded to her by the allies,

to enable her to keep up that army. She vigorously carried out her obligations, and the allies honourably executed theirs; while Austria was enraged to perceive, as a consequence of this movement, that the allies guaranteed the independence of Sardinia while the war continued, making it clearly impossible for Austria to take any advantage of the occupation of the Western powers, to precipitate herself as a spoiler upon the Piedmontese kingdom.

Some details concerning the Sardinian army are desirable, in order that our readers may understand the exact value of the alliance. As to the *morale* of the troops it is excellent. There are no better or braver soldiers in continental Europe than those of Piedmont. In the struggle of 1848 against Austria, which cost Charles Albert his throne, and indirectly his life, this gallant army did not perform what was expected from it, especially in Italy; but that arose from the inexperience of its generals, and the necessary dependence therefore upon certain soldiers of fortune, principally Poles, who had little knowledge of the people of Piedmont, and less sympathy with their military or general character. The battle of Novara illustrated these remarks; Radetzky carried all before him, despite the heroism of the Piedmontese, because the latter were not well officered. Since that event, so deplorable to Sardinia, every effort has been put forth by its government to reform the military system, and to do so on the principle of preserving a small standing army, capable of great expansion in an emergency. The grand source of deficiency in the officers arose from the fact that the military profession was fashionable, and the aristocracy crowded into it, swallowing up promotions and patronage, and leaving to a poor man of merit no chance of competing for rank or honour. The result was, that it became an army of generals who could not command, to whom the gay uniforms and decorations were objects of petty ambition, but who were utterly ignorant of the military art. Turin glittered with decorations and plumes worn by officers who could not "place a square," or "set a squadron in the field," if the salvation of Italy depended upon their attempts. So long as Sardinia was governed absolutely, the system answered her objects—the aristocracy were armed against the people, and ever ready, in the name of the prince, to put down a popular *émeute*; but when liberal ideas entered the cabinet, and the people exercised a popular control, and especially when foreign war tested the comparative worth of plumes and stars, heads and hearts, it was deemed that genius and enthusiasm were worth more than all the insignia of royal or aristocratic glory. Men were then wanted, not

lords—swords, not coronets—talent, not *haut ton*.

The peace standard of the army was 41,647 soldiers, classed in this way:—

	Men.
10 brigades of Infantry of the Line	26,470
10 battalions of Rifles	3,637
10 regiments of Cavalry	5,221
3 regiments of Artillery	4,162
1 battalion of Sappers and Miners	1,019
1 Waggon-train Corps	464
1 battalion of Chasseurs Franes	614
	<hr/>
To which must be added Gens-d'armes	41,647
	<hr/>
Making in all	45,551

In time of peace the Gens-d'armes, or Carabiniers as they are called here, are employed as police, but in war they form a royal body-guard, and in that capacity a portion served with Charles Albert in the last war. The war establishment of the Sardinian army is 85,000 men, but this may easily be increased to 100,000 by an extraordinary levy.

Under the influence of the reforms which of late years have been carried out by the enlightened supervision of the premier and the war minister, professional education is provided for the officers. At Turin there is a military college, where boys are admitted from fourteen to sixteen years of age upon passing an examination in reading, writing, arithmetic, Italian, and the principles of religion. The standard of admission is miserably beneath what it ought to be, nor is the curriculum such as to make up for that defect. The term of study is five years. The examinations are in modern languages, but only French and German are studied, except in exceptional cases; in history, which is very imperfectly pursued; and in mathematics and fortification, which are studied within narrow limits. If, however, a student desires to enter the staff corps, engineers, or artillery, he must remain two years more, during which he has to read hard, and make very respectable progress in chemistry and gunnery. The former is studied more extensively than in English military colleges, but in every other respect the English and French standards of acquisition, especially the latter, are superior. There is a college at Ivrea (established 1850), which tends to make up for the deficiencies of the military colleges, for there subalterns must pass a year, and stand important examinations before they can obtain ordinary promotion. There is a college for cavalry at Pinerolo (established 1849), where every pupil who has studied at Turin must remain for two years, before being gazetted (as we say) to a cavalry regiment. This institution is in principle similar to the other Italian and Austrian schools for cavalry instruction, and they are well fitted to turn out

good cavalry officers. The late Captain Nolan, whose death at the battle of Balaklava was so much regretted by the British army,—to the cavalry service of which he was so useful,—received the elements of his knowledge of cavalry tactics in an Italian school.

The poor are not neglected in the means adopted for military education in Sardinia. At Raccerigi there is a school for the education of soldiers' sons: boys enter at twelve, and remain four years, when, if they pass their examination, they join the line with the rank of sergeant or corporal, according to the progress they have made at school. This supplies the army with intelligent non-commissioned officers, who have all the buoyancy of youth—unlike the British system, which necessarily takes the non-commissioned officers for the most part from among the old soldiers. The Sardinian plan has the disadvantage of impeding the promotion of soldiers from the ranks. This system is borrowed from the Russians. At Asti there is a school of military music, which may account for the superiority of the bands of the Sardinian regiments. Besides all these means of instruction, there are regimental, and even brigade schools, where the elements of geography, topography, geometry, and algebra are taught; and where such of the privates as cannot read or write are instructed in these educational preliminaries. Probably more progress is made in these schools than in the colleges. It is singular that, with so elaborate a system of military colleges, there is no school of military surgery; but the government affords many facilities for improvement during the practice of the profession. Promotion goes by seniority, and this is as rigid as in the service of the Hon. East India Company; but there is a reserve of a certain proportion, amounting practically to nearly one third, for merit. A tenth of the sub-lieutenancies are reserved for non-commissioned officers. It is on the whole a more liberal system of promotion than that of the army of England, but not so liberal as that of France. On service, when an officer falls, his next in regimental service takes his place, and all regimental promotion is made in the regiment—this promotes a fine *esprit de corps*.

The army is under the immediate command of the minister of war, who is always a military man; he is assisted by a board of superior officers, forming what is called "the permanent consultative council of war." To this all important business is referred; this board performs all the duties of what we call the quartermaster-general's and adjutant-general's departments. The late Duke of Genoa, and the minister of war (Marmora), used great exertions to bring the artillery service up to the standards of England and France. Per-

haps those and the Prussian are alone superior to that of Sardinia. The gun-carriages are, for lightness and solidity, better than any other in the world, and they have this peculiarity, that the same carriage will suit a gun of six pound or sixteen pound metal, or a howitzer of thirty-two pound. The whole *matériel* of the artillery is unsurpassed, perhaps unequalled by that of any other army. The defect is slowness of movement in everything; there is too much of the German element in the system; the horses are heavy German, strong in draught, and hardy, but slow. The rapidity of the British or French artillery movements could not be performed by the Sardinian. There are twenty field batteries in that arm of the service, each containing eight guns, of which two are served as flying artillery, and these in the field are most useful.

The light cavalry are armed with carbine and sword like our own, but they also carry pistols similar to our old "horse pistols," now disused. The heavy cavalry are also armed with carbine, pistols, and sword, but carry lances, contrary to our practice of arming with that weapon only the light cavalry. The light horse carry their carbines slung across the shoulder, the heavy, whose carbine is of shorter range, sling it across the saddle in front of the rider. The cavalry horses are nearly all German, and nearly all too heavy; the *island* of Sardinia furnishes a few, they are lighter and better adapted to light cavalry. The Sardinian rifles are very superior, it was upon their model the French Chasseurs de Vincennes were formed. The country is indebted to General la Marmora (not the war minister) for the organisation of these troops. "No light troops can excel the Bersaglieri for quickness, precision, and endurance, but they have not had such advantages in arms as the Chasseurs de Vincennes, though new rifles are now being made for them. The ten battalions are composed of four companies each." The infantry is divided into brigades of two regiments each; each regiment into four battalions; and each battalion into four companies. They are short, thickset men, resembling the Dutch in form, but not in countenance, and are far more active, hardy, and enduring. They are patient, laborious, and brave, and remarkable for strength. The transport and commissariat is imperfect, but both were improved when the army took the field in the Crimea.

The war was popular both with troops and people, and the Sardinian soldiers longed to fight side by side with the British, for whom they entertain a boundless respect. Such was the military state of the little kingdom which so boldly threw down the glove into the arena of war, forming a military connection with England and France. To this guarantee of

Sardinian earnestness, a treaty was added between her and Turkey on the 15th of March, in which the King of Sardinia declared his adhesion to the treaty of the 12th of March, 1854, by which England and France undertook to defend Turkey against Russia, and announced the intended embarkation of a Sardinian army to participate in the conflict. The sultan undertook to see the troops of his majesty of Savoy treated like those of England and France.

England hailed the alliance of Piedmont with enthusiasm, and engaged to find transports to conduct her levies to the seat of war. But it was not England only that regarded with admiration the spectacle of this third-rate kingdom coming forth so bravely to the contest of national independence.

The eyes and hearts of all who were free, and all who were fettered and loved freedom, were turned to Sardinia. This noble little nation rose above difficulties that might well be deemed insurmountable, and asserted its place, and that a high and honourable one, among the nations. Its prince and people had of late years shown more courage, consistency, and enlightened statesmanship than any other nation in continental Europe during the present century, if we except Norway. It is not upon the tented field only that a nation may display its courage, although even there Piedmont, betrayed by its allies, and confronted by overwhelming force, vindicated its old heroism in 1849. Some nations are characterised by a physical courage which is constitutional in their race, while they are far removed from every noble aspiration, and destitute of all capacity for appreciating, even upon the field of battle, that order of courage which is inspired by the imagination and the heart—which springs up at every generous impulse to dare even the impossible, and which, with a clear principle, sustains the effort, the ardour, the passion, or the sacrifice for which the occasion calls. Thus, the Russian soldier will walk in military column to a battery at his master's bidding, or remain in square or battery under a crushing cannonade; but he knows nothing of the high soldierhood of the truly brave—he can form no fellowship with chivalry, and has no sympathy for actions, the gallantry of which shows enthusiasm, principle, and love. But in the memories of old Piedmont what a true heroism survives! How her valleys have replied to the music of religious fervour and ardent patriotism, as in them the old psalmody of the Vaudois—

"Sounded the dirge of the brave and the free,
And echoed the heart with calamity wrung,"

there have never been feats of arms—no, not within the sacred circle of Palestine, that land of conflict and courage—superior to those which

have been achieved within the vales of Piedmont, upon her mountain slopes, and beyond their precincts, by the children of these hills and valleys, when freedom to worship God summoned their honour and their energy to the deed. While Spain, for which England shed so much blood and spent so much treasure, shrunk with her characteristic cowardice from even an expression of sympathy with the sister nations of Western Europe,—while Portugal, bound to England as her oldest ally, and whom, in case of any aggression upon her, we are bound by treaty to protect, skulked from the duty and obligation which fairly rested upon her, of garrisoning our military stations in the Mediterranean,—while even Northern Europe, having so much to gain by our alliance, and so much to apprehend from the continued encroachments of Russia, would not strike a blow nor man a gunboat in her own defence,—Sardinia signed the protest against invasion and plunder, which we, with our allies, have published to the world, and threw down her gauntlet beside ours against the gigantic champion of modern despotism.

While the admiration of Europe was directed to these events, and to the chief actors in them, there was also much gratulation at the indication given by these circumstances of the working of principles and feelings in the heart of Italian society, which were likely to produce still greater things for rejoicing and hope. Although Sardinia was in advance of Italy generally, yet her voice was that of the great majority of the Italian people. Lombardy burned to be free. At Milan, the city of the Iron Crown, there were hearts true and stern as that emblem, and who hailed what was done at Turin as the mariner beholds the star which guides his bark when the storm and the cloud are passing away. Florence was not a city of willing slaves; for the petty despot of Tuscany sits upon a throne built of Austrian bullets, and encircled by Austrian bayonets. The people of the Tuscan state neither sympathised with the native tyrant, nor the foreign masters to whom that tyrant was himself a slave. Naples, with her lazzaroni, her Swiss guards (volunteers from the cantons of the Sonderbund), the truest tools of royal oppression, is not a city of unaspiring bondsmen; her people did not forget the struggle of '48, nor the treachery which re-bound their yet heaving breasts, filled with the first fresh inspirations of liberty. All above the police agents and street vagabonds sighed to be free. Their mournful hope was, that some day the bright sun of their beloved Italy would "rise and give them light to die," if liberty was not to be their inheritance. From the smouldering ruins of Brescia, where the bloody captain of despotism, the Austrian

O'Donnel, paid the penalty of his oppression, the chain was clanked by hands ready, at the first hour of hope, to bear the brand or wield the sword.

And Venice, fair queen of the Adriatic, though still sleeping in thy fetters, thy dream was of liberty! Beautiful captive! for thee, too, as for all Italy, there is hope. There is one prince beneath the azure skies of the classic realm who scorns to be chained to a pontiff's chair or a kaiser's throne. There is one free nation within the confines of long-lost but glorious Italy which has the opportunity, without which even the brave must stand in silence and in gloom. And Rome, although thou art not eternal, as thy parasites proclaim thee, thy people are worthy of a better destiny. While from thy half-buried temples, and from beneath the shadows of those broken columns which tell of a glory which cannot be revived, thou hearest the edicts of oppression, and lookest upon the blood of persecution, thy love of freedom is not quenched; for "one bleeding moment" thy sons were free, and used well their liberty, and again long for the hour when slaves may snap their manacles. Thy Romans are Romans still—the lineaments of their proud race linger on their manly countenance; sons of fathers who, as heroes, conquered the world, and as martyrs to a purer cause conquered death and torment, they only need the dawn of the "good time coming," the sound of the glad trumpet which shall soon speak to the nations that their time to be men has once more returned, and they will rather see the monuments of thy fame broken by bombardment, and piled up in the ramparts of popular defence, than linger among those monuments as shadows of what Romans were. Even the Roman, with his strength of will and still indomitable courage, may look to Piedmont as the schoolmaster of Italian liberty, as in the dark centuries of the middle ages Piedmont was a light to the nations. Great was the mission of the little kingdom of Sardinia. Countrymen of Cromwell and of Milton, who sympathised and protected the fathers of those who now inhabit a portion of that realm, welcome this new ally, and stand by her, although Austria fulminates and intrigues, until Piedmont is the centre of a wider dominion and the glory of a regenerated Italy.

Such were the hopes and feelings with which England and all free nations regarded the Sardinian enterprise, and this hope and these feelings were intensified when the expedition actually set sail for the land of contest. A considerable number of the officers departed before the bulk of the little army set sail. These officers embarked at Genoa during the month of March. Early in April a fleet of British steamers arrived at Genoa, but the

accommodation afforded by it only extended to about half the expeditionary army. The king, being desirous to see the whole of the troops assembled before any embarked, detained the transports, so that a fresh accession of vessels arrived, and the entire transport fleet became so large that the harbour of Genoa was not extensive enough for their accommodation, and some found shelter in Spezzio. It was on the 14th of April that Victor Emanuel reviewed his troops, and none that witnessed the interesting ceremonial can forget its impressiveness. It was looked upon as significant that the place of review was the plain of Marengo, immortal in history as the site of Napoleon's hardest fought and least likely victory over the Austrians. The troops were arranged in the form of a crescent; altars were erected for the benediction of the flags; a vast concourse assembled to witness the scene, and an amphitheatre of seats accommodated an immense number of the notabilities and gentry of the provinces now subject to the old dukedom of Savoy. The appearance of the king was welcomed by a loud shout from the great concourse of citizens and soldiers. He was attended by a *cortège* of the principal officers and nobility of his realm. As he passed each regiment, the band played the Sardinian national tune. Immediately by his side were the two brothers Marmora, one of whom had served him so well as minister of war, and had resigned his post to command the expeditionary force. It was the first time the king had made any public appearance since his overwhelming domestic afflictions had nearly borne him to the earth—wife, father, mother, and brothers, had all, since the fatal battle of Novara, and some of them recently, been carried to the tomb. Within three months the two dearest of all—his wife and mother—had been torn from him by him whom the old Latin poet tells us “knocks with equal foot at the palaces of the great and the cottages of the poor.” The Archbishop of Tortona appeared, to give the sanction of the church to the policy of the king. Mass was celebrated along the lines, the troops presenting arms, and the spectators uncovering. As soon as the religious ceremony terminated, the profound and solemn silence which rested upon the multitude was succeeded by the roar of cannon, and the huzzas of excited patriotism and loyalty, while, rising above all the sounds of enthusiasm, the fine military bands of the Piedmontese regiments could be heard pouring forth their martial strains. The king presented personally the flags to the regiments appointed to receive them, while he assured the officers in brief, pithy, and feeling addresses, that nothing but the stern necessities of the state prevented him from leading his army. As the personal courage of the king was well

known, and it was also well known how important his presence was in his kingdom, considering its relations to Austria, Rome, and the various Italian states, this assurance was received with loud acclamations of sympathy—the army and the people felt that his words were true. The close of this eventful day was attended by military and civil pageant, and every heart felt the glow of a patriotic fire destined, we trust, long to burn for the light and glory of Sardinia and of Italy.

The 23rd of April witnessed the departure of the first division of the expeditionary army. Seven thousand men, with all the necessary material of war, embarked. The embarkation was delayed by the defective state of the Sardinian commissariat, and a painful accident added to that delay. The Screw Steam-ship Company's vessel *Cæsus* sailed from Genoa on the 24th of April, with 400 men on board, and a heavy freight of provisions, having in tow a sailing transport loaded with guns, munitions, and stores. She had not been many hours at sea when fire was discovered in the hold, all efforts to extinguish which proved abortive. When taking to the boats the Sardinians, brave although they are in battle, did not show the steadiness and discipline which the English have always shown in like circumstances; a rush was made for the boats, some of which were soon upset, and many men perished. The soldiers of the expedition betrayed more superstitious feeling in connection with this accident than would have been expected among so free and gallant a people, and a feeling of depression fell upon the whole force.

Previous to the embarkation of the division, General Alfonsa Della Marmora, the commander-in-chief, delivered an address to the soldiers, which was received by them with pleasure, patriotic feeling, and military pride:—“We shall have before us a strong and powerful enemy; but by our side will stand brave armies, which have already consigned to history the celebrated names of Silistria, Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman. We shall arrive in a few days at the seat of war, and vicing with our allies in courage, firmness, and discipline, we will endeavour to imitate the constancy of which they have given such heroic proofs. . . . A cruel and premature death has deprived us of a prince who was to guide us in that glorious enterprise. You followed him with alacrity in the fields of Lombardy, and admired him at the fatal battle of Novara. He expired, regretting his inability to lead you to victory. May the name of the Duke of Genoa remain engraved on our hearts. . . . Soldiers! let us swear not to disappoint those expectations, and pledge ourselves to demonstrate that an Italian army is worthy to co-operate in this gigantic struggle.”

Some of the officers had occasion to travel by way of Naples, where the authorities treated them with the most pointed incivilities. It did not need Austrian instigation to induce "King Bomba" to act in this spirit of mean and petty malevolence; but it was currently believed, and not without foundation, that these discourtesies received additional venom from the sting of that power. At Constantinople the Turkish government gave a generous reception to their new ally, and the French there made many demonstrations of goodwill and fraternity. At Balaklava and Kamiesch the displays of friendship on the part of English and French were very grateful to the contingent. There was a confidence in it felt by the allies, and the reception was such as the

brave meet from the brave. When they landed, they marched up the Balaklava valley by Kadikoi, and took up their position near the left of the French army. The British and French commanders soon perceived that in General Marmora they acquired an auxiliary of intimate practical acquaintance with all military detail, and scientific acquaintance with the theories of armies and of war. The personal appearance of the men, their picturesque uniform, their polite bearing, and their heartiness to the cause of the allies, soon won for them the respect, good feeling, and good opinion of the whole host. Their future history will be blended with the general narrative of the siege and its attendant actions.

CHAPTER LXV.

THE WAR IN ASIA DURING THE EARLY PART OF 1855.

"I am arm'd,
And dangers are to me indifferent."—SHAKSPEARE. *Julius Cæsar.*

DURING the first months of 1855, Prince Bebutoff retained the chief command of the Russian armies in Asia, but as spring advanced that commission was consigned to a more skilful general named Mouravieff. The reputation of this officer was very considerable, he had the art of command, and all about him promptly respected his authority and revered him. M. Gallet de Kutture, who was secretary to Prince Demidoff, calls him "the first of tacticians." In the war of the Caucasus Mouravieff distinguished himself greatly, and won the highest commendations from Prince Woronzoff. After making for himself a renown in the war with the Daghestans he returned to St. Petersburg, and was "the lion" of the hour. The Emperor Nicholas was desirous to test in some way the abilities of the great general, and accordingly he one day said to him (we quote a Vienna writer)—"As you play the professor in the Caucasus, I must judge for myself whether your pretensions are well founded. Take the command of a corps, and manœuvre against another which shall act under my directions. Do your best; for I do not intend to spare you." The manœuvres had hardly commenced, when the emperor lost sight of the corps opposed to him. Some hours passed, and as no Mouravieff appeared, the imperial force retired towards the Neva; but unfortunately for the military reputation of the sovereign, the corps of his adversary was concealed behind some high ground close to the spot to which he had withdrawn. Mouravieff suddenly appeared, pushed forward a column which separated the czar from the gros of his corps, and eventually managed to get the latter be-

tween his artillery and the river. On seeing this, General Yermoloff, who officiated as *juge de camp*, galloped up to Mouravieff, and thus addressed him:—"I congratulate you, *mon cher*, on a victory which will prove to be a defeat." The sequel showed that Yermoloff knew his master. Mouravieff was under a cloud, and nothing more was heard of him until very recently, when he re-appeared on the scene as commander-in-chief of the separate corps in the Caucasus."

During the command of Mouravieff in Asia Minor, in 1855, the reputation of the Russian arms was greatly redeemed, and the moral influence of Russia in Asia effectually restored. The conduct of this general to the English and Turks was nobly generous, and he served the cause of Russia nearly as much by his conciliatory disposition and mild administration, as by the force of his sword and the skill of his arrangements. General Williams and his brave companions in arms, when the war had terminated, bore to this officer's genius, wisdom, humanity, and generosity, the strongest testimony.

During the month of January, Schamyl, the bold chief of the mountains, was not idle. In the snow-covered fortresses of his hills he was safe from Russian surprise, but the land below was not secure from the sudden swoops of the chief, who repeatedly descended upon the plains, seizing convoys, or swooping off small detachments with the sword. *The Danube* related an instance of this which occurred in the month of January, when the climate is very severe in Georgia. The Russian general (Rede) had charge of the Daghestan prisoners

in Tiflis, but sent them for better security into the interior of Georgia; Schamyl hearing of this from his scouts, intercepted the escort, slew the Russian infantry (Georgian militia), dispersed the cavalry, and brought back the redeemed prisoners in triumph to their highland homes. The accounts from the whole of that district were, however, very conflicting and unreliable. Intelligence of Schamyl's feats travelled by way of Trebizond and Constantinople, and were doubtless often exaggerated. Thus, a letter in the *Porta foglia Maltiese*, gave a very detailed account of the plan of a spring campaign resolved upon by Schamyl, but which was not put into execution, if it ever existed in the prophet warrior's mind:—"Travellers arriving from the Caucasus state that the famous Naib Mohammed Emir Effendi is in Abesch, and keeping up a very active correspondence with Schamyl. The plan of the two mountain chiefs for the next campaign will be to invade the Crimea on the side of Anapa and the Sea of Azoff, and thus to co-operate with the allies in driving the armies of the czar from the peninsula."

The Russian accounts came to Western Europe through the St. Petersburg press, and there were no records in its columns of surprises, defeats, cutting off convoys, &c., such as were received by way of Constantinople. On the contrary, according to the *St. Petersburg Journal*, and other organs of the Russian government, the winter in the Caucasus was one of unprecedented activity by the Russians, and surprise and loss by the Circassians. The following is a specimen of these narratives from the *Invalide Russe*:—"On the 16th of January, Baron Nicolay surrounded the strongest fort held by the Tchetchan, called Schonaih-Capon, and took it by storm. This fort is described as the Gibraltar of the Caucasus, and its capture is represented as the heaviest blow yet dealt at the power of Schamyl."

According to accounts from Constantinople subsequent to this announcement, the Russians experienced a defeat in the attempt, and incurred a heavy slaughter; according to intelligence from Trebizond direct, no such attack had ever been made, and the story in the *Invalide Russe* was merely to keep up the warlike spirit in the Russian capital. Such are the difficulties of determining the course of events in the Caucasus during that period. In like manner stories were put into circulation concerning the progress of the Russians in Central Asia, which would lead Western Europe to suppose that, in spite of all her reverses, Russia could still muster large armies for Asiatic enterprises; and that, while the English withered away before Sebastopol, Russian legions were in triumphant march towards Hindostan! The bombastic announcements to

this effect of the Russian journals, and the pro-Russian journals in other parts of Europe, were amusing throughout the spring and summer of 1855. There was no doubt, however, that the intrigues in Central Asia which Russia had conducted the previous year, and the menacing attitude assumed towards Persia, continued. At the beginning of January, letters received in England from respectable sources at Trebizond, alleged that "the Russians have razed the forts of Bayazid, and were closely watching the frontier of Persia." They further stated, "The heavy falls of snow which have taken place near Kars render it very improbable that hostilities can be resumed until the spring. The Russian garrisons of Schamkoi and Anapa will be, it is said, marched to the Crimea." According to these authorities also, the Russians were marching in force on Khiva, and were using every effort to shake the neutrality of Persia. The result of such communications was resumed discussions in England, and in the English press, as to the practicability of the Russians ever reaching India, and how far a successful issue of the Asiatic campaign of 1855 would prepare the races of central Asia to be Russia's auxiliaries in such an enterprise. "What," it was asked, "are the frontiers of Russia in Asia to be? The Araxes? or the Persian Gulf? or the river Indus?" Elaborate articles appeared in some of our periodicals upon the neutralisation of the Caspian Sea, the protection of Khiva, the re-establishment of British prestige in Persia, the subsidising of Schamyl, and the exclusion of Muscovite influence from Kurdistan. It was natural that the latter topic should command attention, for the insurrection there was kept up during the winter and spring by Russian emissaries. On the 18th of January, the Kurdish chief was represented as at the head of 1500 dashing cavalry, and a motley band of infantry, threatening Sachogeziere, and preventing the passage of couriers who traverse Mesopotamia to Constantinople and Bagdad. There could be no doubt that in disturbing Turkish power in Kurdistan, Russia supposed she was clearing for herself the high road to Bagdad. The Russians had officered Kurdish regiments, and obtained detachments of Spahis, once the flower of the Turkish cavalry.

Mr. Richard F. Burton, of the Bombay army, a distinguished oriental traveller, gives the following humorous but instructive summary of the history of these discussions concerning Russian aggression in Asia for a number of years, and which in 1855 were renewed with such fervour in England:—"Early in the present century two great military routes, according to Sir J. McDonald, connected Russia with Northern India. The line of least resistance, if we may trust Eldred Pottinger,

lay through Mushed, Herat, Cabul, and Candahar, to Peshawur. The other, passing by Bokhara, Balkh, and the Hindoo Kush, was deemed impracticable until General Harlan's Paropamisian march with artillery in 1838. This subject engrossed the attention of Stirling, Conolly, Burnes, and Abbott, Mouravieff, Orloff, Zimmermann, and a host of others. Captain Grover complained that the British public believed Bokhara to be in Persia. But in 1836, Mr. McNeill went to Teheran as minister, and Mr. David Urquhart became secretary of embassy at Constantinople, while Mr. B. Fraser remained as oriental reporter in Downing Street. The Eastern question was written up, skirmishers were thrown out in the daily papers, the monthlies swept the field in serried files, cavalry and artillery succeeded in pamphlets and reports, the heavy quarterlies acted as support, and a huge portfolio the reserve; the Guards' charge was the 'Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East.' McNeill, Chesney, and their followers proved the northern apophthegm—'The road to the English lies through Persia.' They showed that an invasion of India was not only possible but probable. To the frigid apathy of 1828 succeeded the fever fit of 1838, and relapses of Russophobia through the five subsequent years. Presently the question of Indian invasion *viâ* Persia, chameleon-like, changed its colour. In 1839, Perofsky advanced upon Khiva, 'to strengthen in that part of Asia,' said his master's manifesto, 'the lawful influence to which Russia has a right.' *Honneur oblige!* At the same time, England prepared to push a spider's web beyond the Hindoo Kush, for the purpose of entangling Dost Mahommed. It is printed that Baron Brunow then remarked to Sir J. Hobhouse,—'If we go on at this rate, Sir John, the Cossack and the Sepoy will soon meet upon the banks of the Oxus;' and that the president replied with spirit, 'Very probably, baron, but, however much I should regret the collision, I should have no fear of the result.'"

During January, February, and March there was skirmishing in the neighbourhood of Batoum, and in one instance a body of Georgian militia were suddenly fallen upon by a detachment of Turkish cavalry from the latter place, and put to the sword.

The chief interest of the contest in Asia is, in the British mind, associated with Kars and Erzerum. During the latter part of the winter Colonel Williams and the chief of the medical staff remained at Erzerum, in frequent conference with Consul Brant and the pasha of that pashalic, and busy organising and arranging for the opening of the campaign in spring. Mr. Teesdale, Colonel Williams' aide-de-camp, was, during this same period at Kars, in con-

stant communication with the muschir and correspondence with his own chief. The exertions of Mr. Teesdale were very great to secure supplies and effect organisation in the destitute and disorderly garrison. The objects to which Colonel Williams addressed himself were chiefly—the supplies of food to the two garrisons (Kars and Erzerum), the acquisition of military depots, the organisation and discipline of the troops, and arrangements for hospital supplies—as by far the largest portion of the Turks who perished in 1854 were lost for want of medical attendance, appliances, and care. The importance of this last point, so sadly neglected by Lord de Redcliffe on the Bosphorus, and Lord Raglan in the Crimea, was never for a moment lost sight of by Colonel Williams, or his active chief of the medical staff, Dr. Sandwith. More than a year afterwards, when the war was over, Colonel Williams (having acquired higher military rank) was invited to take the chair at an examination of the medical students of the London University, when he showed how strong was his impression of the necessity of judicious medical arrangements for the welfare, efficiency, and success of an army. He delivered on that occasion a remarkable speech, from which the following is extracted:—"He said his reason for taking the chair on this occasion was that he should be enabled to say a few words to his young friends around him, as well those who had received prizes as those who had not, in reference to one of their fellow-students, Dr. Sandwith, who accompanied him during the whole of the recent struggle in Asia Minor, whose zeal and virtues he hoped they would emulate, and when they arrived at his age he trusted they would be held in the same estimation by the British public. It had been hinted that he (General Williams) might bear some testimony to the value and efficacy of the medical profession, from his experience as a soldier in a remote region, and under circumstances with which, he did not doubt, they were all more or less familiar. When he went into Armenia he found the poor Turkish soldiers, amounting to some 400 or 500, stretched on straw, in the most wretched state of filth and degradation, and without comfort or consolation of any kind during sickness, or while suffering from wounds received in battle; but Dr. Sandwith, notwithstanding that he himself was suffering at the same time under a most severe illness, by his zeal and ingenuity completely changed the condition of the hospitals, and when he (General Williams) left he saw the poor invalid soldiers laid upon clean beds, instead of straw, and surrounded by every comfort that humanity or medical skill could dictate; and, instead of lying on the field of battle after being wounded, by the same tact

and consideration on the part of Dr. Sandwith, ambulances and mules were provided, and every other thing necessary for the accommodation and comfort of the wounded soldier. He (General Williams) would hold that gentleman up to his young friends around him as a pattern, and hoped most sincerely that they would imitate his example. There was another very distinguished member of this hospital with the army in the East, Dr. Parkes, and, although he was not personally known to that gentleman, he had heard from various sources of his great worth from those who had witnessed his efforts, and who esteemed him for his virtues as a medical man. He (General Williams) begged to offer his very sincere congratulations to the young men to whom he had that day distributed medals, which he trusted would operate as an additional incitement to exertion in attaining skill and knowledge in their profession, and be regarded by them as the foundation of their future fame. Those, on the other hand, who had been unsuccessful he counselled to persevere, in the hope that on a future occasion they would be among the competitors who bore away the rewards of merit."

In a former chapter, when recording the events which occurred in Asia in 1854, a correspondence among several great notabilities—Colonel Williams, Lord Clarendon, Lord Raglan, Lord de Redcliffe, Consul Brant, &c.—was given, illustrating the general condition of Turkish interests. In January and February, 1855, the correspondence continued, and was still unsatisfactory; but it is unnecessary to print the voluminous epistles that were interchanged, having already sufficiently shown the spirit in which the whole affair of despatches was conducted. The ambassador saw that the "ferik," as Colonel Williams had now become, was a power; that the government and public at home would support him; that further opposition on his part was hopeless; and that no coldness or neglect would be allowed: still he continued to do nothing for Williams or the army.

The Kurdish insurrection, incited by Russian agents, was quelled early in the spring by the firm conduct of the British commissioner. In February, Vassif Pasha was appointed grand muschir of the army of Kars. Lord de Redcliffe had stated to Lord Clarendon, when the latter urged a change of muschirs, that such changes in Turkey were only from one form of demerit to another; that corruption so prevailed there was no prospect of promoting by such changes the welfare of the army, or the success of any enterprise. This opinion was exemplified in the appointment of Vassif, for although an honest man, he had no knowledge of military affairs. Like the English general in the Crimea, he had never commanded any

large body of men previous to his appointment to the high, responsible, and difficult task of commander-in-chief of an army. Dr. Sandwith describes him as having no more experience of military affairs than a Fleet Street shopkeeper; but this is an exaggeration, and the doctor sometimes sacrifices accuracy to the affectation of an off-hand style of writing. Vassif was a soldier, but his military knowledge had not been gleaned or tested in war, and he had none of the requisites for a great command. This pasha yielded to the firmly-expressed demands of the English commissioner to Shukri Pasha, Hussein Pasha, and Ahmed Pasha, to be tried for peculation at Constantinople. So novel a procedure struck terror into the hearts of the corrupt pashas, which nearly paralysed their hatred and revenge. Still, throughout January and February, the obstacles raised at Constantinople to Colonel Williams' proceedings severely impeded his usefulness; and at last he wrote to Lord Clarendon, informing him that it was his conviction Rizza Pasha, the minister of foreign affairs, really desired to ruin the army of Asia. Rumours were extant that the wish was not confined to Rizza; that the British embassy was very conversant with Rizza's secrets, and a great deal too lenient to his motives. Several of the pashas at Kars became attached to the commissioner, professing to admire his boldness—at all events they adhered to him in his attempts to correct disorders and root out peculation. Vassif, Tahir, and Kerim, were almost as zealous reformers, to all appearances, as Colonel Williams or Mr. Teesdale. Kerim was a grey-bearded, rough, soldierly-looking man, brave as a lion; and it was curious to see him with the youthful Teesdale, in close conference about the various reforms in progress. The intrepid old chief did nothing without the opinion of his young friend, to whom he closely attached himself.

When the snows began partially to break up throughout the theatre of approaching strife, the state of the Turkish army and garrisons was still wretched, notwithstanding the labours of Captain Teesdale at Kars, and of Williams and Sandwith at Erzerum. The central government utterly neglected the army of Armenia, and the allied generals in the Crimea had too much work around them, and miseries too numerous and appalling to contend with, to think of Armenia, and its perils and its wants. Besides, the ambassador at Constantinople was a great man, and it was his proper province to look to such matters. For two years up to the end of February, 1855, the Turkish soldiers quartered in Armenia had no pay; their slippers were worn out, and they were often obliged to mount sentry barefooted in the snow. Their clothes could be no longer distinguished as military uniforms, being tattered and discoloured;

a large portion of them were afflicted with scurvy, and many suffered from dysentery even in the winter. Dr. Sandwith attributed this to their ill-ventilated huts, long confinement within them in the severe weather, and the want of nutritious food. By the end of February 10,000 deserters were reported, and these did their best to induce the other soldiers to desert. On one occasion a whole battalion revolted, and insulted their officers, to which act they were driven by the latter having robbed them of their food and apparel—with this they upbraided them while refusing obedience; yet it does not appear that either the charge was investigated, or the revolters punished.

Of all departments of the service the least fit to open the campaign of 1855 was the cavalry; they looked like beggars on horseback; the worst cab horses that refuse the coaxing, and are invincible to the lash of the London Jehus, are dashing-looking animals compared to the chargers which were mounted by the forlorn-looking horsemen of Kars. In spite of the moral authority and vigilance of Williams and Teesdale the pashas carried on systematic plunder on a large scale, so as to destroy the market both for provisions and horses, although for both, Kars and Erzerum ought to be amongst the best marts in the world.

In March three other British officers arrived in Erzerum—Lieutenant-colonel Lake, Major Olpherts, and Captain Thompson, all of whom proved themselves worthy of their country and their leader. Captain Teesdale was then ordered to join the commissioner at Erzerum, while Lake and Thompson were dispatched to Kars. General Williams and his aide-de-camp then vigorously applied themselves to the fortification of the garrison. Late in March the snow thawed; and in the beginning of April the warm genial sun of spring began to clothe the country with light and beauty, and to remove, by its genial influence, some of the sufferings of the hapless soldiery of the sultan. General Williams and Captain Teesdale were then oppressed with labour beyond the meanest soldier: from dawn to sunset they were occupied fortifying the heights around the city.

General Williams called together the city council, and requested the bishops and other dignitaries of the Armenian and Greek churches to be present. The general then addressed them, warning them that Mouravieff, at the head of a powerful army, was at Gumri, and would soon assail the Turkish positions. The council did not seem apprehensive of this, they supposed that Mouravieff would do as Bebutoff had done—act upon the defensive; and if he was minded otherwise, why Allah was great, and so was the prophet. General Williams exhorted them to the duty of self-reliance and exertion, whatever might be the

prospect of supernatural assistance which they cherished. Having complimented the courage of the true Turks, he turned to the Christians, and expressed his reliance upon them also, assuring them that the Porte had ceded to them equal rights, that they were now citizens of the great empire, and bound in honour to study and to promote its greatness:—the general wisely, however, invited them to try the spade first rather than the sword, and commended to them at that period the milder glory of digging at the batteries, however important it might become for them afterwards to meet the enemy with instruments of defence more martial. The Christians were morally electrified by the appeal; the archbishop rose and said with gravity and deep earnestness:—“O English pasha, we are your sacrifice! we will work—dig—die for you! Are we no longer dogs—no longer Giaours, although Christians? Then, as fellow-citizens, we will fight like free men!” This address was still more effective than the general’s; the Turks heard it with amazement, and considered it an additional reason for exclaiming that “Allah was great,” a piece of philosophy with which all difficulties were resolved. The greatest wonder of all to the Turkish mind was the severe labour to which General Williams addicted himself. Was he not a pasha? and was it meet that a pasha should work? Pipes, coffee, and the harem, were for pashas—work for the poor; but the English seemed to think that the higher they rose in rank the more incumbent it was upon them to work—this was incomprehensible to the Turks, poor or rich, pashas or slaves.

The government at Constantinople had ordered a levy of horses throughout the Turkish Asiatic provinces; the horses were brought forth, but the pashas stole all the barley—so the poor animals arrived lean, lank, spiritless, and often too much exhausted to recover; many of them had to be shot. When, however, it was discovered that the general was willing to give his guarantee for the payment, the country people brought good draught animals for sale—the word of the English pasha was sufficient; in their own pashas they had no confidence, they knew that they were liars and rogues. Mr. Churchill worked hard to lay up stores of rice and corn, and was able to forward considerable quantities to Kars. General Williams, finding that in one form or other everything was plundered which came through the custody of the pashas, became commissary-general himself, and laboured with the same indefatigable industry and observant intelligence in this as in every other department. The general wrote to the British ambassador at Constantinople, craving the removal of the incompetent and dishonest; his despatches

were no longer treated with disrespect, but little practical benefit ever followed. Dr. Sandwith says that but for the encouragement afforded by Lord Clarendon, General Williams, with all his vigour and courage, must have given up his labours in despair.

A speech of General Williams' has been given on a previous page, showing the importance of medical supervision to an army, and in commendation of Dr. Sandwith. The doctor has himself published an account of his difficulties and successes in his department. The following is an interesting picture of his position, and the state of things with which he was more immediately concerned:—"In the month of February, 1855, I had been appointed, at the instance of General Williams, inspector of the hospitals; and, as a brief account of this department of the army may not be uninteresting, I shall endeavour to describe my duties, and state a few collateral circumstances springing out of those duties. In the first place, my staff consisted of about fifty persons, including physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries. These were divided into three classes: the *hekims*, or physicians; the *jerachs*, or surgeons; and the *ezadjes*, or apothecaries. The physicians (*hekims*) were of various nations, French, Hungarians, Poles, and Italians; but the greater part were pure Turks, or Osmanlis, who had been educated at the Galata Serai, or medical school of Constantinople. The *hekims* were considered the most educated part of our force: the best of them, by far, were the Turks; the Europeans were, for the most part, ignorant pretenders—perfect Sangrados—without diplomas, or with very doubtful ones. I now found myself at the head of a body of officers who were, in truth, the only educated part of the army. Some of the Turkish physicians who had been instructed in Constantinople could speak French fairly. . . . Some few of the Turkish *hekims* were very fair operators, and were well grounded in the principles of their profession. They were, moreover, most modest and anxious for that improvement which increased facilities, and an enlarged intercourse with more advanced nations, cannot fail to bring within their reach. The surgeons, or *jerachs*, were of quite another class. These were ignorant barbers, who professed to bleed, draw teeth, and dress wounds, but whose surgical knowledge went no further. Nevertheless, among these were many docile and tractable, who, with fitting opportunities, would soon far surpass the old class of Turkish practitioners. The medical department was, in truth, at a very low ebb; less on account of the inefficiency of the staff than because they were, as usual in that land of plots, split up into numerous factions, and intriguing against each other. Moreover, they had been habitually insubordinate to their former chief, and enjoyed

little, if any, consideration from the superior military officers among their own countrymen."

Dr. Sandwith found croton oil sufficient to purge the whole population of Armenia, and linseed sent from Constantinople, at ten times its intrinsic value, which was a product of Armenia. He found sufficient chloroform for 100,000 operations! All these things were supplied by a medical purveyor, who poisoned the sultan's troops by wholesale for a profit which he shared with certain officials about the Porte. The doctor began to form a pharmacopœia for the Turkish army, but found an excellent one which had been thrown aside by the drug purveyor, and had been neglected, and at last forgotten. Dr. Sandwith again thus writes:—"No ambulances, or any means of conveying the wounded, existed; indeed, a sort of deathlike inactivity pervaded this department, for the commanders-in-chief had invariably turned a deaf ear to the suggestions and representations of its former inspector-general. My appointment was useful, inasmuch as it brought the matter within the sphere of General Williams' influence, who was the terror of pashas, large and small; whose visit would at any time cause a cold perspiration to start from the great officials, and inspire a singular and galvanic simulation of activity in themselves and their myrmidons. I represented to the general that an ambulance corps for the field was essential: ambulances were made, horses and mules were purchased. I ordered such and such individuals to different out-stations, and my authority was at once backed by the terrible English pasha: and although I cannot deny that very serious difficulties did meet me, some of which were insurmountable, yet most of these disappeared under his energy and will. My aim in the management of the medical corps was not to remodel and reconstruct on my own plan, but to build upon old foundations, and to ensure proper discipline and order. I moreover did my utmost to utilise the resources of the country, and render myself independent of Constantinople; since the time required to obtain necessaries from thence was generally extended over months, and the articles received were of the worst description. To General Williams' iron will and determination in all matters of hygiene in the camp must be attributed in a great measure this happy exemption; while to Salish Bey and Ynt Agha, names unknown beyond the scene of their labours, and to several other earnest, working men, whose noble qualities shone brighter and brighter as the siege advanced, would I here record my gratitude and admiration."

From the time that General Williams obtained a full recognition of his authority from Constantinople, his power over the pashas,

feriks, boys, &c., considerably increased, and he was enabled to make more way in the progress of reform. It was not until the 25th of February that he was invested with full Turkish rank, and he soon proved to the other officers of the sultan that his was not to be worn as mere nominal honour.

During the spring Colonel Lake corresponded with the general, giving him ample information of the state of things at Kars, and the colonel's representations were forwarded to Constantinople and to London, but no help came. On the 20th of April Colonel Lake wrote—"There are only fifteen days' provision for the troops now in garrison." A few days after he wrote again to the same effect, pressing urgently for relief. On receipt of these letters General Williams thus addressed Lord Clarendon:—"Neither land carriage for the army at Kars nor the provisions for that force are to be had in sufficient quantities, and I have this day received intelligence from Colonel Lake drawing my attention to these points, and echoing the prayers I have in vain addressed during the winter to Constantinople." The general then assures Lord Clarendon that he had used every effort to get sufficient food in the neighbourhood, and requests that directions be given to the governors of Diarbekir, Khar-poot, and the more remote provinces, to send food, especially grain. Lord Clarendon forwarded these requisitions to the English ambassador, but no good result followed. On the first

of May, before the heat of summer, so oppressive in those regions, supervened, and the inconvenience occasioned by it in transmitting supplies would be experienced, General Williams addressed a strong appeal to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, it being the third of a similar nature between the first of April and that date:—"Several weeks ago I addressed your lordship on the necessity of my having authority to take an active part in the purchase of provisions for this army; but, although Lord Pannure has expressed his decided sentiments on this vital point, I have not received a line in allusion to it from your excellency, and I have to state that this army cannot be supplied with provision without I can control those who have this matter in their hands. Colonel Lake informs me that the provision has dwindled down to ten or twelve days' supply, and I have not authority to oblige the medjlis to expedite food to our force, which I may soon have to designate as a starving army." If Lord Stratford de Redcliffe acted upon this urgent appeal in any way, there is no record of it in the Blue-books, nor anywhere else accessible to the historian. On the 5th of May, General Williams had sent from Erzerum a considerable supply, and so did the general work, that by the 3rd of June there were four months' provision in the place. To pursue the subject of Kars further in this chapter would be unnecessarily to anticipate events elsewhere to be recorded.

CHAPTER LXVI.

DIPLOMACY FROM THE BEGINNING OF 1855 TO THE MEETING OF THE VIENNA CONFERENCE.

"Everybody is mystified, and drearily does his best to mystify his neighbour. It must be allowed also that everybody succeeds pretty unsatisfactorily."—ROVING ENGLISHMAN.

WHILE the early months of 1855 were signalised by preparations for war on the part of all the belligerent powers, yet each hoped to cajole the other by the various agencies of diplomacy. Austria was the most active in pressing on peace negotiations. There was a certain dignity to be maintained by the powers actually at war that fettered them in any desire they might entertain to stretch out the hand of amity; but Austria had not yet drawn the sword, was unwilling to draw it, and was therefore anxious to save her own honour, by making it appear that recourse to arms on her part was not necessary, and that the time had arrived when those engaged in hostilities might abandon them. She, however, made great show of military preparation in the beginning of 1855. A correspondent from Vienna thus notices them, and the motives of Austria in restraining her armies from any warlike overt act:—"The public has recently heard so much

of the armaments of Russia that some information respecting the Austrian forces may not be out of place. The whole of the fourth army will be concentrated in Galicia by the end of January, but the different corps will be posted in such positions that they may without difficulty be directed to any given point. According to a reliable estimate, some 180,000 men, with 50,000 or 60,000 horses, are now in the Bukovina and Galicia. The Vienna correspondent of the *Augsburg Gazette* writes that not long since 45,000 men were at Cracow, 45,000 at Lemberg, 30,000 in the country lying between those two cities, and about 70,000 in East Galicia and the Bukovina, but such intelligence deserves no great credit, as only the persons employed in the emperor's military chancellerie can speak positively on such matters. The third army, in Transylvania and the eastern part of Hungary, consists of about 130,000 men, while the corps in

Wallachia and Moldavia may be about 50,000 strong. It is supposed the whole active army under the command of Baron Hess may consist of 360,000 men and some 100,000 horses, but the estimate is probably somewhat exaggerated. There never was an army better supplied with all the necessities of war than the Austrian, and it is well that it is so. The political world, and your Vienna correspondent with it, has often loudly complained that Austria has held back so long, but it must not be forgotten that she has between 1300 and 1400 miles of frontier touching on Russia, and seven fortresses to besiege if she carries the war into the enemy's country."

In keeping with these preparations was the tone adopted by the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople. Baron Bruck gave a diplomatic dinner there, at which he proposed the toast, "The Sultan," and added, "and to the Turkish troops—the conquerors of the Russians, the defenders of their country against Muscovite ambition. With them and their allies Austria will gladly draw the sword for the rights of Turkey, of Europe, and of justice. Russia is not to be feared; she will find that she has suffered defeat, whatever may be the final settlement of the present difficulties."

These words were carried through Europe, and read everywhere with avidity. It was felt that the turning point of the war was the junction of Austria with the allies, and her great military preparations and resources, viewed in connection with this bold speech, greatly excited all Europe. In Russia alone did it appear to take no effect—there Austria was better understood than anywhere else, even in Prussia. The czar had accurately measured the motives and means of the *kasir*. Austria had her own reasons for speaking through Baron Bruck in this defiant way against Russia, and expressing herself so cordially to the Ottoman Porte. The Danubian provinces had not only grown weary of Austrian armies, but so intolerant of their presence that the people would have risen and attacked them had there been the slightest hope that valour could achieve victory. The state of things was ripening, which a few weeks later was thus described:—"A very extraordinary event has taken place at Bucharest. Mr. Colquhoun, the British consul, was seated quietly in his cabinet, when four men, with masked visages, rushed into the room, and laid upon his table a variety of documents, after which they rapidly withdrew. These documents, on examination, proved to be revelations seriously impugning Prince Stirbey, who is said to have been in correspondence with Russia; and other papers revealed the unprincipled atrocities committed by the Austrians during their occupation of the Danubian Principalities. These documents

referred to persons who, it was alleged, could substantiate all the accusations brought against Stirbey and the Austrians. Unfortunately, no such proofs were wanting, as the facts are patent to all who are at all conversant with Danubian affairs."

This state of matters in "the provinces" gave much uneasiness in England, and led to so many remonstrances at the Porte, that Austria, anxious to hold these provinces in an iron grasp, thought it good policy to flatter Turkey, and placate Great Britain. The Porte too had, it was believed, resolved upon dismissing the Prince of Wallachia, Stirbey, and appointing Prince Ghika Karmakam as governor in his place. It was also rumoured in Constantinople and in London, that the governor of Moldavia had received from the Porte an official notification of the approaching arrival of French troops. On these subjects great reserve was practised by the Turkish and French governments, and this was observed so closely towards Baron Bruck as to give him considerable uneasiness, and cause some foreboding that measures were deliberated which it was known would be unpalatable to his government.

The forward conduct of the gallant little kingdom of Piedmont made Austria at once jealous and apprehensive. She was jealous of her moral power in Europe, and apprehensive lest Sardinia should leave the Western powers under so much obligation to her, as to be a guarantee for her independence against an Austro-Lombard invasion, or any persecution or annoyance which she might be disposed to offer to a kingdom which she hates so much. Prussia was also attempting to open up separate negotiations with the cabinets of London and Paris, the drift of which was not thoroughly comprehended at Vienna; and Austria, always jealous of Prussia, was anxious to forestal her in the supposed offers of some kind of alliance which, through M. Von Usedom, she was supposed to make. By calculations of this nature, the court of Vienna was solely influenced—there was no sincerity in its warlike words.

Prussia, unwilling to enter into the treaty between Austria and the Western powers, called the treaty of December, sought to accomplish a separate one with France, or failing that, with France and England, which would leave her position to Austria more loose, and not bind her so stringently to take up arms against Russia, as it appeared to her the treaty of the 2nd of December bound the southern German power.

The mission of Von Usedom failed. According to the *Württemberg Staats Anzeiger* (an official paper), the French reply to the Prussian despatch proposing a separate treaty stung to the heart the Prussian monarch, and greatly disconcerted his court and cabinet. The French

minister gave M. de Manteuffel, the Prussian minister, to understand, that any despatch or mission having for its object a separate treaty was no longer seasonable. The French foreign minister inquired, in an indignant form of expression, why new negotiations should be opened to effect what could without further loss of time be accomplished, if Prussia intended any military co-operation with the West. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was of opinion that if France consented to enter into a second treaty, in order to attain one and the same end proposed to be accomplished by that of the 2nd of December, the world would be justified in coming to the conclusion that she sought to create a schism in Germany. France, therefore, declined to enter into any separate treaty, seeing that Prussia had been invited earnestly to join in that of the 2nd of December. This put an end to the projects of Von Usedom, at all events for that time, and left Prussia "to chew the cud of bitter disappointment." Her real object was to create a schism between the Western powers, and between the Western powers and Austria, and to play the game of Russia among all the powers of the coalition against her. Austria was not sincere to the allies, and Prussia knew that, but she also knew that neither was Austria sincere to her nor to Russia. The Prussian king might, when he reflected upon the kasir's dealings with the czar, and the efforts to entangle Prussia in connections and treaties for Austria's interest solely, address him in the language of Byron's betrayed lover—

"Thou false to him, thou fiend to me!"

Prussia, finding that the Western powers were not to be deceived, showed the most bitter feeling, especially to England; and, indeed, while M. Von Usedom was speaking honeyed words in the ears of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at Paris, means were taken to woo the smaller German states into sympathies hostile to the Western alliance. It was by her influence that the minor German states forbid the exportation of horses, as it was understood England wished to purchase largely for her augmented cavalry forces. Prohibitions of foreign enlistment were intended to withdraw from England the means of recruiting her foreign legions. Prussia was intensely anxious to carry out this object all through northern and central Germany. The governor of the province of Posen issued the following notification:—"The criminal code of Prussia prescribes that whoever enlists a Prussian into the military service of foreign states, or introduces him to their recruiting agents, likewise whoever intentionally seduces a Prussian soldier to desert, or knowingly assists his desertion, will be punished with from three months' to three

years' imprisonment. Any attempt at the above will be visited with a similar punishment. As offices are about to be opened in the Netherlands and free towns, for the purpose of enlisting men into foreign service, I take this opportunity of bringing the above penal law to mind, and call upon all the police authorities of the province immediately to arrest any recruiting agent, and hand him over to the state prosecutor, to take from him his papers, and if he is a foreigner, to take measures for his being sent over the frontier after undergoing his punishment. I require to be informed of each separate instance."

In these measures the Prussian king was supported by his cabinet, army, aristocracy, merchants, and by the middle classes of his people to a large extent. The masses sympathised with England, and many Prussians enlisted in her legions in spite of opposition and menace. A Berlin journal declared at this time that the young men of the city flocked to the British embassy anxious to enrol themselves in the English service, while the Russian ambassador could not secure accessions to the medical staff of the Russian army, although the Prussian government gave every encouragement to medical gentlemen to take service in that army. This was not only a proof of the general feeling of the *people* in favour of the allies, but a specimen of the kind of neutrality preserved throughout the war by that power. The policy of Prussia was described with admirable precision in a letter from a Prussian gentleman, in Berlin, at this juncture:—"No doubt the dominant party here is well disposed to 'old' England, but it is better disposed to young Russia. No doubt it entertains the most just respect for her wise and patriotic queen; but it entertains infinitely greater admiration, mingled with a due quantum of fear, for the 'emperor.' No doubt, also, it would be rejoiced to form a triple alliance with the aforesaid old England; but then the trifolium must be made up with Russia as the centre leaf. This would save Sebastopol, Cronstadt, the Russian navy, and Russian supremacy in every coloured sea, and in every land throughout Europe. This would attach Germany to the Russo-Prussian car. This would neutralise Austria; and then a fig for France, and perhaps a 'third march to Paris,' to re-proclaim the elder Bourbons. All this, and more, exists in the dreams of those who pull the strings of Prussian policy, and will continue so until their hold of the strings be cut asunder."

While Prussia was endeavouring to form a separate treaty with France, or with France and England, she was also coquetting with Austria to draw that power away from the alliance, or to induce it to form conventions with her—

self which would neutralise the treaties with the West against Russia. It will be recollected by the reader that on the 20th of April, 1854, a convention had been entered into between Austria and Prussia, binding them mutually to arm in case of their respective territories being endangered by attack from any of the belligerents. The Austrian government called upon Prussia to fulfil this obligation, as, by virtue of the treaty of December the 2nd with France and England, Austria would soon be at war with Russia. To this the Prussian foreign minister replied. The following is the despatch *in extenso*, transmitted by that functionary to Count Arnim, the Prussian minister at the court of Vienna:—

Jan. 5, 1855.

Your excellency will find enclosed a copy of a note addressed on the 24th of December, 1854, to Count Esterházy, in which the imperial Austrian cabinet more closely defines the military measures which, in its opinion, Prussia and the other German governments ought to take in virtue of the treaty of April 20, and of the additional article of the 26th of November. Count Buol very justly remarks that it is necessary the contending parties should come to an understanding in respect to the exigency which presents itself, and on which the efficacy of the conditional military obligations into which Prussia has entered depends. As your excellency will readily conceive, his majesty has from the same point of view uninterruptedly directed his attention to the course of events, and long before this matter was brought forward, in the way done in the despatch of December 24, his majesty had conscientiously taken into consideration the obligations which he had taken on himself. It does not appear to be my duty now to enter more fully into the dispositions made by his majesty the king—dispositions arising as well from a regard to the interest of his country and people as from the undeviating attention which he has paid to the gravity of the circumstances—in order with noiseless progress to effect an increased preparation for war and a more speedy development of force. By the measures taken, larger bodies of troops can be ready for action within a much shorter period than that conditionally appointed in the Military Convention of April 20, and we might therefore suppose that we should in some degree be able to tranquillise Count Buol in regard to the heavy blow of the Russian military force on the Austrian Empire, could we share his opinion that Russia entertained the idea of proceeding aggressively.

However, after having dispassionately examined the general state of affairs, we should be obliged to do violence to our own conviction before we could arrive at the conclusion that Russia will assume the offensive if she is not attacked. I have more than once had occasion to direct your excellency to make such confidential communications to the imperial Austrian cabinet as in our opinion would most positively refute any such supposition. Besides, our intelligence respecting the movements of the Russian troops is by no means of a nature to justify the apprehensions alluded to. I attach the greater importance to what has above been said, as it appears to be the object of a part of the press to lead public opinion astray in this matter. Indeed, the recent conduct of Russia, in respect to the endeavours made to bring about negotiations for peace, is of such a nature that it would be difficult for a dispassionate observer not to remark her sincere wish to come to an understanding. Russia has unreservedly accepted the four points as they were proposed to her. After the conclusion of the treaty of December 2, she not only did not retract her acceptance, but she gave a fresh instance of her readiness to conclude a peace by granting fuller powers to Prince Gortschakoff. His majesty the king has the satisfactory consciousness of having always so employed his personal and diplomatic influence at St. Petersburg, that the imperial Russian cabinet should declare itself ready to

treat on the basis of the four points, although this basis of peace goes beyond that which the two contracting powers (Prussia and Austria) had considered the object of their alliance when the treaty of April 20 was concluded. A confidential conference has already been held, in order more nearly to specify the four points. We do not know the result of that conference, and because we do not know it, and as long as we do not know it, we shall consider it an imperative duty to take the simple and unmistakable conditions of the treaty as our inviolable rule of action, and keep the circle of our obligations free from any extension which we cannot clearly overlook. In respect to the military matters, which are pointed out to us as duties, we shall hold fast to the leading and fundamental principles of the April treaty, which also find their expression at the close of the military convention, inasmuch as the object of mutual assistance is stated to be the warding off of an attack. Even the obligations which Prussia took on herself in the additional article of November 26, 1854, bear this defensive character, although they confessedly go beyond the fundamental principles of the treaty of April. They (the obligations) are, besides, inseparably connected with the pre-supposition of a mutual endeavour to procure the acceptance of the four points. It is self-evident that there cannot be any mutual common action as long as Prussia has no share in the interpretation of those points, and exercises no influence on the same. The right to such participation, in as far as it regards definitive arrangements which, though made with the declared intention of maintaining the balance of power in Europe, change the whole of the international relations of Europe, and seem to modify treaties which Prussia has also signed—this privilege Prussia does not found on her being a sharer in any stipulation connected with the present Eastern complication, but on her quality of a great European power, which, by its own well-earned right, has participated in the treaties that regulate the legal state of things in Europe. The assurance need hardly be given that his majesty the king will, with the utmost tenacity, cling to this view of things, and in order to maintain it, should it be in danger of being disputed, he will not shrink from sacrifices and dangers which his faithful subjects will share in with their well-tested resignation, and with the whole force and perseverance which arise from true patriotism. It is least of all necessary to give such an assurance to his majesty the Emperor Francis Joseph, the illustrious relative and ally of the king. Neither need it be given to the sovereigns and the leading statesmen of the other states, as, in spite of divergent views and interests, Prussia reckons with confidence on their just appreciation of her claims, and is willing to procure their recognition (*anerkenntung*) of the same by means of explanation and mutual agreement (*vereinbarung*).

From the foregoing remarks on the principles which actuate the king in respect to his own military attitude, your excellency will readily perceive that his most gracious majesty does not consider himself called on to take the initiative in the German Confederation in respect to an immediate arrangement for the preparation of war of each separate contingent. The draught which was specially recommended by us and Austria to the Bund as a fitting basis is positively established, both by the proposition of the committee and by the resolution which was taken by the Bund on the 9th, but Prussia, from consideration for her other German allies, believes herself bound not formally to return to the same, as by so doing she would anticipate the duties of the military commission. On the other hand, it is self-understood that the royal military plenipotentiary will always be furnished with the necessary instructions for demanding the activity of the military commission on the basis of that part of the Federal Constitution which makes provision for war, and also for bringing the matter to a conclusion in a proper way. By thus acting according to the Federal Constitution, those objections will be best removed which, as we confess, present themselves to the proposals of the Austrian cabinet, as intimated in its despatch of the 24th of the last month.

Your excellency will be pleased to make to Count Buol a written communication of the present instructions.

Accept, &c.

MANTEUFFEL.

This excited, according to some accounts, great indignation at the court of Vienna; others pretended to know that these angry appearances were simulated, and that the Austrian court was really glad to have a pretext for holding back, in the infidelity of Prussia to her engagements. Be this as it may, the despatch was met by the following rejoinder from Count Buol, the Austrian minister:—

Vienna, Jan. 14.

AFTER the resolution taken by the German Confederation on the 9th of December, we considered it our bounden duty directly confidentially to confer with the royal court of Prussia on the subject of the practical result to be derived from the decision of the Bund.

The instructions which were given to our minister at Berlin to this effect, your — has learned by my communication of the 26th of December. It is evident from the reply now received, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, that the views of the cabinets of Vienna and Berlin do not coincide in some essential points.

The whole Confederation acknowledged the threatening state of affairs; but Prussia questions the correctness of the decision of the Bund, on the ground of the reiterated assurance of Russia—for which there is no guarantee—that she will confine herself to the defence of her own territory. We neither undervalue such a promise given by a power involved in the war, nor the effect which it may possibly have on its limitation; but no binding, no securing quality which could exercise any positive influence on the execution of the resolution taken by the German Confederation can be attributed, either by the German governments or by Austria, to a promise which has been accepted by no one. If proof were necessary that Russia herself does not believe that it (the promise) can be made subservient to the necessities of her military position, it could at this very moment be found in the conduct of Russia towards Turkey on the right bank of the Danube.

Even if we do not refuse to share in the hopes which Europe attaches to the concessions recently made by Russia at the conference held on the 7th, the object to be attained is still too distant—the opinions as to the practical accomplishment and the application of the four preliminary points may differ in such manifold ways, and the chances of war may exercise so much influence—for the imperial court to yield to the hope that in the preliminary results which have already been obtained, it has in hand a sure guarantee that peace will really be restored.

We appeal to the good sense of the German governments, and demand whether they can deceive themselves by fancying that the situation of affairs has until now lost anything of that threatening character which the Bund itself recognised. His majesty the emperor, our illustrious master, considers it necessary to remain in a state of complete preparation for all contingencies, and the approaching negotiations for peace will therefore, as long as the certainty of a favourable result is wanting, neither exercise any influence on the military measures of Austria, nor can they, in the opinion of the emperor, be allowed to interfere with the engagements entered into with his majesty's German allies for the attainment of common (mutual) objects. Such an attitude can but serve the interests of peace, and increase the chances of a favourable issue to the negotiations.

It is our most firm conviction that our German allies ought also now to place the whole of Germany in a position calculated to command respect. It appears to us that the interests of the German nation and its princes urgently require that Germany should, as well as ourselves, be sufficiently prepared for all possible contingencies. Whatever expression may in future be given to the resolutions of the Bund in its quality of a political power, we must again propose that whatever is requisite for the development of its military force may be cared for without delay. You will readily conceive that, entertaining such opinions, we could not otherwise reply to the communication of the Prussian cabinet respecting the

armaments of Russia and the German Bund than by those instructions to Count Esterhazy of which a copy is annexed.

The imperial presidial minister to the Bund will accordingly propose to the respective committees that a motion be made in the Diet that at least one-half of the several contingents shall be made *mobile*, unless the opinion should prevail that it would be more advisable to place the whole of the federal army in readiness for operations. The question whether, in the first case, two combined army corps or one complete corps should be formed, which the second half of the contingent would have to follow in case of need, as well as all other matters of a like nature, ought to be made the subject of consultations which should be held as speedily as possible, and of resolutions on the part of the authorities of the Bund.

The election of a federal commander-in-chief will also be necessary, in order that the union of the different parts of the federal army may, agreeably to the act of confederation, be united under one command. We are, therefore, of opinion that the Diet should immediately occupy itself with this matter, and take the necessary steps for electing a commander-in-chief of the military forces of the Bund, while in the several states the necessary measures should be taken for placing the federal corps prepared for war at the disposal of the commander who is to be elected.

Your — will communicate these instructions, as well as the documents which accompany them, to the courts of —, &c., and request of them to have the kindness to make known to us the resolutions to which this communication may give rise, as also the instructions which they may be pleased to give to their representatives at Frankfort, in order that they may co-operate in the accomplishment of the important duty which the organ (the Bund) of the will of the whole of Germany has to fulfil.

Accept the assurance of my perfect esteem.

COUNT BUOL.

Baron Manteuffel's despatch to Vienna was communicated to the cabinets of London and Paris; the result was a despatch to the Prussian government, from the French minister for foreign affairs, refusing to Prussia the right to be represented in the approaching conference at Vienna, unless she joined loyally in the treaty of the 2nd of December. The reply of the French government was peremptory and explicit, and produced in Prussia and in all Germany the greatest excitement. It is as follows:—

THE cabinet of Paris establishes that Prussia explains her refusal to mobilise her army:—1st, because she does not believe in the imminence of an attack upon Austria by Russia; 2ndly, because the support which she would have to give ought to be preceded by an *entente* between the contracting parties upon the feasibility of carrying out the eventual conventions. Prussia adds, moreover, that there can be the less objection to suspend the execution thereof, because if it was really necessary to place the Prussian army on a war footing, it could be done within the period fixed upon. The Prussian government, therefore, is resolved not to change the character of its obligations. The additional article may have extended them, but it has not modified their nature, and Prussia only engaged herself towards Austria to a *defensive* alliance. The two great German powers, moreover, ought to unite their efforts to obtain the adhesion of Russia to the four points specified in the notes of the 8th of August, and it would be necessary for the realisation of that community of action, that Prussia herself should participate in the definition of those first bases of a future peace.

As regards the acts the object of which would be either to consolidate the balance of power in Europe, or to modify existing treaties, and which Prussia had signed, her right to participate therein does not depend upon this or that accidental stipulation; it is due to the rank she

holds in the world. King Frederick William, to maintain it, will not be deterred by dangers and sacrifices, which the nation would share with as much devotion and energy as patriotism.

Another despatch from M. de Manteuffel (the above is the analysis of that of the 5th of January) brings out in more prominent relief the principal points where Prussia establishes that, the more she intrenches herself behind the strict interpretation of her engagements by the resistance to the pretension made to extend them against her will, the more, on the contrary, will she be disposed to enlarge them by means of negotiation, provided her position and her dignity as a great power are respected.

The cabinet of Paris beholds in the *expose* given in M. de Manteuffel's despatches two distinct orders of ideas:—the one special to the relations of the Prussian government with the court of Vienna; the other concerning the *ensemble* of its position in Europe. On the first point, France is resolved not to interfere in questions which exclusively concern the German Confederation; on the second, the cabinet of Paris is willing to explain itself.

The cabinet of Paris does not pretend to contest to Prussia the rank she holds. Nay more, during the last two years it has often reminded her of the obligations of that high rank of which she is so justly proud. But it feels it a duty to observe that the quality of great power is permanent—it cannot be cast off when it implies onerous duties, and be resumed when it only offers advantages. Privileges and duties of this importance are absolutely correlative. The one is inseparable from the other. It is not to be supposed that England and Austria take a different view of the case from France. But so much is certain—that France will never allow that a power which, from its own free will, took no part in the great events which are taking place in the world, shall afterwards maintain a claim to regulate the consequences thereof. The advantages arising from the war are only for the belligerent powers. And the advantages of the present (essentially moral advantages) consist in the right of participation, in the interests of Europe, in the regulations of peace. Prussia has not done anything as yet for that object. She has refused to proclaim her neutrality. That resolution does her honour. But, in reality, on what side is she? If hostilities continue, will she be with or against the allied powers? This is what no one can tell.

Can Prussia reproach France for her confidence in Austria? The lines of conduct have been so different. By a movement which she declares purely a strategic one, Russia evacuates the principalities; Prussia immediately declares herself satisfied, while Austria, on the very morrow of the day upon which that evacuation is communicated to her, exchanges the notes of the 8th of August with France and England. On the 28th of November, Prince Gortschakoff announces the adhesion of his court to the four points; Prussia congratulates herself on having obtained the object of her efforts, while Austria signs the treaty of alliance of the 2nd of December with the Western powers. On the 7th of January, Russia accepts the interpretation of the four guarantees; Prussia, fancying the success of her policy complete, rejects the appreciation made by Austria of the treaty of the 20th of April, and refuses to call out her contingent, while Austria spontaneously hastens to recognise the case provided for by Art. 5 of the treaty of the 2nd of December as realised, that the re-establishment of peace is not assured, and offers to combine her plans of military operations with the allied powers.

Is there a wish of maintaining that Austria finds in the alliance of the 2nd of December advantages not shared by Prussia? What are they? This observation of Prussia doubtless does not imply assent, but yet, as a proposition is made to conclude a *Prussian* treaty, beside the *Austrian* treaty, it would be well to explain the exact meaning of the proposition. Was that the object of M. d'Usedom's mission to London? That mission was veiled up in so much mystery that its real object is not yet known in Paris. But the more endeavours were made to conceal it, the more were made to discover it. All that has been ascertained is, that Prussia exerted all her efforts to prevent the allies from waging the war upon the vulnerable point of the enemy, and to prevent the passage of their troops through Germany. What did she offer as

a compensation? To place a *corps d'armée* on the Polish frontier—that is to say, that Prussia with one hand would turn aside the sword of the allied powers, and with the other cover Russia as with a shield. Might one not be authorised to suppose that M. d'Usedom had different treaties in his portfolio, and took out by mistake the wrong one at London—that which was to have been produced at St. Petersburg?

The French government has not the intention, you may be assured, of hurting the feelings of Prussia. It expresses itself thus in a loyal and sincere expression (*épouchement*); and if it desires its language to be heard at Berlin it is in the hope to see Prussia at least give up a position in which, if it had been happy enough to see its efforts crowned with success, she would not have been to-day.

The attention of all Europe was directed to the sittings of the German Diet, and its resolutions to arm on the 8th of February were accepted in such different lights by all the powers concerned, as to form a very curious feature in the aspect of the times, strikingly illustrating the language with which this chapter is headed. When the resolutions of the German Diet came under the consideration of the Austrian cabinet, it ordered a diplomatic circular to its agents at the different German courts, which excited extended discussion in all the cabinets of Germany, especially in that of Prussia, and led to much diplomatic turmoil between the greater and lesser German states, and between the two leading German powers themselves.

Our previous communications do not permit your excellency to doubt that the resolution of the Diet of the 8th, by which all the principal contingents of the federal army are to be ready on the first appeal to enter upon a campaign within a delay of fifteen days, has been received with satisfaction by the government of the emperor. In fact, we see in the resolution of the Diet an event of great importance, if only for the reason that the schism which the question of military preparations threatened to cause in Germany has been fortunately avoided for the moment. Considered in itself, however, this resolution does not appear to us to arise logically from the reflections caused by the present situation of things, or to respond to the indispensable necessity of keeping the federal army completely prepared to take up a strategic position with out loss of time. It is true that we have not been able to admit the motives on which the united committees based the proposition which has been converted into a resolution. It will be understood that on our part we could not present our accord with the Western powers in the light of a demonstration directed at the same time against the two belligerent parties; but the confederation itself, which on this question is no longer placed exclusively on the ground of the federal act, but is also placed on that of the offensive and defensive alliance of the 20th of April, and of the resolutions subsequently attached thereto, has in our opinion assumed an attitude much too decided to be accepted as the motive of the measure at present resolved on, as far as regards the generally menacing situation of European affairs. In the meantime we believe that we may expect that these motives, insufficient in our eyes, will be corrected by the situation *de facto* and *de jure* of the question, and especially by the nature of the relations with the powers with which we are allied by a solemn treaty. Your excellency will express yourself in a general way as regards the resolution of the Diet on the indications which we have just given. The immediate and as energetic as possible execution of that resolution is now a question of honour for Germany, and we have no doubt that all the governments of the Confederation will endeavour, with the same zeal, to carry into execution the measure resolved on, and that they will do all in their power that the military constitution of Germany

shall, under these circumstances, respond to its object and to the mission of a great federal power. As far as concerns Austria, the emperor our august sovereign has deigned to order that in the delay of fifteen days, given to the different governments to notify the measures which they shall have taken, the statement of all the troops placed on a war footing, and under the superior command of Field-marshal Baron von Hess, shall be communicated to the Diet, and that a proof will be furnished that the preparations for war made by Austria will far exceed what has been demanded by the Diet. It is scarcely necessary for us to formally express on this subject our conviction that the complete inadmissibility of the proposition made during the vote by the representative of Prussia, not supported by any other government, to the effect that the placing of troops on a war footing must take place within the limits of the federal territory, has not escaped the appreciation of the German governments, the said proposition completely losing sight of the fact that the measure now adopted by the Diet is only a consequence of previous resolutions, according to which the common defence with which the Confederation has charged itself, in consideration of the dangers which threaten German interests, is not only to protect the German federal territory, but also all the territory of Austria and of Prussia, and even our position in the Principalities. There will be no impropriety in your excellency communicating this despatch confidentially to the government.

Accept, &c.,

BOL.

In the sittings of the Diet on the 22nd of February these questions occupied that assembly most painfully. A letter dated Frankfort, 9th of March, in the *Nuremberg Correspondent*, says:—

“We are enabled to give almost textually the discussion which took place between the representatives of the two great German powers in the sitting of the Diet of the 22nd of February. M. de Prokesch (the Austrian representative) declared that he was charged by his government to submit to the Diet the state of the troops assembled and ready to take the field to cover the territories placed under the common protection of the confederation, in virtue of the resolutions of the 24th of July and 9th of December, 1854.

“M. de Bismarck (the Prussian representative) replied:—‘The declaration we have just heard from the imperial representative appears to rest upon the supposition that the principal object of the contingents which are to be placed upon a war footing, in virtue of the resolution of the 8th of February, should be to cover the territories which have been placed under the protection of a common defence by treaties to which the confederation acceded by decisions of the 24th of July and the 9th of December last. The Prussian representative does not think that that supposition is in accordance with the contents of the resolution of the 8th of February, nor with the debates which preceded it. He feels himself, on the contrary, obliged to observe, that if an ulterior interpretation of the resolution was necessary, and if the substance was to be found in the motives that dictated it, it would be seen in those very motives that the circumstances that would render necessary the defensive measures provided for by the resolution of the 9th of De-

cember, 1854, had not yet taken place, but that it was the obligation imposed upon the Diet by the second article of the federal pact to watch over the internal and external safety of Germany, the independence and inviolability of German states, which induced the Diet to make preparations to meet that obligation, and that the forces of the confederation might be brought to bear on any quarter.’

“M. Prokesch von Osten replied to this:—‘The government of the emperor considers doubtless the resolution of the 8th of February, which converted into a resolution the propositions submitted to the Diet by the united committees on the Eastern question, and in execution of the resolution of the Diet of the 9th of December, as an ulterior development of the resolutions of the Diet of the 24th of July and 9th of December. As the representative of Prussia takes another view of the case, it is the more important that Austria should not allow any doubt to exist as to its view of the matter. It will be for the Diet to judge whether it thinks it necessary to reply to the question as to which view is the right one.

“‘The representative of Austria, moreover, thinks it right to observe that not the motives of a proposition of the committees, but that it is the propositions themselves, which form the object of the deliberations, and that in voting a proposition it does not necessarily follow that the motives are accepted. Austria, moreover, thought fit to declare in her vote that she did not appropriate the motives of the committees. As regards the necessity of proceeding to the fulfilment of the defensive obligations contracted by the resolution of the Diet of the 9th of December not being proved according to the mooring of the committees, it does not follow that that necessity does not exist; and certainly it was not the wish of the committees to affirm that fact, as they themselves declared that they were not yet in a position to form a judgment on the question as to whether hopes favourable to the re-establishment of peace could be founded upon to pending negotiations.’”

The effect upon Austria of the Russian manifesto and general call to arms was to increase still more her armaments, and to drive her still nearer to the Western alliance. Baron von Hess, and Generals Letung and Crawford were directed to report upon the military situation; they recommended the augmentation of the Austrian army to 800,000 men. But indications of financial inability to sustain such a tremendous force greatly disturbed the cabinet, and rendered it really solicitous to bring about a peace. The *German Journal of Frankfort* gave a very minute account of the interview of the Russian minister with the Austrian em-

peror, arising out of these new phases of the complication:—"Prince Gortschakoff on Tuesday last demanded an audience from the emperor for the purpose of giving, in the name of the Emperor of Russia, explanations on the new manifesto of the czar. The prince declared that the sovereign had been constrained to take that step by the extension, more and more considerable, of the coalition against Russia, and that the calling out of the whole forces of the empire was only a measure of defence necessitated by the warlike preparations of the West. This measure, added Prince Gortschakoff, was not intended to exercise any influence on the conferences for peace, the czar being disposed now, as before, to treat with the Western powers on the basis of the four points. The Emperor Francis Joseph did not, we are assured, consider this explanation satisfactory, and he frankly stated to Prince Gortschakoff that the proceeding of the czar inspired him with less confidence, from the fact that up to the present moment no other power has had recourse to measures of such gravity. In a word, the manifesto of the Emperor of Russia has produced a very unfavourable impression in our official circles; and it is asserted that our emperor will not leave without replying to this demonstration of the czar."

Hitherto in the progress of the war Russia had no sincere friend but the King of Prussia, and, even irrespective of his monarchical bigotry and dread of ultra-liberalism, his friendship for the czar was disinterested. In her dealings with Turkey, Austria, and the West, Russia had been diplomatically defeated, as well as defeated in the field, except so far as she succeeded in influencing the Aberdeen ministry to doubt her intention to do more than make a demonstration in the provinces. The *Oesterreichische Zeitung*, after the interview between Prince Gortschakoff and the Austrian emperor, observed:—"Russia still holds her own where the contest is one of arms, but her diplomatic defeats have been severe, and it is upon that field she is after all most likely to be beaten. Her moral power is everywhere so entirely broken, that there is not a state in the world which dare declare that it approves of her policy." Although the above was written by a gentleman well informed in German politics, and in Russian policy so far as it is apprehended in Germany, yet it held in too low an estimate the dexterity of the Russian diplomatists, for, notwithstanding her previous diplomatic defeats and the friendliness of Russia in Europe—except in Germany north of Vienna—she continued to gain her ends in the intrigues which then everywhere prevailed. Finding Austria armed along her whole frontier, and the German states about to call out their federal contingents, she made overtures of

peace so plausible, and in a spirit apparently so conciliatory, that the Vienna conference was entered upon with most sanguine expectations that peace would follow its deliberations.

The British and French ministers at Vienna were authorised to negotiate a peace which it was professed there and at Berlin, and even in London, that Nicholas was willing, with newborn moderation, to make. There was, however, good reason to believe that his real object was to throw Austria off her guard, while the Cossacks attempted to make another Sinope at Tultscha—an attempt, which, although defeated by the bravery of the Turks, enabled their aggressors to make considerable slaughter, and to keep up the prestige of the Russian army for alertness and courage. To produce a lulling effect upon Austrian military preparation, and sow discord in Germany by the help of Prussia, was another object to be gained by renewed negotiations. This proved successful. Austria began to talk confidently of peace, and had gone so far as to inform the Thuringian princes that they need not mobilise their contingents as Russia was sincere. Meanwhile Russia redoubled her exertions. From Bessarabia and Southern Russia troops were hurried to the Crimea, which Russia dare not move thither, if she had not made sure of sheathing the sword of Austria by the peace pretences of Prince Gortschakoff. It could hardly be said that in the negotiations which attended the opening months of the year 1855, Russia experienced diplomatic defeat, whatever her previous reverses in this way.

The Western powers made considerable exertions to draw Sweden and Denmark into the alliance. The ministerial press of Stockholm laboured incessantly to show the disadvantage of such a course, while the popular feeling, as in the previous year, was altogether in its favour. The influence of the King of Prussia in the Swedish court was very great, and it prevailed to recommend a temporising policy, and a real neutrality. The Swedish merchants, profiting by the contraband trade, sustained by their influence the ministerial policy. Denmark resolved also upon neutrality, and the king, professing to fear the coercion of the Western powers, ordered a new conscription, and strengthened his small but well-ordered fleet and army.

Amidst this hubbub of diplomatic rumours, negotiations, hurrying to and fro of ambassadors and agents, and general arming of the nations, a publication issued from the Belgian press, professedly written by a French general officer, which took all Europe by surprise, and produced everywhere a great sensation. This work was attributed to Prince Napoleon Buonaparte, cousin of the Emperor of the French. It will be seen by referring to the account

given of the dispatch of the army of the East to its destination, that Prince Napoleon commanded a division. The prince is a quasi-republican, and disapproved, it is alleged, of the *coup d'état*. When in command of his division in Turkey he preserved a severe reserve, and held little intercourse with Marshal St. Arnaud, whom he considered incompetent to the great task he had undertaken. The prince was invalided in the Crimea, and having remained in Constantinople without any material improvement of his health for some time, he was ordered home by the emperor. On his arrival he was the centre of a clique at Paris from which emanated the most contemptuous reflections upon the management of the expedition, and the policy of the war—everything which went wrong being attributed to the self-will and inordinate self-esteem of the emperor, and the incompetency of the generals selected by him to carry out his schemes. At last the pamphlet appeared which produced such a painful impression throughout Europe. It was entitled, *De la Conduite de la Guerre d'Orient — Expédition de Crimée — Mémoire Adressé au Gouvernement S. M. l'Empereur des Français, par un Officier Général*. It contained critiques upon the management of the war, which were as just as they were severe; but it also contained many things which, even if written by a prince of the imperial house, proved that he was not fully acquainted with the facts or the policy arraigned. The policy of the French emperor towards Austria is thus described:—"It was the hope of securing the alliance of Austria, after having secured that of England—it was the desire of forming a coalition of sovereigns against the czar, instead of forming a coalition of peoples against despotism, which misled that artful and circum-spect policy, and which destroyed in one single campaign the forces of the Western powers. Austria could not but be a hindrance, and her alliance an insurmountable obstacle. Austria saw an inevitable danger in the continuation of French uniforms on the Hungarian frontiers, and at a short distance from Poland. That continuation might give hopes to the Hungarian national party, and provoke insurrections powerful enough to shake to its roots the scarcely planted tree of the Austrian monarchy. Already the Hungarian and Polish emigrants were on the move; they formed legions destined to join the allied powers, and to combat the czar, in whom they saw the impersonation of absolutism and tyranny. In the heart of the French army there were Hungarian and Polish refugees. Now, what Austria was anxious to avoid, at any cost, was the appearance of a French flag on those Hungarian frontiers; it was the agitation which might result from that, in provinces ever ready to rebel. Her

adhesion was on that condition, and on that condition, as we have already stated, it could not but be unacceptable. And yet it was accepted. The Emperor Napoleon III. was peculiarly anxious to secure the alliance of Austria; he had particularly at heart to make himself acknowledged and accepted, as a peer and an ally, by the last descendant of the ancient house of Hapsburg."

The treaty between Turkey and Austria signed on the 20th of June, 1854, it will be recollected, enabled the latter to occupy the Moldo-Wallachian territory, and this treaty was cunningly completed by the Austrian minister at Constantinople without, it was alleged, so much as consulting the ambassadors of France and England. According to "the general officer" (who writes of Prince Napoleon as though it was not his hand who held the pen), Marshal St. Arnaud was the real author of the treaty, acting under the secret instructions of the Emperor Napoleon, and that when the army heard of the treaty they were filled with indignation, Bosquet loudly exclaiming, "treason!" At Varna the delay is attributed to the secret influence of Austria, which became so obvious that Prince Napoleon on that ground demanded his recall, which the emperor refused. It appears that "the general officer" forgot that the want of transport, and the prevailing sickness, rendered it quite impossible to move the French army upon the Danube. One division which entered the Dobrudscha was decimated by disease, and hardly a man returned to Varna in health. Still, as the reader may find in the pages of this History recording the transactions there, the inaction of the allies was suspicious, transport might have been—ought to have been provided; and unless some diplomatic end was to have been arrived at, it is unaccountable that two great nations should leave, in summer, armies of no great magnitude, unable to proceed even a few days' march for want of transport. Allowing Silistria to remain so long unrelieved, will ever throw a dark shade of suspicion over the cabinets of the Western powers.

The Crimean expedition was, according to this author, wholly the design of the French emperor, in order to gratify the wish of Austria to remove the forces of France from a field of action by which Poland and Hungary might be excited to revolt. If this be true, the emperor proved himself more far-sighted than his censor, for he succeeded in his enterprise, and conquered a peace by it; while, in selecting such a field of action, he removed all pretext for a junction of the forces of Germany with those of the czar, which would have prolonged the war, and have cost multitudes of lives and many more millions sterling. "The general officer" thus accounts for the expedi-

tion:—"It was in the private apartment at the Tuileries that the idea of that expedition originated: it was conceived in solitude. The emperor, bent over a map, and with eye intent, and a compass in his hand, spent long hours in elaborating the plan, and he sent it to Constantinople entirely written with his own hand, and without having previously communicated it to anybody. The emperor distrusted the observations which Marshal Vaillant would not have failed to proffer, and which he would have listened to only with a sacrifice of judgment."

When the counsel of war at Varna, convened by St. Arnaud, discussed the expedition to the Crimea, the votes of the members were equally divided. Against the expedition were Prince Napoleon and the Duke of Cambridge, Admirals Hamelin and Dundas—the duke being the least opposed. On the other side were St. Arnaud and Canrobert only—but Lord Raglan and Bosquet gave affirmative votes, declaring that it was contrary to their own convictions. These were the timid counsels to which the emperor referred in his celebrated letter to the widow of Marshal St. Arnaud. Lord Raglan and Bosquet were both supposed to be influenced by the urgency of the French marshal, who pleaded the desire and authority of the emperor. Bosquet, suspected of disloyalty, was perhaps actuated by an unwillingness to oppose the emperor's wish, having accepted honours and command at his hands. The decision was referred back to the two cabinets, who were swayed by the desire of Austria to remove French uniforms from the paths to Poland and Hungary. The Crimean expedition sailed, and Austria was conciliated. Such is substantially the story of the French "general officer." According to this writer, also, the army of Omar Pasha was left unsupplied in Bulgaria by Rizza Pasha (through whom the army of Asia was destroyed, and Kars lost), under the influence of Austria; and if the allegations of proof be true, it would appear that the whole policy of Austria at Constantinople was to play upon the corruption of the pashas to leave armies unsupplied, in order to get her own armies thrust upon the provinces; while her influence in Paris was wielded to flatter the dynastic pride of the emperor, and work upon his fear of democracy, to induce him to direct his armies from the provinces of the Danube for the reasons already detailed.

It is of course impossible to confute the statements of the "general officer," when he professes to reveal what were diplomatic secrets, until he revealed them; but if his accuracy in these respects is to be tested by his accounts of the actions in the Crimea, little reliance is to be placed upon any of his revelations. Let the following suffice to illustrate this: in describing

the battle of the Alma he is anxious to detract from the glory of the victory, in order to inveigh the more successfully against the policy of the emperor. He thus describes it:—"On the left the English made their preparations but slowly. They were not in line till ten o'clock, when they advanced with their habitual coolness. But they were attacked by cavalry, crushed by the fire of artillery on the heights, and compelled to withdraw behind the Alma to re-form their ranks. The position was becoming critical for them, and consequently for us. But the Russians, threatened in front by the Napoleon division, and a brigade of the Forey division, in flank by the divisions of Bosquet and Canrobert, felt a hesitation that decided the day. The Zouaves threw themselves on the Russians with the bayonet. At the same time the divisions of Sir de Lucy Evans and General Brown re-appeared on the other side of the Alma, and attacked the Russians in front. The Russian cavalry fell back under the fire of Cathcart's division, and before a brilliant charge of the cavalry, under Major-general Lord Lucan."

This whole paragraph is a tissue of inaccuracy and misstatement. The English were not crushed by artillery on the heights; they were not charged by cavalry; they never retired behind the Alma, nor recrossed it again, but as victors; the Russian cavalry did not fall back under a fire of Cathcart's division; nor did the Earl of Lucan and the British cavalry make any charge, brilliant or otherwise. Yet these are only a portion of the errors contained in this absurd passage. It must be no matter of surprise if, with the reputed authorship of the emperor's cousin, the pamphlet obtained a vast circulation, notwithstanding errors so gross as these here exposed. The prince denied any connection with it, but he was not believed, and the production is attributed to his intimacy with the leaders of "the nationalities." There are persons who think that, as in England it was found convenient, in reference to patronage, for the interests of certain noble conservative families, that some noisy member should be a whig, and for whig families of powerful pretensions that a conservative traitor should be numbered among the circle—so, in case of changes in France, it is alleged that a democratic as well as an anti-democratic member might subserve the imperial family interests. There are no proofs to sustain such a surmise; but as these speculations largely influence the feelings of men, and shape their political conduct, some account of them is necessary in a narrative of the political and diplomatic intrigues of the period.

As the spring advanced, the plenipotentiaries, for the Vienna conference, to decide on terms of

peace, were definitively nominated; and public attention in England was directed to the antecedents of Lord John Russell, while discussing his fitness for the post. By a careful reference to these, Lord John did not appear to be a man on whom the country might rely in such an emergency. His feelings against Russian policy were not at all so strong as his parliamentary war speeches would lead persons to suppose. His correspondence with Sir Hamilton Seymour establishes this. On the 9th of February, 1853, when minister for foreign affairs, he directed the English ambassador at St. Petersburg to read a despatch to Count Nesselrode, of which the following are extracts:—"Upon the whole, then, her majesty's government are persuaded that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe, than that which his imperial majesty has so long followed, and which will render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory." . . . "The more the Turkish government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptionable protection which his imperial majesty has found so burthensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty."

In this trimming, un-English, and unstatesmanlike communication, Lord John recognises the course long followed by the czar as one calculated to shed lustre on the name of his imperial majesty! Was not Lord John aware that the whole career of the man had been one of dissimulation and blood—the invasion of his neighbours' territory, and the suppression of the rights and liberties of nations? Had Lord John never heard of the Caucasus; of the treaty of Adrianople; of the suppression of Polish independence; of the robbery of Persia; of the invasion of Khiva, &c.? Was there ever a prince who "so long followed" a course of more signal rapine and injustice? And why was all this so tolerable to Lord John? Because the great emperor was the patron of order—as monarchical and aristocratical dominion in Europe is pleasantly entitled. Lord John recognises the protection of the Greek Christians as sanctioned by treaty: he ought to have known the treaties between the two powers better than to make such a concession. The foreign minister of England should at least be conversant with that description of lore. His lordship concedes, as a *fait accompli*, that right of protection which the emperor sought to exercise, as prescribed by duty, and therefore maintained although "burthensome" and "inconvenient!" How the wily Nesselrode must have laughed in his sleeve at the simple English

foreign secretary, unless he regarded him as "looking through his fingers," as the Russians say when they wish to describe a thing as very sly and mock innocent. Whether these paragraphs were penned in sincerity or hypocrisy, their writer was not a fit man to deal with the questions pending at Vienna, nor with the power whose minister he thus addressed, unless indeed he had very much improved since he held the seals of the British Foreign-office. How far that was the case will be seen in another chapter.

The most curious episode in the diplomacy of the period was a proposal made in the American legislature to offer the mediation of that power. Mr. Sumner brought forward a resolution, similar to one presented to the House of Representatives by Mr. Clingman, directing inquiry as to the propriety of the United States' government offering to mediate between Russia and the allied powers. Mr. Clingman's resolution, requesting the president to tender the mediation of the United States to the powers engaged in the Eastern war, was worded as follows:—"Whereas, the people of the United States see with regret that several of the great powers of Europe are engaged in a war which threatens to be of long duration, and disastrous in its consequences to the industrial and social interests of a large portion of the civilised world; and being, under the favour of Providence, in the full enjoyment of the blessings of peace, distant from the theatre of conflict, disconnected with the causes of quarrel between the parties belligerent, and as a nation having no immediate interest in the contest, and while, not recognising the right to interfere, either by force or by menace, nevertheless are of opinion that the controversy is susceptible of pacific adjustment through the interposition of a neutral and friendly power. Therefore, be it resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the president be requested to tender to the belligerents the mediation of the United States in such manner as, in his judgment, may seem most likely to lead to a pacification."

America was probably the last state in the world which the allies would be likely to accept as an umpire. Russia would in all probability have accepted it, for the impression in Russia that the Western European powers might be thwarted and counteracted by American instrumentality, was very strong. The *Englishwoman in Russia*, whose interesting publication we have already quoted, thus refers to this subject:—"It was extraordinary how the Russians clung to the idea that they had secured the aid of America to save them from their embarrassments. They spoke of the help they were to receive with as much assurance as

if a treaty had already been signed on the subject, and they appeared to regard the president of the United States with as much respect as a sailor does his sheet anchor in a storm. To do the Americans justice, they took all the advances in perfectly good faith, and rather encouraged the hope. They were courted in all companies, feasted, petted, and as they say, 'made much of,' and seemed rather pleased than otherwise. It is odd that citizens of a republican nation, such as that of the States, should have so great a reverence for titles, orders, stars, and the like trumpery; for surely, if a person be a gentleman in the proper sense of the word, it is not necessary that he be ticketed as such, like a prize ox in a cattle-show; and in Russia, above every other country, a glittering star, or a cross suspended by a scarlet riband round the neck, would be a most fallacious criterion that the wearer merited so high an appellation. Indeed, it often happens that the subjects of the czar, the breast of whose coats is like a cushion on which the family jewels are pinned, have the vilest souls and the blackest hearts, together with the most empty heads in his dominions. I do not know if a foreigner would not really form a more correct estimate of their character, if he judged of their baseness by the number of orders they display. The Americans in St. Petersburg did not seem to think so, for the very morning I left it, one of the *attachés* of their embassy showed my friends, with the greatest exultation, the Easter eggs with which the Princess So-and-so, the Countess Such-a-one, and several

officials of high rank about the court had presented him; he also exhibited the portraits of the whole of the imperial family, which he intended to hang up, he said, 'as household treasures, when he returned to New York,' whither he was going 'right away,' as he assured us. The Russians, upon the strength of their hopes, were always threatening us with the American fleet in the Baltic, which would place the allied fleets between two enemies. Is the old adage about extremes meeting really so near the truth? Whether there were any substantial foundations to all these castles in the air, we had no means of knowing."

The cross-purposes, blandishments, intrigues, and treacheries of the various agencies at work in connection with the war thus performed their criminal round during the early months of 1855, until the conference, so anxiously expected, opened its dreary details at Vienna. On another page of our story, the history of that event shall be recorded, and we now once more turn to Sebastopol, and see what occurrences there were likely to quicken negotiations or defeat hopes of peace. The feeling of the English people was, like that of the Turks, unfavourable to negotiation *yet*:—they desired to see justice done to the wronged and plundered ally, by prompt, frank, honest, open treaty, if the enemy were willing to offer or accept righteous terms; but, otherwise, they were ready to welcome continued war and its consequences, however formidable. The spirit of the people was—"Fiat justitia, ruat cælum."

CHAPTER LXVII.

THE SIEGE IN FEBRUARY TO THE BATTLE OF EUPATORIA.—PRESENCE OF THE RUSSIAN GRAND DUKES WITH THE ARMY ON THE BELBEK.—ARRIVAL OF RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS AND MUNITIONS OF WAR.—ARRIVAL OF CROATS AND OTHER LABOURERS TO ASSIST IN MAKING THE RAILWAY.—REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE ALLIES.—CONTINUED SICKNESS, CONTESTS, AND SORTIES.

"And in this seat of peace tumultuous wars
Shall kin with kin, and kind with kind confound;
Disorder, horror, fear, and mutiny
Shall here inhabit, and this land be called
The field of Golgotha and dead men's skulls."—SHAKESPEARE. *Richard II.*

The first intelligence received in February from the armies in the Crimea was by a telegraphic despatch from Admiral Bruat, which communicated the arrival of 1350 French soldiers, with a large cargo of provisions, camp articles for the French army, and apparel for the sailors. It also announced that at Eupatoria the roads, hardened by the frost, afforded excellent opportunity for action in that neighbourhood. By the same medium intelligence was announced that the Russians had received large reinforcements, and that the grand dukes were in the Crimea, either at Simpheropol or

Sebastopol. From St. Petersburg the news was transmitted to Western Europe that Prince Menschikoff received the grand dukes at Simpheropol, on the 4th, in great military state. Thence they proceeded to the encampment on the Belbek to encourage the troops, who had suffered much from cold and exposure, and were said, notwithstanding the patience and submission of Russian soldiers, to be very discontented and desponding. About 30,000 men were assembled there whose only shelter was the wretched holes they had dug in the earth, behind the works which had been formed at

the close of 1854, between the Belbek and the Katcha. General Osten-Sacken was entrusted with keeping open the communications with Perekop, and Liprandi still threatened Balaklava. Prince Menschikoff, writing on the 8th, informed the emperor that the general situation was unchanged; that he continued to disturb the besiegers; and that the English army was incapable of defending their own trenches, which were now held to a considerable extent by the French.

On the 3rd of February, Lord Raglan sent home the following despatch:—

Before Sebastopol, Feb. 3, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE,—Nothing has occurred in front of the British lines since I wrote to your grace on the 27th January.

Before daylight, on the morning of the 1st, the enemy made a vigorous sortie on the most advanced works of the French right; they were repulsed, after a sharp contest, in the most gallant manner by our ally, who, however, sustained some loss.

The weather, which had latterly been fine, broke yesterday; and, after a rainy evening, there was a fall of snow during the night, and there is again a frost, with an exceedingly cold wind.

The materials for the railway continue to arrive, but I fear it will not be possible for me to supply the amount of military labour which Mr. Beatty would seem to require.

Nearly 200 Croats, who were hired at Constantinople, have arrived, and been handed over to him, and more are expected, and, as a matter of experiment, I have obtained 400 Tartars from Eupatoria.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c.

Again, on the 6th of February, his lordship addressed the secretary-of-war in the following despatch:—

Before Sebastopol, Feb. 6, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE.—I mentioned to your grace on Saturday that the weather had broken. The frost was very severe on that night, and the thermometer down at 13, and the wind was very high and piercingly cold.

Sunday was rather milder, and yesterday was fine. To-day the glass has fallen, and there is every appearance of rain.

I am happy to state that the medical officers consider that the general condition of the men has improved, although apparently there is no diminution in the number of the sick.

The enemy has made no movement of importance, but great convoys of waggons have been observed to go into Sebastopol laden either with ammunition or provisions.

I enclose the casualties to the 4th inst.

Lieutenant-colonel Collingwood Dickson, of the Royal Artillery, an excellent officer, whom I have before had occasion to bring to your notice, was slightly wounded on the 4th inst., when making a reconnaissance in company with some French officers.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The opening of February was characterised by certain amenities which contrasted happily with the previous asperities of the war—the French leaving little gifts of white bread for the Cossack videttes, who placed a note in Russian in a cleft stick, declaring how acceptable such supplies were.

The preparations for laying down the electric telegraph made satisfactory progress, as did also the railway; and the mild weather cheered the

troops, although clouds and high winds gave sufficient indication that the mild temperature could not be expected to last.

During the first week in February many sick were sent away to Scutari from the British camp; they were brought down to Balaklava in a deplorable condition, literally covered with filth and vermin. There the blankets had to be removed and burned, and the poor invalids were supplied with many comforts from the *Times*' Fund. Hot brandy and water, tea, rice, arrowroot, sago, and other nutritious and gentle diets appropriate to the sick, were provided for them, which had been sent by Mr. Macdonald (the *Times*' commissioner) from Scutari. Mr. Russell records in his journal the following fact in connection with these benefactions:—“An officer said to me yesterday, with tears in his eyes, ‘the things I have got from the *Times*' Fund out of the *Bride*, will save many of my poor fellows' lives. My God! what would I not have given for them a month ago. Many of our best men would now be alive if I had had them.’”

Although the British troops were in so much need, and large stores of every comfort were in Balaklava or in the harbour, delays were perpetually interposed by the officials, and the men continued to die for want of these comforts. The ship *Sir George Pollock*, heavily freighted with various commodities by the government, remained in the harbour day after day without an effort to unload the cargo and distribute it. “The Crimean Army Fund” was a little less slowly administered, the administrators having opened their stores at the beginning of February. The gifts of the public were, however, not distributed to the soldiers as gifts; it was deemed more proper by the authorities to *sell them*, in order to defray the cost of carriage and administration—a mean and unnecessary policy. The soldiers were entitled to receive gratuitously whatever the fund supplied; whether they were likely to use their pay wisely or otherwise was no affair of the authorities of any description—the men should have been supplied with what the public intended them freely to receive.

The British slowly received reinforcements. On the 4th the *Midway* arrived with the 71st regiment. Lord Rokeby assuming the command of the Guards, inspected them on that day, when it is said he was moved to tears by their wan and wasted appearance, and by the absence of the many brave he had seen pass through the Bosphorus to that scene of desolation and death. Lord Raglan was unusually active, more so than the short and sparse despatches we have just given would encourage the reader to suppose. On the 5th he made a long inspection of matters at Balaklava. Perhaps his lordship deemed this especially neces-

sary as the harbour was full of shipping—and yet orders were given to the harbour-master to prepare for the reception of a portion of the French ships, Balaklava being nearer than Kamiesh to a newly landed French division which had taken ground near to the British right.

The loss of life among the Turks continued to be most appalling. It was at once painful and pleasing to observe how our Ottoman allies cared for their dead, turning the old vineyards into burial-grounds, and finding out retired and picturesque spots among the hills where they might lay their plague-stricken brethren. Laboriously, silently, and solemnly did they toil in the performances of these offices; and every spot where their dead was laid was marked by a decorous respect and sound reverence for the place of the departed.

Great exertions were made to get up the planking for the huts, so that, as an eye-witness described, "miles of men, and of mules and ponies, all struggling along through the mud with boards—nothing but boards—might be daily seen."

Although the days were very sunny and genial through the first week of February, the nights were extremely cold, and the men, not acquainted with the climate, did not take suitable precautions; this may have accounted for the continued mortality. Warm clothes, which had been issued with some show of industry since the third week in January, were still not dispensed to all. Many were obliged to do duty during the long cold nights in thin and tattered garments. A store of warm clothing brought out at the end of December was removed from one ship to another, and remained in the harbour; the time and toil expended in changing it from ship to ship would have been better employed in dispersing it among the men. What was distributed proved generally to be very bad—the shoes parted with their soles after the wear of a week or ten days. The sufferings for want of fuel were felt through the whole month of February. Requisitions were indeed made for charcoal, but the commissariat could not always supply it—and when it could, no transport could be procured. The following remarkable statement is inserted in the journal of the *Times* correspondent, and will illustrate the general condition of the army at this period:—"The light division, although it has been one of the hardest worked, is one of the healthiest in the camp. The Guards are now reduced to 500 men fit for duty. It must be considered that when the condition of a regiment is noticed to be better than that of another, if they have been an equal length of time in the campaign, it will be found invariably that the result is the work of three men, the colonel, the doctor,

and the quartermaster. Efficiency, zeal, and activity on the part of the last-named class of officers produce the best effects; and I have been a witness of the extraordinary amelioration which one of them can bring about in the state of a regiment by his almost unassisted labours."

At this period a crime was committed upon an English soldier which astonished the whole camp. A man named Cullen, a servant of Lieutenant Harvey, of the 9th regiment, was the unfortunate victim. He was found dead, and naked, near the new Turkish camp. The Turks laid the offence to the account of some Spanish muleteers, who in turn shifted the crime upon some Italian sutlers; but the amount of evidence was to the disadvantage of some runaway Greek servants—a class who infested the camp, and were ready for any crime. Amongst the English bad acts were very rare, perhaps no army was ever so free from offences against order, justice, or morality. The commissioners sent out by government to inquire into the state of the army in the Crimea thus reported upon its moral condition:—"It has only been by slow degrees that we have been able to form any adequate conception of the distress and misery undergone by the troops, or fully to appreciate the unparalleled courage and constancy with which they have endured their sufferings. Great Britain has often had reason to be proud of her army, but it is doubtful whether the whole range of military history furnishes an example of an army exhibiting, throughout a campaign, qualities so high as have distinguished the forces under Lord Raglan's command. Suffering and privation have frequently led to crime in armies as in other communities; but offences of a serious character have been unknown to the British forces in the Crimea. Not one capital offence has been committed, or even alleged to have been committed by a soldier, and intemperance has been rare: every one who knows anything of the constitution of the army, must feel, that when troops so conduct themselves throughout a long campaign, the officers must have done their duty and set the example. The conduct of the men, therefore, implies the highest encomiums that can be passed upon their officers. They have not only shared all the danger and the exposure, and most of the privations which the men had to undergo, but we everywhere found indications of their solicitude, and of their constant readiness to employ their private means in promoting the comforts of their men."

The Russians worked with great assiduity at their batteries; and especially upon the works in the rear of the Malakoff. On the 7th they had as many as 1200 men employed at the earth-works, and on the slopes and parapets of the

batteries. Mr. Russell, looking down upon Sebastopol on that day from a favourable situation, saw "the small steamers and boats in the harbour particularly active; and one portion of the place, containing some fine buildings, and a large church with a cupola, as seen from the picket-house, put me in mind of Greenwich, from the Park Observatory, seen through a diminishing glass."

Circumstances favourable to the health and convenience of the army followed the demolition of a portion of Balaklava, the active superintendence of Major Hall, Colonel Harding, and Captain Powell, in effecting the expulsion of suttlers and other filthy idlers, and the cleansing of the place. The "navvies," perhaps, did more to put nuisances out of the way than any other agents, however effective.

The allies continued to work at their third parallels, and their redoubts there had been placed with such skill, that, although all the batteries were not mounted, they had already done the exterior works of the place more harm than the firing from the second parallel during the whole winter.

While the Russians were so busy with their works and batteries, they were not unmindful of the progress of their enemies; their cannonade was hot for some portion of every night, and sorties were perpetual: our allies had to bear the brunt of these. Thus, on the early morning of the 1st, before dawn, the Russians, after a heavy cannonade, made a rush upon the French trenches, where they were met with a prompt and bloody repulse, but the fighting for a time was very severe, and our allies lost 400 men, including officers and non-commissioned officers. After this repulse, the Russians again opened a heavy cannonade along the French lines. Soon after dawn, Canrobert moved 16,000 men down the declivities towards Inkerman; the Russians cheered loudly, but did not accept battle. On the 3rd, there was another sortie; but after two volleys of musketry from the French, the Russians declined any attempt upon the trenches, and retired unpursued. On the 5th a severe fire was sustained and returned by the French with considerable loss, and as deserters afterwards informed them, with still heavier loss to the enemy. The French scouts kept up a dropping fire all night; the Russians repeatedly sallied out, but fell back under the heavy roll of the French musketry.

Our allies continued to scarp the Woronzoff Road, and to strengthen all their works; their mortars began to tell upon the masonry of the defence, and to scatter portions of the earth-works. The English guns of this description were considered superior, and Lord Raglan lent our ally ten of our 13-inch mortars. This was one among many instances in which the English aided their coadjutors in *matériel* of

war and artillery; while it is the fashion to magnify such assistance as was afforded to our troops, justice demands that English aid to the French should not be unmentioned.

At the end of January, General Niel, the distinguished French engineer arrived, and immediately inspected the works, and gave a formal opinion to the French chief of the prospects of the siege. This general had a high reputation in France, and was aide-de-camp of the emperor. He was the engineer officer who made the capture of Rome, when the French republic sent an expedition thither to reinstate Pio Nino: the conquest of Bomarsund, under General d'Hillier, in conjunction with the British engineer, General Jones, enhanced his fame. Under his influence, General Canrobert adopted new views in several matters bearing upon the prosecution of the siege. After a council held on the 1st, it was resolved that approaches should be effected in front of the Malakoff Tower, by the engineer corps under the direction of General Bosquet; in order, says Bazancourt, "that by this commanding point we might attack the Karabelnaia at the moment when an assault should be made upon the west of Sebastopol. The basis of the first works was laid; the officers of artillery and engineers who managed them were instructed to confer with the heads of departments in the English army, for the purpose of ensuring their immediate execution." From the "Journal" of the French Siege Corps we extract the following:—"Two batteries shall be constructed: one of eight pieces at the point where our works join those of the English; another, of fifteen pieces at least, on the east slope of the Careening Basin. The batteries must direct a cross fire upon the Tower and the Mamelon situated in front. Under the protection of these two batteries, and the English batteries, there shall be opened approaches leading, on the west to the Central Bastion, and on the east to the parallel which must crown the Mamelon situated to the south of the Malakoff Tower. A battery of fifteen pieces shall be afterwards constructed near this last parallel. After this, there shall be made ways of approach upon the two elevations which enclose the Dock Ravine, in order to reach the Redan and the Tower. For the execution of these works the commander-in-chief appoints Lieutenant-colonel Laboussinière of the artillery, and Major St. Laurent of the engineers."

The concluding passage of General Niel's report was as follows:—"Whatever plans may be adopted as to investment, and despite the danger of extending our lines towards the right (in which direction they are already so far developed), the place *must* be attacked on the side of the Malakoff."

General Canrobert, in his letter to the French

minister of war, under date of the 3rd of February, thus notices the opinions of the newly arrived chief of engineers:—"Since his arrival General Niel has not ceased to observe narrowly the fortress of Sebastopol, which from its immense extent partakes of the nature both of a strong city and an intrenched camp. His experience has enabled him to appreciate the difficulties of the position, and the manner in which these difficulties have contributed to the weakening (so much to be regretted) of the valiant English army, in conjunction with which we have undertaken the half of the siege of Sebastopol."

On the 7th of February 1200 labourers were set to work by our allies to trace the communications, erect epaulments, carry up balls, rockets, and material for a vigorous prosecution of the siege in the new direction. Major Renson, an experienced staff-officer, was appointed as major of the trenches. While the real interest of the siege was transferred to the new attack, the Russians, perceiving the design of the allies, set to work with the most indefatigable labour to strengthen this position. Not that they had ever neglected it, they had all along seen that the Central Bastion, and Flagstaff Bastion, were not the positions where attack brought most peril—they had never mistaken the key of the defence; but now, when menaced upon this point with formidable power, as they saw it begirt with cannon, and the approaches worked with redoubled energy, they met this new danger with commensurate exertion and vigour. Several times the French engineers and sappers and miners were counterworked by the Russians, and blown up or suffocated with smoke balls; but the Russians paid dearly for those attempts, as the French now generally brought up fieldpieces to command the approaches, in such a way that the parties making the sortie were obliged to retire, when repulsed, under showers of grape and other missiles, which made havoc among them. While the French were opening these new arrangements, the original attack was worked with renewed energy, until the numerous batteries which it comprised were all finished and armed. These batteries were thirty-two in number. No. 33 was a field-battery, placed in the line of circumvallation. Indeed, the exertions of the French at this juncture were prodigious, and those of the enemy were equally energetic. The British attack did not, from the nature of the ground, give opportunity for similar displays of engineering, as on the French attack was afforded to both assailants and defenders. One well competent to pronounce an opinion upon the subject, and who examined all the ground after Southern Sebastopol had fallen, and the docks were destroyed, thus graphically sketches the appear-

ance of the works, which were to a considerable extent in existence at the period of which we write, but which afterwards increased to a surprising magnitude:—

"Our approaches to the defences of the place afforded no opportunity to our engineers of developing the use of mines against the enemy, and were not assailable by the same agency on their side for the same reason, as it is obvious that where mines can be used by the attacking force, they can also be adopted by the defenders. The French had not the same sort of ground, and the system of French mines in front of the Bastion du Mât presents the most astonishing instance of labour and skill ever witnessed in any siege. To the Russians, however, belongs the credit of the most important and extensive operations of this nature. Our engineers have in their possession plans of both the French and Russian mines and galleries, and the tracings resemble a section of a honeycomb. The enemy's mines consisted of two series of shafts or galleries and magazines, the first being twenty-seven feet below the surface, the second being no less than forty feet below the first. The workmen were supplied with air by means of force pumps, and in one magazine at the end of one of these galleries, there was found no less than 8500 lbs. of powder, all tamped in and ready for firing by electric wires. This magazine would have formed an *étouffoir* far in the rear of the French advance, and its probable effects may be estimated, when it is considered that the destruction of the docks was effected by a smaller quantity of gunpowder than was contained in this one mine. Many of the shafts spring out of the counterscarp, and there are numerous chambers cut into the same portion of the ditch of the bastion, which were used as bombproofs by a portion of the garrison. It has also been discovered that the Russians had cut a subterranean gallery from inside the parapet, under the ditch, to an advance work which they used as a *place d'armes* in making a sortie, and hitherto it had puzzled the French to understand how the men used to collect in this work without being seen. The effect produced by the French mines in their saps can only be conceived by those who have looked down into the yawning craters of the *étouffoirs*, after stumbling over the wild chaos of rocks cast up all round by the explosion, just as though the Titans and the gods had met there in deadly combat. Some of these gulfs resemble the pits of volcanoes. The Russians only intended to fire some of these mines in case of an assault on the Bastion being repulsed under circumstances which gave them a chance of occupying the enemy's advanced saps; others would have been fired only in case of a retreat from the city, in order to destroy as many of

the enemy as possible, and to check pursuit; and the explosion was intended to destroy not only the French parallels, but the works of the Bastion itself, so as to prevent the French turning the guns. There were two or three mines inside the Redan, and there were some extensive galleries and mines in front of the Malakoff, but it was at the Bastion du Mât, or Flagstaff Battery, that the French and Russians put forth their strength in mine and countermine. The galleries are pushed for fifty yards through the solid rock in several instances. These labours are of the most stupendous character, and must have proved very exhausting to the garrison."

In the journal of the French Siege Corps is the following entry under date of January 7:—"Commandant St. Laurent informs General Bosquet that the Russians are actively working at the defences of the lighthouse, where they have raised five epaulments covering seventeen pieces, and three mortars to be directed against the battery at the bottom of the harbour. At the request of Colonel de Laboussinière, the engineers will finish the battery at the bottom of the harbour, in order to check the Russian works, and to silence the fire of the five batteries."

On the same night information was brought to Sir Colin Campbell of a meditated attack by the corps under Liprandi upon Balaklava, and preparations were made to suit the occasion. All the various approaches to the works were covered with artillery, and the troops were ordered to the heights. The steam sloop, *Vesuvius*, landed all her men to guard the town. Admiral Boxer and Captain Christie, with alertness and promptitude, formed a corps of the crews in the harbour, and these were placed in suitable positions in the houses of the town, so as to give the enemy a decisive reception should he conquer an entrance. In this way all stood to their arms during a bright moonlight night, in which musket barrels and bayonets gleamed in long successive lines, until the dawn broke in mist over the cold bleak plateau. Mr. Russell considers that all this apprehension and vigilance was under the influence of that active chief, "General Rumour;" but the pun was not well placed, for on the morning of the 8th, the Russians appeared in force, and took possession of the redoubt No. 1, of which their previous occupation was so memorable. They also endeavoured in the course of the day to bring heavy guns up to Canrobert's Hill, during which operation they perceived the preparations made to receive them, and converted the intended attack into a reconnaissance.

While all this preparation was going on at Balaklava, Sir Colin and his troops taking up their position upon the heights, and Admiral

Boxer and Captain Christie displaying skill and energy in the town and harbour, a cannonade boomed heavily from the French attack, and the Russian defence opposed to it, over the silent hills. At Balaklava suspense reigned over the watchers, who listened every moment for the sound of the enemy, and peered through the vivid moonlight for the sheen of their bayonets. At Sebastopol the rage of a fierce artillery battle filled the air with violent concussions, and sent the sounds of the conflict far out upon the calm bright sea.

On the night of the 8th and 9th another awful cannonade shook the earth around Sebastopol. A feint was made against the English lines, which found their guardians too vigilant to be surprised. A sortie was directed against the French, much in the usual way, and, as usual, repulsed. During the day masses of Russian infantry were seen moving along the Tchernaya heights, in the direction of Sebastopol and northward, while a large force hung upon the British rear, and the whole force at Balaklava was again turned out to repel the expected foe. The British watched under the drizzling mist of a chill and miserable morning, until all chance of an attempted surprise had passed away: our troops experienced—

"The feigned retreat, the nightly ambuscade,
The daily harass and the fight delayed,—
The long privation of the hoped supply,
The tentless rest beneath the humid sky."

On the night of the 9th there was a storm and a heavy fall of rain. Sir Colin Campbell and a French general were to have effected a reconnaissance of the large force which harassed the British rear, but the weather prevented them.

The morning of the 10th broke in dimness and dreariness over hill and vale, rendering the enemy's movements obscure, but at last a gleam of sunshine enabled our people to discover his soldiers hard at work at some earth-works on the brow of the hill near Kamara. On the top of Canrobert's Hill, one of their videttes remained watching the British. After some time three columns were seen moving along the bank by Kamara in the direction of the high grounds above Baidar. Between Kamara and the road to McKenzie's Farm clouds of Cossacks passed to and fro, and every indication was presented of a large army in observation of our positions. On the heights overlooking the Woronzoff Road the Cossack videttes never for an instant relaxed their "look out," and it became necessary for the British to be on the *qui vive* incessantly. Our heavy dragon videttes were doubled, but the Cossacks increased in boldness and in numbers, and approached so close that our artillery shelled them.

The reports of Tartar spies, who were em-

ployed successfully by the French, and of deserters who made their way to the British camp, agreed in representing a grand attack upon the lines, and upon the flank and rear of the British, as daily imminent. The incessant rains flooding the Tchernaya, and laying the whole country deep in either mud or water, perhaps prevented such an attempt, or else these reports were given out in the Russian army to deceive the deserters and spies, and mislead the allies, while the point of attack really intended was Eupatoria.

On the 9th the general-in-chief of our ally made known to his army, by an order of the day, the arrangement of the French emperor for the permanent division of his army into two corps (an arrangement which had provisionally existed); the one to be commanded by General Pelissier, the other by General Bosquet. This idea was the suggestion of General Canrobert to the minister of war; and, in consequence, Pelissier was sent from the army of Africa to take the command of the first *corps d'armée*, which was to conduct the left attack; while Bosquet's corps should still remain a corps of observation as before, but also to sustain the new attack—that against the Malakoff. Each of these corps was comprised of four divisions, while the imperial guard and the 9th division, under Brunet, were placed near head-quarters, so as to be directed in reserve of either corps as circumstances might require.

The entire force of the French army on the 9th of February was 83,000 men. The arrangements of the two *corps d'armée* were as follows, according to the journal of the Siege Corps:—

FIRST CORPS.

Commanding officer—the General of Division, Pelissier.
Artillery:—Commanding officer—the General of Brigade, Le Boeuf.
Engineers:—Commanding officer—the General of Brigade, Tripiet.
 1st Division—The General of Division, Forey.
 2nd " " Levaillant.
 3rd " " Pâté.
 4th " " De Salles.

SECOND CORPS.

Commanding officer—the General of Division, Bosquet.
Artillery:—Commanding officer—the General of Brigade, Benard.
Engineers:—Commanding officer—the General of Brigade, Pressard.
 1st Division—The General of Division, Bonat.
 2nd " " Canon.
 3rd " " Maxran.
 4th " " Dulae.

The superior command of the engineers remained in the hands of the General of Brigade Bizot, and the superior command of the artillery with General Thiry. General Niel returned to Paris to make his report to the emperor.

The French have taken all the credit to themselves for the adoption of the new and ultimately

successful attack upon the Malakoff, as the key of the place; and have, in several of their publications, insinuated, and even expressed the idea, that the first and erroneous direction of the attack was to be attributed to the English engineer general. The reverse was the case; General Burgoyne, the British chief of the engineer staff, from the very first pointed out the true attack; but the French brigadier in charge of that department of Canrobert's army objected so strenuously, that General Burgoyne was overruled. That gallant and wise old general at once indicated the mode in which Southern Sebastopol must be conquered; and had his views been carried out, much suffering would have been spared in both armies, and many lives saved. In the British House of Commons, Captain Vernon, moved by the incessant attempts on the Continent to discredit every scientific branch of the English army, brought the matter under the notice of the representatives of the British people. The following report of his speech places the matter in its true light:—

"I rise pursuant to notice to call the attention of the house to the services of the corps of Royal Engineers in the Crimea. I do so because there is a disposition abroad to depreciate the services of the British army in the Crimea. We think it high time that something should be done to counteract this tendency to detract, and my statement this evening will be a step in that direction. No detractor has ventured to question the courage and the conduct of the British soldiers of the general service. So far as the special corps are concerned, I have never heard any one bold enough to say the British artillery was second to any in the world, and my statement this evening will show that the British engineers were equal, to say the very least, to any engineers that took the field. The war that has just terminated, unlike any other modern war on record, narrowed itself into one mighty siege. The victory of the Alma was but the introduction to the siege of Sebastopol, and the battles of Balaklava, of Inkerman, and of the Tchernaya, were but futile attempts on the part of the Russians to raise that siege. A fortress important rather for its uses than for its strength—a fortress so low in the scale of scientific defence that it was supposed, erroneously enough, to be open to a surprise, so moderately fortified that it was considered liable to the assault of a *coup de main*,—became, under the pressure of circumstances, and by the mere force of earthworks erected by the genius of Todleben, one of the strongest places on record, and held at bay for eleven months the chivalrous valour and the military science of the world. This war, then, being a siege, it follows that the battle was fought by science. It was a war of engineers, and I rise in my

place to claim for the British engineers their full share in the achieving of that great result which has brought about the peace. There were three great turning points on which the success of the war depended. First was the selection of a place of landing in the Crimea; secondly was the decision as to which front of Sebastopol should be attacked—for we were not in a condition to invest the whole, according to the real acceptance of the term; third, and most important, was the discovery of the key to the position of the front to be attacked. Now, sir, I may at once avow that I claim for the British engineers the decision on all these three points, and I shall confine myself as much as possible to proving that this was the case. I must trust to the indulgence of honourable members while I place historically before them these three questions in their relative positions. It will be seen at a glance that this question widens itself from a corps question into a national one. What I now say, by the aid of the press, will be spread far and wide. What I now say will, doubtless, by many be impugned, and it therefore behoves me to start on a proper base, and to go on adding fact to fact in order to be able to defy all contradiction. In January, 1854, on account of the appearances in the East, Colonel Vicars, with three engineers, left England to place themselves under the orders of Admiral Dundas, who commanded in the East. At Gibraltar Colonel Vicars was taken ill, and the command devolved upon Captain Chapman, now Colonel Chapman, whose distinguished services I have had occasion before to bring under the notice of the house. These officers joined the fleet in the Bosphorus, and were dispatched to reconnoitre the strong position of Maidos, near the Dardanelles. Now, at this juncture the home authorities were without any precise information with regard to the East. In this dilemma, Sir John Burgoyne, whose high position as inspector-general of fortifications might well have excused him from the arduous undertaking, volunteered his services, at this inclement season, to proceed to the East, to make military observations of such forces as should be sent by the allied French and English armies in support of the Turks, in the event of a war with Russia, which then appeared imminent. His services were accepted with eagerness. On his way through Paris the Emperor Napoleon associated with him Colonel Ardant, an officer of French engineers. These two proceeded together to the Dardanelles, and inspected the position of Maidos, and afterwards of Boulahir, preferring which latter the officers of engineers were withdrawn from Maidos to reconnoitre Boulahir, which they did in that inclement season, the snow being then deep on the ground. Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ar-

dant then proceeded to Constantinople to reconnoitre the position of Bujukhekmédji, about twelve miles from Constantinople, a strong position, intended to be made the base of operations and to cover Constantinople. Colonel Ardant went forward to examine the position of Kara-su, where strong lines of defence were available, connecting the Sea of Marmora with the Black Sea. Sir John Burgoyne meantime went to Shumla, to confer with Omar Pasha, and he reconnoitred and reported upon Varna. Thence he returned to England, leaving Colonel Ardant at Gallipoli. Now, while Sir John Burgoyne was at Constantinople, there was presented to him a project for the defence of that town by certain French officers attached to the embassy—these lines of defence were to pass from the Sea of Marmora to the Golden Horn, and from that to the Bosphorus, passing within a mile of the suburbs of Constantinople. The ground was ably taken up, but Sir John Burgoyne at once pointed out that it was faulty, because it passed close to an enormous population and a city liable to conflagration as was Constantinople; but the principal objection was, that it abandoned to the enemy the Bosphorus, which was our only means of communication with the Black Sea. This plan of defence, therefore, was abandoned in favour of Kara-su, which in every point resembled the lines of Lisbon, with a similar advantage of the stronghold of Bujukhekmédji. War was now declared; the allied army was sent to Gallipoli, and took up the intrenched post of Boulahir; they then proceeded to Constantinople, leaving a small force to occupy Gallipoli. The Russians having made no impression on the Danube, notwithstanding their vast military resources, and the allied armies having advanced to Varna, in support of the Turks, the proceedings of Sir John Burgoyne and of Colonel Ardant were criticised as being too cautious and unenterprising, by taking up a defensive position for Constantinople and the Dardanelles; but it must be remembered that at that time the war had not begun, and it could not have been supposed that the Russians, who, in so arrogant a manner, had forced on the war, should have been held entirely in check by the Turks; and it was therefore requisite that Constantinople should be protected, and the Dardanelles, without which there were no means of communicating with the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, or the Black Sea, which latter was at that time in the possession of the Russian fleet; in a word, it would have been impossible to trust an allied army in that country if such a strong position as Gallipoli and its adjacents had not been found. Such was the opinion of the Emperor Napoleon, and, what is more to my purpose, such was the opinion of Sir John

Burgoyne. In August Sir John Burgoyne was sent out to command the engineers in the Crimea, and was placed upon the staff. In September the army embarked at Varna for the purpose of invading the Crimea. And now, sir, I come to the first point I wish to prove—namely, the selection of the part of the Crimea in which the landing was to be effected. A council of war assembled on board the *Caradoc*. It was attended, on the part of the French, by General Canrobert, by Colonel Trochu, one of the French staff, and by General Bizot, the French engineer; on the part of the English, by Lord Raglan, by Sir George Brown, by Sir Edmund Lyons, and by Sir John Burgoyne. The French held the opinion that the best place to land was at the mouth of the Katcha, and I believe that Sir George Brown coincided with that opinion, but he said, ‘Before coming to a decision on this point, I think we ought to know the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne, who has had more practical experience than any other officer present.’ On this Sir John Burgoyne declared that the Katcha was not the proper place to land, that it was a difficult and defensible ground, and close to the resources and reserves of the Russians, and he pointed out, on the other hand, that the safest place to land was at the Old Fort. Sir John Burgoyne’s representations were made known to Marshal St. Arnaud, who at once grasped the idea, and consented to the move. The landing, therefore, was safely effected at the Old Fort, and Eupatoria, in the rear, was seized and occupied. The abandoning of the idea of landing at the Katcha was very distasteful to some officers of the French staff, but when that place fell to our position it was seen that Sir John Burgoyne’s estimate of the difficulty was right, and that an attempt to land there would have been followed by failure and disaster. I think, sir, I have proved now my first point, and that I have a right to claim the selection of the place for landing for the British engineers. I now come, sir, to my second point—that is, the selection of the side on which Sebastopol was to be attacked. After the battle of the Alma the troops advanced towards Sebastopol, across the rivers Katcha and the Belbek. Now, the intention of the French, and for which they had prepared projects, was to attack Sebastopol on the north side. Sebastopol on the north side was situated on a promontory, and its defences were placed on rocky heights, having in front of them strong ground of a very defensible character, narrowed by the bay of Belbek on one side and the broad and deep valley of the Tchernaya at the head of the harbour on the other side, the promontory being dominated by a strong permanent work called the ‘Severnaia.’ Now, Sir John Burgoyne did not think that the north side of

Sebastopol was the side to be attacked; he rather held to the opinion that it should be attacked on the south side, and he wrote a report to Lord Raglan, giving his reasons for holding that opinion, an extract from which report I will now, with the permission of the house, proceed to read:—

“The communications with the fleet, whence all resources were necessarily obtained, would be from the fine bays and harbours of Balaklava, Kamiesch, and Kazatch, instead of from an entirely open beach, which was alone available on the north. The fronts that were exposed to attack were extensive, and, though naturally of great strength, were not more so than that of the north, which was limited, and, consequently, admitted of defence after defence. The south side covered the docks, barracks, and all the great establishments of the place; whereas, if the north promontory were obtained, there was the harbour still intervening, which could not be crossed by any means; and the only resource would have been a bombardment, and not possession. In rear of the encamping ground to be occupied by the allies in front of Sebastopol on the south side was a compact and most powerful position facing the country, and the communication to it from the harbours was direct and comparatively short, while on the north there was no favourable position on the land side; the ground to cover the camp and landing-place must have been of enormous extent, for that landing could not have been nearer than the Katcha, as the Belbek was commanded by the enemy’s batteries, and the communication would have been much longer, and over two heights instead of one. The enemy, if attacked on the north, having but one front of the garrison, of moderate extent, to cover, could have greatly increased the outer field army for raising the siege. In thoroughly reconsidering every circumstance, it is impossible to conceive how the operations could possibly be sustained against the north side; nor how the army, were it to remain there, could avoid some frightful catastrophe.”

“This report, sir, was sent to Marshal St. Arnaud, and that officer, with his usual sagacity, accepted the idea, and consented to attacking Sebastopol on the south side. Then came the question, how was that to be done? If there be one axiom in war more cogent than another, it is that an army should never separate itself from its base; and if there is any other axiom equal to that in cogency, it is that a flank march should never be made in the presence of an enemy. And yet, at first sight, it would seem that the proposition of Sir John Burgoyne embraced both these military errors; but it was not so in fact. He proposed to leave one base, but the base moved, so that he should

fall upon it again; and the flank march to enable him to reach the south side of Sebastopol was in the rear of a flying and disorganised enemy, and it thrust the army between Menschikoff and Sebastopol. The movement was therefore undertaken, and the army sat down before Sebastopol, never to rise from it again till it left that place and its defences a shapeless ruin. I think, sir, that I am entitled to say that I have proved my second point, and that I have a right to claim the selection of the side on which Sebastopol should be attacked for the British engineers. The siege was now commenced with scanty military means. There were 300 or 400 sappers where there should have been as many thousands—for it should be remembered that behind the earthworks at Sebastopol was ranged the whole military power of Russia—and where, if there had been as many thousands, it would have saved thousands of lives and millions of money. There were eighty officers of engineers sent to the Crimea; of these forty-three were killed, wounded, and put *hors de combat*—a wholesale slaughter with no parallel. Many of these officers passed in that inclement season, and under what the French call ‘fire of hell,’ 100 nights, making nearly a third of the whole time of the siege. Under that fire the executive officers, Chapman and Gordon, erected batteries of so substantial a character that they were not damaged by the fire of the enemy. The British artillery destroyed the fire of Todtleben, the Russian artillery swept from the face of the earth the French batteries, but no missile hurled against the English batteries stopped for one single moment their steady, sure, and onward course. From the first reconnaissance of Sebastopol, Sir John Burgoyne perceived that the Malakoff was the key to the position of the front attack, and he so represented it to Lord Raglan. After the battle of Inkerman he again impressed on the authorities that the Malakoff was the place to be attacked. Upon the arrival of General Niel, the French aide-de-camp of engineers to the emperor, a council of war of the allied engineers was held; at that council of war Sir John Burgoyne again represented that the Malakoff was the key to the position, and that it should be attacked. After the council of war had been held, wishing to place on record his opinion he reduced it to writing, and, through Lord Raglan, sent it to the French engineer General Niel. The following day General Niel called a council of French engineers to take under consideration Sir John Burgoyne’s memoir—they prepared a *procès verbal* of what there took place, and sent a copy of it to Lord Raglan for Sir John Burgoyne’s information. The first paragraph of that *procès verbal* stated that the Malakoff should be attacked in compliance

with the opinion of Sir John Burgoyne. The words used were these:—

“Il résulte des dispositions adoptées en conseil, et suivant le vœu exprimé par le Lieutenant-général Sir John Burgoyne, que des travaux d’approche devront être exécutés devant la tour Malakoff, afin de pouvoir attaquer, par ce point dominant, le faubourg de Karabelnaia, en même temps qu’on donnera l’assaut à la partie ouest de la ville.”

“I think, therefore, sir, I have a right to say that I have made out my third point, and that I am justified in claiming the discovery of the key to the front attacked for the British engineers. Now, sir, that I have established the claim of the British engineers to the merit of deciding on the three turning points of this war—they forming a part, and an important one, of the British army—what becomes of the case of those who would seek to depreciate the services of the British army in the Crimea?”

It will be perceived from the speech of Captain Vernon that General Niel, instead of suggesting the attack upon the Malakoff as his own original idea, treated it as the idea and proposal of Sir John Burgoyne, which he approved, overruling the contrary opinion, that of Brigadier Bizot, upon whose plan the siege had been hitherto conducted. Yet the Baron de Bazancourt, the French emperor’s private commissioner, who had access to every authentic document, and drew up the very report quoted by Captain Vernon, conceals the fact that the plan was General Burgoyne’s, while he represents General Niel as the person with whom the responsibility and honour of the Malakoff attack rested. This is a rare specimen of disingenuousness on the part of an officer of rank, and one holding a position of trust and consequence, and betrays a disposition towards an ally unworthy of a great people and a victorious army. We do not believe that France, its emperor, and its army, applaud these unworthy attempts at depreciation, which are the more to be deprecated because France and her army need no accession of military glory.

The state of affairs from the Russian point of view, during this period, was expressed by Prince Menschikoff in a despatch to his government, under date of the 12th; his references to incidents of the siege go no higher than the 8th:—“On the 30th we succeeded in discovering subterraneous works of the French leading towards the fortifications. With the aid of artillery we destroyed, on the 2nd, a portion of the enemy’s gallery. On the 6th the French, trying the same means, attempted our countermines; the attempt turned to their own disadvantage. On the 8th the play of a new mine enabled us still more to destroy the enemy’s works. Meantime our artillery successfully replied to the fire of the besiegers. At night

detachments of volunteers continually harass the enemy in their trenches, and by obliging them to beat to arms, compel them to suspend their works."

The following despatch of Lord Raglan reveals the enemy's movements as they appeared in the British lines:—

Before Sebastopol, Feb. 10, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE,—I have nothing material or important to report to your grace since I addressed you on the 6th. There was rain yesterday and the day before, and in the course of last night there was a considerable fall of snow, which remains on the ground; but it does not freeze, and the country is again saturated with wet. It is reported from the front that great activity prevails in the town and harbour of Sebastopol. Large convoys of apparently sick men were observed to be moving out of the place, and numerous carts, with one horse, to be coming in. The enemy appear to be breaking up hulks in the Arsenal Creek, and to be using the material for platforms and *chavou de bois* at the Battery "du Mât." We are proceeding with the arrangement of the works on the right. The health of the troops continues to improve in some slight degree. They are amply supplied with warm clothing and with provisions. Forage is our only want, and this arises chiefly from the commissary-general not receiving from England the supplies of hay upon which he has reckoned. I enclose the return of casualties to the 5th inst.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c.

It is a most painful thing to be obliged to animadvert upon the despatches of a man possessing such qualities of excellence as Lord Raglan; but there is frequently no way of reconciling his lordship's despatches with truth and honour, but by supposing him ignorant of the real state of things in his own army. His lordship in the foregoing despatch represents the health of the troops as improving in some slight degree, and all the supplies for the men abundant. Under the same date, the *Times'* correspondent, who was much more about the camp than Lord Raglan, and as all the world now knows, much better informed as to the true state of the army, gives this testimony:—"I regret to state that sickness does not diminish in the camp. Scurvy and low fever extend their action every day. Now scurvy is mainly caused among debilitated men by the use of salt meat and the want of vegetables. Even fresh meat alone will develop it among men worn out by excessive labour, should they have no leguminous diet. I believe there has been only one cargo exclusively of vegetables ever sent up here, and that came in the *Harbinger*, which lay in Balaklava for weeks, till her load of potatoes and onions began to rot and become putrid, so that much of it was unfit for use, and had to be thrown away. Whoever had an order got a sack of potatoes; but who could carry a sack of potatoes to the front? Meantime, ships chartered by government for the use of the service come in day after day to Balaklava, with quantities of vegetables *for sale*, and with stores of provisions to be sold for the private profit of the stewards

and adventurers at great prices, though the charter-party of these vessels expressly forbids any such use to be made of any ship, or any private property to be conveyed in her while she is in the employment of the government."

Had "our own correspondent" known the contents of the English general's despatch, and designed to write a reply to it, he could not have more effectually carried out his intentions.

On the 13th, Lord Raglan sent another despatch:—

Before Sebastopol, Feb. 13, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE,—I mentioned to your grace in my despatch of the 10th inst., that there had been a return of bad weather, and that the country was saturated with wet. On Sunday it rained or snowed from morning till night, and the wind was very high, and though it was fine yesterday, still the ground was in a worse state than I had seen it for some time. The enemy has made no movement. Major-general Jones, Royal Engineers, arrived a few days ago, and is busily engaged in making himself acquainted with the position occupied by both armies. Lieutenant-general Sir George Brown has also returned, and I have great satisfaction in adding, in excellent health. His wound is healed, and with the exception of not having entirely regained the full use of his elbow, he no longer suffers any inconvenience from it. He will resume the command of his division without loss of time. I enclose the return of the casualties to the 13th inst. (One killed and two wounded.)

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c.

It is not surprising to those who read such despatches, that Lords Aberdeen and Newcastle should have declared that they gained their first correct intelligence of the state of the army from the London newspapers. His lordship informed the minister of war that the enemy had made no movements; the correspondents of the London morning papers represented the enemy as making remarkable movements, which proved to be of great importance soon after—as they were indications of the march upon Eupatoria, rumours of which had reached his lordship's camp, and were heard by the correspondents of the press, although beyond his lordship's knowledge. In illustration of this statement the following, from the correspondent of the *Morning Herald*, will suffice:—"During the 10th and 12th their [the Russians'] force again diminished, and the enemy were observed moving north, along the ridges of Inkerman. Almost at the same time, intelligence was received that a large part of Liprandi's corps, with other troops, were advancing against Eupatoria. This was on the 13th."

Either the British general wished to conceal from the minister of war the occurrences that took place in his own camp, and in that of Liprandi, or his lordship knew less about either than the civilians who accompanied his army, and the moderately well informed connected with it. At all events the despatches of the general, and the letters of the "correspondents," of the very same date, contradict one another on matters which are now well

known to have been as these correspondents declared them.

The arrival of Sir George Brown was encouraging to the army: as second to Lord Raglan, he was extremely efficient, and made up by his vigilance and activity for the want of those qualities in the commander-in-chief. It is but justice to his lordship to observe that his health was extremely delicate, and no officer with health so imperfect could have put forth the physical vigour necessary in such a command. Sir George Brown did not appear to be quite recovered from the effects of his wound; he was pale, and age seemed to creep upon him, in spite of the indomitable vigour by which the hardy and gallant veteran was so strongly characterised.

The condition of the artillery horses caused anxiety not only to the arm of the service which more immediately suffered in consequence, but to the whole army. For several days up to the 13th, a short ration of barley and a little chopped straw was their only food—the hay had been expended: four months previously Commissary-general Filder had urged upon the authorities at home that means should be taken to procure fodder for the horses, but attention was not paid to his requisitions. Lord Raglan had authority to procure what was required; ships of large tonnage lay idle in the harbour, and the shores of the Euxine and Bosphorus abounded with what was wanting so badly in the Crimea. At a board of veterinary surgeons, 140 horses of the artillery were condemned as no longer serviceable; “the mounted staff corps was reduced to twenty-eight effectives.”

On the 13th the Russians made a successful cannonade, blowing up a French magazine within the batteries; this was followed by “six tremendous salvos of artillery” before the French returned fire. The Russians mounting the parapets gave loud cheers, to which the French responded by an overwhelming shower of shells, which burst over and amongst the Russian gunners, and the sailors who manned the batteries. Some of the shells falling on the walls of the admiral’s house rent it, and the Russian battery No. 3, at the Flagstaff Fort, was silenced. The French mortar batteries had now become very destructive to the enemy, having been advanced to within 1300 metres of the inner batteries of the Russians. A sortie followed, which was quickly repulsed, the French losing only five men. Great secrecy was ordered in the arrangements connected with all the attacks, French and British. The engineers and artillery officers were directed not to give information to officers of the line, nor to any one not strictly authorised to demand it.

The recall of the Earl of Lucan, the com-

mander of the British cavalry, was at this period the subject of discussion in the whole army, and the general impression was that his lordship was a badly used man. That his care of the cavalry horses was deficient, has been proved by the inquiries on the spot of the Crimean Commissioners, and at the Chelsea Commission of general officers appointed to hear his lordship’s defence; but the discussions between Lord Lucan and Lord Raglan, which arose out of the light cavalry charge at Balaklava, were the real cause of his recall, and on that ground we are unable to see its justice. The orders to Lord Lucan, given by Lord Raglan, were inconsistent, and inappropriate to the actual situation of affairs, and his lordship had no alternative but to obey.

On the night of the 16th a fierce storm tore down tents and huts on the heights along Balaklava, and swept them, along with piles of loose battery *matériel*, down the steep. The temperature rose considerably, the wind having been described as “hot” and “tropical;” and the crocus, hyacinth, and other flowers, of which the soil and climate of the Crimea is so productive, burst forth with their bright green shoots, under the influence of the warm atmosphere. There was another sortie that evening against the French, the loss of the latter being slight—thirty-five men killed and wounded.

A powerful reinforcement to the corps of observation of General Bosquet gave assurance for the protection of the British right. This accession of force consisted of 8000 men. The Russians at the same time unmasked their batteries which they had erected on the Inkerman heights, over the Tchernaya, for the purpose of playing upon the English right flank; the distance was too great, the messengers of vengeance fell short of the British position. On the 17th men were seen working in the Russian batteries on the north side of Sebastopol: about 2500 were engaged in making a trench from the end of the bay at Inkerman towards the Belbek.

Lord Raglan visited the lines, and was engaged in their inspection throughout the day; as the weather grew milder, his lordship’s health enabled him to visit more frequently the posts which required his supervision. “All our lines,” says the *Times*’ correspondent, “towards the sea road from Yalta, have been much strengthened, and the profile of the works, which was certainly not satisfactory before, has been altered and improved.” The oxen which had been introduced to supply the troops with fresh meat had been dying for want of fodder, and the mortality among them became so great by the date of which we write, that the speedy extinction of the whole became certain.

On the 17th General Canrobert, writing to his government, stated that the French army was impatient for an assault, that he expected in a few days to be ready again to open fire from his whole line, and hoped his ally would be ready to open a general fire also. In this attitude we must leave besiegers and besieged while we turn to another sphere of combat; but before we do so, it may be instructive to place before the reader an American estimate of the conduct of the British, and the condition of their army throughout the campaign. There is a tone of boasting, and a disposition to depreciate everything English in the passage; but it is a sketch of the British military system from an American point of view, which shows us how our Transatlantic brethren regard it, and must be important to us, because it is the general view of a people with whom we may yet be at war. Referring to the privations and sufferings recorded in this History, and the causes by which those evils were produced, the American editor observes:—

"Nothing less than this would have convinced Great Britain of the utter folly and absurdity of the system on which the British army is conducted. It has long been usual for officers of the British infantry and cavalry to buy their commissions, and to buy promotion from grade to grade afterward. The artillery and engineers pass a sort of examination, and when a man in these corps is really anxious to learn his profession, some poor facilities are afforded him to do so. But it is contrary to the practice of the service for officers of the line to interfere in such matters. They are expected to be rich or noble—in every case to be gentlemen, but nothing more. The consequence is, that for many years Great Britain has not contained a more thoroughly incompetent and useless set of men than the officers of her army. Perfect gentlemen in manners—when they do not fall into the habit of gambling, drinking, and so forth,—they know positively nothing. Their lives are spent in the drawing-room or at the mess-table. Delightful companions and very popular with young ladies, as soldiers they are as worthless as the wooden target at which their men are taught to fire. Like that counterfeit, they never flinch from danger, but stand firmly to be shot: but like it, to expect counsel from them would be ridiculous. Of the science of war, of the duties of an officer in the field, of the thousands of matters with which a soldier should be conversant, in order to make head against the enemy and protect the lives of his men, they are wholly, helplessly ignorant.

"These are the men whom England sent out to command her brave soldiers. In their hands she placed their lives, and the consequence is that after a campaign of a few weeks, 40,000

out of 54,000 are under the sod or in the hospitals; and though three battles have been won, the failure of the campaign has come to be admitted on all sides, and the expediency of the withdrawal of the troops openly debated. From day to day a fresh Inkerman may be expected, and though it is hard to say what may be the issue of a combat between the Russians and French, no one can doubt what would be the effect of a bold sortie on the weak English lines. There are doubtless other points besides that one on which an attack might be made. There are, indeed, many reasons for believing that the withdrawal of the force under Liprandi from the line formerly occupied in the valley of the Tchernaya has been nothing but a *ruse* intended to delude the besiegers into an extension of their ground.

"That these things are well known and fully appreciated in England will be seen by the speeches republished elsewhere, and the cabinet movements which have just taken place. Whether they will lead to the correction of the real evil remains to be seen. The spirit of conservatism is very strong in all European countries; and the Horse Guards have strong friends in parliament. For years and years enlightened men have urged the reform of their system, the abolition of the plan of selling commissions and promotions, and the adoption of some rules obliging officers to learn their business. But the aristocracy has been too strong for the reformers. The army was a convenient nursery for the stupidest of the scions of nobility; they would not give it up. So long as peace lasted the most ignorant lord's son was competent to discharge the duties of an officer; and the rulers of England thought it would be time enough to think of change when war broke out. They resisted reform accordingly; rather increased than diminished the power of rank and wealth in the army; sold ensigncies, companies, colonelcies; and now they find they have sold their army and their country's honour into the bargain.

"We have no wish to draw invidious comparisons, but contrasts will force themselves on the mind on such occasions as these. It has long been a favourite answer of Englishmen, when questioned about their costly war establishment, to say that their position in Europe required them to maintain 100,000 men in arms to defend their country, at an expense of 100,000,000 dollars a year or more. They have sneered at the insignificant army of the United States, and expressed uncommon curiosity to know what we should do if we became involved in war. It is not ten years since that contingency happened. On that occasion the total available force of the United States was something like 7000 men.

Before a year was over, more than 300,000 had volunteered to serve; and we were enabled to make two invasions of the enemy's country, to fight three battles in one, and six in the other, to storm three of the strongest forts in America and the world, and to seize the enemy's capital. The country invaded was full as unhealthy as the Crimea: indeed, the cold at Balaklava is not nearly so deadly as the fevers of the Rio Grande or the vomito of Vera Cruz. Yet not one disaster occurred to

check the ardour of our troops; and the mortality from disease was not much greater than it would have been had they been quartered in barracks in the same latitudes. In comparing this simple record with that of the British campaign in the Crimea, the true secret of the difference is disclosed at once. Our officers were mostly West Point men; theirs idle noblemen or the sons of rich merchants and landholders, who know nothing of their trade. This explains everything."

CHAPTER LXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF EUPATORIA.

"I think by some odd gimmals or device
Their arms are set, like clocks, still to strike on.
Else ne'er could they hold out so as they do.
By my consent we'll e'en let them alone."—SHAKSPEARE. *Henry VI.*

It was a remarkable circumstance, that neither the allies nor the Russians, in the earlier part of the campaign, estimated the position of Eupatoria as it ought to have been valued by both. The allies appear to have sooner discovered its strategical importance, and to have strengthened the defences there, before the enemy could bring a force to attack it, so powerful as to awake great apprehensions for its safety. It was strange that the Russian government, and its generals in the Crimea, should be so ignorant of the relation of Eupatoria in a military point of view to the Crimea, or so remiss in providing against its occupation in strength by the allies. The czar himself, it is alleged, was the first to perceive the danger of its possession by his enemies, and to have ordered its capture at any cost. For this purpose the army of Liprandi was quietly drawn away from the Tchernaya, and after a harassing march of six days, occasioned by the wet state of the ground, was joined before Eupatoria by a strong force under Osten-Sacken. What the precise strength of these united *corps d'armée* was it is difficult to determine, for the reports of the Russian generals were fabulous; their numbers and losses were underrated with shameless falsehood; and the desperate and repeated attempts to storm the place, which met with signal defeat, were designated by Prince Menschikoff "a successful reconnaissance." The estimate formed of their numbers by the Turkish generalissimo, upon data supplied by the prisoners and from his own observation, was, that they consisted of thirty-six battalions of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, 400 Cossacks, eighty pieces of artillery in position, and a few troops of horse artillery which were held in reserve. It is not easy to determine the numerical strength of either the battalions of infantry or regiments of

cavalry, as the rules applying to such matters in the Russian service were relaxed by the contingencies of war. Perhaps 50,000 men may be a tolerably correct computation of this army.

The forces of the defenders are differently represented: the historian is as much at a loss in this case as Prince Menschikoff, who thus described the object of the attack:—"To ascertain accurately the number of the hostile forces that occupied Eupatoria, and to see whether there would not be a possibility of expelling them." If this were all that was intended by the prince, there was much more attempted by Osten-Sacken and Liprandi, without discovering after all how many men Omar Pasha had at Eupatoria. The Baron Bazancourt states the number in the defence as 40,000; Mr. Woods describes the army under Omar as consisting of 25,000 Turks. There were also a few French, and the crews of the English fleet. Probably 30,000 would be a correct estimate of the numbers of the defending force.

Omar Pasha had only been a few days in the town before the assault was made. He found on his arrival the Turkish infantry, with forty-five guns, under the command of Suleiman Pasha and Selim Pasha; and a small body of cavalry, not exceeding 400 men, under Skender Beg. Skender was a famous man in the Turkish army, "a Polish renegade," and a most intrepid soldier. He was not like Cassio, who

"Never set a squadron in the field,
Nor the division of a battle knew
More than a spinster."

He had been engaged with the Russians ninety times, at the head of troop, squadron, regiment, or brigade, as chance or duty led. There were about 200 French sailors and marines of the crew of the *Henri IV.*, wrecked in the storm of the 14th of November, and the crews

of the French frigate *Veloce*, the Turkish frigate *Scheckfuër*, and the English ships *Furious*, *Valorous*, *Caracooa*, and *Viper*. The ships of war were so drawn up that the right flank of the defence was completely covered by their guns, so as to render all attempts on that side too desperate to give the least hope of success: although bravely tried, it failed.

Before entering on the detail of the battle, it may be desirable to present the reader with Prince Menschikoff's despatch of the 19th of February:—

"On the 17th the troops cantoned in the vicinity of Eupatoria were employed in a reconnaissance of the town, at a distance of 250 toises. They opened a cross-fire of artillery upon the works, and in a very short space of time had dismounted and silenced several of the enemy's cannon, besides blowing up five ammunition tumbrils. Having satisfied himself that Eupatoria was occupied by 40,000 men and 100 pieces of artillery, General Chru-leff, who commanded the detachment, gave orders for it to retire beyond the range of fire, which was effected with the utmost order, the corps marching towards Sebastopol. The siege works at that place have not advanced; our artillery and sharpshooters gall them continually. On the 13th we blew up the French field powder-magazine in the trenches by a shell."

How far the representations in this despatch were correct the facts of the conflict reveal. On the morning of the battle the Turks ranged themselves behind their half-formed batteries with the most prompt alacrity, and with unbounded confidence in their general and their cause. Omar Pasha took up his post on a rising ground, from whence he could at once overlook the defence and the lines of the enemy. The position of the defence was in no respect strong. The little town is formed along the sweeping shore of the bay. The houses, with the exception of a few modern Russian buildings, are in the old Tartar style—square walls, plain and bare without, having in the inside verandahs looking into a court, in the true oriental style. The usual population of the place had been 10,000; but, in consequence of the severities of the Russian army, and the sympathy of the Tartar population with the allies, the inhabitants had increased to the number of 30,000. Such of these as were not in arms crowded the flat tops of their houses to see the battle, their curiosity gaining the mastery over considerations of personal safety: in this way some of them fell under the explosion of the enemy's shells. The town, in the state which its batteries and defences then were, was almost open. On the left, however, the *Henri IV.* and four French transports had

been stranded, and seemed as if sailing on shore from their upright position. The sailors and marines remained in the *Henri IV.*, and she was placed broadside to the enemy, as if the vessel were at sea. This ship and the transports formed an admirable defence to the extreme left of the place, sweeping the road with the range of their guns, and rendering it impossible for the Russian cavalry, powerful as it was in numbers and condition, to enter. At both the north and south ends the English steamers and a Turkish ship took up positions which enabled them to cover with their guns both flanks of the defence. Beyond the town the country presents the appearance of a vast arid plain. An old Russian barracks in ruins was a short distance in front. The space, however, is not a perfect level, for the ground rises gradually from the front to a line of tumuli which lie nearly parallel with the town, the left tumulus being nearest to the right of the defence. From these lines of tumuli, three in number, the ground again descends into the vast plain beyond. On the left of the defence there was nothing peculiar in the aspect of the ground: on the right, Lake Sasik almost fringed the town, the lake being separated from the bay by a narrow segment of land. On the small space between the lake and the town were some corn-mills, which were comprised within the lines of the defence; and nearer to the Russians, between a curve of the Simpheropol Road and the Sasik, was the Greek cemetery, behind the further wall of which the Russian infantry formed, and through which they rushed forward to the attack. The anchorage of Eupatoria is very unfavourable for shipping, whether martial or mercantile—worse than any occupied by the allies in the Black Sea, not even excepting Varna. The sea was rough on the morning of the engagement, and, had a gale sprung up, the shipping could not have contributed so materially to the defence. The Russians generally chose a misty or foggy morning for offensive operations against the allied positions in the Crimea. The 17th of February favoured them in this respect: under cover of its gloom they were enabled to form along the line of the tumuli, and behind them, unseen. Their cavalry was so numerous, that of Omar Pasha numerically so inferior, and the morning light so imperfect, that the Russians were able with impunity to push up their light horse in reconnaissance to the very works, and to bring forward their fieldpieces, and several powerful thirty-two pounders, to desirable positions without losing a man. Their first operations were upon their own right; here the cavalry in great force charged up the road leading into the town on that side, but were met by so galling a fire from the guns of the English steamers, and of the stranded French

ships, that they suffered severely; a portion of them hesitated and turned, some charged boldly on, until the musketry of the French sailors and marines, as well as showers of grape and canister, compelled them to retire and re-form beyond range. The cavalry then moved gradually towards the right centre attack. The cannon opened along the whole line, and for two hours played upon the defence. It was a splendid battle of artillery, and the gloom of the morning heightened the interest of the scene, giving to the flashes of the guns so much more brilliancy. It appeared as if the little town were begirt with lightnings, the flashes of which never intermitted, while innumerable thunders burst upon the earth, and rolled forth over city and sea. Upon the centre of Omar's position the greater force of the enemy's artillery was directed, and there many of the brave defenders fell. The Russian ordnance was worked well, but that of the defence better. The Turks stood to their batteries, not only with unflinching courage, but with patriotic and soldierly enthusiasm. The British officers scattered amongst them covered themselves with glory, and the confidence reposed in them by the Turkish artillerymen knew no bounds.

Notwithstanding the smoke of so many pieces of cannon, as the morning advanced the scene became more extended and picturesque. The sky was not cloudy, although a haze covered the dawn, and as the wind freshened it dispersed. From the position occupied by Omar Pasha the long dark lines of Russian infantry were distinctly seen behind the artillery, their cavalry preserving a watchful and menacing attitude to their right and right centre. As the rising day gradually disclosed the imposing forces of the Muscovites, the Turks from the batteries, and the Tartars from the house-tops, strained their eyes in the direction of their heavy masses, but there was no blanching—on the contrary, as the enemy became more distinctly seen, the enthusiasm of the soldiery of Omar increased, and shouts of "Allah! Allah!" rolled along the flaming lines. The discipline of their chief was stern, and when the first few shouts, as if of joy on at last seeing the foe with which they had to contend, subsided, the men remained silent at their guns, and only the voice of command, or the call of the bugle, or the roll of the Turkish drum, could be heard through the din of the cannonade, until the clamour of battle rose amidst the close and fierce contest which, after two hours' artillery combat, was waged upon the extreme of the Russian left. During the cannonade, the scenes in the rear of the Turkish batteries were exciting. Tartars running to and fro, carrying up ammunition and bearing away the wounded and the dead; women and children piercing

the uproar of the conflict with their cries; and out at sea the ships moving as new advantages of position demanded, while from their broadsides were vomited streams of fire as shot and shell were hurled upon the foe. Every moment of the combat the enthusiasm of the defenders rose higher, and, without any exaggeration, it may be written that the whole line was impatient to grapple closely with the enemy.

It appeared for a short time as if the Russians hesitated as to the wisdom of an assault, and expected a sally from the garrison. The cavalry of Omar were too few—only 400 men—and the cavalry of the enemy too numerous, amounting to several thousands, for any such movement on the part of the Turks. Besides, the position taken up by the Russians forbade that: their extreme left, consisting of infantry and fieldpieces, rested upon a small lake separated by a narrow piece of land from Lake Sasik; their right rested on the line of tumuli; and near it their cavalry was massed, rendering a sally in that direction as hazardous as on the other flank it was impracticable; while along their line, and especially on the centre, their guns played with most formidable power—and to protect these guns from a *coup de main*, earthworks were thrown up, behind which were detachments of rifles. From their right several attempts were made by their cavalry after the first repulse, which ended in skirmishes. On one of these occasions they came on, emboldened by the slackness of the fire opposed to them; the *Viper* gun-boat threw two Lancaster shells, which burst among them with fearful havoc, and they rapidly fell back upon their main body.

It became at last obvious that the grand effort was intended to be made on the extreme left; and, as soon as Omar Pasha perceived that their infantry was manœuvred for that object, he sent to Captain Hastings of the *Curaçoa*, the senior officer on the station, a request that he would send the *Viper* to that flank. While this order was being effected the enemy, perceiving the movement, again threw his cavalry forward against the left of the defence; but the place of the *Viper* was taken by the *Valorous*, which opened a well-directed fire upon the cavalry, compelling their rapid retreat, leaving many of their fallen upon the field. The *Curaçoa* and the Turkish steamer were both very effective in their fire.

The Muscovs at last brought a reserve of eight heavy guns, which inflicted serious injury upon a redoubt near the centre, from which they had suffered much during the morning. The English Colonel Ogilby opened fire in another redoubt with a single gun, to draw off the cannonade in some measure from the point on which it was so heavily concentrated.

This he effectually accomplished, for four of the eight pieces were directed upon his single gun, which they did not succeed in silencing, nor did a man who worked it fall, although the works were shattered, and the men covered with *débris*.

Finding all attempts to silence the batteries of the defence in vain, the enemy determined upon a storm. They selected for the point on which to execute this purpose the extreme right of the place. Their reasons for its selection may have been that there was less to fear in that particular direction from the fire of the Turkish artillery; the outworks at the windmills between Lake Sasik and the town appeared to be more vulnerable, and the wall of the Greek cemetery afforded a shelter in approaching those works. Here the third and fourth battalions of the regiment of the Azoff infantry, the battalion of Greek volunteers, three sotnias of the regiment No. 61 of Cossacks of the Don de Jeroff, under General Chrulëff, emerged from behind the wall of the burial-ground, advanced rapidly through the cemetery, and attempted to storm the outworks above described. While General Chrulëff was forming his Greeks and Cossacks for the assault, the *Furious* British war-steamer landed a rocket party on the extreme right of the town, who, coming round among the windmills, opened their fire precisely on the head of the Russian column as it emerged from the broad gate of the cemetery. The discharge was point blank, the rockets tearing through the column, which nevertheless endeavoured to deploy, but was so broken by the inequalities of the ground, and the various impediments met from tombs of every size and shape, that they necessarily lost time under the unexpected and destructive fire of the little rocket brigade; a portion of the column never left the burial-ground, or came out only in a struggling and confused mass. Those who did come forth were met by a deadly volley of musketry from the intrenched position of the Turks, from which they precipitately sought shelter in the cemetery once more. A ringing cheer broke from the windmills and the redoubts, in which the British tars, and Turkish infantry and artillery, mingled their shouts. General Chrulëff, undismayed, rallied his men; the Russian regiments obeyed his orders without any show of reluctance, but without enthusiasm; the Greeks and Cossacks rallied with heroic alacrity. Field-pieces meanwhile opened fiercely upon the mills, which were broken beneath the cannonade, and soon brought in ruins among the defenders.

The conduct of General Chrulëff was most intrepid. He rode a large and conspicuous horse, and wore a uniform more showy than is customary with the Russian officers under

fire. Rallying his Cossacks and Greeks he again led them on, and this time in better order; the Turks awaited the onset in silence, and allowed the assailants to approach within seventy or eighty feet of the works, when a fire of musketry was poured with fatal aim among them; the Russians reeled back under the shock of that dreadful volley, and again sought the refuge of the cemetery. The general exposed himself most recklessly in his attempts to preserve order among his troops, and to rally them yet again. Strongly reinforced, he advanced a third time against the position with an apparent determination to conquer it. Sealing-ladders and other means of gaining access were carried by detachments, and the whole came on with better order and more rapidly than in the second attempt. They this time advanced to the works and endeavoured to plant the ladders, but fell so fast under the steady fire of the defenders, that the attempt was abandoned in despair, and the friendly cemetery was sought once more for shelter. On this occasion it was not permitted to afford a respite from the Turkish rifles, for Selim Pasha, at the head of the regiment of Roumelia, supported by an Egyptian battalion, sallied out in pursuit, penetrated the cemetery, shot down or bayoneted many of the fugitives, who fled in utter disorder upon their main body—the Roumelians and Egyptians retiring with little loss within their works. In this gallant charge Selim Pasha, a *ferik* or lieutenant-general, and a most gallant and skilful soldier, perished; a musket-ball pierced his body, and he fell dead, cheering on his gallant followers. His second in command, Ismail Bey, was wounded also, in consequence of his too forward valour; only a few other officers were slightly hit. The result of this dashing charge was instantaneous upon the whole Russian line; they retired for about two miles, and there bivouaced. The retreat was executed with order and skill, and as it commenced the sun burst out brilliantly over the field, and was reflected by the arms and uniforms of the fine army, as the artillery limbered up and covered the retiring infantry, and the cavalry in turn covered the retiring guns. Scarcely had the Russians retreated than the Tartars, to the number of above 2000, rushed from the town into the cemetery, and rendered the scene of horror there still more horrible. The dead and dying were strewn thickly among the tombs, many of which were torn up and shattered by cannon balls and shells. The Tartars stripped the dead, and in several cases mutilated them—a work in which some of the Turkish soldiers participated. Two of these ruffians presented themselves before Omar Pasha, one of them with the head of a Greek volunteer reeking in his hand, and the other with the head of a Russian

soldier. Omar at once put them under arrest, and made examples of them in such a way as was likely to deter their comrades from similar atrocities. It is but justice to the Turkish soldiery to state that they generally expressed their disapprobation of such acts.

Appalling scenes were not confined to the line which had been occupied by the Russians, nor to the cemetery; the ground around the mills, and the works in front bore evidence of the superior weight of the Russian cannon. In one spot a number of artillery horses were crushed into a mass of blood and mangled flesh. Some similar instances of the effect of a closely-directed cannonade were presented by the fallen men; headless trunks were strewn about, and torn bodies lay among shattered guns and earth-works, marking the progress of the battle. The Turks showed a most laudable humanity to their wounded, and a decent reverence for the dead, in which they are unsurpassed by any people, notwithstanding the criminal departure from this characteristic which had been occasionally shown by their irregular soldiery in the treatment of slain Russians. Nor can we withhold from the Russians a large and honourable participation in this sentiment and feeling. It matters not what may be the religious rite of the people, in any portion of that empire—whether Greek, Latin, Armenian, Jewish, or Mohammedan—nor how various the obsequies practised, there is a consecrated care and a tranquil solemnity attendant upon the mouldering remains of the departed, almost unknown to us with all our boasted civilisation. Throughout the vast regions subjected to the government of St. Petersburg, extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Icy Sea to the shores of the Caspian, there are great public cemeteries at well-judged distances from the city populations; and so situated as to secure inviolability, be compatible with health, and keep up such associations of thought and feeling concerning the dead as to promote the civilisation of the living. At St. Petersburg and in Moscow, the Greek church lavishes upon its burial-places ceremonial and expense. The Greek cross is engraven upon the stone that surmounts the grave, or there is inscribed there the story of departed worth, and how dear the dead still is to surviving friends. All this care and reverence, and the safeguard of imperial authority, impress the Western visitor with one trait of civilisation to which the unlettered Russ have attained. In Finland, Lithuania, and Poland, the hand of imperial rule has set apart the place of tombs—so that Lutherans, reformed and Romanist, may be free within its precincts, each to honour his own creed, and see preserved in sacred quietness places so endeared. On no space of Russian soil is this paternal care for the living, as

to the depositories of the deceased, more conspicuous than in the Crimea. At Sebastopol, small as is the population, and open as is the country around it, the cemetery is extramural, so that it was held by the French army as a line of intrenchment. At Simpheropol the most picturesque objects in the vicinity are the places of burial, and they are so arranged that the health of the inhabitants shall suffer no injury, and the homes of the dead no indecency—equally preserved from levity of approach, and from inflicting any insalubrious influence in the neighbourhood. At Bagtché Serai, the Tartar capital, the cemetery, with its turbaned tombs, is preserved with as much jealousy as the antique palaces of the khan; and the attention, culture, and taste, as marked as in the garden of the Gheri, the old sultans of the vanquished race. The Jew devoutly seeks the spot set apart for the interment of his people; and although nothing besides which is his remains unmolested, where the Greek or Moslem holds ruthless sway, yet here at least his oppressions cease—they do not maltreat the depositories of his buried ones. In the untroubled quiet of the cemetery, secure from the footfalls of his tyrants, he lays the ashes of his fathers to rest; as of old, when Abraham set his race the example in the land of Abimelech, of providing for this sacred duty, and of regarding this tender accompaniment of a true civilisation. Descending along the meandering slopes and rugged precipitate declines, to the Valley of Jehoshaphat (for in the land of the Crim Tartar, as in the mysterious land of his origin, the Jew has a valley so named), the traveller will find the homely, devout, and almost Christian Karite Jews, enclosing their last resting-place within the boundaries of a decent distance from habitations. Even the poor gipsy-boys, as they roam about with the characteristic wildness of their race, disturb the burial-places of no other race; and the rude gipsy horse-dealer, honest in nothing beside, would not pluck a bough from the overhanging cypress, nor ravish a flower from the tomb on which it drooped and breathed its life away, as if longing to die upon the breast whose sleeping sanctuary it was intended to adorn. The Tartar women, as they come from the woods laden with filberts, cease the clangour of their usual garrulity when they pass the gates of a necropolis, or even see at a distance the well-defined erections within it. There is in all the races of the Crimea some traditionary reverence for the dead. Our French ally, as well as our enemy, surpassed us in this quality. It is no surprise that our French confederates excel us in artistic taste, whether they decorate with offerings a nuptial altar or a tomb. But even the Germans are before us, both in the grace of a refined burial and the precautions of sanitary policy

connected with it. Surely our Evangelism teaches no disrespect or forgetfulness in these matters! Is it not a dreary picture, and filling with tones of acute anguish the sacred song of the Psalmist, when he describes the uttermost desolation of our nature thus:—"Our bones lie scattered at the pit's mouth?" It is in "the sure and certain hope of a glorious resurrection," that the Gospel teaches us to lay lowly beneath the green sod, or the sculptured marble, the lips that filled our sanctuaries with psalmody, and the hearts that thrilled with the emotions of Christian consolation.

In whatever foreign land the enterprising Englishman lays him down to rest in the last long repose, it will do no dishonour to our nation if it copy from other nations their respect and reverence for the spot where the ashes of the departed remain. Such was the force of national hostility, and such the demoralising effect of war upon the heart, that Turk and Tartar for awhile forgot their traditional emotions in their treatment of the Russian dead in the Greek cemetery at Eupatoria. Some few set up the displaced sepulchres of the Greeks, but in other instances the vindictive feeling entertained to that race was shown in the treatment of their broken tombs. Omar Pasha was enraged when, arriving at this spot after the battle, he witnessed these indignities to the graves of the Greeks and the bodies of the Russian dead, and he drove with violence the marauding Tartars away. The muschir, as he rode along the lines while the victory was no longer doubtful, was received with a wild excitement; the soldiery hailed him as if he were a god; some clung to his stirrups, others ran before him with gestures of fanatical enthusiasm, and loud exclamations of triumph. The sagacious chief commended the common soldiers, who are sensitive to the praises of a general whom they respect; and protestations arose on every side that if he would lead them out against the enemy, they would expel them from the vicinage. Omar was too wise to try their prowess in that way, knowing that, without cavalry, and a better equipped field artillery, he dare not pursue the well-appointed army of the enemy.

An incident occurred just as the retreat began, which has been variously related. A carriage was seen moving about during the battle, almost beyond cannon range. The cavalry officers and mounted orderlies were seen, from Omar Pasha's position, having frequent recourse to this carriage, as if receiving their orders thence. When Omar had some leisure to direct his attention from the general conflict to objects which did not immediately appear of vital importance, he entered one of the redoubts, and addressing the Turkish gunner, asked if he thought he could throw a shot

as far as that carriage. The gunner's reply was, "Yes, highness, with the help of God, and your encouragement, I think I could." The order was given, and promptly obeyed; at the instant the carriage, luckily for its occupant, moved away, for the shot fell upon the spot it had just left, scattering, slain and wounded, the cavalcade which was around it. It was reported by prisoners and deserters that it was the carriage of Prince Menschikoff, who they said commanded in chief during the action. By others it was alleged that it was occupied by one of the grand dukes. Little information could be gathered from this description of persons, who were often ignorant of everything which it might be expected they would know, and sometimes pretended to be ignorant. There were many Austrian subjects in the Russian cavalry; one of these, a Croatian, was taken prisoner; this man belonged to the 12th division, commanded by Liprandi, and to the 32nd regiment, called Afafsky; he had been at the battle of Balaklava, and had remained in the army of Liprandi in observation there, until his corps left to take part in the attack on Eupatoria. His information was to the effect that three days before his troop had left the environs of Sebastopol, with only six days' rations of bread in their canvas bags, and that the commissariat waggons were still forty versts behind, in consequence of the bad roads. This was important information to Omar, for he gathered from it that commissariat difficulties would probably compel a portion of the force before him to evacuate the neighbourhood. The prisoner either did not know, or would not tell, who commanded the Russian army; but alleged that the commander's rank was that of a prince, and that before the battle the prince harangued the troops, and promised them money if they should force an entrance to the town. This, which both prisoners and deserters confirmed, showed that the attack on Eupatoria was no mere reconnaissance, as Menschikoff's despatch so mendaciously put forth. The number of Russian slain who were found, and almost all the wounded, were in and before the Greek cemetery; on every other part of the field they not only bore away their wounded but their dead, whom they buried at some distance; the object of this was to deprive the victors of the triumph of reporting a great number of Russian slain, and thereby increasing the courage of the Turkish soldiery.

During the battle, and the whole day after it was gained, and the next night, men, guns, and *matériel* of war were landed; these arrivals were opportune, for the Croatian prisoner just referred to, informed Omar Pasha that the enemy had 100 guns, many of them 32-pounders, well horsed, and capable of being served

with great rapidity. The Turkish general continued to strengthen his defences, as soon as the men had removed the wrecks produced by the combat, and had buried the dead. The working parties were changed four times within that day and night. The pasha showed the utmost vigilance and diligence. It was surprising that the Turkish officers generally did not catch this noble infection; but all the native officers relapsed into their usual languor after the excitement of the contest had subsided. One old colonel, very fat, and said to weigh eighteen stone, was an exception to the lazy gentry who bore the commission of the sultan—for no officer, Turkish, French, or British, equalled him in activity; he appeared to be ubiquitous, for at every point he inspired the Turkish soldiery with zeal, either to land munitions and supplies, or build up and consolidate the defence.

Immediately upon the withdrawal of the Russians, Omar Pasha dispatched intelligence to Kamiesch and Balaklava, informing the allies that Liprandi was before him with nearly all his force, and suggesting the idea of a bold attack upon any corps lingering in observation of the rear and right flank of the armies before Sebastopol. The allied chiefs dispatched to Omar two more vessels of war, in case a fresh attack should render their assistance requisite.

The moral effect of the battle was everywhere great, beyond the magnitude of the contest itself. Within Sebastopol it had less influence than anywhere else; for the troops were made to believe in a successful reconnaissance, by which five Turkish waggons were blown up—a fiction which, if it had been a truth, would have been of little consequence. The number of Turks slain in the defence was also set down at a number amusingly fabulous. In the allied camps the effect was to redeem the Turkish reputation for courage, which, so far as the common soldiers are concerned, should never have been brought into question. Tunisians are not Turks; the former, and not the latter, had fled from the redoubts at the battle of Balaklava. “Bono Johnnie” was “himself again;” and extra rations of rum were consumed by the British to toast the redemption of their Turkish confederate from the odium of cowardice, so thoughtlessly and cruelly heaped upon him. At Constantinople the exultation of the Moslem knew no bounds; nothing could compare with it, except the rage and resentment of the whole Greek race, whether in Greece or Turkey. In Russia the consequences were more important than anywhere else; for while the people were deceived as to the real nature of the conflict, the czar was not; and the anguish the defeat inflicted upon him had much to do in producing, or at all events aggravating, the illness which brought him in the prime of life from wielding the

sceptre of many dominions to bow, himself, beneath the sceptre of death.

The following, taken from the columns of the *Invalide Russe*, is a specimen of the way in which the affair was represented to the Russian public.—“We knew by the report of Prince Menschikoff’s aide-de-camp of the 12th, that on the 3rd the Turkish troops disembarked at Eupatoria had made an offensive movement upon the village of Saki, in numbers of more than 10,000. In order to assure himself of the exact amount of the enemy’s forces in occupation of Eupatoria, and to ascertain if there was not a possibility of expelling them, Prince Menschikoff ordered Lieutenant-general Chruleff to execute, on the 17th, a strong reconnaissance upon that town, with a party of troops stationed in the vicinity. The troops destined for this operation approached Eupatoria within the distance of 250 yards, and opened a cross fire of artillery upon the place. The enemy responded with a lively cannonade from the fortifications which surround the city; nevertheless, the action of our artillery was so happily executed, that in a few seconds five ammunition waggons belonging to the Turks were blown up, and several pieces of cannon dismounted. Carried away by this success, the 3rd and 4th battalions of the regiment of the Azoff infantry, the battalion of Greek volunteers, and three sotnias of the regiment No. 61 of Cossacks of the Don de Jeroff, got nearer to the town, and profiting by the shelter which the locality offered, commenced a smart fusilade with the enemy: nevertheless, General Chruleff, being assured that the town contained nearly 40,000 troops with 100 pieces of artillery, and that further effort on our part promised no result, gave orders to the troops to retire. This difficult movement was executed with remarkable order. Our loss in this affair amounts to nearly 500 men killed or wounded. The loss of the enemy was in all probability much greater; for his troops, pent up in narrow streets, remained for a long time exposed to the terrible fire of our artillery, the projectiles of which had clear range of the entire town.”

While the people were flattering themselves with the occurrence of a new event redounding to the honour of the Russian arms, the sick czar, in his palace, felt a deep and heart-blighting humiliation. To be beaten on his own territory by a Turkish army, after having been driven by Turkish bands from the Danube and the Pruth, was mortifying to his pride beyond all the disasters which his mad policy had entailed. From the hour in which he heard of the battle of Eupatoria his equanimity was never restored. Omar Pasha killed the czar! He was among the mortally wounded by the defence of Eupatoria.

Although there was no very great generalship displayed in this battle by Omar, yet there were no mistakes; the affair was competently conducted, the arrangements were safe, and the issues were satisfactory. The fame of the pasha was elevated and extended; this was felt from the gates of the seraglio to Lake Sasik—from the dreary steppes of the Tauric government to the dreary chambers of St. Petersburg. Western Europe acknowledged the claims of the adventurer to rank among the first generals of the age.

Such was the battle of Eupatoria, and such its moral effects; its political and military consequences may be traced in the events yet to be related in this History. The following despatches will place some matters before the reader unsuitable to introduce in the author's account of the engagement, and will show the light in which the event appeared in the judgment of the various actors connected with it, and the authorities concerned in forming a just estimate of its general relation to the campaign and to the war. The following is the despatch of the Turkish general to Lord Raglan:—

MY LORD,—I have the honour to inform your lordship that the enemy attacked Eupatoria on the morning of the 17th inst. The troops intended for this attack had left the camp before Sebastopol six days ago, and other troops from Perekop and Simpheropol had joined them in the night of the 16th, and the morning of the 17th, in the flat ground that lies behind the heights that are before Eupatoria. As far as one could guess, and according to the information furnished by prisoners, the enemy mustered thirty-six battalions of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, four hundred Cossacks, eighty pieces of artillery in position, and some troops of horse artillery, which were in reserve. The attack commenced at daylight by a strong cannonade, during which the enemy used even 32-pounders. At first the Russian showed themselves in great force along our whole position; but seeing that our left was protected by men-of-war, which went there when the first shot was fired, they concentrated against our centre and right. I then requested the senior officer of the English royal navy to send the gun-boat *Viper* to the right, and to take up a position near the French steamer *Vélocé*, and the Turkish steamer *Schekfaer*, on board of which was the Vice-admiral, Ahmed Pasha. At the same time I reinforced the right with some battalions of infantry and some pieces of artillery, which I withdrew from the left. The enemy continued his fire, without ceasing, from the position held by his artillery, supported by a powerful fire of skirmishers, and then his infantry, carrying planks and ladders, three times tried to storm the works. Each time it was repulsed, and obliged to retire under our fire; but it was enabled to effect this retrograde movement under cover of its artillery, and of heavy masses of cavalry. Our cavalry, which at the present moment only numbers about 200 or 300 horses, and which charged the Russian infantry at the commencement of its retreat, did not dare to pursue it in the face of such heavy masses. The superiority in artillery and cavalry prevented our disturbing the Russians on their retreat. After four hours and a half's fighting, they commenced retiring in three different directions, towards the bridge of Lake Sasik, towards Top Manna, and towards the Perekop Head. I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of my troops during the day. Although behind were only half finished, and not fully armed, they showed a bold front, and were very steady. Our losses are not very numerous, but they are to be deplored. We regret the death of Selim Pasha, lieutenant-general, commanding the Egyptian troops. We had, moreover,

87 killed and 277 wounded; 79 horses killed and 18 wounded. Amongst the killed there are seven officers, and ten are wounded, amongst them Suleiman Pasha; thirteen inhabitants of the town have been killed, and eleven wounded. I consider it my duty to make honourable mention of the French detachment that is here, and of the English men-of-war, *Caracoo*, *Furious*, *Valorous*, *Viper*, of the Turkish steamer *Schekfaer*, and of the energetic co-operation of the French steamer *Vélocé*, who all contributed greatly towards frustrating the efforts of the enemy. The French detachment had four men killed, and nine wounded: amongst the latter is a naval officer. The Russians must have suffered a heavy loss. According to the report of the civil authorities of the town, who had to bury the dead, their number of killed amounts to 453; their artillery lost 300 horses. They carried away a great many of their dead, and almost all their wounded. We have taken seven prisoners.

I have, &c., OMAR.

Colonel Simmons, the British commissioner with the Turkish army, also addressed to Lord Raglan the following:—

"The enemy's artillery opened their fire about twelve hundred yards from the place, covered by skirmishers, and supported by heavy masses of infantry in their rear, and cavalry on their flanks. The artillery subsequently took up a second position more in advance, about four hundred yards from a small crown work which is being erected in front of the mills to the north-east of the town; and after continuing their fire for some time, the infantry advanced to the attack, having formed under the cover of a wall about six hundred yards from the right of the town. They were repulsed at this point, leaving from 150 to 200 dead on the field. On other points of the field a number of horses were left dead, but the killed men were removed. At length, about 10 A.M., the whole force retired, covered by the artillery and cavalry. I am not able as yet to ascertain the number of men engaged, but I should think there were not less than 40,000 of all arms, with a very powerful artillery. As many as sixty of the enemy's guns must have been firing at one time, amongst them some 32-pounders. Prisoners report that they were accompanied by 100 guns. As yet, all the particulars I have been able positively to ascertain is, that Liprandi's division (the 12th) was present. At present I understand that they are in position about five miles north from this, their left leaning on the Sasik Putrid Lake. It is with much pleasure I have to inform your lordship that the portion of her majesty's fleet under the Hon. Captain Hastings have rendered most efficient assistance. The *Valorous* threw some well-directed shells, and completely covered our left; whilst the *Viper* gun-boat, which was at first stationed on the left with the *Valorous*, by Captain Hastings' directions, moved, and took up a flanking position on the right, near the mills."

The despatch of Lord Raglan to the English government was a brief recapitulation of the

above, and containing them as enclosures. The French general thus addressed the imperial minister of war. This despatch, in common with most accounts of the battle, refers to two assaults, while Omar Pasha mentions three. The enemy was thrice repulsed before the sortie which compelled his retreat.

Crimea, February 19.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,—Yesterday, the 18th, an English steamer coming from Eupatoria brought the news that the enemy had vigorously attacked that place, and had been repulsed. That vessel left Eupatoria without taking the despatches of Commandant Osmont, and I was without details. To-day only I received a report from Commandant Osmont, containing the precise details, which I subjoin:—

In the night between the 16th and 17th the Russians, taking advantage of the darkness, established round the place—the circumvallation works of which are not quite completed—a sort of irregular parallel, consisting of earth-mounds thrown up, intended to cover their artillery and riflemen.

On the 17th, at eight, A.M., eighty pieces of artillery opened their fire. Behind this artillery there was a mass of 25,000 infantry, commanded (according to Commandant Osmont) by General Osten-Saeken. There were also 400 horse.

After a cannonade of nearly two hours' duration, the enemy made their preparations for an assault on the north-east side, where the smallest number of guns are mounted. Five battalions of infantry, provided with the necessary materials for crossing the fosse and scaling the walls, advanced to within 400 metres, protected by a fragment of a wall belonging to an old cemetery. Two of these battalions were then thrown forward. This column arrived within twenty metres of the fosse, but, received by a brisk fire, was compelled to retreat. Brought up a second time to the attack, it was vigorously repulsed by a Turkish battalion, which, making a sortie from the town, attacked it boldly at the point of the bayonet, and routed it, while the small body of Turkish cavalry charged it on the flank. This column left 150 dead in the cemetery.

Meantime the cannonade continued along the whole line. The fire of the enemy was chiefly concentrated on the Hill (so called) of the Mills, where the Egyptian general of division, Selim Pasha, and the Egyptian colonel, Rustem Bey, were killed, nobly fulfilling their duty. At ten o'clock the Russians began to waver, and were soon in full retreat.

The defence of Eupatoria confers the greatest honour upon the commander-in-chief, Omar Pasha, and the troops under his orders. It inaugurates, in the happiest and most brilliant manner, the *début* of the Ottoman arms in the Crimea.

Commandant Osmont estimates the loss of the enemy at 500 killed and 2000 wounded. Writing at the very moment of the event, he had not yet received the official return of the losses of the garrison. He estimates them at about 100 killed and a proportionate number of wounded.

Our little French garrison of about 200 men of the 3rd regiment of marines, and a portion of the crew of the *Henri IV.*, figured honourably in the defence, under the orders of their commander, Chef-d'Escadron of the Staff Osmont, whose intelligence and firmness are known to you. We had four men killed and eight wounded; among the latter Lieutenant Las Cases, who had command of the marine guns. His wound is not serious. He is a distinguished officer, full of vigour.

The steamers in the roadstead, among which I must mention the *Vélocé*, Captain Dufour de Mont Louis, rendered good service to the defence of Eupatoria by a well-directed fire. I am, M. le Maréchal, &c.,

CANROBERT.

On the 22nd of February General Canrobert published an order of the day, directed to his troops, in which he eulogised the conduct of

Omar and his army in terms highly complimentary to both. The address will be found in a subsequent page.

The naval despatches present the battle from the point of view in which the officers of that service regarded it.

Royal Albert—off Sebastopol, Feb. 20.

SIR,—I have the honour to inclose, for the information of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of two letters which I have received from Captain Hastings, of the *Curaçoa*, senior officer at Eupatoria, reporting an unsuccessful attack upon that place at daybreak on the 17th inst., by a large Russian force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and inclosing a letter from Omar Pasha, expressing warm acknowledgments for the great services rendered by her majesty's ships *Curaçoa*, *Valorous*, *Furious*, and *Viper*, as well as his highness's thanks for the reinforcements of steamers which I had sent to him on hearing that the enemy was still in force in his neighbourhood.

Captain Hastings appears to have conducted his share of the defence with his accustomed zeal and ability, and to have been well and effectively seconded by Captains Buckle and Loring, and Lieutenant Brock, and the officers, seamen, and marines of all her majesty's ships present on that occasion.

Colonel Simmons, of the Royal Engineers, who is attached to Omar Pasha's staff, estimates the attacking force at 40,000 of all arms; and he states that as many as 60 guns, some of them 32-pounders, played upon the place at one time.

I understand that at nine o'clock the enemy's infantry formed under the shelter of a wall at 350 yards from the place, and advanced to the attack; but were repulsed with considerable loss, and soon afterwards retired, leaving nearly 200 dead on the nearest spot, and removing the rest of their dead from the more distant parts of the field.

Omar Pasha's army appears, from the latest and most authentic accounts, to have had nearly 100 men killed, and about 250 wounded, and to have had 80 artillery horses killed, and some guns much damaged.

The *Banshee* has brought me a report from Captain Hastings up to noon yesterday, at which time the enemy remained encamped about five miles from Eupatoria, with his left leaning on the Putrid Lake Sasik; while Omar Pasha, with the garrison, having been reinforced after the battle by further Turkish troops brought over from Varna in British transports, as well as by the *Dauntless*, *Curlew*, *Arrow*, and *Lynx*, sent by me hence, and by two French steamers sent by Admiral Bruat, awaited an attack with confidence in a favourable result.

I am, &c.,

EDMUND LYONS,

Rear-Admiral and Commander-in-chief.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

INCLOSURE No. 1.

Her Majesty's ship Curaçoa, Eupatoria, Feb. 17.

SIR,—I have the honour to acquaint your excellency that this morning, about 6.30 A.M., the Russians, in considerable force, attacked the Turkish troops which are encamped at this place under the command of his Highness Omar Pasha.

The ships under my command at this anchorage, which are named in the margin, immediately proceeded under steam to close the flanking position of the Turkish intrenchments—*Valorous* and *Viper* taking the left flank, and *Curaçoa* and *Furious* the right. About half an hour after the commencement of the attack I received from his Highness Omar Pasha a request to strengthen as much as possible the right flank, as the enemy were pressing their attack upon that point.

The *Viper* was immediately recalled, and from her light draught of water was enabled to effect good service, as also the three other ships in their respective positions.

The conduct of the captains, officers, seamen, and

marines under my command on this occasion deserves your excellency's approbation.

I have, &c.,

G. F. HASTINGS, Captain.

P.S. The French and Turkish vessels also did good service in the respective positions which they took up.

His Excellency Rear-admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Bart., G.C.B., K.C.H., &c.

INCLOSURE No. 2.

H.M.S. Curgeon, Eupatoria, Feb. 18.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum of yesterday's date, relative to my report of the Russians having attacked this place on the 17th inst., as communicated by the steam transport *Queen of the South*, and I beg to inform you that the reinforcements of vessels mentioned therein have duly arrived here; and that I immediately informed his Highness Omar Pasha of the reinforcements being sent to his support, who begged me to offer to your excellency his warmest thanks.

In the late attack the Turks suffered a loss of 88 men killed, 250 wounded, and 78 horses killed. The loss on the part of the Russians cannot be ascertained.

No further attack has been made; but the Russians still remain in force about five miles from Eupatoria, and large reinforcements, both of men and waggons, are daily arriving from the road to Simpheropol. If the *Arrows'* services could be spared she would be of great assistance here.

I have, &c.,

G. F. HASTINGS, Captain.

His Excellency Rear-admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Bart., G.C.B., K.C.H., &c.

Royal Albert—off Sebastopol, Feb. 24.

SIR,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, that no attack has taken place at Eupatoria since that of the 17th inst., which, as their lordships will perceive by the enclosed copy of a letter from Colonel Simmons to me, was more serious than was at first supposed. Her majesty's ships are in eligible positions for assisting in the repulse of any future attack.

The weather, which for the last few days has been very severe, is now remarkably fine.

I am, &c.,

EDMUND LYONS,

Rear-admiral and Commander-in-chief.

To the Secretary of the Admiralty.

INCLOSURE.

Eupatoria, Feb. 20, 9 P.M.

SIR.—The bearer is an aide-de-camp of the Seraskier, bearing despatches from Omar Pasha to his government. His Highness would be much obliged to you if you would kindly order him a passage to Constantinople by the first opportunity.

The position is much stronger here than it was; in fact, I should say doubly so, and nearly twice as many guns mounted as on the 17th. That affair was pretty sharp, and the Russians lost a great many men: we have interred 53, and there can be no doubt they carried off and buried many more who were killed at long ranges by our artillery. They also left nearly 300 dead horses on the field.

Our loss was 87 killed, 277 wounded, Turks; 4 killed and 9 wounded, French, and 13 killed, 11 wounded, of the population; besides 79 horses killed and 18 wounded. Our field battery had 19 men (Turks) killed, and every gun (six) disabled.

The Turks behaved very well. Selim Pasha, the Egyptian, who was killed, was a great loss; but his place is well supplied by Solomon Pasha, who was wounded.

Omar Pasha is most gratified at the promptitude with which you sent up ships after hearing of the attack.

The exertions of the officers and men of your fleet in disembarking troops, &c., here are beyond all praise; but, unfortunately, the weather during the last week or ten days has not been propitious, and consequently transports have been detained longer than they otherwise would.

I am, &c.,

J. N. SIMMONS.

Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, K.C.B., &c. &c.

Montebello, Kamiesch, Feb. 20, 1855.

On the 17th the town of Eupatoria was attacked from the eastern side by the Russians, with eighty pieces of artillery, six regiments of cavalry, under the command of General Korff, and twelve regiments of infantry—about 25,000 men, under the orders of General Osten-Sacken. The battle lasted five hours and a half, beginning at ten in the morning. The Russians were vigorously repulsed: their loss was reckoned at 500 men killed, and a proportionate number of wounded. The Turks had 88 men killed, and 250 wounded: they lost 70 horses in action. The general of the Egyptian division, Selim Pasha, and Colonel Rustem Bey, were killed. Among the French, four marine artillerymen of the *Henri IV.* were killed; the wounded were seven, of whom three belonged to the *Henri IV.*, and four to the regiment of marines. The attack of the Russians has not been renewed. The war-steamer anchored in the roadstead energetically contributed to the defence of the place. I have dispatched the *Brandon* and *Megara* to Eupatoria. Admiral Lyons has also sent thither a frigate and a corvette, with two artillerymen.

BHUT.

Vlodec, Eupatoria, Feb. 21, 1855.

Since the defeat of the 17th the Russians have made no further attempt against Eupatoria. To-day columns of infantry and convoys of waggons are seen retiring from before the place, and taking the direction of Simpheropol. Many villages are in flames in the vicinity of Eupatoria. New guns of positions are being landed, and new defences in course of construction. The city is in a good state of defence.

DE MONTLOUIS.

In the battle of Eupatoria notice was taken of the death of Selim Pasha, the commander of the Egyptians. His history is as romantic as his death was gallant. He was generally known among the Egyptians by the title of "the last of the Mamelukes." This appellation was literally correct: he was the only survivor of that body when Mehemet Ali, in 1821, massacred them. They had been all assembled at Cairo, and Mehemet, jealous of their power, and annoyed by their arrogance and occasional insubordination, ordered their indiscriminate destruction. Selim, who was then a mere youth, was one of the body. Seeing that there was no other hope of escape from the means which Mehemet had taken to destroy his party, he mounted his horse, and forced him to spring from the lofty wall of the place into the space below. The horse was killed by the fall, but Selim survived, wounded and severely confused. Mehemet Ali, astonished at the youth's determination and escape, ordered him to be spared. He soon recovered; and his subsequent and brilliant military career was entered upon under the auspices of Colonel Selves.

CHAPTER LXIX.

OPERATIONS OF THE CONTENDING ARMIES IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF EUPATORIA AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE 17TH OF FEBRUARY.

Messenger. West of this—scarcely off half a mile,
In goodly form comes on the enemy;
And by the ground they hide, I judge their number
Upon, or near, the rate of thirty thousand.

Mowbray. The just proportion that we gave them out.
Let us sway on, and face them in the field. SHAKSPEARE. *Henry IV.*

IN the midst of the triumphs of Omar Pasha, consequent upon his victory, he was subjected to a serious domestic grief, which it is generally supposed ever after subdued his energy, and rendered him less fit for a large command—this was the loss by death of his nephew. Previous to the battle, this young man was attacked by typhus fever, which prevailed among the Turkish forces, and he was removed from Eupatoria to Constantinople. The young man, although but twenty-two years of age, had acquired a reputation for military talent; he was the adopted son of Omar, who was extremely fond of him.

In his grief, however, the famous soldier did not forget his duty. Precautions were taken against the return of the Russians, whom deserters (perhaps spies) reported were reinforced by fresh troops from Perekop, and were ready, with 30,000 picked men, to assault the place, aided by an increased artillery. It was rumoured that the troops encamped in the vicinity, and those at Simpheropol and Perekop destined for service against the place, numbered not less than 80,000 men. Accordingly, Omar caused his troops to work incessantly at the defences, while he dispatched letters to Kamiesch, Balaklava, Varna, and Constantinople, placing the English, French, and Turkish authorities in full possession of what information he could gather. From the two places last mentioned troops, provisions, and munitions of war were sent day by day. Landing these stores from the ships impeded the progress of the defences, but the men of the English and French steam squadron in the roads, which was reinforced, aided in this work, while the officers made themselves useful in the fortifications.

Among the troops landed from Constantinople was a body of irregular cavalry (Bashibazouks); this description of force was much wanted by Omar Pasha, as the plain around Eupatoria was peculiarly favourable for the action of cavalry, wherein the Russians were powerful, and of which the Turks were almost destitute. The new cavalry arrivals were mostly Kurds—very doubtful auxiliaries anywhere in the neighbourhood of Kurdistan, but at a distance from their native land, and under a general so strict in discipline as Omar, likely to be useful. There could be no doubt

they were disposed to plunder if opportunity were presented; but nothing was left for their rapacity, as the Russians had burned all the Tartar villages, and either drove the inhabitants into the interior, forced them to join their ranks, or frightened them into timely flight to the already crowded city of Eupatoria.

The rations supplied to the Turkish troops were excellent, and abundant in quantity: they consisted of biscuit, rice, *kaourma* (a kind of preserved meat), beans, and butter. Lemons, oranges, figs, nuts, chestnuts, tobacco, could be purchased cheaply at the bazaar, where private speculators sold them. Such luxuries as were procurable at Kamiesch and Balaklava were altogether absent from Eupatoria. The pashas had their supplies with them, and the men relied upon their rations; the English and French officers found what they wanted on board the ships of the squadron; so that the bazaars limited their supply to the articles mentioned.

The common soldiery manifested the most ardent zeal and enthusiasm in every labour, and longed for another opportunity to chastise the "Muscovs." *Mutatis mutandis*, matters at Eupatoria were not unlike those at Silistria. The enemy, however, did not prove in the long run so pertinacious as the former as at the latter place. Omar won the love of the common soldiers by his kindness, and constrained their respect by the sternness of his discipline. He adopted the wise method in feeding the army, of first distributing rations to the privates. This was an innovation seriously injurious to the interests of the officers, who would in all probability have resisted or embarrassed such a distribution had not Omar been surrounded by so many English and French. The Turkish officers have, by the military law of the sultan, a right to a number of rations varying with their rank. Thus a lieutenant-general has thirty-two; general of brigade, twenty-two; colonel, sixteen; lieutenant-colonel, twelve; major, eight; &c. Omar reduced this scale, no doubt offending by his happy audacity the clique at the Porte as well as the speculating officers of his own army. He issued an order of the day, giving to a major, two; a lieutenant-colonel, three; a colonel, four; a brigadier-general, five; a lieu-

tenant-general, six, rations *in natura*. These worthies consented to receive them under protest, claiming the right to demand the value of the rations in money another time—to which Omar had no objection, so as their feeding and fighting while with him bore some fair proportion to that of the men whom they so indifferently commanded.

There was no forage on the steppe at that early period of the year, and, besides, the Russians commanded it; but Omar personally superintended the organisation of his commissariat, and procured fodder from Varna and Burgas in sufficient quantities, and with tolerable regularity.

The proceedings of the Russians after the day of battle were at first unascertainable by Omar, although he had used spies on the Danube, and employed similar agencies at Eupatoria also, more efficiently than the English and French chiefs did before Sebastopol. In a letter dated Eupatoria, February 25th, from one perfectly cognisant of all that had been ascertained there of the Russian movements on the steppe, the following remarks occur:—"Since the affair of the 17th the Russians have not disturbed us. It is, of course, impossible to say whether they are waiting for further reinforcements to recommence their operations, or whether, having found the works too strong to be carried by a *coup de main*, they have determined to assume the defensive, leaving only a *corps d'observation* in the neighbourhood, which latter plan would have the advantage for them that they could more or less choose their own battle-ground. Among these conjectures there is only one thing certain, and that is, that there are still Russian troops, infantry as well as cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Eupatoria. One body of them is to be seen on our left, in the vicinity of the little lake to the north of the town. On Thursday last another body of infantry as well as cavalry, with a number of arabas, supposed to be some convoy, was seen moving on the road to Suk, the first station towards Simpheropol."

That the Russians kept up a very close observation was obvious, for at that juncture Colonel Simmons cruised close along the coast on board the *Curlew*, and shells were thrown at the ship from several points. He observed a paddle-box boat, a portion of one of the wrecks of the 14th of November, lying on the shore not far from Eupatoria; he sent a boat's crew to bring it off; the Russians, perceiving this, brought down horse artillery to prevent the removal, but were driven back by the fire of the *Curlew*. Deserters gave information that the movements of arabas observed from the ships and redoubts were for the purpose of bringing up mortars to shell the place. Up

to the end of February the Russian headquarters remained at Oraz, about five miles distant, and their cavalry videttes occupied the second line of tumuli referred to in the description given of the Russian position on occasion of the battle recorded in the last chapter. The *Dauntless* and *Curlew* made various experiments as to the common range of the shipping. Before the vessels began this operation the outlying Turkish videttes were drawn in, lest any accident should occur by the firing. The Russians perceiving this movement, and of course unable to comprehend it, pushed on their patrols to ascertain its cause; this movement was opportune for the purposes of the ships, as they tried their range upon the enemy's videttes, putting some *hors de combat*, and causing the rest to gallop back to the tumuli.

The Turkish chief had still to contend with the dilatoriness and want of principle of his own government. He every day visited the piers at Eupatoria, and inspected personally the shot, shell, arms, clothing, and provisions landed; and but for his vigilance and industry, peculation at the capital would have destroyed the enterprise, as it soon after did the defence of Kars. Omar was especially particular as to the supply of his army with fuel—a matter as to which the home authorities did not see the necessity; but the general persevered in seeing his demands in that respect executed until wood and charcoal were landed at Eupatoria in large quantities, so that soon after the battle the troops had regular rations of fuel. A person resident at Constantinople, and in a position to know what he related, observed:—"Omar Pasha has throughout this campaign given proof of his skill as a general, and it could be wished that his power in his own army was more complete, and that he was not obliged to defer in so many things to a minister at the Porte who enjoys no high reputation either for genius or integrity." The person referred to in this extract was Riza Pasha, whom General Williams had denounced to Lord Clarendon as a traitor to the cause for which the allies fought. Omar was well seconded in his activity and surveillance of everything by several officers. The crew of the *Henri IV.* were directed by their commander to erect a large crane on one of the piers, and the British men-of-war's men were ordered to construct several on the others. Commander Hosenson, R.N., Lieutenant Ballard, of the East India Company's army, Selim Bey (Major Kutzulesco), and the Turkish colonel, Abdallah Bey, were as indefatigable as Omar himself.

Deserters from Liprandi's corps caused considerable excitement by relating the movements of that general and the troops under his

command. According to their account, after the defeat before Eupatoria, he retraced his steps towards the Tchernaya; but as the weather suddenly changed, and the heaviest fall of snow which had been known for many winters covered the route, the general lost his way, and his troops were subjected to the greatest hardships. Many fell out of the line of march, and were never heard of after; others finally made out the corps of Osten-Sacken, frost-bitten and exhausted; and numbers perished in the attempt to regain the Tchernaya. Unfortunate as was Liprandi during all the war, not excepting the exploit of making the passage of the Danube (which, although bravely effected, cost many lives by fatigue and pestilence), he was more unlucky on this occasion than on any other. None of the engagements in which he took a part cost him such loss of life among his troops as the march from before Eupatoria, to regain the position before Balaklava, on the night of the 18th and 19th of February. The reports concerning this were very various and discrepant, some alleging the loss of half his corps, others of a third and a fourth. There is no doubt that some thousands of men perished on that dreadful night. Occasion will occur to refer to this subject more particularly in the next chapter.

The Russians for some weeks continued to make close reconnaissances, and frequent skirmishes took place: a letter from the scene of combats thus describes one of them:—"We had just brought our luncheon to a very satisfactory conclusion, when the alarm was given, and we adjourned from our mess-room (what a profanation of the term!) to the redoubt. Two of our messmates from the frigate, whose names it would not be fair to reveal, were lunching with us, and accompanied us to see the fun, which very nearly ended in a most serious catastrophe. As our people manned the guns and rockets, the Cossacks came over the hill at a gallop, and commenced scouring the plain in order to secure the flocks of sheep which were feeding on it. As they swept past us, at some 1000 yards' distance, our batteries opened fire upon them with round-shot and rockets, which emptied several saddles. The Cossacks, however, being 'diners out,' were not deterred from their very laudable endeavour to secure a dinner, and a very interesting skirmish ensued between them and the Tartar irregular horse, the one party endeavouring to get their mutton, the other as strenuously striving to save it. The Cossacks cut off a large flock, and drove them towards the country with their lances, and while doing so they were repeatedly charged by the Tartars, who would gallop within 100 yards, discharge their muskets at them, and then wheel round to load. The Turkish officer who is in command

of the irregulars shot one Cossack with his pistol, and wounded another by a sabre cut. While this skirmishing was continuing with varied success, a large force of Turkish infantry marched out with their general at their head, and poured several volleys into the Cossacks, who were compelled to retire, with a loss of some of their numbers, but with a gain of part of their booty. As they retreated along the crest of the hill, they came under our fire again, when we gave them a volley of shot and rockets; one of the latter burst among a group of the enemy, knocking over two, and giving a great addition of speed to the remainder. Another shot struck directly beneath a horse, which fell upon its head, and flung its rider to some distance. The Cossack picked himself up and took to his heels, but the horse was captured, with several others. These successful hits were loudly cheered by our blue-jackets, who watched the effect of each shot with great earnestness, and whose nautical expressions would have greatly amused landmen. Thus, when the enemy retired in haste, they exclaimed that they 'were making sail;' and when the pace increased to a gallop, they declared that 'the Roosians must have the wind right aft—they were bowling along at such a rate!'"

As the Turks began to feel more confidence in their numbers, they became the assailants; and although they knew well that an army of at least 30,000 men lay before them, better equipped for war than any of the corps which the czar had engaged on the various theatres of struggle, they were minded in the spirit of the motto selected for this chapter to "sway on," and meet the enemy in the field. They had repulsed the foe when protected against his assault by the breastwork and redoubt, and they were confident to engage him upon the steppe, notwithstanding the numbers and completeness of his cavalry. The Russians seemed much astonished at the increased boldness of the Turks, and accounted for it on the supposition of very strong reinforcements of French and British marines having been landed. They were not well informed of what took place in Eupatoria, the only instance in which, during the war either in Europe or Asia, the Russian spy system failed to work efficiently.

Every day, and generally twice a day, from the beginning of March, the Turks sallied out in quest of the Muscovs. They observed a singular regularity in these excursions: in the morning and in the evening, at the same hour, a detachment of Kurdistan cavalry galloped out upon the plain, followed by horse artillery and infantry. They generally passed out at the same point, and moved towards the range of tunuli where the Russian cavalry videttes kept up their ceaseless observation. The latter

retired slowly upon their reserves. These, prepared for what was going on, advanced in strength; the Turks galloped to the nearest tumulus, looked at the enemy for some time, and retired upon their own reserves. The Russians were in such case accustomed to throw out skirmishers, and form in pelotons; the Turks and Tartars would then make flank movements: various evolutions on the part of the Russians would counteract those of the Turks, both parties firing carbines and pistols when neither could carry half the required distance. The Russians gradually retiring, the Turks would follow them to the next line of tumuli, sometimes approaching pretty close during the various windings and manœuvres mutually practised. On these occasions the chief officers would exchange salutes, as if it were a holiday review. The whole affair would begin over again along the second series of mounds, until the Turks in turn gradually retiring, the Russians would gradually advance to their original position.

Colonel le Dien, the French commissioner, was recalled at the beginning of March, much to the regret of the army with which he served.

The Tartar irregular cavalry began by degrees to be very useful, both French and Turks enlisting them: they preferred the service of the sultan. They had been accustomed to carry heavy muskets on horseback, which impeded their efficiency, but early in March sabres, lances, carbines, and pistols, were distributed to them, and their utility was greatly increased.

On the 5th of March the Turks made a reconnaissance on a larger scale than they had previously ventured upon. Two squadrons of the 2nd regular regiment of Rumeli, called Hadji Alay, because it had made the pilgrimage to Meera, and a squadron of rediffs (a militia which comprises cavalry and infantry) of the 2nd regiment of Guards, a small detachment of Bashi-bazouks, and a large detachment of the newly-arrived mounted Tartars, under the command of Skender Beg, went out upon the steppe. They took, as usual, the direction of the tumuli. The nearest to the Turkish left, which was occupied by the Russians, was close to a bridge which leads over a creek running inland from the Putrid Lake Sasik. Opposite the Turkish centre the Russians occupied two large tumuli in unusual force, and behind them videttes were strongly posted, falling back to the little lake to the north of the town, on the side of which was a little Tartar village, called Meskow, which the Russians had burned. Near the bridge, in a hollow to the right of it, was posted a strong squadron of lancers, to support their videttes: these were quite hidden from the Turkish skirmishers. Towards the

centre there were two sotnias of Cossacks, upon which the videttes retired as the Bashi-bazouks advanced; and besides these Cossacks, to their left, was posted a beautiful squadron of hussars, all mounted on white horses. The general arrangements of the Russian cavalry outposts was well known to the Turks by their frequent reconnaissances and skirmishes for some days before. Skender Beg, who always had commanded these excursions from the town, based his plan of action on this occasion upon the knowledge he had thus acquired. He sent the two squadrons of the 2nd regiment to the right, to keep at bay the Russian Lancers, while he, at the head of the rediffs, Bashi-bazouks, and Tartars, advanced towards the two mounds in the centre already described. The enemy's videttes fell back upon the main guard in the customary manner; but before they could be joined by their reserves, Skender Beg gave the order to charge, which was promptly obeyed, the Cossacks hurrying back with all their speed. Both parties opened a warm fire; but the Turks, charging on, were in the midst of the Russian main guard when the reserves of the latter came up. Skender Beg ordered his men to charge them, and he, with his usual intrepidity, led them on, first in the charge: his Bashi-bazouks bravely followed, the Tartars halted, and the rediffs ran away; a few of the Tartars fled with the flying Roumelians, and a few more, it is bare justice to say, joined the Kurds in their brave onset. The result may be foreseen: the Cossacks rallied, charged the few brave men who had followed their leader, swept them away; and the hitherto hesitating and stationary Tartars an instant afterwards were flying before the victorious Cossacks. Skender Beg miraculously escaped; two of his Bashi-bazouks remained by him, and these three intrepid men cut their way through the Cossack sotnias; but the gallant chief received a sabre-cut on the head, which penetrated the skull, a lance-thrust which scarred his breast, and a sabre-cut on the hand, which took off two of the fingers. The Tartars had taken such care of themselves that only one was lost; four Bashi-bazouks fell in following their too confident chief, and the rediffs, who never came within lance-length of the enemy, suffered more than either, six of them having been shot down before they got clear out of harm's way. About 2300 yards from the tumuli the frightened horsemen of Islam drew up. Skender Beg exhorted them in vain to return to the charge: but the sight of his streaming wounds was sufficient to deter them from any closer contact with the enemy. Faint with loss of blood, he resigned the command to Safer Pasha (General Koseelszky, a Pole). He was equally unfortunate as to obtaining their acquiescence in any

movement towards the enemy; and after sundry manœuvres in the promenade style, which appeared to suit them, although, not without symptoms of trepidation, they joyfully and with alacrity obeyed the command to retreat *en échelon*, in the performance of which duty the Russians scarcely even noticed them. There was nothing remarkable in this whole affair, except the rashness of Skender Beg, and the superfluous bravery of himself and his few Bashi-bazouks. This force was utterly unfit to cope with Russian regular cavalry. The rediffs were sober citizens, who hardly knew how to sit on horseback; the Tartars were only fit for scouts, and the Bashi-bazouks for skirmishing: none of them had ever seen a line of battle before. It was utterly absurd for their commanders to use them except as scouts and skirmishers; but they were elated by the glorious result of the battle of Eupatoria, and fancied that any description of Turkish force could beat the Russians.

Eupatoria soon began to assume the aspect of a fortress; and while Omar performed all the duties of a general, the native magistrates, or medglis, preserved order among the Tartar population.

The death of the Emperor Nicholas was one of the most signal episodes of the war; the incidents connected with it will be related in their appropriate place. Tidings of this event reached Eupatoria on the 7th of March, and gave rise to rumours similar in nature to those which the event caused throughout Europe—perhaps throughout the world. It was determined in the garrison that the tidings should be communicated to the Russian commander; for it was rightly conjectured that the news could not have reached the enemy's camp—Eupatoria, by medium of the sea, being more immediately in connection with the sources and media of information. Safer Pasha was delegated to this delicate mission. He accordingly, attended by two squadrons of regular cavalry, wended his way towards the Russian lines. Turning to the right as they left the town they ascended the first mound occupied by the Turkish videttes, and passing it, advanced to the parallel mound occupied by the videttes of the enemy; and, when some little distance from it, Safer Pasha rode forward, only attended by his staff, until he approached the bridge which crosses the creek at Lake Sasik, where a squadron of Russian lancers were posted. The Cossacks *en vidette* retired slowly to the ruined village near the bridge, as if afraid that some ruse was being put in practice against them. Safer Pasha still advanced; but pausing at a little distance, when the Cossacks began to make demonstrations of a hostile nature, he ordered a Polish officer, with a trumpeter, to advance in the mode

usual when a parley is demanded between opposing forces. This officer told the Russian officer of the main guard that his errand was to invite the Russian commandant of outposts to meet the Turkish commander for a conference. The Russian commander was at the camp, but was sent for; and when he arrived, turned out to be a Pole, an old friend as well as countryman of Safer Pasha. The greeting was lively, and Prince Radzivil—for such was the Russian commander's designation—was extremely courteous to the whole Turkish party. He was much surprised and excited by the news of the death of his emperor, of whose illness he had heard, but had not entertained apprehensions for his life. The two Polish chiefs made some useful arrangements about the treatment of prisoners. It was gathered also by the Turkish staff that few of the Kurds, or rediffs, who had been led out by Skender Beg had been killed,—they were wounded and prisoners. The lieutenant-colonel of lancers had inflicted the severe cut upon the forehead of that adventurous horseman, whose feat very much resembled that of Major Edwards in one of his exploits in the Punjab. Brandy, tobacco, and other little luxuries, were exchanged by the generals and their staffs; and they parted as good friends (to use a Hibernicism) as enemies could possibly be.

This peaceful conference created in Eupatoria a desire for its renewal, and Safer Pasha went out again, ostensibly to effect a change of prisoners, when all who could find an excuse for going left Eupatoria along with him, making a very promiscuous cavalcade of soldiers, sailors, and civilians—Turks, Tartars, French, and English. A gentleman who was one of the retinue of the Turkish negotiator on this occasion relates what he saw, in a manner that would suffer from any attempt to abridge it:—"The affair was more or less managed as yesterday, only that we had to wait rather longer for the commander. The Polish officer, who was again in advance, amused himself by talking, drinking, and smoking with the Cossacks. At last we saw a cavalcade coming from the right; when they approached, the squadron of Lancers near the bridge, who had again dismounted when they heard of our peaceful intentions, got in their saddles, and when we passed them we heard a hearty cheer. It was the usual answer to the question which every superior officer in passing his troop makes—'*Zdra sferit tyè, rabiata?*' ('How do you do, children?') To which the answer is—'*Zdravia jeluin washe?*' ('We wish good health to you'). The prince sent his aide-de-camp before, and soon after galloped up himself. Again a good deal of politeness, and cigars were exchanged. By degrees the Turkish staff as well as the Cos-

sacks drew nearer, and a few minutes afterwards both parties were mixed up together. The predominant feeling was curiosity on both sides, both parties wishing to surpass each other in politeness, except a few Cossacks, who came up on foot and made their observations. I always thought the Cossack faces in *Punch* a caricature; since I have seen these specimens I think they remain behind the truth. Safer Pasha proposed an exchange of prisoners, which the Russian commander accepted. After that the order of the day was introductions. Some French officers were introduced who were seeking for some sailors of a French brig stranded somewhere about Sebastopol; it was rather an odd moment to choose for introductions. Among those introduced was Captain Methuen, of the *Colombo*, as the bearer of the news of the death of the emperor."

The weather now cleared up beautifully; spring asserted her glorious reign, which in the Crimea is indeed genial and lovely; and although there were some alternations of warm and cold days, and the nights continued sharp, and were sometimes severe, yet the fine weather had come, and the roads were dry and fit for the movement upon them of any reinforcements the Russians might choose to send against the place. But they were now too well prepared in the garrison to fear the result; notwithstanding the inefficiency of his cavalry on the plain, Omar was assured that his artillery would be well and bravely served, and that his infantry would give to any assault of the enemy another reception as memorable as that of the 17th of February.

During the interview above recorded, it was agreed to exchange the prisoners at noon the next day. On inquiry, the Turks were found to have only five prisoners, and they were wounded and could not be removed, so it was resolved to postpone the exchange; but Safer Pasha resolved to go out and tell the circumstance himself, and see his friend the Russian commander; and accordingly a procession went forth, and was met by another in all respects similar to the preceding. During this interview a somewhat mysterious occurrence took place. A Tartar officer, on a fine white horse, rode past the left of Safer Pasha's escort towards the Russian lines. Some Turkish officers and sergeants set out after him, as he appeared to be a deserter. It was, however, too late, as a strong party of Cossacks rode up to meet him, and thus escorted he rode safely into the Russian lines. This occurred just as the conference between the two Polish representatives of Russia and Turkey were terminating their conference. It was observed that the former and his staff rode up to the Tartar captain (*tuzbashe*), and had a conference with him. The Turkish general promptly sent over to the

Russian commander a messenger, demanding the restoration of the absconding cavalier and the white horse. The reply was a refusal, grounded on the fact that when the horseman was seen approaching, Cossack videttes were sent to warn him of his contiguity to the Russian position, when he replied that he was aware of that, and came to join service with Russia, and at once divested himself of his sword, and presented it to a Cossack officer. This reasoning did not seem sound to Safer Pasha, and he felt that an unworthy advantage had been taken in a small matter. On his return to the town it was found that no officer had deserted from the Tartars in the Turkish pay; inquiry was made of the French, and no one had absented himself. Conjecture assumed many forms as to who or what the trooper of the white horse could be, but no satisfactory conclusion was arrived at. The probability is, that the Tartar chief was a Russian spy, who had assumed that uniform, and took advantage of the relaxed vigilance attending the conference to inspect the place, and make good his escape in time as the conference was closing. The ready approach of the Cossacks to protect him, as if they had waited in expectation of his arrival, and the apparent consultation with him by the Russian commander of the outposts, give colour to this opinion.

As the Turkish general and his *cortège* were returning from the conference, five Tartars, all intoxicated soldiers in French pay, were moving out, evidently with the intention of deserting; they were arrested. The Tartars felt French discipline to be irksome, and when not permitted to join their compeers in the Turkish service, sometimes deserted to the enemy. The French did not succeed in conciliating the natives, Tartars or Asiatics, so well as the British.

An interesting letter from Eupatoria thus comments upon the frequent conferences which had taken place:—"Amusing it is to hear from what points of view the Turkish soldiers look at these interviews with the Russians, which are something new to them. Some of them having heard of the previous acquaintance of Safer Pasha with Prince Radzivil, think them only a renewal of old friendships under rather difficult circumstances, while others see the first steps towards peace in these encounters, principally as the death of the Emperor Nicholas, the author of the war, seems to lend some probability to this version. But by far the greatest part think it uncommonly strange that, since the last check received by the Turkish cavalry, these peaceful and complimentary interviews have been substituted for the former warlike but harmless military promenades; and this is so much more the case as they see daily numbers of cavalry and artillery horses arriv-

ing and landing. To-day, again, another interview was projected, to take four cases of Bordeaux and some tobacco as a present over to the Russian commander. But this time Safer Pasha did not go himself; he sent only one of his aides-de-camp. The Russian commander sent, likewise, only his aide-de-camp, who, I hear—for I was not there—received the presents smiling, and with the observation that the Russians were so plentifully provided with everything that they had even sucking-pigs (*cochons de lait*), and would be very happy to offer some of them. What the projects are for to-morrow is as yet unknown, perhaps to send matches to light the tobacco, or glasses to drink the Bordeaux; but I hear there are some apprehensions of a visit of the Russians, and that of a less amicable nature. Bodies of infantry have been seen moving about, and in general an unusual amount of activity was observed. The patrols have therefore been strengthened, and other precautions taken to receive them properly. I must say I do not believe in an attack. It would be foolish of them to try to take a place which is of no use to them, and which they could not hold for a day, on account of the men-of-war. There are said to be, again, 50,000 men around Eupatoria, but even with this force the taking of Eupatoria, as it is at present, would be very problematical, principally as the Turkish soldiers are well aware that they have only the choice between the Russians and the sea in the rear. As long as the Turks remain here they are harmless, and in case they advance, the Russians may defeat them, as the cavalry of the latter is so superior to theirs, and so numerous."

Yet the rumours of an attack were reasonable, for in a few days the Russians doubled their videttes, and appeared in greatly increased force. Siege artillery and two divisions and a half of infantry had arrived, according to the reports both of deserters and Tartar spies. Projects for removing the Tartar women and children began to be discussed, and it was thought of sending them by the transports to Burgas and Varna. An effort to get rid of the Tartar men not suitable for enlistment was made by offering them eighteen piastres a day as labourers at Balaklava; but the only labour the Tartars like, is tending cattle or driving waggons,—many, however, accepted the employment proposed.

Some curious specimens of partisan falsehood appeared in the newspapers of Constantinople and St. Petersburg, in connection with the cavalry affair in which Skender Beg was wounded. The *Journal de Constantinople* proclaimed that the Turks had eleven killed and two wounded, while the Russians lost thirty men; like the Russian attack on Eupatoria, as

represented by the *Journal of St. Petersburg*, it was a "successful reconnaissance." On the other hand, the *Invalide Russe* magnified the skirmish into a grand cavalry battle, in which the Russians had the usual loss of the one Cossack killed,—it was, however, admitted that a few also were slightly wounded; whereas the Turks incurred great slaughter, were pursued three versts, driven into the town in full flight, to the confusion and consternation of the garrison.

Matters went on in and around Eupatoria in the manner here described until the 20th of March, when Omar Pasha effected a movement which had an important influence upon the safe occupation of Eupatoria, and the effect of that occupation upon the campaign.

The cavalry force of Omar had been gradually and greatly augmented. Kurdistan irregulars, and others of the Bashi-bazouk description, a few rediffs, and a considerable body of regular Turkish horse, were landed from Constantinople and Varna. By dawn of day on the 20th five regiments of cavalry, two troops of horse artillery, and a strong division of infantry, marched out of Eupatoria. They reached the line of tumuli, the scene of previous skirmishes, the Russians retiring as usual upon their main supports. The Turks this time closely followed. A long line of Cossacks skirmished and protected the Russian right flank. The Turks followed from one range of tumuli to another, until a considerable body of their horse came upon the creek behind which the Russian cavalry had fallen back. The Russian strategy now became obvious, they manœuvred to draw the Turks as far from the town as possible, and then by operating on their left flank to cut them off. Omar Pasha's own directions were followed in this excursion, and he had previously warned his cavalry officers of such a danger, and took care to guard against it. The Turkish infantry took up a position, and the cavalry skilfully and cautiously advanced until the Russian outposts retired upon their camp. Omar kept the position he had taken up, and his object in the expedition was soon unmasked; he never intended an attack, but designed to make a demonstration which would keep the Russians occupied, and expel them from the tumuli, until the purpose of the demonstration was accomplished. That purpose was to erect new works at a greater distance from the town, and this he succeeded in effecting before the Russians had any idea of his intentions: before a week new redoubts were erected, armed, and garrisoned, relieving the over-crowded town, promoting the health of his army, advancing discreetly his position, and greatly strengthening the defence. The tumuli formerly in the possession of the Russians were now occupied

by the Turks, and the Russians had been skillfully manœuvred back to a less advantageous position, while a kind of intrenched camp defended the town as a strong line of outworks, rendering the place almost impregnable with such a commander as Omar, and such troops as he commanded, against any force the Russians could probably bring against it.

On the 29th a foray was made by the Bashi-bazouks upon the village of Bazar, on the borders of the lake, where there was a Cossack post. The Bashi-bazouks succeeded in coming suddenly upon them, and putting them to the sword; the Cossacks behaved most cowardly on the occasion, as disgracefully as the Tartars and redifls had conducted themselves under Skender Beg. The Bashi-bazouks pursued, shouting "*Yallah Allah*," their customary war-cry, until the retreat of the "Muscovs" was turned into flight. The pursuers then turned their attention to the village and the Cossack quarters, which they speedily stript of everything that was at all valuable and portable. Food and fodder, uniforms and accoutrements, pipes and tobacco, brandy and raki, were carried away in triumph, all of which things proved advantageous to the winners of these spoils of war. The captures most prized by the victors were copper dishes, copper cooking utensils, and the cloaks of the whole detachment of the vanquished horsemen, which had been left behind; some of them were good furs.

The Russians were discouraged by the growing boldness and efficiency of the Turkish cavalry, whose irregulars began to obtain a mastery in combat over the Cossacks, and to display more activity, if not more vigilance, than that description of Russian cavalry. They accordingly fell back, moving their headquarters from Oraz farther into the country, and ceased to harass the Turks, or even approach with their former boldness.

This condition of things continued through the spring, until the steppe became covered with verdure and the beautiful wild flowers for which it is so famous. The winter campaign at Eupatoria had passed away in every respect favourable to the invaders; the spring operations had opened, giving them easily won advantages; and the summer gradually advanced, nothing occurring to weaken the Turkish position or prospects.

Omar grew more and more confident, and leaving his garrison in security, sailed for Kamiesch, to confer with the allied officers as to the conduct of the future. The proceedings in and around Eupatoria during the later spring, and the summer, must be reserved for the narrative of another chapter. It may here, however, be observed as preparatory to our narrative then, that if operations around Eupatoria were difficult in winter, and in the early

spring, they were almost as difficult in summer, for reasons peculiar to the climate and the country.

An English clergyman, well acquainted with the Crimea, has published his views on this subject, which will appropriately close this chapter. Writing of the dangers incurred in conveying large bodies of troops in the early part of spring,—so favourable for executing marches in most other countries,—he shows how sudden and unexpected frosts and falls of snow, like that which destroyed so many of Liprandi's troops on the 18th and 19th of February, and from which Sir Colin Campbell and his Highlanders suffered at the same moment in an expedition from Balaklava upon the Tchernaya (as the next chapter will relate), might involve an army in ruin. He also affirms that a sudden thaw following such a frost and snow-fall, is yet in some respects more dangerous:—"If an attempt was really made to convey a large body of troops over the snow from the north of the peninsula, and if any detention occurred from a sudden thaw, the unhappy victims of imperial ambition will have found themselves exposed to destruction from a more terrible enemy than frost and cold."

A late spring and early summer campaign against a force occupying Eupatoria is also exposed to peril, according to the author we quote, whose remarks were written early in April, 1855, and in reference to the position of Omar's army at that time:—"When the steppe is covered by the luxuriant grass of the spring the task of crossing it in force is of course an easier one, as the baggage animals find their provender on the spot, and, being entirely grass-fed, the scarcity of water is, as far as they are concerned, much less felt. But this favourable period is comparatively short. The heat of the sun ripens the herbage very rapidly; early in June it begins to scorch up, and becomes in July and August highly inflammable from its dryness. So remarkable is it in this respect, that it was a cause of great anxiety to Munich lest his camp should be destroyed by the firing of the steppe; and every wheeled carriage was furnished with a large besom, for the purpose of instantly extinguishing the first sparks that might be seen. As a means of defence against an invading army, it is scarcely necessary to point out how effective such a conflagration must be. When Munich, the year after the expedition to the Crimea, laid siege to Och-sakoff, the Turks burnt the steppe for three leagues around the town; and this circumstance of itself would have compelled Munich to abandon his hope of taking it, had not one of his shells accidentally exploded a large powder-magazine, causing such destruction that the governor surrendered in a panic. In the plain of the Crimea a westerly breeze generally pre-

vails through the months of May and June; and, if necessity required it, nothing would be easier, after securing as much hay as could be brought within the defence of the lines, than to take advantage of the dominant wind, and interpose a barrier of temporary barrenness between Eupatoria and any besieger. I say temporary, because it is the general practice to burn the surface in the month of August, such a proceeding being considered advantageous to the growth of the young grass; and, if a besieging army is to come by land from the north in sufficient strength to attack a force of 40,000 men in Eupatoria, there will be plenty of time to get in the hay before its arrival. There is, however, together with these advantages, one great drawback to the assemblage of a large force at Eupatoria. The supply of water is said to be deficient in quantity, and bad in quality. I suspect it is derived from wells very near the shore, and is probably filtered from the sea, and brackish; but the town once contained a considerable population, as appears from the circumstance that when the Russians entered it (and burnt it), in 1736, there were 2500 private houses in it, most of them built of stone. Pallas speaks of it having been formerly supplied by pipes from a reservoir at some distance from the walls, and says that the

water was raised into this by the constant application of horse-power out of a 'very good and deep well.' Of this, however, he adds, that in his time (1794) scarcely a trace remained, and that the wretched wells in the town were the only available sources. It occurs to me, that here we English have an occasion on which we may advantageously put forth our peculiar resources, by sending forth-with, before the bad water has begun its work of destruction in the camp of our ally, a regiment of well-sinkers and pipe-layers to restore the old hydraulic apparatus to efficiency, or supply its place by a better one, worked, not by the agency of horses, but that of steam. If we can preserve in an efficient state that which is now the only army Turkey has left, we shall do more towards bringing the war to a successful termination than by any other possible course. If they choose to do anything, let them do it quickly and completely. Let an English steamer carry out every appliance, and every man who may be required. Let us have no borrowing of idle Turkish soldiers, or hiring of slippery Croats; and let an ample supply out of the very 'good and deep well' be brought to the surface, and distributed through the town and camp at Eupatoria by the 1st of May at the latest."

CHAPTER LXX.

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL DURING THE LATER PORTION OF FEBRUARY.—EXPEDITION OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL AGAINST THE RUSSIANS BEYOND THE TCHERNAYA.—SEVERE REPULSE OF THE FRENCH IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO DESTROY THE WORKS CONNECTED WITH THE MALAKOFF TOWER.

"Our life is but a battle and a march,
And like the wind's blast—never resting—homeless,
We storm across the war-convulsed earth." COLERIDGE.

THE third week in February opened before Sebastopol with mild spring weather, but the troops did not improve in health, as might have been expected. Typhus fever appeared in many of the regiments, and carried off not only the weakly and delicate, but the strong and sturdy. This mild weather was soon interrupted, for on the night of the 19th and 20th a dreadful storm of snow fell upon the whole surrounding country—by far the most severe the troops had known. In the last chapter reference was made to the sufferings and losses of the corps of Liprandi, on their march from the neighbourhood of Eupatoria to regain the position over the Tchernaya, which they had vacated for the purpose of hastening to the aid of Osten-Sacken against Omar Pasha, in the hope of crushing him before he could consolidate the defence of that place. Before his departure from the camp near Balaklava, Liprandi stationed a division in a good position

near the Tchernaya, where they were to remain in observation until his return. Intelligence was brought by some spies to the generals of the allied armies that the division were the sole occupants of the camp where that general had been for so long posted, and a night attack and surprise were consequently concocted, in the hope of destroying or capturing the entire body. The mode of action resolved upon was as follows:—this expedition was to be conducted by Sir Colin Campbell, on the part of the British, and by Generals Bosquet and Villenois, on the part of the French. The weather, from the 15th to the night of the 18th, had been such as to prepare the country for the movement of troops, and greatly to facilitate the passage of artillery: sunshine by day, and drying winds by night, had characterised the interval from the 14th to the 15th. According to the arrangement, Sir Colin's force was to consist of the Highland brigade

and Rifles, rather weak in number, being under 2000 men. The French contingent of the enterprise was to number 4000 men. Soon after dark the French began their preparations, from the vicinity of head-quarter's camp, and the troops were told off on whom this duty was to devolve. Sir Colin also made his preparations, and soon after midnight the march was to begin. Before midnight, half the French detachment had assembled in columns of companies near their head-quarters. Sir Colin's men were also ready and willing. Scarcely had the different groups of men collected when the weather changed, the wind rose, and was cuttingly cold; the sky became overcast; and the stars, which a few hours before glorified the whole heavens, were obscured. The wind changed, became less cold, and then a torrent of rain fell for at least an hour—such rain as was seldom seen in Europe, unless perhaps in the Crimea. The wind again changed, blowing in fiercer gusts from the north; the rain froze; the whole earth was covered with ice in so short a time as to be quite beyond the conception of persons only accustomed to the climates of Western Europe. Snow then fell, and the wind rose to a gale, drifting the fallen snow into every hollow and valley, and covering the whole plateau to a great depth in a very brief space of time. To make a reconnaissance, or find out the enemy on such a night, appeared hopeless to General Canrobert; and he therefore sent Major Foley to inform Sir Colin of his determination not to send out the French troops, and those already under arms were ordered to their tents, which they found with difficulty, near as they were, so altered had the whole face of the plateau become by the drifted snow. Major Foley lost his way, and many hours were consumed by him in vain attempts to find it, and ultimately he found himself at Lord Raglan's head-quarters. Informing his lordship of the mission confided to his care, and his inability to accomplish it, being then utterly exhausted, his lordship dispatched an aide-de-camp to General Campbell that the French were not coming, and ordering him to postpone the enterprise. It was about three o'clock in the morning when this officer set out for Balaklava. Passing through the French camp, he made General Villenois acquainted with his mission to Sir Colin; but that officer generously said he would move down his men to the English general's support, lest the latter, not having received any intimation of the change of General Canrobert's intentions, should have started upon his march, and perhaps meet the enemy in strength, and finding no support, be overpowered. The aide-de-camp, after a weary contest with the difficulties of his journey,—all landmarks having been covered with snow,—at

last arrived at Balaklava—Sir Colin was gone! True to his orders, neither rain, frost, snow, nor storm could deter him and his gallant Highlanders from the path of duty. The aide-de-camp bravely went in pursuit. The track of the brigade was already covered with snow, so that no trace of it could be discovered; and after overcoming countless difficulties and incurring great dangers,—for it was impossible to see a yard in advance,—the aide-de-camp reached Sir Colin near to Tchorgoum, whither he and his persevering soldiers had buffeted their way with snow and tempest. Sir Colin, hearing that Brigadier-general Villenois had determined to move down to his support, determined, if possible, to accomplish the object for which he had gone forth, and ordered the march to be resumed. Sir Colin's brigade was accompanied by a detachment of Zouaves, and despite the increasing violence of the storm, the men of both services were as ardent as the general to fall upon the enemy when so little likely to be expected, and thus render a great service in the campaign. The way became more and more dangerous; the Rifles were the advanced guard; the Highland light infantry followed in skirmishing order. The general's directions had been few and simple, and his troops were capable of their steady execution. There was to be no firing in case they came upon the enemy. Thus the men plodded on until day dawned: slowly did the light struggle through the drifting snow-wreaths and the masses of snow-cloud which darkened the whole heavens. A few feet before them were all that the troops could see, and the snow was so deep as greatly to impede their progress and increase their fatigue. Yet there was not a murmur—all were patient under their sufferings, and glowing with ardour for the object of their contemplated exploit. At last the advanced guard came suddenly upon the pickets of the enemy, whose watchfulness not even such a night could derange, but who were unable to desert the approaching troops, it was so dark. Their sentries were seized by the light infantry, when their comrades immediately gave the alarm, and the Cossack videttes fired their carbines, and the infantry their muskets, at random into the darkness. No one was hit, but the report of fire-arms put the Russian division on the *qui vive*, and they stood at once to their arms; for their drums beat violently the alarm, and the hoarse voices of command penetrated the muffled atmosphere, and came heavily on the ear of the advancing English. Through the snow-rifts Sir Colin made a reconnaissance, which enabled him to determine that the columns of the enemy were retiring upon the heights above the Tchernaya. To make out their number was impossible—his conjecture being 5000 men.

This was near the truth; the division numbered rather more than 6000. By their slow movements, Sir Colin judged that they had strong supports upon which to fall back. He was deceived by their skilful movements. Liprandi had at that time the main force of his corps with him, and they were sinking beneath the tempest, in impassable places, in one of the most terrible marches ever endured by an army. The snow not only continued to descend, but fell in increasing quantities, hiding the enemy completely from view. The word was given to fix bayonets and advance; the men found they were unable to obey the order, their hands were so benumbed with cold; the Rifles could not handle their weapons; frost-bite had attacked the men, especially the Highlanders, in the ears—their bonny Scotch bonnets affording no shelter to that feature. The horses refused to face the increased storm. There was no appearance of the French; and if they had been a very short distance off, it was impossible they could be seen, and improbable that they could be heard. In this most distressing situation, Sir Colin was life and soul to his brave troops, riding about encouraging and cheering them by voice and example; but there was no disguising the fact—the noble-hearted uncomplaining men were sinking. Sir Colin was not the man to sacrifice his heroic soldiers, as a gamester flings his dice, and loses all or wins great stakes. He resolved, however, to await the arrival of the French, and if their advent was timely, to attempt something against the enemy if the soldiers could use their hands. He could not halt the men, a short halt even and many would never have moved again—they would have sunk, benumbed and stupified, into the frost-sleep that subsides in death. He therefore kept them moving to and fro, until all hope of the arrival of the French was unreasonable, and the reluctant order to return was given. At eleven o'clock, A.M., the men arrived at their quarters, fatigued, hungry, frost-struck, and in some cases utterly exhausted. Never before did English soldiers do so much or behave better on such a night—if ever, in the varied wars of England, British soldiers had before endured a single night of such soul-penetrating hardship. But few shots had been fired, and those only in reply to the shots at a venture made by the retreating pickets of the enemy. Three prisoners were the only trophy of this dreadful march; but it must not be supposed that this was the only injury inflicted on the enemy—they were exposed to far more sufferings than the English: obliged to stay out all night posted on a hill-side,—not daring for a moment to give up the advantageous position they had found, and unable to see another, if one more advantageous were at

hand,—many of the Russians fell down dead in the snow, and a terrible proportion of them were frost-bitten. The sufferings of Liprandi's corps on its march scarcely exceeded those of the division which maintained the snow-beaten bivouac which the English general had compelled them to take up. Perhaps more punishment, and with less loss, was inflicted upon the enemy than if the surprise had been actually successful. Every regiment which accompanied General Campbell had a portion of its men sent to hospital, and not a few of the Highlanders lost their ears by frost-bite.

Had the French co-operated, there can be little doubt that if they had found their way as well as the English, the Russians must have been caught as in a trap, and destroyed or made prisoners. The plan of action, as it afterwards transpired, was this:—the English were to advance by Kamara and Caurobert's Hill, and proceed stealthily to the enemy's front; the French were to move by the Woronzoff Road, and turn the Russian left flank, so as to cut off their retreat by the Traktar Bridge.

The troops with Sir Colin were a French regiment (Zouaves), the 42nd, the 71st, 79th, and 93rd Highlanders, and twelve pieces of horse artillery. The blinding snow caused them in the first instance to miss their way, and they wandered for some time in the vineyards to the left. But the Highland soldiers, as if by instinct, hit upon the right track. Perhaps no other troops but Highlanders could have discovered it; accustomed in their native mountains to the snow-storm, and all its dangers and difficulties, they were able to conduct themselves with an instinct through the storm, such as no other portion of either army possessed; and to endure with a hardihood which no other soldiers could rival. Mr. Woods, in relating the events of this hard march, says that at half-past four o'clock in the morning the English lay down on the hill-side, waiting for the arrival of the French. This may be so—on the authority of that gentleman we should be disposed to rely much, but it is contrary to our other sources of information; and knowing the danger of lying down, or even standing, in such circumstances, we are disposed to think that Mr. Woods was misinformed.

It was as Sir Colin was retiring from the environs of Tchorgoum that Villenois' four regiments arrived, having generously persevered until they came upon the British in their retrograde movement. He was willing to return and advance upon the Russians, but both officers saw how hopeless of success such an effort must be; besides, Sir Colin had then received the order to retire, and the march of Villenois

had been countermanded before he set out—his own generosity having prompted his movements to share the perils of the English, and perhaps to succour them under unforeseen disaster. Long after these events had transpired, and when Sir Colin Campbell was received with festive entertainments and brave welcomes in his native land, the veteran remembered with gratitude the heroism and generosity of Villenois. A public meeting assembled in the city of Glasgow, where Sir Colin was born; the object was to subscribe for the relief of certain sufferers by an inundation in France, by which life and property had been extensively sacrificed; the lord-provost took the chair; the celebrated historian, Sir Archibald Alison, moved the first resolution, and the *élite* of Glasgow notabilities supported the purposes of the assemblage, when the whole proceedings received additional and deep interest from the circumstance of Sir Colin Campbell presenting himself to relate the noble instance of French sympathy he had experienced on the awful night of the 19th of February, 1855. The address of Sir Colin was as follows:—"There is one anecdote I must relate to you respecting these Frenchmen. In February of past year I was ordered, with the Highland brigade, a detachment of cavalry, and twelve guns, to move to a certain position, to co-operate with a large force of the French, with a view to turn the Russians out of the Tchernaya. The weather became very bad—a frightful night of snow, and frost, and cold. I succeeded in fulfilling the order given me, and the troops under my orders found themselves at time in the position. The French did not appear. The night was so bad that they had received counter-orders; and, actually to keep my men from being frost-bitten, I had to march them round and round in circles. I had been associated with a Frenchman named General Villenois—a man whom I love very much—a man who is admired as a soldier. In the morning after receiving the counter-orders the night before, on coming out of his tent, he saw the Highland brigade, the detachment of cavalry, and the guns at a distance. Immediately on seeing our troops, and recollecting that the French army had been called back in consequence of the dreadful state of the weather, he said, 'My friend Campbell may find himself overpowered,' and sounding the bugle without waiting for the instructions of his superior officer, he sent a body to my relief. Happily I was in such a position that whenever they came against me, I knew I could drive them out of it. But that does not take away from the merit of General Villenois in sending his troops to us. I believe it is impossible to know of more unity, or a stronger feeling of

regard than that which existed between these Highland soldiers and the Frenchmen."

It appears that considerable confusion took place among the French in endeavouring to obey the orders and counter-orders which had been given them for this "reconnaissance." The division of General Espinasse had been ordered by General Bosquet to perform their part, the arrangement of which had been committed to him. His account of the attempts made by him to do what he was commanded thus appears in the journal of the division:—"After having made sure, by frequent blasts of the trumpet, that no troops had remained in the plain of Balaklava, outside the Mamelon of the English vidette, the general gave the order to march, in order to avoid being frost-bitten, and in such a manner as to remain near the rest of the force. For that purpose the men were marched successively with the wind and against the wind, describing circles; and at daybreak they found themselves at the foot of the positions, the steep acclivities of which they climbed with difficulty, by reason of the accumulation of snow. At a quarter-past six the men re-entered their bivouacs, not a single man missing at roll-call."

The severity of that night was much felt in the trenches, very great numbers were brought to the French hospitals afflicted with frost-bite. Probably the most graphic account of the character of the weather the day which followed is recorded in the journal of Mr. Russell. He thus relates his experience:—"Such a day as followed that morning I have never witnessed. Being anxious to get a letter off by the post ere it started from Kamiesch, and not being aware that the reconnaissance had been countermanded, I started early in the morning for the post-office *marquee* through a blinding storm of snow. The wind howled fiercely over the plain; it was so laden with snow that it was quite palpable, and had a strange *solid* feel about it as it drifted in endless wreaths of fine small flakes, which penetrated the interstices of the clothing, and blinded horse and man. For some time I managed to get on very well, for the track was beaten and familiar. I joined a convoy of artillerymen, but at last the drifts became so thick that it was utterly impossible to see to the right or left for twice a horse's length. As I fancied the artillerymen were going too much to the right, I bore away a little, and soon after met a solitary pedestrian, who wanted to know the way to Balaklava. I sincerely trust he got there by my directions. As he was coming from Lord Raglan's he confirmed me in the justice of my views concerning the route, and I rode off to warn my friends the artillerymen of their mistake. They were not to be found. I had only left

them three or four minutes, and yet they had passed away as completely as if the earth had swallowed them up. So I turned on my way, as I thought, and, riding right into the wind's eye, made, at the best pace I could force the horse to put forth, for my destination. It was not above an hour's ride on a bad day, and yet at the end of two hours I had not only not arrived, but I could not make out one of the landmarks which denoted an approach to it. Tents, hill-sides, and jutting rocks, all had disappeared, and nothing was visible, above, around, below, but one white sheet drawn, as it were, close around me. This was decidedly unpleasant, but there was no help for it but to ride on and trust to Providence. The sea or the lines would soon bring one up. Still the horse went on snorting out the snow from his nostrils, and tossing his head to clear the drift from his eyes and ears; and yet no tent, no man—not a soul to be seen in this peninsular swarming with myriads of soldiery. Three hours passed!—Where on earth can I be? Is this enchantment? Has the army here, the lines and trenches, and Sebastopol itself, gone clean off the face of the earth? Is this a horrible dream? The horse stops at last, and refuses to go on against the storm. Every instant the snow falls thicker and thicker. A dark form rushes by with a quick snarling bark—it is a wolf or a wild dog, and the horse rushes on affrighted. The cold pierces one's bones as he faces the gale, and now and then he plunges above the knees into snow-drifts, which are rapidly forming at every hillock and furrow in the ground; a good deep fallow—a well or pit—might put a speedy termination to one's fears and anxiety at a moment's notice. Minutes become hours, and my eyes were bleared and sore striving to catch a glimpse of tent or man, and to avoid the new dangers in our path. Suddenly I plunged in amongst a quantity of brushwood—sure and certain sign that I had gone far astray indeed, and that I was at some place removed from the camp and the wood-cutters. The notion flashed across me that the wind might have changed, and that in riding against it I might have shaped my course for the Tchernaya and the Russian lines. The idea of becoming the property of a Cossack picket was by no means a pleasant ingredient in one's thoughts at such a moment. Still what was to be done? My hands and feet were becoming insensible from the cold, and my face and eyes were exceedingly painful. There was no help for it but to push on, and not to let night come on. That would indeed be a serious evil. At this moment there was a break in the snow-drift for one moment, and I saw to my astonishment a church dome and spire on my right, which vanished again in a moment. My im-

pression was, that I must either be close to Kamara or to Sebastopol, and that the church was in either of those widely separated localities. Either way the only thing to do was to bear away to the left to regain our lines, though I could not help wondering where on earth the French works were, if it was indeed Sebastopol. I had not ridden very far when, through the ravings of the wind, a hoarse roar rose up before me, and I could just make out a great black wall as it were rising up through the snow-drift. I was on the very edge of the tremendous precipices which overhang the sea near Cape Fiolente! The position was clear at once. I was close to the Monastery of St. George. Dismounting, and carefully leading my horse, I felt my way through the storm, and at last arrived at the monastery. The only Zouave in sight was shooting larks out of a sentry-box, but he at once took my horse to the stable, and showed me the way to the guard-house, where his comrades were enjoying the comforts of a blazing fire, each waiting for his turn to be shaved by the regimental barber. Having restored circulation to my blood, and got the ice out of my hair, I set out once more, and a smart Zouave undertook to show me the way to head-quarters; but he soon got tired of his undertaking, and deserted me on the edge of a ravine, with some very mysterious instructions as to going on always '*tout droit*,' which, seeing that one could not see, would have been very difficult to follow. By the greatest good fortune I managed to strike upon the French tents of the waggon train, and halting at every outburst of the tempest, and pushing on when the storm cleared away a little, I continued to work my way from camp to camp, and at last arrived at head-quarters, covered with ice, and very nearly 'done up,' somewhat before four o'clock in the afternoon. It was some consolation for me to find that officers had lost themselves in the very vineyard, close to the house, that day, and that aides-de-camp and orderlies had become completely bewildered in their passage from one English divisional camp to another."

The weather continued severe for some time after the great snow-storm: although the days were sunny, the keen north wind bore upon its breast sleet and snow at intervals, and through the nights it swept over the plateau like an enemy on the charge. In the camp and at Balaklava the troops did not appear to suffer from this, because they could move about, and all had by this time long boots, and warm clothing to some extent, and some regiments had very thick great-coats, which, although generally too small, were beneficial as a protection against such piercing cold. In the trenches, where the men could not move about,

and dare not light large fires when fuel was procurable, the suffering was great; but the wind dried up the trenches, and the long boots were there felt to be a protection of the most appreciable value.

The Russians in the field, and even in the various garrisons, as at Sebastopol, Simpheropol, and Perekop, were reported by Tartar spies and deserters to be sickly, and the number in hospital from frost-bite, chest complaints, and typhus fever was very serious. The following despatch of Lord Raglan, written on the 17th, gives a fair picture of the condition of both armies at that date, and for a week after; except that his lordship was probably misinformed as to the necessities of the enemy in respect to provisions. The army before Eupatoria was well supplied, and it is unlikely that such would be the case while there was scarcity at Simpheropol:—

MY LORD DUKER.—I have the satisfaction to acquaint your grace that the weather has improved since I last addressed you, and the country is becoming drier. Two days ago the thermometer was up at 60°. It was somewhat lower yesterday, and early this morning it was down below freezing-point, and at this moment it is snowing. I mention these particulars in order to show your grace how variable the climate is. No movement has been made upon the part of the enemy. The garrison of Sebastopol is engaged in deepening the ditches, and improving the defences of the south front, and in constructing works on the north side of the harbour. I have received information that the Russian army, in the neighbourhood of Bagtelé Serai and Simpheropol, is suffering much from want of provisions, and from privations of all kinds. I am happy to be able to say that the railway is making considerable progress, and that every hope is entertained that in the course of a very short time it will be available for transit as far as Kadikoi, which will accelerate the conveyance of stores up to the camp. I inclose the return of casualties up to the 16th instant. I have great pleasure in stating that Colonel Bell, of the Royal Regiment, who received a slight wound in the side from a musket-ball, when commanding in the trenches on the night of the 11th instant, experiences very little inconvenience from it, and has felt well enough to continue to discharge his duty with his accustomed zeal.

I have, &c, RAGLAN.

His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, &c. &c.

The letters of private persons confirmed the tidings conveyed in Lord Raglan's despatch:—"The drying winds continue, and the plateau to the south of Sebastopol can be traversed easily on horse or foot, even at the bottom of the ravines. With this fine weather the good spirits and energies of our men have returned. The trenches are dry; the men get all they want, provisions are abundant; hay has arrived and fresh vegetables have been sent up to the front to check the scurvy."

Correspondence from the East at this date was eagerly read by the English public, from the impression that spring in the Crimea was favourable to military operations; such communications as the following increased this appetite for Crimean news:—"The Cossacks are riding about the hills in front; our videttes are watching them; vast masses of men in long

lines carrying planks of wood or fascines intersect the plain, and seem at a distance like armies of ants migrating. The thunder of cannon from the front booms through the air, the martial music of the French regiments interrupted by the creaking of cart-wheels, the cries of camels, the yells of drivers in nearly every language of the East or West,—worse than all, by the terrible instruments of the Turkish bands,—speak of war, which no Englishman has ever known at home in this day."

The desire in England to ascertain how the railway operations proceeded was very strong; the people regarded it as a project of their own, and would have considered any failure in respect to it a greater disaster than almost any government failure. The following account of its progress, under date of February 19th, gave universal satisfaction:—"The progress of the railroad is extraordinary. It is already completed out to the entrance of the village of Kadikoi, to-morrow it will have passed through it on its way out to the plateau, and on Wednesday it will be, in all probability, used for the transport of a cargo of shot and shell out so far from Balaklava in the intervals of the workmen's labour. The aspect of the town is greatly altered for the better. The wretched hovels in which the Turkish soldiery propagated pestilence and died have been cleaned out or levelled to the earth, the cesspools and collections of utter abomination in the streets have been filled up, and quicklime has been laid down in the streets and lanes, and around the houses. The sutlers have been driven forth to a wooden world of their own outside the town, and the number of visitors to the town diminished. Indeed, the railway, which sweeps right through the main street, very effectually clears away the crowds of stragglers who used to infest the place. It is inexpressibly strange to hear the well-known rumbling sound of the carriages and waggons as they pass to and fro with their freights of navvies, sleepers, and rails; it recalls home more strongly than anything we have yet heard in the Crimea."

A few days afterwards, the *Times'* correspondent wrote—"The *Australian* arrived to-day, with Lord George Paget on board. The railway is now 100 yards beyond Kadikoi. One stationary engine has been run up to the high ground opposite, on the plateau near the camp. *Inter alia*, we are to have an hotel at Balaklava. It is to be conducted by 'Mrs. Seacole, late of Jamaica.' I suppose the lady calculates on a liberal share of patronage when visitors come out to see the siege in the summer."

On the 20th (the night after the great snow-storm) the Russians, calculating that the severity of the weather would cause the English to relax their vigilance, made a petty sortie. Mr. Russell relates it as made after the

usual manner, which he thus describes:—"Some thirty men are sent in advance of a party of from five to eight hundred, in loose skirmishing order. These men advance stealthily, *en tirailleur*, up to the line of our sentries and pickets, and feel their way cautiously, in order to ascertain if there is a weak and undefended point for the advance of the main body. If the firing is slack, the latter immediately push on, rush into the trenches, bayonet as many as resist, and dragging off all the men they can get as prisoners, return to the town as rapidly as possible. In these affairs the French suffer most. Any man, however weak, can rush across a landing into the nearest room, and do damage in it before he is kicked out. The French are so close to the Russians, they may be said to live next door to them. The latter can form in a small body under cover of their works, at any hour in the night, and dash into the works ere our allies can get together to drive them back again." On the night of the 20th, the sortie was made against Major Chapman's batteries on the left attack. The sentries saw and challenged them, and instantly delivered their fire. The contest was short and unimportant, but men fell on both sides, and the "Rushi" "took nothing by their motion."

On the morning of the 22nd, General Canrobert published the following order of the day:—

"ARMY OF THE EAST!—The enemy has just sustained another check. On the morning of the 17th they attacked Eupatoria with 25,000 infantry, 80 pieces of cannon, and 4000 cavalry. This corps, composed of all the reinforcements that could possibly be brought together at Persekop or from within the Crimea, was vigorously repulsed by the Ottoman troops of the army of the Danube, under the orders of Omar Pasha, general-in-chief. On the second attempt at an assault, a column of Turkish troops, rushing out from the place, resolutely charged the assaulting party with the bayonet, and drove them back for a considerable distance. At last the enemy, after a fruitless struggle of two hours' duration, was forced to retreat with considerable loss. This brilliant affair reflects the highest honour on our allies, and worthily continues the series of their successes against the common enemy during the preceding years. I have the satisfaction to add that the small French garrison, under the orders of Chef d'Escadron d'Etat-Major Osmont, composed of a detachment of the 3rd Marines, and a detachment of naval gunners, under naval Lieutenant de la Caze, have vigorously sustained the honour of our arms, as well as greatly contributed to the defence of Eupatoria, by the works which they had prepared for that purpose. This first exploit of the army of his

majesty the sultan felicitously inaugurates a campaign, the opening of which can no longer be retarded.

"Companions in arms! With unconquerable energy, and a patriotism that has spread your renown through Europe, ensuring you a place in history, you have during one year mastered the very hardest trials to which the organisation and *morale* of an army can be exposed. These trials are close upon an end. Those which now await you are such as your courage will look upon without alarm. You will soon join battle with an enemy whom you already know how to conquer. The ardent sympathies with which France accompanies her armies will be with you when you meet them, as they have before followed your previous victories and glorious sufferings during this war. The heart and the prayers of our emperor are with you; his solicitude trebles your efficiency and powers.

"Soldiers! be sure the English, Ottoman, and French armies, firmly united, will triumph with the aid of God, who protects the just cause.

"CANROBERT, *General-in-Chief*."

The proceedings of the Russians, in connection with the famous Mamelon, gave the allies considerable anxiety. The most advanced trenches of the allies were about 400 yards distant from this defence, which was itself about 600 yards in advance of the Malakoff Tower. No adequate efforts had been made to dislodge the enemy from the Mamelon, although our engineers constantly drew attention to the necessity of depriving him of its possession. Had the advice of General Sir John Burgoyne been followed in reference to it, many valuable lives would have been spared; but the opinions of that gallant and skilful officer never received the respect which they deserved. The English commander-in-chief had a prejudice in favour of the French engineer officers, who had, nevertheless, hitherto proved themselves inferior to ours throughout the campaign.

On the night of the 22nd noises were heard in the trenches, which evidently proceeded from the Mamelon. The sounds were those of numerous bodies of workmen urging some vast undertaking with great energy. The pickets and trench-guards were doubled. The 23rd was a dim heavy day, such as often in the campaign favoured the foe. The Russians carried on their operations under cover of the fog; the same noises were heard, the same indications of energy fell upon the ears of the listeners in the trenches; but nothing could be seen. In the evening the weather cleared, and the formidable results of the labours which sent the strange sounds over the lines were apparent. Two rows of gabions had been

filled and placed round the summit of the hill, which rose with a perpendicular rocky face in front, the stone having been quarried out for building purposes at Sebastopol. Under cover of the gabions, numerous working parties were still busy plying their tools with the most eager haste. It was obvious that the French could never allow the batteries to be completed without a desperate attempt to frustrate the design; and General Canrobert accordingly resolved upon an attack. The erection of this work so far was admirably managed, justifying the eulogy contained in Prince Menschikoff's despatch:—

"On the night between the 21st and 22nd of February we erected a redoubt on the left flank of the fortifications of Sebastopol. This was done so promptly and unexpectedly, that we received no annoyance from the enemy (the allies). On the night between the 24th and 25th the enemy (the allies) attacked the redoubt with considerable forces. Two regiments repulsed them. The enemy lost 600 men. The mining operations of the allies have been suspended."

There are two errors in this despatch: the prince underrates the number of Russians engaged; and, unfortunately, he also underrates the heavy loss of our ally. What the difficulties of this undertaking on the part of the French were, are briefly stated in a letter of General Canrobert of the 24th to the French minister of war:—

"Being informed yesterday morning that the Russians had raised, during the preceding night, some important works of counter-approach, directly opposite to our works, and upon the lower part of one of the slopes of the plain of Inkerman, which descends to the Careening Bay, I repaired to the spot, and after having carefully examined the nature of the enemy's intrenchments, I decided on having them stormed. The operation was a difficult one, for numerous defenders were sheltered behind the intrenchments; and it was the more impossible to surprise them, since they had thrown forward, to about 700 metres in advance of their position, a complete chain of small fortified posts. Beside which, the 800 or 900 metres that our soldiers had to traverse before reaching the enemy, were literally ploughed up by the projectiles of more than 80 guns, fired as well from the ships as from the land-batteries which converge on that place from all the points of a semicircle."

The attack was ordered for the night of the 23rd to the 24th. Its general superintendence was committed to General Bosquet. It appears from the French journal of the siege from the 23rd to the 24th of February, that the general

ordered for this service two battalions of the 2nd Zouaves, of 500 men each; one battalion of the 6th of the line, and one of the 10th; the respective strength of these two battalions is not stated; neither does the journal mention what was indisputably the fact, that a battalion of French marines constituted the reserve. General Bosquet charged General Mayran with the direction of the attack, the supreme command of which was given to General de Monet.

Eleven o'clock on the night of the 23rd was the hour of rendezvous for the expeditionary detachment. At midnight the attacking columns took their positions in the intrenchments. Colonel Cler, with the Zouaves, took post behind two large openings made to the right and left of the second parallel. The right battalion was commanded by Major Lacrosette, at the head of which Colonel Cler ultimately placed himself; the left battalion was under the command of Major Derbois. Between these two battalions General Monet placed himself at the head of a strong battalion of marines, probably numbering 1000 men. General Bosquet, with his usual alacrity and vigilance, inspected all these arrangements himself. The night was intensely dark, and ail was still around the camp and in the trenches, when, at half-past one, General Mayran gave the signal, and instantly the battalions issued to the front, and formed in close columns by sections; in front of each a company was thrown out as the *avante garde*, and with each a captain of engineers and a small detachment of soldiers of that corps, with tools to destroy the works.

The moon was in its first quarter, and had gone down at eleven o'clock, after which the darkness became deeper, favouring the enterprise. Much misapprehension existed when the intelligence of this attack reached England and France as to the design of the French general. It was not intended to make a lodgement: the orders on this subject were precise, and show that Mr. Russell and Mr. Woods mistook the nature of the assault when they describe it as a defeat of the French. The orders of General Canrobert were in these terms:—"The end which the French generals wish to attain, in making this sortie from the Inkerman intrenchments, being solely to produce a moral influence, the order is given to occupy but for a short time the enemy's works; and to overturn and abandon them at the signal of retreat. The use of that signal is left to the commanding officer of the troops engaged."

The Zouaves crept forward furtively, and, for a time, noiselessly; the 6th and 10th of the line, under Colonel (Major) Derbois, formed in a hollow to protect the return. The French had

no suspicion that their approach was expected; but unfortunately the Russians were aware of the whole plan of attack, for it had been a subject of conversation in the French camp all the evening; and a soldier of the foreign legion, an Italian, knowing how valuable such information would be, and perhaps not having any very goodwill to the French nation, deserted, and put the Russians in possession of what was contemplated: they took their measures accordingly. In front of their works a long line of small posts was formed behind a wall which lines a part of the Sebastopol Road, and where that road crossed a hollow space. Ambuscades were in front and flank of that line, which were protected in the rear and near the works by small bodies of infantry formed in squares. The force which occupied these posts was afterwards estimated by the French at 1200 men.

The right column of attack arrived at the outer line of the ambuscades without seeing an enemy; but as soon as it entered the net-work a fusillade, point-blank, was opened upon the head and flank of the column. This fire was received by the advanced companies; the main body avoided the fire, wheeled to the left, and charged into the ambuscade with the bayonet, driving the Muscovites quickly out. The left column meanwhile encountered a deep ravine, or valley, as the Russians call it, where large stones lay along the declivities in great profusion: these were rolled down by the passage of the troops, thundering against one another as they bounded to the bottom, and making a noise which, even if the enemy had not been apprised of the attack, would have betrayed it. The central column, which advanced in support of the others, came precipitately upon the ambuscades that were arranged across its course, and received a close and terrible fire from the troops posted there. All the columns were now much disordered, especially that which had to make its way by the rough and rocky ravine. The fire from the ambuscades had brought down many, and no less than three shots struck General de Monet himself. Both hands were shattered by musket-balls. Feeling weak with loss of blood, he committed the command to Colonel Cler; and then, holding up his mangled hands, exclaimed, "Soldiers, advance, follow me—that is the point we must reach!" he rushed forward against the redoubt through the squares of the enemy, followed bravely by his Zouaves. At this moment the advanced companies were engaged with three squares in a desperate and confined bayonet-struggle, which the darkness rendered more desperate. This close encounter prevented the enemy from shooting down the main body of the advancing column—for so close were they, that, dark as it was, no shot

could fail to tell had they been able to fire upon the assailants. Colonel Cler re-arranged the men, ordering Commandant Lacrosette to charge with his Zouaves on the right; Commandant Derbois, with his soldiers of the line, on the left; and he himself, heading such men as he could get together, dashed forward to the ditch of the intrenchment, and scaled the parapet. Scarcely had he done so when the victorious parties, under Lacrosette and Derbois, penetrated into the work from either flank. The Russians were hemmed in, in the gorge of the intrenchment, and were obliged to make a desperate resistance; they delivered a volley, before which many of the French went down, for the muzzles of the Russian muskets were at their very breasts; they then received their assailants on their bayonets, several superior officers being literally impaled. The shock was terrible, the havoc great; and the impetuosity and determined bravery of the French were irresistible. Never did Frenchmen behave more chivalrously than that night around and upon the Mamelon.

While this terrible conflict raged in the gorge of the work, and every blow struck dealt wounds and death, the sky over Sebastopol became suddenly illumined by innumerable fires, rockets and pyrotechnic preparations of every conceivable sort were flung up high into the heavens. The hills and valleys instantly echoed the sound of the Russian trumpets, the tocsin rang in the town with a sound clear and alarmful above all the clangour, and forthwith a peal of artillery from ships and battery shook Sebastopol and the earth around it. The combatants no longer fought in darkness, the artificial lights which glared above the town revealed the whole struggle distinctly; and men were seen like fiends, of every horrid hue, struggling in deadly combat. While the Grenadiers and Cossacks appeared swaying to and fro, their bayonets crossing those of the Zouaves, the French engineers were destroying gabions and parapets. The illuminations thrown up by the Russians enabled them to see the numerical inferiority of their assailants, encouraging those actually in the conflict, and instructing those who were about to be moved to their support. The Russians here adopted the diabolical plan which they so disgracefully resorted to at the battle of Balaklava—they fired into the combatants, friends and foes, regardless of the sacrifice of their own troops if only the assailants were shot down. The French nevertheless swept the defenders from the redoubt, but the Russian batteries at that moment directed upon it a concentrated fire which no troops could withstand. The French lay down while the grape and canister swept over them with the screeching sound of a tempest. It was from the Malakoff that the

most murderous fire came, and the Zouaves, dauntless still amidst scenes of such horror, cried "On to the Malakoff! on to the Malakoff!" Their officers could with difficulty restrain them from the gallant, but desperate and hopeless, enterprise; and some, bursting the bonds of discipline, rushed forth and met the fate which an intelligence equal to their bravery might have enabled them to foresee. Lying within the shelter of the redoubt the Zouaves persisted in holding it, contrary to the original intention of the attack, and the precise orders of the French chief. They were not permitted long to maintain their choicest position; the cannon of the batteries suddenly ceased, and dark masses of infantry fell upon either flank of the French supports, who maintained a position sheltered by some gabions outside the work. The marines, who were here posted, at first made a gallant defence, but after they were thrown into confusion by quick and repeated volleys from their numerous assailants, they were charged with the bayonet and driven pell-mell among the rocks and uneven ground, where they could not be re-formed, nor rallied, and were in fact dispersed, helpless fugitives, upon their own lines. General Monet at this critical moment gave the signal for retreat; he was the first to enter the work and the last to leave it. It is incomprehensible that, with orders so precise as those already quoted, he did not give the command to retire as soon as the object of the engineers was tolerably performed. It is even surprising that with so small a force he should have continued the enterprise when he saw that it was no surprise, and that the enemy were well prepared and numerically far superior, for this was obvious as soon as his troops entered among the ambuscades. Dauntless courage is not sufficient for a general—prudence and consideration for human life are quite as essential. Many comments to the disparagement of the English generals have been made at home and on the Continent, but in no respect did the French show superior generalship. Most of them had more experience in large commands; but the English generals showed as much fertility of resource up to this period as their vaunted allies. Generals Evans, England, Burgoyne, Brown, and Campbell, were not surpassed—we fearlessly say, not equalled—among the French generals, unless Bosquet be the exception; the Duke of Cambridge, although inexperienced as a general, was as well acquainted with the military art and the minutest details of the profession as any officer well could be.

Monet at last retired, reluctantly accompanied by his desperately daring soldiers. Colonel Cler, upon whom the command without the redoubt devolved, heard the signal twice before he moved a man, while the musket-balls of the

enemy seemed to fill the air, and the flower of his troops lay bleeding around him. At this moment the French soldiers believed that they suffered more from the misdirected fire of their marines, who were then giving way, than from the bullets of the foe. The marines in the French navy were a most unsuitable force for the kind of service on which they were that night sent, and were so considered by the line and the Zouaves, on the part of whom a bitter contempt arose to the marines for their deficient skill in the emergency. The whole of the little force were soon surrounded in their retreat, but a desperate bayonet-charge procured them a passage through the enemy at the expense of many valuable lives. Several officers sacrificed themselves to the safety of the brigade; Captain Sage and Sub-lieutenant Levestre were among these heroes. They fought their way back to the trenches, having lost one-fourth of their men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The total was not less than 1000, although both French and Russian accounts compute it at about 600.

The work was not entirely destroyed, nor was the injury inflicted upon it commensurate with the loss of life. Nor was it true, as the Baron Bazancourt represents it, that the moral influence of the event compensated for the loss. The Russians felt encouraged, they illuminated the town, joy-bells flashed their triumphant peals upon the still dark air, and a *feu de joie* rang along their lines, while shouts of victory and defiance rent the atmosphere.

The generalship displayed was wretched; Canrobert was a first-rate general of division, but as little fit to command in such a siege as St. Arnaud or Lord Raglan. Instead of allowing his projects to be bruited about the camp, he might have have imitated his enemies in their secrecy. Sudden as was the resolution taken to attempt the destruction of the new works of the Mamelon, hardly a soldier in the French army was ignorant of it, and even of the plan to be acted upon, before the moon went down that night—even in the English lines it was well known. The conduct of the affair was rash and headstrong. Frenchmen do not require to prove their bravery by rushing to useless destruction, their valour is celebrated in all lands.

General Canrobert proclaimed to the army the brilliant courage of the men who had forced their way over a path so bloody to the end proposed, and who showed so extraordinary a devotion. The language employed was full of well-earned compliment, but it gives no information requiring a place here. One passage was just and beautiful:—"The commander-in-chief, in the name of the emperor and of France, thanks those brave soldiers who have maintained the honour of our flag with such

lofty courage, that our enemies themselves render it their homage."

The commander-in-chief testified correctly to the admiration of the enemy, for General Osten-Sacken sent a letter to Canrobert in which he paid this tribute to the fallen:—"I hasten to inform you that your valiant dead, who remained in our hands, on the night of the 23rd, were buried with all the honours due to their exemplary intrepidity."

The following is the despatch of General Canrobert. He affirms that the retreat of the French was *unmolested*, which is a grave error, as they had to cut their way through the host that surrounded them. It is probable that the general meant to convey the idea that, after the bayonet charge by which they cleared for themselves a way out of the circle of fire which begirt them, they regained unmolested the trenches. This is correct, except that a musketry fire was poured after them.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL.—I have the honour to send you details of the *coup de main* executed in the night between the 23rd and 24th of February, in advance of our right line of attack. The following dispositions had been taken:—A detachment of engineers, and a detachment of artillery, two battalions of the 2nd Zouaves (Colonel Cler), and a battalion of the 4th regiment of Marines (Commander Mermier), commanded by General of Brigade Monet, were to carry the redoubt constructed by the Russians in front of our right lines. Two battalions of the 6th and 10th of the line formed the reserve. The whole was commanded by General of Division Mayran, and moreover, the operation was under the superintendence and direction of General Bosquet, Commander of the Second Corps. The Russian work had some ambuscades in advance, which, in the obscurity of the night, offered obstacles of which it was difficult to appreciate the disposition or strength. The troops destined for the attack stormed them and routed them, and, while the battalions on the French left and centre overcame these obstacles, the Zouaves, led by Colonel Cler, and having General Monet at their head, who had already received four wounds, penetrated into the redoubt under a heavy fire of musketry, and threw themselves upon the infantry assembled in a dense body inside. This infantry gave way, after a short but severe struggle, in which the detachment of engineers, under Captain Valesque, took a brilliant part, as did also the artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Delafosse. The Zouaves displayed the most remarkable intrepidity. The enemy had suffered considerable losses. The object we had proposed was attained. We could not think of holding a position open on all sides to the Russian artillery, but we had shown them once more our superiority in action. The return to our lines was accomplished without the enemy, who were struck with astonishment, molesting us, notwithstanding their numerical superiority. The reserve, which had left the trenches, to cover, if necessary, the retreat, did not meet any one. Our loss was considerable, but not in proportion to the danger of this nocturnal combat, where our soldiers were exposed until they returned to the trenches to the fire of the artillery of the town. Our troops behaved admirably, as they always do, and I cannot praise them too highly.

CANROBERT.

The English general also made an especial despatch for his government of an event so important:—

Before Sebastopol, Feb. 24, 1855.

MY LORD,—The weather has improved since I wrote my despatch of the 20th inst. The snow is still on the ground, and the nights are cold; but the wind has subsided, and we have to-day a bright sunshine. Consider-

able activity continues to prevail in the movement of the enemy's troops on the north side of the harbour, and convoys of waggons are constantly arriving, and the object of the Russians would appear to be to fortify the heights extending to their left, and looking upon the valley of the Tchernaya. The troops of the garrison having lodged themselves on the point of the spur of the ridge from Inkerman over the Careening Bay, at about 300 yards from the new French parallel, on the extreme right, General Canrobert determined to dislodge them; and this was gallantly effected at two o'clock this morning by 1500 men, under the immediate command of General Monet, and the direction of General Mayran, with however, I regret to say, some loss, the consequence of the heavy fire which was brought to bear upon them from the enemy's batteries and the shipping, whilst they were engaged in demolishing the works. When this object was accomplished, they withdrew to the trenches, as had been their intention. The gallant General Monet is, I am much concerned to have to add, among the wounded.

I enclose a return of casualties on the 22nd inst. Lieutenant-general Sir George Brown has, I am happy to say, resumed the command of the Light Division in perfect health. The railway is getting on remarkably well, and the exertions of Mr. Beattie, who is superintending the works, are unremitting, and entitle him to great praise.

I have, &c.

RAGLAN.

Another despatch from his lordship, three days later, gives a concise and clear account of the events which transpired in the interval:—

Before Sebastopol, Feb. 27.

MY LORD,—It appears that, on Saturday night, the enemy sunk three or four more ships of war in the harbour, as far within the booms as the first sunken ships were outside of them; and, according to the most accurate examination yesterday, there are now four barriers or impediments to the entrance of the harbour, viz.: two of sunken ships and two booms.

The only movement on the part of the enemy, since I last wrote to your lordship, is the march of some infantry and artillery from the neighbourhood of Bagtché Serai towards the Tchernaya, upon which river, near Tchorgoun, they have at present five guns and several hundred men.

The weather has been fine for the last three days; the snow is gradually disappearing, and the country is becoming drier.

The enemy have reoccupied the ground which was the scene of contest between the French and Russians on Saturday morning before daylight; and they are making great progress in a work they are establishing upon that point.

I enclose the return of casualties to the 25th inst.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The Lord Panmure, &c.

At this juncture the British Naval Brigade rendered good service, whether under fire or at work; their state of discipline was excellent, and yet a freedom was allowed to them in various ways which was denied to the troops. Admiral Lyons, in a despatch, sent the following as an enclosure:—

Camp, Naval Brigade, Feb. 18.

SIR,—I have the honour to inform you that the enemy still continues strengthening his works. I am happy to say that there have been no casualties this week, and that the brigade is remarkably healthy. We have only 27 men on the sick-list, victualling 999 men and officers. All symptoms of scurvy have disappeared, and I am informed by the medical officer in charge that he considers this is principally owing to the liberal supply of oranges issued to the brigade.

I have, &c.,

S. LUSHINGTON,

Captain commanding Naval Brigade.

Rear-admiral Sir E. Lyons, Bart., G.C.B., &c.

The cheerfulness of the British soldiery during the closing weeks of February was as encouraging to their officers as their patience had been and still continued to be. The Irish regiments were very remarkable for the fun and frolic in which they indulged under all circumstances. The following is an exemplification of this:—"Everywhere there is a laugh or joke; not perhaps the wit of a Swift, but wit enough to indicate cheerful hearts. At this moment some men near me are making a wall, and chatting. 'Do you call that,' says one, 'the way to make a wall? What a simple woman your mother must have been!'"—"Do you think so," answers his companion. 'I was told once what a fool I was, but do you know what they soon found out?'"—"No," said the other.—'Well, then, I'll tell you; they found out that I was no fool—it was only a silly look I had.'"—"Well," joined in a third, 'you always look very simple. I can tell you; so they have hit you off.'"—"I look simple, do I?" replied the joker; 'why, you should only see me sometimes—I look so stupid that once, in the barrack-room, they took me for you.'" At this there was a hearty laugh, and the wall-building went on merrily."

Little incidents like these are of importance in an army, as indicating the tone and temper of the common soldiery. Lord Hardinge, on the first night of the battle of Ferozeshoosah, went among the men, lay down with them on the earth under the fire of the enemy, and joked and chatted with them: the occasion was exceedingly critical, and he knew well that all depended upon the tone and temper of the ranks. He rose from his earth-couch that night no longer uneasy, for he saw the men were full of hope and courage, even under a murderous cannonade which the Sikhs continued all night. The spirit of the men before Sebastopol in the British lines at the end of February might well embolden any general.

On the night of the 25th to the 26th the French were disposed to renew their attack on the Mamelon, and a very large force was under arms for several hours; but no attempt was made. The Russian batteries played during the whole time, lighting up with their incessant flashes the ravines and rugged country around. The enemy threw out numerous bodies of rifles under the protection of this fire, who were met by the French *enfants perdus* with their usual daring and resource.

During the closing days of February, Lord Raglan was busy visiting batteries and divisions, and doing all that during the earlier part of the siege he did not do, in the way of active and vigilant inspection, although he and his staff were up half the nights making out returns for the home government. Conference among the allied generals was frequent; and it

was alleged that disagreements were rife, the main subjects being the plans of the engineers, and their modes of carrying them out. The conviction became stronger in both armies that the counsels of Sir John Burgoyne had been sound from the beginning, and that many disasters had arisen from their neglect.

The Russians continued to work as men seldom before laboured in any siege; and it was evident that they were erecting a large square redoubt on the spot so lately and valorously contested. The French held the control of the neck of the creek of Sebastopol and Inkerman. On the south-east side of that creek the shore is high and somewhat precipitous, so that men could not ascend or descend in any compact order. Between the Malakoff and the Mamelon a deep ravine runs to the sea, which it would be next to impossible to cross under fire. It became therefore important to the Russians to keep a tenacious hold of the works they had planted in front of that ravine; and for this purpose they laboured incessantly, carrying on by day and night herculean labours.

The French repeatedly borrowed our heavy guns to give strength to their batteries.

On the 27th an armistice was agreed upon for the burial of the dead, during which officers and men exchanged civilities. Scarcely had the armistice terminated when the French and Russians opened fire once more, and their sharpshooters were engaged in their usual struggle.

The progress of the railway seemed greatly to puzzle the Cossack videttes. Having never before seen locomotives, their amazement when they beheld them flying at the rate of twenty miles an hour was ludicrous; they galloped to and fro in the greatest excitement, and, as well as could be judged through the glasses of observers, with signs of trepidation.

February went out in frost and snow; but the troops had now clothing and rations, and all looked forward to a spring campaign with hope.

A letter, not indeed from the Crimea, but from the Wellington Barracks, London, appeared in one of the morning papers in January, relating the extraordinary heroism of a mere child. It is one of the most remarkable instances of courage and humanity united which the war revealed:—

"A sergeant-major, now in Wellington Barracks, who has recently returned from the Crimea, has sent us the following enthusiastic account of the conduct of a young soldier, only ten years old, named Thomas Keep, of the 3rd battalion Grenadier Guards, under the command of Colonel Thomas Wood. The writer states that this boy accompanied the army to the heights of the Alma, preserving the most

undaunted demeanour throughout the battle. At one time a 24-pounder passed on each side of him, and shot and shell fell about him like hail; but, notwithstanding the weariness of the day, present dangers, or the horrid sight, the boy's heart beat with tenderness towards the poor wounded. Instead of going into a tent to take care of himself after the battle was over, he refused to take rest, but was seen venturing his life for the good of his comrades in the battle-field. The boy was seen stepping carefully over one dead body after another, collecting all the broken muskets he could find, and making a fire in the night to procure hot water. He made tea for the poor sufferers, and saved the life of Sergeant Russell and some of the private soldiers who were lying nearly exhausted for want. Thus did this youth spend the night. At the battle of Balaklava he again assisted the wounded. The boy did his duty by day, and worked in the trenches by night, taking but little rest. At the battle of Inkerman he was surrounded by Russians for twenty minutes, and, to use his own words, he said he thought it was a 'case' with him; but he escaped all right. He received one shot, which went through his coat and out at the leg of his trowsers, but Providence again preserved him unhurt. He helped, with all the bravery of a man, to get in the wounded, and rested not until the poor sufferers were made as comfortable as he could make them. He waited on the doctor when extracting the shot from the men, and waited on the men before and after. 'Thus did this youth,' says the writer, 'do anything to any one who needed help. Some of the wounded say that they should not have been alive now had it not been for this boy's unwearied watchfulness and kindness in their hours of helplessness. This boy had been recommended by Colonel Robinson and Colonel Wood, and other officers in her majesty's service.' "

In the 88th regiment, or Connaught Rangers, a soldier named Hourigan displayed great courage at Inkerman, and afterwards in the trenches. Henry Grattan, Esq., son of the distinguished Irish patriot and senator of that name, sent him a present in money, and wrote to his colonel concerning him, which drew forth the following characteristic letters from the officer and the soldier. Hourigan had been seen, in one of the contests in which he had been engaged, to encounter and slay three Russian soldiers.

Camp before Sebastopol, Jan. 22.

"DEAR SIR,—I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter regarding Hourigan,—not Houlahan, as the papers call him,—and to thank you for the interest you and all take in the 88th regiment. I assure you I think the fine young fellows we have here will never

disgrace the old Rangers, but follow their footsteps in their career of honour and glory. I assure you, up to this time, nothing can exceed their gallant behaviour; and their most fervent wish and prayer is that they may be allowed to have a dash at the walls. I must not forget to mention their patience under all their very severe trials; one hardly hears a murmur or complaint, although many poor fellows are obliged to go on picket in trenches in this inclement weather, who ought to be in a comfortable bed in hospital; indeed, the truth is, that few are really fit for anything else. I am happy to say, that, in consequence of the great reinforcements received by the French lately, they have commenced to-day to take the duties which were performed by the second division, and the latter are to assist the light division, so that we may now expect better times; and, thanks to the munificence of the whole country at home, the men are now well clothed, and more comforts arrive daily. Pray excuse this scrawl, and believe me yours,

"H. SHIRLEY, Colonel,

"Commanding 88th regiment."

"To Henry Grattan, Esq."

Camp before Sebastopol, Jan. 22.

"HONOURED SIR,—I have duly received your very kind and flattering letter, which gives me the highest satisfaction that my poor endeavours to do my duty should meet the approbation of such an Irishman as the son of the 'illustrious Henry Grattan.' Honoured sir, I want words to convey to you in adequate terms the meed of my gratitude towards you for your very handsome present, which I value the more as I know you are prompted by the purest motives of goodness of heart and noble-minded singleness of purpose to bestow a favour on the lowliest of your countrymen. I am happy to inform you that Colonel Shirley has promoted me to corporal for the affair at Inkerman; besides, he has recommended me for the medal and gratuity. All the papers mention my name as 'Houlahan,' and that I am a native of Waterford. My name is Daniel Hourigan, and I am a native of the county of Clare. In conclusion, honourable sir, as I have no friends at home who require the money, I would kindly thank you to forward the amount to me here. Hoping that I may never die until I have the pleasure and satisfaction of thanking you in person for your kindness and generosity to me, I remain, honoured sir, your most devoted and obliged servant and countryman,

"DANIEL HOURIGAN,

"Corporal, 88th Connaught Rangers."

"To Henry Grattan, Esq."

Amongst the achievements attributed to Hourigan was the rescue of Lieutenant Crosse from a fabulous number of the enemy. It ap-

pears that more glory was ascribed to him in that case than fell to his share, for Lieutenant, then Captain, Crosse published the following letter concerning the encounter in which his life was so imminently endangered:—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

Army and Navy Club, Feb. 16.

"SIR.—In the impression of the *Times* of to-day there are letters copied from one of the Dublin papers, relative to my life having been saved at the battle of Inkerman by Private, now Corporal, Hourigan, of the 88th regiment; but, as he did not in any way assist me, I deem it only justice to those who did that I should correct the error. I fired the first chamber of my revolver (one of Dean's) to save Hourigan's life, and did not see him again during that day. When I was attacked by the six Russians I saved my own life as follows, viz.:—I shot four, and was then bayoneted by the fifth, who fell, bringing me on my knees, and while there I had to defend myself with my sword against the sixth. I got on my feet and walked as well as I could to the rear, and at about ten yards' distance met my colour-sergeant, Pat Cooney, and told him to take command of the company, and get me a man to assist me, as I was wounded. Private John Gascoigne came; I afterwards called two more, Privates Samuel Price and Pat Connolly, to defend us, as the Russians were close to us. Privates Price and Gascoigne supported me till I got a stretcher, I think, from the 49th regiment, and they and two men of that corps carried me to the hospital of the Light Division.

"Such are the facts of my escape at the battle of Inkerman; and how the romantic story that has been going the round of the papers got into circulation I cannot divine.

"Trusting that you will, in justice to the men I have named, insert this in your journal, I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

"J. G. CROSSE,

"Captain, 88th Regiment."

A letter written in February, by an Irish soldier, is illustrative of the humane and gallant feelings which prevailed among the men:—"Three days ago our regiment was in the trenches, we had one man knocked to pieces and two more wounded by grape. The same day a very feeling circumstance took place. Two Russian soldiers were coming down a street; says one of our men, 'By the powers, but they have a woman to protect them.' 'Bad luck to me,' says another, 'if she ges one side I'll have a slap at them.' They would not chance a shot for fear of hitting the woman. But she was not four paces from the Russians when whizz go the Minié rifles, and down tumbles one of them: the other started off at a good

run. 'Faith,' said one of my comrades, 'if we shot the woman the bloody Rooshians would let Old Nick know it, and he would stick it in the papers that we were shooting the women; and other countries would say, Sinope again.' Now, my dear wife, although we are at bloody work, this little incident will let you see that, while we have no reluctance at shooting or bayonetting a Russian we have some respect for their women."

A letter concerning the policy of an army at Eupatoria, the operations of which we have narrated, was written by an officer who pointed out the dangers which might have ensued, but happily did not:—"Omar Pasha is by this time at the head of his *corps d'armée*, at Eupatoria. The Turks already landed have been engaged with the Russians partially, and have shown the same aptness to conquer which they proved upon the Danube. The occupation of that position is of great importance, but many strategists deny the wisdom of it without a complete investment of Sebastopol and well-maintained connection with Omar Pasha's force. They say that the existence of two separate armies, unable to support one another, tempts the enemy to concentrate his whole force upon that most susceptible of defeat, and destroy, even without the knowledge, not to say the help, of the army with which it was intended to co-operate. The operations of the Romans against Hannibal, of Napoleon I. in his Italian campaigns and in the campaign of 1812, and of our own Wellington in the Spanish Peninsula, illustrate this peril."

One of the most touching letters written by humble soldiers during the war was by a Scotch bombardier. It breathes a home-love and pious feeling, associated with stern determination in the performance of duty, which have been frequently displayed in the letters of our soldiery:—

Camp before Sebastopol, Feb. 11, 1855.

"DEAR FATHER,—I received your welcome letter on this day, and lose no time in writing an answer. I was glad indeed to hear from you, as I am desolate and alone, without any earthly companion to whom to speak my mind, or say a word about the soul, or Christ, or his salvation. I cannot express to you the joy your fatherly letter gave me. It is plain that, although distance separates us, you have not forgotten me, and however apart in body, we are not so in spirit. My situation here will not allow me to leave the battery in my charge one hour, as during the shortest absence the bugle might sound the near approach of the enemy. My promotion places me in charge of a gun, and I must be always present when called upon. I know there are many Christian soldiers in the camp, but duty is so rigid and

hard it is impossible to spare even one hour. Indeed, so constant is the employment of the men, that even if many were in one company, I doubt whether they could manage to meet, not knowing the moment the enemy might attack, and we turned out to fight. I see your care for me by your writing to Woolwich. I have been well in health since we came to the Crimea, but, as you say, our encampment here is different indeed to that at Chobham. Here many a brave soldier found his grave, and I have been called, in the providence of God, not only to witness terrible scenes, but to experience marvellous deliverances. I owe much to my Heavenly Father, who in the hour of peril and death interposed His omnipotent power. I may say that, in some instances, I have been more exposed than most of my comrades, and in every such case, by the mercy of God, I escaped unhurt! I was once surrounded by thousands of Russians at my gun, who obliged our gunners to quit their posts and leave their guns. One gunner alone remained with me, and him they shot and stabbed with two bayonets, and there was my single self with scores firing at me, like one on whom lead had no power! I was the object of God's delivering hand, and here I am, thanks to His name. I lost my beloved commander, the good Major Townsend, about one o'clock. I lament him deeply. This was at the battle of Inkerman. O my kind father, what shall I say? I over-worked myself on that day, so much so that bodily strength failed me to get home. The working of my gun was left to one man and myself, instead of ten! too much, indeed, for human strength, but the occasion required it. In the morning, when preparing hurriedly for battle, I said in a half loud voice, 'O God, my confidence is in thee; a hair cannot fall to the ground without thy notice and permission,' and soon after the fire began. Oh! my gracious God, how good thou hast been to a poor sinner like me, a mark of thy mercy, loving-kindness, and long-suffering! My dear father, not only an hour would I spend in writing to you, but twelve, because my heart and mind are with you while I write, and I think I see you and hear your voice. I have no news to relate of importance, and I presume you know all that passes, through the newspapers. You mention a Mr. Matheison, you cannot think how truly delighted I should be to see him. If he visits our camp I hope I shall. I hope this will find you and Mrs. Rigley quite well. May the Lord give you strength to labour for him, and should my life be spared, and that I should go back to England, you may expect me to come and see you. My dear father, don't forget our situation here. All is not over yet. A great struggle is at hand—I mean the *assault*, but so far from despairing, I shall continue to trust in the

Lord. Give my Christian love to Mrs. Rigley, and accept the same yourself, and praying God to bless you both, I am yours, &c.,

"BOMBARDIER NEILL McLEOD,
"P. Battery, 4th Co. 12 Batt. Royal Artillery,
"British Army, Crimea."

It has frequently been our wish in affording to our readers the interesting details which the letters of eye-witnesses and actors in the great drama present, to obtain letters from Russian officers and soldiers, or from persons in any way serving within the besieged city, but efforts to procure such have been in vain, from causes which will readily occur to the reader. The following extracts from the letter of an American, who practised as a surgeon during the months of January and February within Sebastopol, will supply in some degree the desideratum. This gentleman saw of course many of the scenes within the fortifications, and the events that passed there, and could say "part of which I have been." The medium by which he made his knowledge and opinions known was an American paper entitled the *Providence Journal*. The communications were entitled *Americans in the Russian Service: an inside view of Sebastopol, Events of the Siege, Desertions from the Allies*. The information conveyed did not answer to the large expectations excited by the parade of attractive headings, but still some glimpses of what went on inside of Sebastopol were given to the Americans, which were not received by the British public. The American surgeon, and a colleague, also an American, appear to have been employed in surgical operations upon the wounded, and their sympathies were cordially with the Russians and against the allies. For the month of January the following short extracts will suffice:—

"Jan. 15.—There was a sortie from the fourth bastion last night upon the trenches of the allies, in which nineteen Russians were killed and twenty-one wounded. I am not able to judge of the amount of loss and damage which the English and French experience in these affairs. It cannot but be serious, if they are taken by surprise, as sometimes happens. None but the darkest nights are chosen for these excursions.

"Jan. 16.—Three English deserters to-day, who reiterate essentially the statement of those of yesterday, that they suffer much from cold in the trenches; that many are sick; that none are let off from duty unless they are actually unable to walk; that they have to dig up roots for fuel; that their coffee is given to them green, which they must parch and grind as they best can. None of the English soldiers that I have yet seen are provided with boots. The Russian soldiers all have boots. The

English soldiers above speak of the arrival, just now, of winter clothing, sheepskins, boots, &c., and wooden houses that have been brought out from England, and are being put up for the sick, many of whom until now have been kept in tents; also of the extreme difficulty of transporting provisions, &c., from Balaklava to the camp, the draught horses being worn completely out by hard work. I may inform you that the daily allowance of a Russian soldier in Sebastopol is 3 lb. of bread, 1 lb. of fresh beef in soup, a portion of *grus* (a kind of farina porridge), and two glasses of brandy.

"Jan. 26.—I saw at General Osten-Sacken's this evening a ball made of very hard wood, like those used in bowling-alleys, weighing perhaps 12 lb., sent over either by the French or English. One contrivance of destruction which they occasionally make use of is worth mentioning for its droll novelty. It consists of half a cask or barrel, to the bottom of which is fitted a cylindrical piece, which just fits the calibre of a mortar. They fill this with small grenade bombs, and send it over. The small talk of the day just at present is upon the probabilities of peace."

During the month of February the information transmitted to the *Providence Journal* does not seem to have been so abundant nor precise. We glean from it that his "professional occupation was at that point where the wounded were brought from the various bastions or batteries." "A very fine hall immediately behind Fort Nicholas was appropriated to the purposes of an operation hall." "At the end of February there were 3000 sick and wounded in the *Hospital where we were*,"—implying that there were other receptacles for sick and wounded patients, and if they were occupied in any proportion to that where the two Americans operated, the suffering, sickness, and injuries from wounds in the fortress were appallingly numerous. No account is given of the average sickness, or the general rate of wounded brought in, or the nature of the diseases prevalent in the place. Perhaps the letters were inspected

by the commandant, who, however unwilling to interfere with an American gentleman's correspondence, when the czar was so anxious to conciliate the citizens of the Union, yet would be very solicitous to expunge some portions of what bore hard upon "holy Russia." The correspondent gave no information as to whether the inhabitants were few or numerous, or how employed: he in one instance relates that two children, who had been burned shockingly by the explosion of a bomb, were brought to the American surgeon to be dressed, and this circumstance he dwells upon in a manner that might lead his readers to infer that the allies fired bombs for the purpose of burning little children who might stray or play in the streets, so thoroughly *ex parte* and unjust is the spirit of the narrative. He bears testimony to the good practice of the British mortars lent to the French, one of the bombs from which went over the operation hall about the end of February, bursting within twenty yards. For the last week of January and the first of February he gives an average of the wounded brought to the hospital of which he had charge, which he computed at twenty. On the morning after the sortie of the 19th he stated them to be eighty-four. No account is given of the medical staff, its number, plans, regulations, or general efficiency—perhaps these topics were "tabooed." There is enough let out to show that the Russian loss by wounds and disease was extremely heavy, surpassing that of the allies a great deal as to the former instrumentalities, and probably not behind that of the French from the latter cause.

The writer boasted that he and his countryman and colleague were quartered in the same house with General Osten-Sacken, with whom they were on terms of intimacy (of which he seems as proud as if born in an aristocratic country). But this is hardly reconcilable with the presence of that general before Eupatoria, a part of the time at all events. Such, however, is a specimen of the "Correspondence from the inside of Sebastopol" by an American surgeon in the Russian service."

CHAPTER LXXI.

DEATH OF THE CZAR.

"They that see thee shall narrowly look upon thee, and consider thee, saying: Is this the man that made the earth to tremble, that did shake kingdoms?"—ISAIAH.

Europe had probably never been so greatly or suddenly startled by any event as by that which is here recorded. Rumours had reached England and France through Germany that the emperor was ill, but that his illness did not incapacitate him from business, to which he was devoted with his wonted energy and

iron will. When tidings reached him of the disastrous result to his arms of the battle of Eupatoria, he was labouring under a severe attack of influenza, and the effect the tidings had upon him was most injurious. He intensely felt this humiliation by Omar Pasha and a Turkish force, who had repulsed his

troops on the Danube, occupying, as a separate *corps d'armée*, a portion of Russian territory. He also considered the position one more dangerous to his power in the Crimea than most of his generals regarded it. It was by his direct and especial orders, and those orders delivered with unusual eagerness and energy, that the attack upon Omar Pasha's position was made. When he heard of the defeat, his whole nature seemed to feel the recoil, and in proportion to his determination to carry that point was his mortification at the result of the attempt. He never rallied again. On the 22nd of February he consented to refrain from public business, except some directions given in his own apartments, but even this was too much for his shaken frame. On the 23rd he devolved the government upon his eldest son. By this time his prostration was very great; he had insisted upon treating himself, and neglected the importunities of his family and the representations of his physicians as to the necessity of care and rest. On those occasions he would say to his empress and children, "This is not a time to take care of one's self while Russia is at war. I have something else to do than to watch over my health." To his medical advisers he replied, "Thank you, gentlemen, you have performed your duty, I must away to the performance of mine;" and would go forth with his cloak thrown loosely around him to inspect troops or material of war, or to see that some orders had been executed. It was alleged that one circumstance unfavourable to his recovery was his insisting that his physicians should treat him with a view to keep him from growing too corpulent, which he supposed would impair his dignity of person. During the few days which intervened between his confinement to his palace and his death, which was on the 2nd of March, his illness increased alarmingly, fever and inflammation of the lungs supervened. Dr. Mandt, his "body physician," informed him that atrophy of the lungs was possible. He received the communication with fortitude, inquiring, "When shall I be suffocated?" to which Dr. Karell replied, informing him that the danger was great, and that such an issue was to be apprehended as very imminent, but hoped that the peril would be dispelled. The czar did not seem to entertain any hope for himself, but called his empress and children around him and blessed them. He did the same by his chief officers and servants. The charge of union and affection given to his family was touching, and his injunctions to his children to respect their mother, and be guided by her counsels, were most solemn and becoming. Various "last words" have been attributed to him. It was communicated to the Prussian court that his last utterances

were—"Tell Fritz not to forget his father's recommendations in reference to Russia." The empress herself was represented as giving out that the emperor closed his life by saying to her, "Tell my brother-in-law that I trust he will not forsake his own nephew and my children in the great perils which may be before them." The new emperor, Alexander, in a proclamation to his troops, described his father as having addressed his last benedictions to them.

The motives for all these varied versions are transparent. The only authorised account of his illness and death was that recorded in the *Invalide Russe*. There is reason to believe that the account is *substantially* true, and the picture it presents is most touching:—

"As it now turns out, his majesty had been for some time violently affected with *grippe*. About the 18th of February his body physician, Dr. Mandt, begged for permission to call in other physicians. The emperor took this very lightly, and turned it off with a joke, but consented that the body physician, Dr. Karell, should be also consulted. The emperor became by degrees worse from want of sleep and increased cough, with plentiful expectoration, so that the physicians, on the 22nd, begged his majesty would keep his room. The emperor would not hear a word of it; on which one of the physicians said to him, 'No medical man in the whole army would allow any soldier so unwell as your majesty is to leave the hospital, for he would be sure that his patient would soon come in again worse.' The emperor answered, 'You have done your duty, gentlemen, and I thank you, and now I will do mine;' and on this he got into his sledge in rather cold weather, and drove to the exercising-house to see some men of the infantry of the guard, who were about to march into Lithuania to make up the complement of the regiments there.

"At this inspection, which was the last occasion of the emperor's being seen in public, he was evidently very unwell, coughed violently, expectorated excessively, and said as he went away, 'I am in a perfect bath (of perspiration),' although it was anything but warm in the exercising-house. The emperor then drove to Prince Dolgorouki, the minister of war, who was ill, cautioned him not to go out too soon, and then returned to the Winter Palace. In the evening he was present at the prayers for the first week of Lent, stayed some time with the empress, but complained of being cold, and kept his cloak on in the room. From that evening the emperor did not quit his little study. It was there, on February 23rd, that he received his flügel adjutant, Colonel von Tettenborn, and dispatched him to Sebastopol; all the while

lying on the sofa, and covered up with his cloak. After that his majesty transferred all business into the hands of the Grand-duke Alexander.

"The days from February 24th to the 27th passed over without one's learning anything further on inquiry than that 'the emperor does not leave his bed, as he is somewhat feverish: the cough is getting less and less hard,' &c. During the whole time he was ill the emperor lay only on his camp bed, *i.e.*, on a casing of Russia leather filled with hay, a bolster of the same kind, and with a blanket and his cloak over him. It was not till February 28th that his state was looked on as decidedly serious. On that night he became rapidly worse. The physicians apprehended a paralysis of the lungs. On the evening of March 1st they despaired of his recovery. The empress and the crown-prince begged him, at the request of the physicians, to take the sacrament. It was not till then that the emperor seems to have recognised the real danger of his state; but hardly any shock is stated to have been noticeable in him.

"In the night from the 1st to the 2nd instant, Dr. Mandt communicated to the emperor that he was dangerously ill, and that more particularly his lungs were violently affected, and gave great ground for apprehension. The emperor answered very calmly, 'And so you think that I am liable to a paralysis of the lungs?' To which Dr. Mandt answered, 'Such a result is very possible.' On this the emperor very calmly and collectedly took the sacrament, took leave of the empress, their children and grandchildren, kissed each, and blessed each one, with a firm voice, and then retained only the empress and the crown-prince with him. This was about four o'clock in the morning. The emperor said subsequently to the empress, 'Do go now and take a little rest, I beg of you.' She answered, 'Let me remain with you; I would I could depart with you, if it were only possible.' To this the emperor replied, 'No; you must remain here on earth. Take care of your health, so that you may be the centre of the whole family. Go now; I will send for you when the moment approaches.' The empress could not do otherwise than obey this distinct expression of the emperor's will, and left the room.

"The emperor then sent for Graf Orloff, Graf Adlerberg, and Prince Dolgorouki, thanked them for their fidelity, and bade them farewell. Subsequently the emperor had all the servants immediately about him sent in, thanked them for their services, blessed them, and took leave of them: on which occasion he is said to have been himself very much affected. Last of all the Kammerfrau von

Rohrbeck was sent for. The emperor thanked her for the fidelity she had always shown the empress, for the care with which she had always tended her in sickness, begged her never to quit the empress, and ended with, 'And remember me kindly at Peterhoff, that I'm so fond of.' The emperor pressed Dr. Karell's hand, and said to him, 'It is no fault of yours.'

"Whilst the emperor's father-confessor was speaking with him he took the empress's hand and put it into the priest's, as if he would confide the empress to the ecclesiastic. After this the emperor lost his speech for a while, during which time he was engaged in prayer, and crossed himself repeatedly. He subsequently regained his voice, and spoke from time to time up to his decease, which took place without a struggle in the presence of the whole family, March 2nd, at ten minutes past noon.

"Almost the last articulate words that the emperor spoke were, 'Dites à Fritz (King of Prussia) de rester toujours le même pour la Russie, et de ne pas oublier les paroles de papa' (the late King of Prussia). At first the face of the corpse was very much sunk and fallen in; but in the evening the fine features had become more imposing than ever from their repose and regularity."

Our engraving of the czar's last moments faithfully represents the apartment, the description of bed on which he lay, the members of his family then around him, and their attitude at the instant when his majesty was *in articulo mortis*. After death the body was placed upon a state bed at the Winter Palace, in the room of the Grand Duchess Olga, and the public were admitted at certain hours to see it. The embalment, which took place under the directions of the professors of medicine and surgery, was admirably performed. A large pall, edged with gold, was thrown over the corpse, covering the face, which was removed by the attendants at the desire of such visitors as were privileged. The room was very simply decorated, and no attempt at display was put forth except of a religious kind. Lighted tapers, crosses, and other ecclesiastical concomitants surrounded the bed on which the corpse lay, and three Greek priests offered mass alternately.

The crowd that went to see the body was immense, and great eagerness to behold the face of the corpse prevailed. Persons were ordered to stop only a few minutes in the room, and pass on; but there was such a disposition to contemplate the deceased, and especially when permitted to see his features, that there was some difficulty in carrying out these orders, notwithstanding the obedience so natural to the Russian people. The scene singularly justified the appropriateness of the motto se-

lected for this chapter. The solemnity of those who passed through the death-chamber was impressive. Every Russian knelt near the coffin, made the sign of the cross, and kissed the pall which so gracefully hung over the body. No one could witness this deep reverence for the czar's remains without perceiving how completely the power of his name had penetrated the hearts of his people; and few acquainted with the writings of Pope but would naturally apply his lines in the elegy upon the death of an unfortunate lady:—

"How loved, how valued once avails thee not,
By whom remember'd, or by whom forgot;
A heap of dust alone remains of thee—
'Tis all thou art, and all the proud must be."

The devotion of the passers through that solemn chamber could not fail also to impress a stranger with the conviction that the czar was popular because he represented the feelings and desires of the Russian race. The conflict he originated, and waged with such sanguinary and ferocious energy, was the people's; they regarded an invasion of Turkey quite as much a war *pro aris et focis*, as the defence of Cronstadt or Sebastopol. They regarded Turkey as the old Byzantine empire, into which the Turks have temporarily intruded, and of which the czar is the lineal and lawful sovereign, even irrespective of his claim as the head of the only orthodox church. They bowed at the feet of the dead as at the feet of a holy martyr to a most holy cause, whose divine mission, to exterminate the followers of the false prophet, and set up an orthodox empire in the seat of the venerable Byzantine, was opposed by the western schismatics and heretics, aided by all infidels everywhere, and by Satan, as the chief enemy of the czar, holy Russia, and the true church.

On the 11th of March the burial took place. The remains were borne, in deeply solemn state, from the Winter Palace to the Cathedral of St. Peter and St. Paul; the streets were thronged by a vast concourse, and

"The long funeral blackened all the way."

The minute gun, the muffled drum, the wind-instruments, which seemed to wail in pathetic notes, were alone heard amidst the deep silence of the vast multitude, until these were followed by the organ, mournfully pealing forth from the sanctuary an empire's sorrow. As the sarcophagus, gorgeously yet appropriately decorated, passed along, the people fell upon their knees in reverence to the dead, and rose with more resolute will for the war, in which, although struck by no bullet or splintered shell, their martyr had fallen. Half a million of Russians had been sent by him to a bloody death on the fields of war, or the many forms of death by disease; half a million more

were ready to follow him to the grave before the bayonets and shot of the confederated armies; and the more willing to become sacrifices because he had died in his own department of the struggle.

The effect of these proceedings throughout Europe, it may well be believed, was startling. At Constantinople deep sorrow fell upon the great majority of the Christian population. Their two great hopes—to escape from the oppression of the Turks, and to oppress Turks, Jews, heretics, and schismatics themselves—seemed blasted by the untimely removal of the great champion of bigotry and persecution. He had been formed after their own image. He regarded the liberation of the orthodox from all invidious treatment, and the subjection of all others to the rule of the orthodox, as the true object for which to live; and as this is almost the only vitality Christianity has in the East, the czar, who fed and sustained it, was to them a living saint, already canonized by his holy acts. The Turks and Egyptians, while they generally preserved a suitable demeanour, could not restrain their joy at the tidings; and the sultan's court was filled with gratulations. In France the tidings were received with somewhat of awe, and the French court, strangely, went into mourning. Although the theatres were ordered to be closed, the courtiers did not refuse to

"— Bear about the mockery of woe
To midnight dances and the public show."

In England a sensation of mingled astonishment, solemnity, and pleasure were blended. What Lord Raglan is represented to have said at Sebastopol expressed the public opinion and sentiment of England:—"This is the finger of God!" The intelligence of the czar's death came very suddenly upon the British public. On the morning of the day he died his illness was known in England by means of the electric telegraph; the evening of his death the great fact was known by the same medium in London, and in many of the capitals of Europe—illustrating the wonderful power of this modern invention. When the House of Lords met at five o'clock on that evening, the Earl of Clarendon addressed their lordships in the following terms:—"My lords, I feel it my duty to communicate to your lordships the contents of a telegraphic despatch I received half an hour ago from her majesty's minister at the Hague; it is as follows:—"The Emperor Nicholas died this day at one o'clock, of pulmonic apoplexy, after an attack of influenza." I have also received a despatch from her majesty's minister at Berlin, stating that the Emperor of Russia died at twelve o'clock, about an hour before these despatches arrived." Lord Palmerston communicated the intelligence to the Com

mons; and the very same night the electric telegraph flashed the news over the surprised realm. It was a curious circumstance that Lord John Russell, who was on his way to the Vienna Conference, was tarrying at Berlin in hopes of bringing the Prussian court into a policy more nearly allied to that of England, when the intelligence arrived to his Prussian majesty.

The general impression throughout Europe was that the czar had died by unfair means—that poison had probably terminated his existence, as a matter of state policy,—there being no hope of peace while he lived, if the resources of Russia could hold out. It was alleged that a large party, considering the prolongation of the war destructive to the empire, wished to remove him who would not fail to persevere in it “while he had a man or a musket.” All these sinister suggestions were proved to be unfounded, when the disease to which the great patient succumbed was made known, and the circumstances attending his death detailed upon proper authority. Any impressions as to his having come unfairly by his death were very much removed by a very remarkable letter, published in the *Times* newspaper the day after the tidings of his death arrived in the English metropolis. This letter was quoted into the newspapers of every nation in the world, Russia only excepted, and exercised an extraordinary influence on the opinions universally formed concerning the decease of the czar and its causes. The author of the letter was Dr. Granville, a physician of much reputation. It is probable that his communication and his interviews with the government influenced them in some degree in their dilatory policy, and the indulgence which they showed him; whereas Dr. Granville intended to put them upon their guard as to any calculations upon the moderation, courtesy, sense of honour, or general policy of the czar, and to be on the *qui vive* for any act, however rash, sudden, or irrational, which he might perform.

1, Curzon Street, May Fair, March 3.

“SIR,—I commit into your hands the following letter and memorandum for publication. It is fit that the people of this country should know that, at the commencement of the diplomatic dispute with Russia, ministers were made aware of the state of mind and prospect of life of its mighty ruler. The discussions carried on with him were shaped on the usual metaphysical grounds. They should have been guided instead by a knowledge of the physical condition of the disputant.

“At every confidential interview with the British representative, up started the monomaniacal idea of ‘*l’homme malade*—*gravement malade*,’ which was often repeated, ‘not with-

out excitement,’ added Sir George. If this fact did not of itself open the eyes of ministers in January and February, of 1853, the timely professional warning conveyed to them in the annexed letter not long after, might, one would think, put ministers on their guard, albeit the warning came from an humble individual. Who knows how many thousand lives since sacrificed, and millions of money squandered might not have been saved if, on the conviction of the truth of the warning received, instead of continuing for months together all sorts of unprofitable arguments, peremptory language and peremptory action had been employed, leaving no time to the imperial and real ‘sick man’ for the infliction on his own devoted people, and those of the three nations allied against him of that irreparable mischief which he has been suffered to perpetrate? It was thus that Pitt dealt with Paul—but, alas! there is no Pitt now.

“For regularity’s sake I mention that three passages in the following letter, which was strictly confidential, are omitted. The first was the expression of a purely religious opinion which, though awfully appropriate at this moment, might be considered presumptuous. The second detailed the grounds on which, during my residence of several weeks in St. Petersburg in 1849, in attendance on a high personage at the imperial court, I formed the medical opinion which I deemed it my duty to convey to the government at home: their publication at this moment would be injudicious. The third passage was an allusion to my ill-requited service in the navy, which cannot interest your readers.

“I have the honour to be your obedient servant,

“A. B. GRANVILLE, M.D.”

CONFIDENTIAL LETTER TO VISCOUNT PALMERSTON.

Kissingen, Bavaria, July 6, 1853.

MY LORD,—Failing in my endeavours to meet with your lordship at the appointed interview at the House of Commons on the 22nd ult., at which I proposed to make a *ried voce* communication of some importance to the government, as I thought, concerning the present political discussions with Russia, I stated, in a second note written at the moment of my departure from England for this place, that I regretted the disappointment, inasmuch as the subject of the intended communication, from its delicate nature, did not admit of being committed to paper. I think so still. But, on the other hand, the necessity of the government being put in possession of the communication appears to me to become every day so much more urgent, that if it is to be of any use it must be made at once, or it will fail to direct ministers in time, as I think the communication is capable of doing, in their negotiations with Russia, and in their estimation of the one particular element which, I apprehend, has first provoked, and is since pushing on the emperor in his present reckless course. Mine is not a political, but a professional communication, therefore strictly confidential. It is not conjectural, but positive, largely based on personal knowledge, and partly on imparted information as plentifully obtained—it is not essential that I should say from whom, for I take the responsibility of the whole on

myself, inasmuch as the whole but confirms what I have myself observed, studied, or heard on the spot.

The Western cabinets find the conduct of the Emperor Nicholas strange, preposterous, inconsistent, unexpected. They wonder at his demands; they are startled at his state papers; they cannot comprehend their context; they recognize not in them the clear and close reasoning of the Nestor of Russian diplomacy, but rather the dictates of an iron will to which he has been made to affix his name; they view the emperor's new international principles as extravagant; they doubt if he be under the guidance of wise counsels. Yet they proceed to treat, negotiate, and speak as if none of these perplexing novelties in diplomacy existed on the part of a power hitherto considered as the model of political loyalty. The Western cabinets are in error. The health of the czar is shaken. It has become so gradually for the last five years. He has been irritable, passionate, fanciful, more than usually superstitious, capricious, hasty, precipitate, and obstinate withal—all from ill health, unskillfully treated; and of late deteriorating into a degree of cerebral excitement, which, while it takes from him the power of steady reasoning, impels him to every extravagance, in the same manner as with his father in 1800; as with Alexander, in Poland, in 1820; as with Constantine, at Warsaw, in 1830; as with Michael, at St. Petersburg, in 1848-9. Like them, his nature feels the fatal transmission of hereditary insanity, the natural consequence of an overlooked and progressive congestion of the brain. Like them, he is hurrying to his fate, sudden death, from congestive disease. The same period of life, between 45 and 60 years of age, sees the career of this fated family cut short. Paul, at first violent and fanatical, a perfect lunatic at 45 years of age, is dispatched at 47, in 1801. Alexander dies at Taganrog in December, 1825, aged 48. For five years previously his temper and his mind had at times exhibited the parental malady by his capricious and wayward manner of treating the Polish provinces. He died of congestive fever of the brain, during which he knocked down his favourite physician—Sir James Wyllie, who assured me of the fact at St. Petersburg in 1828—because he wished to apply leeches to his temples. Constantine, eccentric always, tyrannical, cruel, dies at Warsaw suddenly in July, 1831, aged 52 years, after having caused rebellion in the country by his harsh treatment of the cadet officers. I saw and conversed with him on the parade and in its palace at Warsaw in December, 1828. His looks and demeanour sufficiently denoted to a medical man what he was, and what his fate would be. It has been said that he died of cholera; again, that he had been dispatched like his father. The physician in chief of the Polish Military Hospitals assured me some years after that he had died apoplectic and in a rage. Michael, after many years of suffering from the same complaints which afflict his only surviving brother—enlarged liver, deranged digestion, and fulness of blood in the head—became in 1848-9 intolerably irritable, violent, and tyrannical to his own officers of the artillery and engineers service, of which he was the supreme chief. In July, 1849, he consulted me at St. Petersburg. It was after he had passed in review the whole train of artillery which was leaving the capital for Hungary, at which review I was present and near him, and witnessed scenes of violent temper towards generals and aides-de-camp hardly equalled in a lunatic asylum. I found him as described above. I advised cupping, diet, non-exposure to the sun and to fatigue, the administration of suitable medicines, and the cessation from drinking steel mineral waters, of which he was fond ever since he had been at Kissingen. His physician, the younger Sir James Wyllie (himself since suddenly dead), assented reluctantly, but did not carry my advice into execution. The Grand-duke, in the state he was, unrelieved by any medical measure or proper treatment, joined the army, rode out in the sun, and fell from his horse apoplectic in September, 1849, aged 48. To complete the disastrous picture of the grand-children of Catherine, their mother, Maria of Wirtemberg, a most exemplary princess, died apoplectic in November, 1829, scarcely more than 65 years of age. The attack, mistaken for weakness, was treated with stimulants and bark by her physician, Ruhl, and bleeding was only had recourse to when the mistake was discovered—but too late to save. The meek and mild Elizabeth had

but a short time before followed her imperial partner, Alexander, to the grave, in the still fresh years of womanhood, 50 years of age.

During my second sojourn in St. Petersburg, in 1849, for a period of 10 weeks What the opinion was of the emperor's health—what acts of his came to my knowledge, which bespoke eccentricity—what were the sentiments of his physician, Dr. Mandt, who, homœopathist as he is, and exercising a most peremptory influence over his master, leaves him, nevertheless, unrelieved, except by mystical drops and globules—what transpired of political doctrines and opinions, or, in fine, what I gathered afterwards at Moscow on all co-equal points, must be left to your lordship's conjecture,—not difficult after all I have divulged. To go further would be like a breach of trust, and of that I shall never be guilty. In all I have related there is nothing that had been committed to me as a privileged communication; while the imperative requirements of the moment calling for its immediate divulgement I hesitate not to make it, under the firmest conviction that my fears and anticipations will be surely realised. If so, then the method of dealing with an all-powerful sovereign so visited must differ from the more regular mode of transacting business between government and government. For this purpose it is—to put her majesty's ministers on their guard accordingly, that I have determined to place in your lordship's hands the present professional information, which must be considered as so strictly confidential that I shall not sign it with my name.

That I have selected your lordship as the channel of my communication rather than the minister of foreign affairs, to whom more properly it should have been addressed, will at once appear natural to your lordship. In my capacity of once, and for some years, your lordship's physician (though not now honoured with that title), your lordship has known me personally, and is convinced that what my pen commits to paper, may be taken as coming from an honourable man and your obedient servant.

“N.B.—An acknowledgment of the receipt of this letter came by return of post in Lord Palmerston's handwriting.

“*Memorandum.*—At an interview with Lord Palmerston, February 23, 1854, on matters of a private nature, his lordship was pleased to ask me before we separated whether I still adhered to my opinion and prediction. I replied that before July, 1855 (the emperor would then be 59 years old), what I had anticipated would happen. ‘Let but a few reverses overtake the emperor,’ I added, ‘and his death, like that of all his brothers, will be sudden.’ It has proved so. Alma, Inkerman, Balaklava, shook the mighty brain: Eupatoria completed the stroke, which has anticipated my prognosis only by a few weeks.

“A. B. G.”

The publication of this important document modified the opinions formed of the czar's conduct and character in England, which continued to be discussed in all the leading journals and magazines of the British Isles. There was a certain dignity about his death which his abettors laid hold upon to proclaim his goodness and greatness notwithstanding many admitted errors. Others said that, like Charles I., he was great only when he came to die. The aristocratic classes in England, although they had suffered so much by his ruthless ambition, were his ardent admirers,

and seemed to forget how many of their dearest and bravest fell by his ruffian hands, in the regrets they expressed, and the admiration of his character which they incessantly proclaimed in every circle. Earl Grey, who was his country's only open opponent in the House of Lords, and the czar's special advocate there, gave vent to his regrets in that place. The noble earl's eulogy was eloquent, as his speeches generally are, but specious and sophistical, qualities common to his orations. It will furnish our readers with a fair specimen of how a very large portion of the higher classes of English citizens really regarded the czar:—"Up to the time of Prince Menshikoff's departure from Constantinople, Russia was in the right, and England greatly to blame for the course she pursued; from that time I think Russia put herself in the wrong, and that the occupation of the principalities was an act of violence and injustice. But admitting Russia to have been then in the wrong, surely the fact that such a man as Bishop Southgate is of a different opinion, must be taken as proving that she may not have been so wilfully and palpably in the wrong, as we have been in the habit of assuming, and that some allowance ought to be made for her conduct. There have been too many gross faults in our own conduct to give us a right to be very severe in criticising that of Russia. Was it unnatural that errors, and very serious errors, should be committed, in the circumstances in which he was placed, by such a man as the late Emperor Nicholas, and does he deserve for these errors the unmeasured vituperation of which he has been the object? For my own part, I will not shrink from saying of him, that, with all his faults (and there were many), he was still a great man, in whose character there was much to admire. I am persuaded that he was sincere and earnest in his devotion to the welfare of his people. No doubt he was often mistaken as to the means of promoting it, but he acted to the best of his judgment; the good of his subjects as he understood it, not his selfish gratification, nor any low or mean interest of his own, was the end to which all his exertions were directed, and for which he displayed such untiring energy, and underwent such unremitting labour, in governing the vast empire which Providence had placed under his rule. When I read the touching accounts which have been published of the last illness of the Emperor Nicholas—when I contemplate the spirit of Christian resignation with which he met approaching death, the calm and unaffected fortitude he displayed in that awful season, his thoughtfulness for his people, his family, and his attached followers, I cannot, I say, consider these things, without utterly dis-

believing that a man, capable of so passing through the great and final trial of human nature, could be one whose character deserved to be described in the odious terms which have been applied to the Emperor Nicholas. Whatever were his faults, fraud and falsehood were not among them. He was, I think, overbearing, arbitrary, violent when his will was resisted; and is it wonderful that the man should have become so, who for near thirty years had ruled with unlimited power and almost unchecked success the vast dominions of Russia? Would he not have been something more than human if he had remained entirely proof against the trials and temptations of such a position? But, I repeat, that his faults were those of a high and noble, not of a low and mean nature, like falsehood and fraud."

Lord Pannure, in a speech delivered at a Bible Society meeting in Edinburgh, replied to some remarks of Mr. Bright, the member of parliament for Manchester, made at a similar meeting in Rochdale, and which was in the spirit and manner of Earl Grey's address in the House of Peers. Lord Pannure referred to a German colony of Moravians settled in the Crimea. This body of religionists hold views similar to those of the sect to which Mr. Bright belongs, especially on the sinfulness of all war. His lordship's object was to unveil the czar's conduct to those poor people as exemplifying his character. We shall relate the matter without quoting his lordship. They emigrated to the Crimea when under the auspices of Alexander I.; there was a certain degree of toleration, and their conduct had never given offence to the successor of Alexander, as they did not seek to make proselytes from the established church, but to reform and cement the czar's Mohammedan subjects; and their civilising influence over the Crim-Tartars was obvious, and it might be supposed would have been thankfully acceptable to the czar. After the death of his mother, who much restrained his bigotry, Nicholas tormented these amiable and peaceful colonists, violating the compact under which they settled there, and completely refuting by his whole conduct to them the character for truth, honour, uprightness, and magnanimity, so eagerly claimed for him by the partial advocacy of Earl Grey. He compelled them to limit their labours to their own material advantages, and claimed, as members of the Greek Church, the converts made by the community from the Tartar population. According to the compact or charter of their settlement, the Moravians were exempt from military service, but their converts were to be liable to it, the same as other Russian subjects. Earl Grey's pattern of everything noble destroyed the

charter of the little colony, and placed it under the usual laws of military service. The poor people in vain represented that they and their fathers had settled there making a testimony against the lawfulness of war; in vain did they plead the inviolability of conscience: the lord of a hundred races, the ruler of sixty millions of men, whom Lord Grey declared to be so vastly elevated above all that was ignoble and mean, persecuted these poor peaceful Christian people with a relentlessness of which many a savage chief would be ashamed, and with an indifference to the honour of Russia and her czars, which ought to cause even the capricious tongue of Lord Grey to abstain from eulogy. Imprisonment and flogging were first resorted to by the colossal tyrant and truce-breaker; and these failing, death was offered as the alternative of their continued refusal to serve in the army. They pleaded conscience, and died! He hanged 300 of the able-bodied of the small community, the most virtuous of his subjects. To falsehood, and violation of compact, he added injury, insult, and ultimately murder. He hated them with a religious animosity because they refused all overtures to join the Greek Church, of which he was head. Selfish, false, ambitious, and cruel, he carried these qualities alike into the government of his own subjects, and his dealings with foreign states; into matters civil, and matters religious. It will ever be a shame to Western Europe that this scourge of human-kind, and this strange compound of fanaticism and hypocrisy, should have been permitted to flaunt his greatness before the thrones and peoples of free nations, and carry on a career of territorial plunder more barefaced and unprincipled than that of the meanest fillibustering captain which ever found adventurous supporters in the New World. Lord Panmure did good service to religion and liberty by calling the attention of the citizens of Edinburgh to the facts of the czar's dishonour and blood-guiltiness to the Crimean Moravian colony. It was strange that this story, so damning to the emperor's greatness, furnished no paragraph for the eloquence of the truly eloquent George Thompson, or any other of the advocates of the Peace Society, while these orators rivalled Earl Grey in panegyrising the saintly qualities of the peace-loving Nicholas! This is to be regretted by all who wish success, as we do, to the efforts of Christian men who seek to propagate a disrelish for war, and the duty of every people cultivating peace at the expense of many and great sacrifices.

The Rev. Dr. Leask, minister of Esher Chapel, Kennington, London, in an eloquent discourse delivered on occasion of the death of the Muscovite emperor, placed before his audience the true feeling which ought to be

cherished by the English people toward their departed enemy:—"But let us not press against the bier of the helpless autocrat. We have no authority to mount the judgment-seat. That is occupied by One who judgeth righteously. In his hands we may safely leave the souls of monarchs as of common men, without misgiving and without anxiety. He needs no witnesses, for he knoweth all things; and the winding up of the affairs of a groaning creation will justify our belief that the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth. . . . Let us so act during life that posterity may love our memory. 'The curse causeless shall not come;' but, alas! it is to be feared that the deep curses of multitudes fell upon the head of the departed czar, and that many have rejoiced at the tidings of his death. When that colossal spoiler fell, helpless as a branch smitten from the forest, men *felt* as if a heavy crushing burden had been mysteriously rolled from the world's heart. Whether that feeling correspond with judgment, and whether that judgment agree with the light shed by revelation on the moral government of God over humanity, are questions which I shall not at present attempt to answer; but the fact unquestionably is just as I have intimated. When the telegraph of yesterday confirmed the rumour of the previous day that the Emperor of Russia was dead, men did grasp each other heartily by the hand, did look happier than during many previous months, and did feel as if a destructive storm had suddenly subsided. But how sad is all this. How melancholy the reflection that men should rejoice over the death of one of their fellow-mortals! Either there was in him, or there is in them, something fearfully wrong when such emotions can be excited by the blow of the last enemy. How terrible to die unwept!"

A passage from a discourse delivered by the Rev. J. Sortaine of Brighton, placed the czar's character in a light in which it would appear as if the preacher had in view Earl Grey's oration, and some kindred effusions from that class. There is a discriminating and eloquent force in this analysis:—

"If the late Czar Nicholas had died some two years ago, there would have been no sufficient reason why thoughts upon his decease should occupy an hour so sacred as the present one. It would have been a topic, chiefly, if not solely, of interest to the politician and historian. And in their summaries of his character and reign, both would have said, that, while equally sharing with his ancestors, Peter the Great and the Czarina Catherine, in largeness and unscrupulousness, and perseverance of aggressive policy towards Europe, he far sur-

passed them in the wisdom and benignity of his domestic government. To his ruthless atrocities in Poland they would have placed, as an offset, his untiring efforts to raise the populace of his vast empire from the miseries of serfdom. If they pronounced him a perfidious marauder on the rights and properties of the civilised Caucasian and the unoffending Turk, they would have contended for his stern equity against rapacious venality at home. They would have said, that if he was not so humane and gentle as his brother Alexander, he was less impulsive and more uniformly just; and that he left his empire far more consolidated in its form, far more vital and healthy in its internal activities, vaster and richer in its commerce, and higher in its scale of European civilisation and influence than he found it when he ascended his throne. Such, we say, would have been the estimate of the statesman and historian; so that his very crimes in statescraft and in war—shaded off, as they would have been, by the generous consideration that they were natural to a semi-barbarian and an autocrat—would have been unnoticed from his surpassing his Muscovite predecessors in the paternity of his rule. Happy had it been for him if he had died then, and thus secured to himself the homage of posterity! But the 'crafty' man is a 'froward' man, and the counsel of the froward is carried headlong."

Much has been written of the czar's desire to improve his country. He, doubtless, encouraged its material advancement so far as promoted its military resources. But he had a hatred of literary men, and of any gifted persons in other than the military art,—if we except actors, artists, and musicians, who ministered to his personal pleasures, or the pleasures of his family and court. What his conduct was to literary men may be learned from Golovin, himself a Russian. His sketch was written some time before the emperor's death:—"Lermontoff, another eminent Russian poet, died, and Nicholas exclaimed, 'He lived like a dog, and has died like one!'" Rybickoff was a distinguished lyric poet. Nicholas hanged him! That is his way of treating Russian talent. Polejaieff was another young poet of liberal tendencies. Nicholas called him to him, and embraced him. Everybody believed that he meant to take him into favour. He made him a soldier; and when the poet died, a friend, wishing to find his body, was told to go and look among the boxes which are used as coffins for the common soldiers. Sakoloffsky wrote some spirited verses against the czar. His judges asked him whether he had not hurled his fiercest invectives against God. 'Yes,' replied the poet, 'knowing that God is more merciful than the czar.' He was thrown into a dungeon, which he never quitted save

as a corpse. Even at this very moment, Nicholas is wreaking his vengeance on Bakunin, whom he is pledged to Austria to keep immured in prison. Disgust prevents our continuing the sad list of victims, and we will, therefore, conclude by mentioning a single fact, to show his mode of treating female poets. Madame Rastopchin wrote some verses entitled 'The Husband and the Wife.' The husband is Russia, and the wife is Poland; and the poet shows that if they do not love one another, it is for want of a proper understanding. Madame Rastopchin was exiled to Moscow. The court goes there; and, at the end of a few months, the empress meets the exile at Madame Nesselrode's, and invites her to a ball at the palace. As soon as Nicholas sees her, he orders her to quit the palace."

The life of the Emperor Nicholas was eventful, but in no way interesting as exhibiting any qualities of his own, except his courage, which was proved on ascending the throne, when he quelled an insurrection by his self-possession, promptitude, and fortitude. His success was followed by as bloody and ferocious a specimen of vindictiveness as his cruel house ever perpetrated. His person was generally esteemed handsome; but this general impression was created by the habit prevailing among all European aristocracies to praise him. His stature was gigantic, and there was an effort to maintain a sort of imperial carriage, which gave it a pomposity and affectation, and made his gait something between a stride and a strut. His features were regular, but without beauty or expression. His mouth smiled, while his eyes refused his lips the sympathy ever rendered in the countenance of the amiable, and good, and beautiful. Even in his most complaisant looks there was a severity approaching to ferocity. There was a certain coarseness, boldness, and yet furtiveness of purpose in his expression, which gave him the look of a genteel but gigantic highwayman. Perhaps one of the best likenesses of him extant is at Chatsworth, the celebrated seat of the Duke of Devonshire, in Derbyshire. The author of these pages will ever remember the impression of repulsiveness and cruelty which it inspired when years ago he first saw it there; and many have felt similarly on beholding it. It gives the idea of a ruffian on a grand scale, who had moved in the highest circles of civilised and fashionable life.

The Emperor Alexander I., as is well known, died without issue, and he was the eldest of four brothers. The next in seniority, Constantine, was accordingly heir to the imperial throne. That prince abdicated his right in favour of his next brother, Nicholas. Various motives were attributed to Constantine. It was alleged that, being subject to sudden

gusts of passion, in which he perpetrated the wildest outrages, he was conscious of his incapacity to govern with temper or justice. It was also alleged that, having married a Polish lady, the Muscovites would never submit to accept her for empress, and his alternative to repudiating her was the renouncement of an empire; and he accepted that alternative, as he tenderly loved her, receiving the viceroyalty of Poland. That Alexander desired to set aside Constantine in favour of Nicholas is certain, as the latter was supposed to lean to the German rather than the pure Muscovite party. Accordingly he ascended the throne, and received the reluctant homage of the Russian people, whom he afterwards governed in a spirit so accordant with their tastes, that none of his predecessors holds a higher place in the loyal remembrances of the nation. In 1825 his remarkable reign began. He initiated his sovereignty at home by putting down the secret societies, then numerous in the empire, and by the sanguinary suppression of a revolt against his authority. He began his relations with foreign states by fomenting disputes with Turkey and Persia, and seizing and holding, with the connivance of the English government, some of their fairest provinces. The policy of the English in thus acting was to strengthen Russia as a counterpoise to France; Turkey and Persia openly avowing their sympathies with the French. The French revolution of 1830 gave a new direction to his mind; from that time his aim was to strengthen absolute monarchy and legitimacy in Europe, and to suppress the liberties of the European peoples. The rising of the Polish nation in 1831 strengthened this policy. The independence of Poland was quenched in blood, and the czar grossly violated the treaty of Vienna. It was from no want of material to prove the personal treachery and political bad faith of the czar, that Earl Grey held him up to the Peers of England as the standard of fidelity, personal and political. The remaining years of his life were principally spent in fostering quietism in Eastern Europe, and pushing quietly his influence towards Central Asia. Constantinople and Calcutta were the grand prizes his ambition aimed at—the policy he inherited from his predecessors; and in pursuing which, fraudulently and violently, he realised the French proverb, “*Mais l’homme propose et Dieu dispose.*” The following brief sketch of the royal house of Russia, from the columns of the *Presse*, will appropriately close this chapter. His imperial majesty had reached a degree of power beyond all his predecessors, but, like them all, he exemplified the truth sung so long ago by the classic poet of another and still more powerful realm:—

“*Pallida mors æquo pulsat pede
Pauperum tabernas Regumque turres.*”

“Russia reckons three historical dynasties—the first commencing with Rurik, a prince of Scandinavian origin; the second, that of the Grand Princess of Wolodimir, commencing in 1157 with Andrew Yourewitch, who was assassinated in his palace; the third, that of the house of Romanoff, commencing in 1613 with Michael, and numbering among its descendants Peter the Great, founder of the existing greatness of the Russian monarchy.

“Peter the Great ascended the throne in 1682, having for his first wife a Princess of Wolfenbützel. He organised against Europe that great destructive machine known as the Russian empire, and reformed his country with a hatchet in his hand instead of a sceptre. His son Alexis, terrified at the cruelties of his father, fled first to Austria, and then to Naples. Peter prevailed on him to return, when Alexis was tried, and condemned to death. The sentence was commuted to perpetual imprisonment; but the unfortunate prince died on the morrow of poison. His mother, who was soon after committed to a convent, also died suddenly. Peter then espoused Catherine Skovrousky. Later in life he became suspicious and cruel, and grew tired of the ascendancy of his favourite Menschikoff. In 1725 he died suddenly in his palace.

“Catherine I. succeeded him. At her death, after a reign of two years, Menschikoff elevated to the throne Peter II., the son of the unfortunate Alexis. The emperor, who was governed by the Dolgorouki family, ordered Menschikoff and his family into Siberia. During this reign the old boyards recovered their power, and the German and other adventurers, patronised by Peter the Great and Catherine, were in disfavour. Peter II. died suddenly in 1730.

“The old Russian party, by a sudden reaction, seized the government, and proclaimed as empress Anne, Duchess of Courland, niece of Peter the Great and daughter of Ivan, who was put to death by order of the former sovereign. The Dolgorouki family, who had bestowed the crown on Anne, were sent to Siberia; and Biron, a Courland favourite of the empress, governed Russia. He is said to have transported 25,000 men into Siberia without trial. Anne died exhausted in 1740.

“Biron placed on the throne the young Ivan, the child of the Duke of Brunswick Lunenburg, and a niece of Peter the Great. General Munich, the favourite of those now in power, sent Biron into Siberia. Lestock, a French barber, conspired with Elizabeth, a daughter of Peter the Great. They entered the chamber of the Duke of Brunswick, took the young czar from his cot, and sent him to the fortress of Schlüsselberg. His parents, who were thrown into

the castle of Kolmogora, lingered through twenty years of suffering.

"Elizabeth, now empress, sent for the son of her sister, the Duchess of Holstein-Gottorp, who was married to a princess of Anhalt-Zerbst. Elizabeth died of some undiscovered malady in 1762, and the Duke Holstein-Gottorp ascended the throne under the title of Peter III. Catherine Anhalt-Zerbst, his wife, had been assassinated the same year in the Peterhoff Palace. A few days afterwards Ivan suffered the same fate in his prison of Schlussberg; and thus ends the legitimate line of the Romanoffs. The succeeding czars have no drop of Muscovite blood in their veins.

"Catherine and her favourite Potemkin now governed Russia. She lavished an unnatural hatred on her son Paul, who betrayed a Finnish origin by his Calmuck face and red hair. Catherine died of apoplexy in 1796.

"Paul I. ascended the throne, and took to wife a Princess of Wirtemberg. Of a fantastic temper, dangerous to all about him, notwithstanding all his vigilance and precaution, Paul I. was strangled in his own scarf on the night of the 23rd-24th of March, 1801.

"Alexander succeeded him. His favourite, the cruel Arakchhoff, governed in his name. Towards the end of his life, this prince was infected with religious mysticism; and the Russian orthodox suspected him of a leaning towards Catholicism. He died at Taganrog, on the 1st of December, 1825, under circumstances of much mystery.

"There were still alive three sons of the Emperor Paul: Constantine abdicated in favour of his brother, receiving in exchange the viceroyship of Poland. This prince died in 1831, after an interview with Count Alexis Orloff, and his wife soon followed him to the tomb.

"Nicholas ascended the throne in 1825, and inaugurated his reign by drowning in blood the revolt of the 13th of December. After a reign of thirty years, he died suddenly at St. Petersburg, on the 2nd of March, 1855, from a disease of the lungs, according to the *Moniteur*—from a stroke of apoplexy, according to the *Debata*. Michael, Paul's fourth son, died suddenly at Warsaw, in 1848, during the war in Hungary. This prince was opposed to Russian intervention in Hungary, and per-

sisted in a claim to the vicereignty of Poland for himself.

"The Emperor Nicholas leaves behind him the following numerous family:—His wife, the Empress Alexandra Fedorowna, formerly Frederica Louisa Charlotte Wilhelmina, daughter of the late Frederick-William III., King of Prussia, and born on the 13th of July, 1798. The issue of this marriage are:—

"1. Alexander Nicolaiewitch, Cesarewitch, and hereditary Grand-duke, born on the 29th of April, 1818; married on the 28th of April, 1841, Maria Alexandrovna, formerly Maximilienne Wilhelmina Augustus Sophia Maria, daughter of the late Louis II., Grand-duke of Hesse, born on the 8th of May, 1821. Issue of this marriage—Nicholas Alexandrowitch, born on the 20th of September, 1843; Vladimir Alexandrowitch, born on the 22nd of April, 1847; Alexis Alexandrowitch, born on the 14th of January, 1850.

"2. Maria Nicolaievna, born on the 8th of August, 1819; married on the 14th of July, 1839, to Maximilian, Duke of Leuchtenberg and Prince of Eichstedt; became a widow on the 1st of November, 1852.

"3. Olga Nicolaievna, born on the 11th of September, 1822; married to Charles, Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, on the 13th of July, 1846.

"4. Constantine Nicolaiewitch, Grand-duke, born on the 21st of September, 1827; married on the 11th of September, 1848, to Alexandra-Josefovna, formerly Alexandra, daughter of Joseph, Duke of Saxe-Altenburg, born on the 20th of July, 1830. Issue—a prince and princess.

"5. Nicholas Nicolaiewitch, Grand-duke, born on the 8th of August, 1831.

"6. Michael Nicolaiewitch, Grand-duke, born on the 25th of October, 1832.

"The Emperor leaves, besides, two sisters—Maria Paulovna, Dowager Grand-duchess of Saxe-Weimar; Anne Paulovna, widow of William II., King of Holland. And a sister-in-law—Helen Paulovna, widow of the Grand-duke Michael, and daughter of the late Prince Paul of Wirtemberg. This lady's daughter, the Grand-duchess Catherine Michaelovna, is married to the Duke George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz."

CHAPTER LXXII.

ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER II. TO THE THRONE OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE.—INAUGURATION OF HIS POLICY.

"When a wicked policy is hereditary in a court, and sustains itself under better and worse princes alike, this is the greatest of all testimonies that the dynasty is incurably evil."—*Crimes of the House of Hapsburgh.*

THE powerful Emperor of all the Russias, Nicholas I., was consigned to the sepulchre of his fathers, and—

"Left a name at which the world grew pale,
To point a moral or adorn a tale."

His tomb will be long honoured by true Russians as the shrine of a departed saint, but the traveller and philosopher will often gaze upon his gorgeous yet gloomy resting-place, and, pondering upon the vanity of human power, feel the sentiment of the poet—

"First of the mighty! can it be
That this is all remains of thee?"

The eldest of his sons, Alexander, ascended the imperial throne, and did everything in his power to impress his subjects with the idea of the identity of his views with those of their departed chief. He declared publicly, what had not been previously known nor suspected, that he had been for ten years in the secret counsels of his father, and had given his approval of all the acts of policy which during that time the departed czar had put forth. The general opinion of him was that he in many respects resembled his uncle Alexander; that he was more mild than his august sire; was more in favour of the German party in the empire; was less ambitious than any of his family, and as a matter both of taste and duty, preferred peace. The new emperor hastened to correct such opinions, by declaring in language as strong as any ever employed by Nicholas, that he would stand by the policy handed down to him by his predecessors; that the glory, honour, and territorial aggrandisement of Russia, and the maintenance of the orthodox church, would engage all his ambition, and be the objects of his existence. It was alleged that the discovery of a powerful conspiracy among the high Muscovite party, to set him aside, and place his brother Constantine on the throne in his stead, compelled him to adopt this course, which was against his own desires; and it was further alleged equally against the private recommendations of the dying Nicholas, who was represented as saying, "Make peace at whatever sacrifice; France, backed by English fleets and English gold, will throw her numerous legions upon the empire, and if necessary pass over Prussia to the heart of our power. I made a great mistake in thinking that France and England would never unite; it was a fatal error, but I

never could have supposed so unlikely an alliance." Whether these words were really ever uttered by the expiring czar, they certainly express what must have been his reflections.

Whether Alexander had secretly determined to adopt the policy thus expressed it is impossible to say; but he deemed it necessary to the stability of his throne to prolong the war, and to pledge himself in the face of Europe that he would abide by the policy of his forefathers. By it he did abide, until the arms of the allies conquered peace.

By the grace of God, we, Alexander II., Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, King of Poland, &c.,

To all our faithful subjects make known:—

In his impenetrable ways, it has pleased God to strike us all with a blow as terrible as it was unexpected. After a short but serious illness, which in the last days developed itself with unheard-of rapidity, our beloved father, the Emperor Nicholas Paulovitch, expired this day, February 18th (March 2nd). Words cannot express our grief, which will be also the grief of all our faithful subjects. We submit with resignation to the impenetrable view of Divine Providence. We seek consolation only in it, and from it alone do we expect the necessary strength to support the load which it has pleased the Almighty to impose upon us. In the same manner as our beloved father, whose loss we weep, devoted all his efforts and every moment of his life to the labours and cares claimed by the welfare of his subjects,—in like manner do we also, at this sad but grave and solemn moment, in ascending our hereditary throne of the empire of Russia, and of the kingdom of Poland, and of the grand-duchy of Finland, which are inseparable from it, take before the invisible God, always present at our side, the sacred engagement never to have any other object than the prosperity of our country. May Providence, which has called us to this high mission, may we, under its guidance and protection, consolidate Russia in the highest degree of power and glory; that through us may be accomplished the views and the desires of our illustrious predecessors, Peter, Catherine, Alexander the well-beloved, and of our august father of imperishable memory!

By their proved zeal, by their prayers, united with fervour to ours before the altars of the Most High, our dear subjects will come to our aid. We invite them to do so, ordering them at the same time to take the oath of allegiance to us, and also to our heir, his imperial highness the Czarovitch Grand-duke Nicholas Alexandrovitch.

Given at St. Petersburg, the 18th day of the month of February (2nd March), 1855, and of our reign the first.

ALEXANDER.

He also addressed the following orders of the day, dated March 3rd, to the Russian army:—

1. Valiant warriors, faithful defenders of church, and throne, and fatherland!—It has pleased Almighty God to visit us with a most severe and heavy loss. Our common father and benefactor has been taken from us. In the midst of indefatigable cares for the welfare of Russia and the glory of the Russian arms, my beloved father, the Emperor Nicholas Paulovitch, has passed away to eternal life.

His last words were—"I thank my glorious faithful

guard, that saved Russia in 1825; I thank the brave and faithful army and fleet. I pray to God that He will preserve in them constantly the same bravery, the same spirit for which they have distinguished themselves under me. As long as this spirit exists, the peace of the empire is secured from within and without, and then woe to its foes! I have loved my troops as my own children, and have endeavoured, as only I could, to improve their state. If I have not succeeded in everything, it was not for want of the desire, but because I either did not know better, or was not able to do more."

May you preserve for ever these memorable words in your hearts as the proof of his sincere love for you, which I, in the fullest degree, participate in, and as the pledge of your devotion to me and Russia.

2. Valiant warriors! Staunch comrades in arms of your illustrious leader, now resting in God!—You have impressed on your hearts the last expression of his tender, fatherly love for you. As a remembrance of this love, I confer on you, troops of the guard, 1st corps of cadets, and grenadier regiment (Suwarow), the uniforms that his majesty the emperor, your benefactor, was pleased to wear. Preserve this pledge, and may it be held by you as a relic—as a memento to future generations.

I further order:—1. In the companies and squadrons which have hitherto borne the name of his imperial majesty, all ranks shall wear on their epaulettes and shoulder-pieces the initials of the Emperor Nicholas I., as long as there is one man left of those on the rolls of the army February 18th, 1855 (March 2nd). 2. The generals attached to the person of his imperial majesty, and also the general and flagel adjutants of his majesty, shall retain these initials in all cases where they formerly had them.

Thus may the hallowed remembrance of Nicholas I. for ever be perpetuated in our ranks, and may it be a terror to the enemy and the glory of the fatherland.

It will be observed that the emperor makes no scruple of describing to the nobles a set of last words as from his father, in which they are represented as the subjects of his dying thoughts; while in his order of the day to the army they are represented as nearest the emperor's heart, and the love of them on his lips as he was about to cease from speech for ever. With such tricks, no matter how solemn the occasion, the Russian throne and government did not disdain to carry out the vile and selfish policy of the imperial *régime*.

The nobles had presented a memorial and loyal declaration to the deceased czar, to which he did not survive long enough to make a formal and public reply. The new emperor met the deputation from that illustrious body, and thus answered on his own behalf and on that of his father their previous address:—"I desired to see you in order to transmit to you the words of our defunct benefactor—of my father, for ever memorable. He was so weak that he was not able himself to read the expression of your sentiments, and I was charged with that duty. Your zeal, gentlemen, consoled his last moments. After having heard all, he said to me, 'Thank them—thank them sincerely, and tell them that I never doubted of their devotedness, and that at present I am more than ever persuaded of it!' And, accordingly, now I thank you, gentlemen; and I am persuaded that these words will be deeply engraved in

your minds. I am persuaded that the nobility will prove that they are a noble class in every sense of the word, and advanced in everything that is good. You do not lose courage; I am with you, and you are with me!" Here the emperor made the sign of the cross, and continued—"God be with us! We will not dishonour the Russian soil!" He then embraced the marshal of the nobility, and said, "In your person, I once again thank the nobility! Adieu, gentlemen—may God be with you!"

On the 7th of March the diplomatic corps assembled to do honour to his majesty's accession, to whom he delivered the following speech, which he was described as delivering with great energy, and especially in its more warlike portions, when his countenance gleamed, and his whole manner indicated that he inherited the fanaticism as well as the policy of his father, or desired to simulate both:—"I am persuaded, gentlemen, that all your courts feel sincere sorrow at the misfortune which has befallen us; I have already received proofs of it from all sides; they have greatly moved me, and I stated yesterday to the ministers of Prussia and Austria how much I appreciated them. I solemnly declare here before you, gentlemen, that I remain faithful to all the sentiments of my father, and that I will persevere in the line of political principles which served as a rule to my uncle, the Emperor Alexander, and to my father. These principles are those of the holy alliance. But, if that alliance no longer exists, it is certainly not the fault of my father. His intentions were always upright and loyal; and, if recently they were misunderstood by some persons, I do not doubt that God and history will do him justice. I am ready to contribute to a good understanding, on the conditions which he accepted. Like him, I desire peace, and wish to see the evils of war terminated; but if the conferences which are about to open at Vienna do not lead to a result honourable for us, then, gentlemen, at the head of my faithful Russia, I will combat with the whole nation, and I will perish sooner than yield. As to my personal sentiments for your sovereign (here the emperor addressed Baron de Werther, minister of Prussia), they have not varied. I have never doubted the fraternal affection and friendship which his majesty the king always had for my father, and I told you yesterday how grateful I am to him for it. I am deeply sensible of the kind words which the emperor has caused to be transmitted to me on this occasion. (This was addressed to Count Esterhazy, minister of Austria.) His majesty cannot doubt the sincere affection which my father entertained for him at an epoch which he himself has recalled by the order of the day addressed to his army. Be kind enough, gentle-

men, to communicate my words to your respective courts."

The policy which the new czar boasted as hereditary, is contained in what is called the "Will of Peter the Great." At the death of the Czar Nicholas it was printed and circulated extensively; and although it is to be doubted whether Peter actually left it as a legacy to his successors, there can be no doubt that they have acted upon it, and that ever since the death of Peter this document has been cherished in Russia as his political testament, and he only is considered a true Russian who subscribes to the national rule of political guidance it lays down. Whoever is cognisant of this fact, and studies the document, will be at no loss to comprehend the eager love of conquest which envenoms the heart of the whole people. In a German work, entitled *Geschichte Peters des Grossen*, von Eduard Pels, the document is thus given. The authority on which it was published was that of the notorious Chevalier d'Eon, French ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg in the year 1757:—

WILL OF PETER THE GREAT.

"In the name of the holy and indivisible Trinity, we Peter, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, to all our successors on the throne and in the government of the Russian nation."

After the usual preliminaries to testaments, and a preamble setting forth that Providence had evidently designed Russia to be the conqueror and ruler of Europe, and of the world, he lays down the following rules for the attainment of that object:—

RULES.

"1. The Russian nation must be constantly on a war footing, to keep the soldiers warlike and in good condition. No rest must be allowed except for the purpose of relieving the state finances, recruiting the army, or biding the favourable moment for attack. By these means peace is made subservient to war, and war to peace, in the interest of the aggrandisement and increasing prosperity of Russia.

"2. Every possible means must be used to invite, from the most cultivated European states, commanders in war, and philosophers in peace, to enable the Russian nation to participate in the advantages of other countries without losing any of its own.

"3. No opportunity must be lost of taking part in the affairs and disputes of Europe, especially in those of Germany, which, from its vicinity, is of the most direct interest to us.

"4. Poland must be divided by keeping up constant jealousies and confusions there. The authorities must be gained over with money, and the assemblies corrupted, so as to influence

the election of the kings. We must get up a party of our own there, send Russian troops into the country, and let them sojourn there so long that they may ultimately find some pretext for remaining there for ever. Should the neighbouring states make difficulties, we must appease them for the moment by allowing them a share of the territory until we can safely resume what we have thus given away.

"5. We must take away as much territory as possible from Sweden, and contrive that they shall attack us first, so as to give us a pretext for their subjugation. With this object in view, we must keep Sweden in opposition to Denmark, and Denmark to Sweden, and sedulously foster their mutual jealousies.

"6. The consorts of the Russian princes must always be chosen from among the German princesses, in order to multiply our family alliances with the Germans, and so unite our interests with theirs; and thus, by consolidating our influence in Germany, to cause it to attach itself spontaneously to our policy.

"7. We must be careful to keep up our commercial alliance with England, for she is the power which has most need of our products for her navy, and at the same time may be of the greatest service to us in the development of our own. We must export wood and other articles in exchange for her gold, and establish permanent connections between her merchants and seamen and our own.

"8. We must keep steadily extending our frontiers—northward along the Baltic, and southward along the shores of the Black Sea.

"9. We must progress as much as possible in the direction of Constantinople and India. He who can once get possession of these places is the real ruler of the world. With this view we must provoke constant quarrels at one time with Turkey and at another with Persia. We must establish wharfs and docks in the Euxine, and by degrees make ourselves masters of that sea as well as of the Baltic, which is a doubly important element in the success of our plan. We must hasten the downfall of Persia, push on into the Persian Gulf; if possible re-establish the ancient commercial intercourse with the Levant through Syria, and force our way into the Indies, which are the storehouses of the world. Once there, we can dispense with English gold.

"10. Moreover, we must take pains to establish and maintain an intimate union with Austria, apparently countenancing her schemes for future aggrandisement in Germany, and all the while secretly rousing the jealousy of the minor states against her. In this way we must bring it to pass that one or the other

party shall seek aid from Russia; and thus we shall exercise a sort of protectorate over the country, which will pave the way for future supremacy.

"11. We must make the house of Austria interested in the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and we must neutralise its jealousy at the capture of Constantinople either by pre-occupying it with a war with the old European states, or by allowing it a share of the spoil, which we can afterwards resume at our leisure.

"12. We must collect round our house as round a centre, all the detached sections of Greeks which are scattered abroad in Hungary, Turkey, and South Poland. We must make them look to us for support, and, then, by establishing beforehand a sort of ecclesiastical supremacy, we shall pave the way for universal sovereignty.

"13. When Sweden is ours, Persia vanquished, Poland subjugated, Turkey conquered—when our armies are united, and the Euxine and the Baltic are in the possession of our ships, then we must make separate and secret overtures first to the court of Versailles, and then to that of Vienna, to share with them the dominion of the world. If either of them accept our propositions, which is certain to happen if their ambition and self-interest are properly worked upon, we must make use of this one to annihilate the other; this done, we have only to destroy the remaining one by finding a pretext for a quarrel, the issue of which cannot be doubtful, as Russia will then be already in the absolute possession of the East and of the best part of Europe.

"14. Should the improbable case happen of both rejecting the propositions of Russia—then our policy will be to set one against the other, and make them tear each other to pieces. Russia must then watch for and seize the favourable moment, and pour her already assembled hosts into Germany, while two immense fleets, laden with Asiatic hordes and conveyed by the armed squadron of the Euxine and the Baltic, set sail simultaneously from the Sea of Azoff and the harbour of Archangel. Sweeping along the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, they will overrun France on the one side, while Germany is overpowered on the other. When these countries are fully conquered, the rest of Europe must fall easily and without a struggle under our yoke. Thus Europe can and must be subjugated."

In the spirit of that extraordinary document the czars had ruled and plotted ever since the days of Peter, and Alexander was not, apparently, desirous to become the first exception.

The call to take the oath of allegiance was promptly answered through all the multifarious

nations that own his sway, and various remarkable scenes were presented on the occasion. A letter dated Warsaw, the 15th of March, says:—"During the last four days our city presented a truly solemn aspect. The churches of all the Christian communities were full of people, who, in compliance with the last imperial manifesto, took the oath of allegiance to the Emperor Alexander II. and the hereditary Grand-duke Nicholas Alexandrowitsch. Yesterday was the turn of the Jews, who flocked in great numbers for the same purpose to their synagogues. I must relate to you a little incident which took place on the occasion. According to the law, every male inhabitant from the age of twelve is obliged to swear allegiance. The Catholic clergy of both worships did not object to that formality; but the pastor Ludwig, superintendent-general of the Lutheran church in the kingdom, publicly declared in the oratory, and in presence of the persons delegated to assist at the ceremony, that he could not allow his parishioners to swear before their confirmation."

As in Moscow so everywhere, from the Black Sea to the White Sea, in the czar's extensive dominions scenes of solemnity were presented, while the vast populations crowded before the places of magisterial assembly to invoke Heaven as to their loyalty to the Emperor of all the Russias and King of Poland and Finland.

Foreign courts paid their respects according to their accustomed forms, but the German monarchs showed an intense desire to conciliate the new authority. The King of Prussia was of course first in the race: a prince of the royal house carried his majesty's condolence for the loss of the august Nicholas, and his fervent wishes for the auspicious reign of the new monarch. Austria resorted to every form of mean flattery, and almost cringing vassalage, to conciliate Alexander's goodwill: an arch-duke was sent with the most humble words and studied compliments. One of the first scenes which his royal highness was called upon to witness, was an assemblage of the chiefs of different departments of the state to present their duty to the emperor, to whom his majesty offered the assurance, in the hearing of the Austrian envoy—"I am determined to march in the way traced out by my father."

The arch-duke must have been greatly chagrined, for the *Court Journal* of Vienna had just published the following piece of flattery by authority:—

"The melancholy tidings which we yesterday evening communicated to the public have filled all hearts with sorrow. Recent occurrences have led to dissensions; there have been differences of opinion as to the duties of the various powers in regard to the events in the East; there have been conflicting opinions as

to the course of action which the state of affairs requires : but all these matters have been cast into the background by the painful feeling caused by the great loss which the whole of Europe has suffered by the decease of one of its most highly gifted sovereigns. The reign of the emperor, which lasted almost thirty years, is one of the most brilliant periods in the history of Russia, and the name and memory of the defunct monarch is intimately connected with all those important events which have occurred within that long and momentous space of time. No one will be so prejudiced by the complications of the last few months as to refuse to acknowledge, and that with the deepest gratitude, the great services rendered by the late Emperor Nicholas to the cause of order, legality, and of the monarchical principle, which together form the great pillars of the European family of states. But Austria, which yesterday, as the anniversary of the death of the Emperor Francis (1835), had such a vivid recollection of its affliction at the loss of that ever-memorable paternal ruler, is particularly struck that, by a singular dispensation of Providence, Russia should on the very same day receive such a heavy blow, and that it should in both empires be a date attended with sorrowful recollections.

"The only alleviation that can be found for the painful impression which the astounding news has caused, is in the thought of the estimable qualities of the eldest son and successor of the Emperor Nicholas, the Emperor Alexander II.

"It is confidently to be expected that the monarch who has now ascended the throne of his deceased father will realise the sanguine hopes which are placed in him, as well in his own great empire as in the rest of the world; and that the work of peace just commenced—which was rendered possible by the honourable advances made by the defunct sovereign—will, from a feeling of filial devotion, be brought to a happy issue by the mild and propitiatory spirit of Alexander II."

The Austrian emperor published an order of the day to his army, in which, after eulogising the virtues of the Emperor Nicholas, he proclaimed that the Austrian cuirassier regiment "Emperor Nicholas" should retain that title for ever.

In England it appeared that the government at first had some hopes of immediate overtures of peace, for Lord Clarendon having announced the death of Nicholas to the House of Peers, requested Lord Lyndhurst to withdraw an important motion concerning the war, expressing his hope that the event which had just been announced, would materially and favourably influence the negotiations for peace about to be opened at Vienna.

Meanwhile the new autocrat put forth all his energies to continue his father's work: throughout the empire decree after decree was directed to promote the consolidation of his power; and the home administration received a new impulse in the direction of making every part of the empire more formally Russian. It was the remarkable saying of Uwaroff, one of the ministers of Nicholas—"In order that an empire so colossal may work harmoniously, that parts of such manifold variety, though tinged probably with their own peculiarities, *may be fused into a whole*, it is indispensably requisite to establish one language and one form of administration *for all*. The bases of Russian power are the three foundation-stones of—*absolute monarchy, Russo-Slavonic nationality, and orthodox Greek Christianity*." It appeared to be the new czar's intention, even in the midst of war, to realise practically this theory, for all the home measures of his government were taken in that spirit.

After a little delay, the true state of things in Russia as to the war and foreign policy became known in the West. From intelligence which afterwards transpired, it became certain that the departed czar had foreseen the defeat of Russia in the Crimea, and that his successor partook of his foresight. The late emperor, when losing his hold of all earthly things, gave up only from the last grasp his projects of territorial aggrandisement for the Russian nation. He became politically sagacious when the delirium of his ambition was checked, and the delusion of an irresistible power and glory dispelled. But the Grand-duke Constantine inherited all his sire's self-will and ambition without any of the wisdom which chastisement imparted, and he menaced his brother with a military revolution if at the approaching conference of Vienna an inch of Russian territory were surrendered, however acquired, or held by whatever claim. The nobles were suffering from the abstraction of their serfs to fill the ranks of the army, but they bore their sacrifices nobly, and supported the policy of their deceased czar. The merchants suffered yet more, and ruin fell upon many—the bankrupt murmured not, and the still wealthy gave freely to the national treasury for the prosecution of the war. Whatever the sacrifices, and even sufferings, of many classes, there was after all a party strong enough to give force to the menaces of Constantine, who was at that time resolved, like Samson, to bring down all in ruins around him, if he could thereby crush the enemy that mocked his strength. The chief resource of the war and the war party was the priests. The church freely poured out its hoarded treasures, and all persons were for war whom the priests could either alarm or beguile. The god of Russia, like the eagle on its standard, has

two heads—it is the god of bigotry and oppression, and from each head the sound went forth over the steppes and plains, and forests and regions of the empire—"My voice is still for war." The aged nobles were very religious, and the aged princesses and countesses were still more religious, and they supported a conflict which was waged for the holy places. Such were the wealthy and aged representatives of modern titles, who could do no more than toddle or drive to the Greek mass, or stand by and see the flogging of a serf. The priests had the ear and heart of all that class. Then there was the old nobility, in the proud sense of the term—they were also for war. Many of them, notwithstanding their characteristic extravagance, were rich. They were generally either freethinkers or devotees, and in the extreme of the one or the other. They were alike jealous of the honour of Russia, and loved her glory. The freethinkers among them had no principle in the matter, unless the love of national and personal renown be one. The devotees had *one* principle—the universal power and authority of the orthodox church; and all this class regarded their own form of government as alone suited to Russia, and believed that Russia was suited to the world. They considered that the princes of Russia ought to have grand hotels in Paris, and palaces on the Bosphorus, and that the centre of European civilisation, and the shores of the Golden Horn, should own them lords. The officials were all for continuing the contest. New provinces require new governors, and new offices of all sorts, and such persons, therefore, must profit by conquest. To lose provinces would be to narrow their sphere—they must extend their empire in order to live. The poor regarded the war as God's war, and their sufferings as a martyrdom for the true faith—for which they were ever willing. The emperor had none to rely upon as a peace party, except a small section of eminent statesmen, and the peoples of the newly-vanquished provinces, who had no wish to extend Russian glory. Yet, among these—Poles, Fins, Germans, Tartars, &c.—there were many who desired the war to go on, in the hopes that their provinces might be swept of Russian troops by their powerful and victorious enemies. The emperor, however peaceably disposed, could do nothing for peace until Russian arms experienced more decided reverses. Russia could still afford to make great sacrifices, and endure great losses, if she could only hold her own in the Crimea. If she did not possess a single port in Asia beyond the Cuban river, and made it and the Terek her line of defence, so long as she maintained her great fortresses on the Baltic and in the Crimea, she could bid defiance to her foes. Surrounded by weak states and peoples, she

could never fear temporary reverse, unless her enemy made those states and nations strong against her.

It was from this circumstance of great consequence, in regulating our policy with that power, to be well acquainted with the condition of the nations that skirt so wide a boundary; that, in case of war, or of a policy to prevent war being requisite, we might know what alliances to form, and where to strike. Almost all races out of Africa touched the fringe of the empire over which Alexander had just put forth his sceptre, and the rites of nearly all religions are celebrated upon its frontiers. Like a sea, it rises above all their landmarks, and their thrones and altars are engulfed. As the wolves upon her own wild steppes, so the equally ravenous Cossacks, armed in her service, prowled fiercely in quest of prey all along her far-encircling bounds. The Russian armies were thrown in masses, or scattered in forts, along this great circuit, and were always on the *qui vive* for an expedition over the borders. Bounded by the Caspian Sea and Asia on the East, by the Baltic Sea and Europe on the west, and by the Black Sea and Asia on the south, she is just in the situation which gives her scope for conquest; while her northern boundary being the Arctic Ocean, she has nothing to apprehend, if she has nothing to conquer, in that direction.

We are too much accustomed to think only of the ruler of this empire, when speculating upon its future possible or probable conquests; the temper of the people should have been as much considered in any sound speculations in reference to Russian aggression. The czars have been of all sorts of characters, ranging from the indifferently good, as in the case of Alexander, down to the sagacious and energetic ruler Peter the Great, the able and utterly unprincipled Catherine, or the frantic yet subtle, fanatical yet hypocritical, ruler of her recent destinies; but the people have been essentially the same, and the people were the real aggressors in the war, and in every war that had for its object the subjugation of contiguous territory. Bigoted, avaricious, cruel, and ambitious, there is no enterprise which a zealot or a robber on a large scale might prompt, which they have not hearts to attempt. If the emperor be unscrupulous, the people are still more so; if the emperor be despotic, the Russian heart is even more despotic. The serfs that crouch love the forms of tyranny that crush them. Their despot is their idol; break the idol—as it has often been broken—and they will set up another in form and figure like it. They may hate and avenge the policy of a particular czar, but they will at once kiss the foot that steps over his strangled body to the vacated throne. It was not Nicholas, it

was the Russians with whom we warred, and who sought, through blood, plunder, and persecution, a universal dominion for him who was but the impersonation of all that Russia adored, in proportion as the zealot, the oppressor, and the plunderer were branded on his brow.

We have heard and read much of the hospitality and kindness of Russians to travellers on their territory, but they would all the while rejoice that their master invaded that traveller's land, made captives of his family and countrymen, and demolished the temples of their worship.

The new emperor made every effort to secure the goodwill of the notabilities of his empire. He summoned to his capital the Grand-duchess Olga (whose leanings to the English were no secret), and her husband, the Prince-royal of Wirtemberg; an autograph letter was sent to Lieutenant-general Vetovtsoff, an influential person in the army, and the letter was accompanied by a snuff-box, set with diamonds and the imperial portrait; a similar letter and present was afterwards sent to Lieutenant-general Rostovtsoff. Various great changes were made in the military commands. General Berg was appointed military governor of Finland; Aide-de-camp General Baron de Leiven was appointed quartermaster-general of the imperial staff; and throughout the empire commands and promotions were given to those officers whose allegiance it was deemed desirable to secure.

The emperor's attention was said to be constantly directed to the Crimea, and among those in his confidence, it was the subject of perpetual and uneasy conversation. There appeared to be a singular providence in making that place the scene of Russian humiliation. Her most unprincipled intrigues and violations of treaty were in respect to it, and she lavished her resources there, to make it the basis of her power for the conquest of the East. She only required with it to secure the sovereignty of the Caucasus, and then the three great Eastern empires—Persia, Turkey, and British India—were prizes of which she would feel ultimately secure. China and Japan would follow Persia and Turkey, in all probability before India fell to her sword, for to these far-off regions Russian ambition was directed. An especial treaty had been lately made with Japan, and she had within a short time plundered China of a vast area of territory. With the Caucasus and the Crimea behind her, Russia could make the Araxes a base from which to conquer Central Asia, and finally lay another base of operations for the conquest of India, within fourteen days' march of the British possessions. To do any of these things it was essential to hold the Crimea. Driven from both the Caucasus

and the Crimea, her imperial greatness would vanish—

“And, like the baseless fabric of a vision,
Leave not a rack behind.”

It is perhaps scarcely a digression to offer the opinion—however diplomatists have since decreed otherwise—that no peace should have been made with Russia until driven from Bessarabia and the Crimea, and Podolia were in that direction fixed as her boundary; while in Asia she should have been driven from all her possessions south of the Cuban river, and any advance beyond it should be regarded as a declaration of war against the civilised world. If permitted to hold any point at all upon the seaboard of the Black Sea (considering the Sea of Azoff as an arm of that sea) it should only be at the mouth of the Don; although it would be well for the safety of Europe to hold the gulf of the Sea of Azoff and the mouth of the Don, even as Russia herself has controlled the Delta of the Danube. To avoid all jealousies among the European powers in respect of her, there ought to be raised up a barrier of independent states between her and the rest of Europe.

However these things may be, or ought to be, the Emperor Alexander regarded the Crimea with admitted alarm, as draining out the resources of his country. His Cossacks had cleared the various countries, wherever they came, of food, horses, and provender, except the granaries and public stores, which were still filled with vast supplies for his forces. The emperor determined on changes in the command in that direction. Prince Menshikov, who had been seriously wounded in the leg, was recalled. His furious fanaticism against the allies almost amounted to monomania. Prince Gortschakoff was placed in command of the eastern portion of the Crimea, from Theodosia and Arabat to Kertch. The recall of Prince Menshikov excited astonishment all over Russia, as the Russian people and the private soldiers considered him the most skilful of all Russian generals and diplomatists, although Europe generally formed a very different estimate. He had, however, fallen into disgrace—the new emperor having been all along convinced that most of the disasters, diplomatic and military, which Russia had experienced were to be attributed to him. It was suitable that this man should be removed from confidence, if the new emperor had any wish to leave the impression in Europe that his mind was open to any proposals for peace. The necessity for his removal, on the ground of his mental and physical state, was however imperative; and here again retributive providence seemed to pursue the authors and chief abettors of this war. It is impossible

for any mind at all reflecting to overlook the hand of God in these transactions, and the workings of a mysterious providence throughout. What but a providential blindness could have influenced Menschikoff in leaving the landing of the allies in the Crimea unopposed, or Balaklava and Eupatoria unfortified and insufficiently occupied? Upon the chance that France and England could not coalesce, a war was risked by Russia against odds before which, humanly speaking, she must fall. Trusting to the gratitude of Austria—a power that was never grateful, that keeps no treaties, and observes no oaths—Russia sent her armies into the Dobrujscha, to be broken before Silistria, and to reel back discomfited and plague-smitten through the swamps of the Danube. No matter, for the purpose of these reflections, who originated the war: Napoleon, at the instance of England, withdrew his pretensions about the Holy Sepulchre, although the Latins have older treaty-claims than the Greeks; and Nicholas, refusing to meet that concession, where claims so strong existed, insisted upon guarantees for his own influence utterly subversive of Ottoman independence. He began the war like a fool, he waged it like a fanatic: he treated superior powers as if he were their conqueror, and received from their victories over his hosts that chagrin and despair which drove his spirit from the world. The war killed the Emperor Nicholas, and he was the author of it, however the demands of Napoleon may have been the pretext, or the occasion.

The fate of Prince Menschikoff is not less remarkable. He was the emperor's messenger to the Porte, and never did a message-bearer from kings play a part so arrogant and unwarrantable, or pursue a course so calculated to embroil his master with all around him. Wounded and sick, this messenger of blood and tyranny was carried away from the scene of contest; while, like his master, successive despatches of ignominious defeat and bitter disappointment smote his spirit, rendered him unfit for future service, and sent him an invalid to a monastery at Moscow. Nor was it the least remarkable among these strange providences that a small battery, the smallest in all the attack, recently erected by one of the Western allies, and worked and manned by the other, performed its *only achievement* by sinking the *Gromonosetz* (*Thunderer*), the very ship which bore Menschikoff on his mission of haughty defiance to Constantinople, just as he himself sunk into decrepitude, whither the missile of those enemies consigned him. The most skilful operations of the Turks had been conducted by the Egyptian contingent, and the men of this contingent signalled themselves by greater bravery than any other section of the Mohammedan armies: it was to Russian

interference solely that the defeat of Mehemet Ali and his Egyptians was attributable in 1841—for had not the czar interfered, the other powers would not. Thus the policy of Russia in the past, by subjecting Egypt to the Porte, prepared for herself at this juncture a formidable foe.

Whatever were the reflections of the new emperor, he set himself vigorously to accomplish all that was possible of what his father had undertaken: he therefore reinforced the army in the Crimea, replenished its stores, recalled the least efficient of its officers, promoted Todtleben, to whose genius the skilful defence of Sebastopol was attributable, and rewarded officers and men there with a liberal hand. He attempted too much, and undertook some tasks that had proved too great for his father, and would probably prove ultimately too great for himself. Some of these were much to be commended: among them was the eradication of official bribery, peculation, and partiality, from both the civil and military services. The correspondent of the *Pays*, Parisian paper, in a letter from St. Petersburg, thus writes upon the subject:—

"In my letters I have often alluded to the fraud and corruption which is the death of Russia. This evil is so rooted, it extends so widely to every branch of the service of the czar's army, that the troops, despite the efforts of the sovereign, are in want of nearly everything. I was assured a few days since that Alexander II., despite the usual mildness of his character, got into a regular fury on learning what took place, and resolved to act with extreme severity against any person, no matter what his rank, found guilty of fraud. I know the country well, and all his power will not be of any avail to put a stop to these abuses. The evil is too deep-rooted in the Muscovite soil. All will combine together to deceive the most vigilant eye.

"The subjoined few facts of recent occurrence, the exactitude of which I guarantee, will show you the extent of the evil.

"A Livonian officer of very good family, intrusted with the provisioning of the army in Taurus, went from province to province buying oxen, cows, and sheep, which he had sent to Odessa and Cherson. Wishing to make a rapid fortune, he hit upon the following fraud. He proposed to some of the peasants to leave them their cattle for a consideration agreed upon. The cattle were booked as delivered, and he gave a false receipt for the price of them. He then put them down as 'died on the road.' By this means he pocketed—first, the money of the peasants; secondly, the money of the government. It was clever, but not honest. Suspensions were at last aroused. When it was mentioned to the czar he would not at first

believe that one of his superior officers was capable of committing a crime the consequences of which to the army were incalculable. The rumours, however, grew so loud that a serious investigation was ordered. The officer was commanded to proceed immediately to headquarters at Odessa. He was not so slow as not to smell a rat. He felt some hesitation at obeying the order, but overnight he hit upon a plan, and, while staying at an hotel near Odessa, his room caught fire so cleverly that the flames, which purify all things, destroyed the accounts. He arrived at head-quarters with a certificate that his papers were burnt. What more could be exacted? We are assured that the fire spared the roubles in his pouch. He was acquitted. Poor fellow! as Molière would say.

"Another anecdote, the truth of which I will guarantee:—A dealer in flour, in the vicinity of Kiev, provides some thousand sacks of flour to the commander of the place, and asks an exorbitant price. He is refused payment. He is brought up for usury and fraud. The affair is a serious one; he is liable to a very severe penalty and a journey to Siberia in perspective. He was as calm, however, as if conscience was pure and his cause a good one. At the appointed day he appeared before the judge, and proved by his books, A plus B, that to accept the supply the officers had exacted for themselves 80,000 silver roubles, or 240,000 francs. Very flattering this for the officers of the Russian army! The trader was acquitted and his honour saved; the money was paid; he gained nothing on the transaction.

"Everywhere, at the very steps of the throne, the most audacious robberies are committed. The Emperor Alexander I. said that his sailors would steal his guns if they dared; Alexander II. observed the other day that his attendants would steal his breeches if they had the opportunity. The following gave rise to the observation:—Among the emperor's household there is a chamberlain silversmith, who has the care of the crown plate. He has a dozen 'tchinowiches' under him. For some time these gentlemen have amused themselves by passing the plate through acids, by which process a considerable portion of the silver was taken off, which they afterwards transformed into a solid state by a chymical process. This robbery had been carried on for a long time before it was discovered. But as all were equally guilty, no culprit could be found for want of proof. The crown plate has been ordered to be melted down and recast.

"The *bourgeois* and merchants are not personally subjected to the recruiting tax, but they have to pay 500f. for each recruit asked for them. Thus they provide as many soldiers

per thousand merchants as the nobles provide per thousand peasants. This tax brings in a considerable revenue to the crown. The number of merchants in the whole extent of the empire amounts to about 150,000, and as the state has already levied about sixty men per thousand, it results that the merchants have had to pay about 400,000,000f. Thus, however good Russians they may be, the *bourgeois* are beginning to find the war taxes somewhat heavy.

"The populations who suffer most from this state of things are precisely those who entertain the least sympathy for Russia—for instance, Finland, Livonia, Esthonia, Courland, Poland, and the Southern provinces, which are almost exclusively inhabited by Tartars and Mussulmans. The provinces of the Baltic particularly are weighed down by taxes. Whatever may be said about the Russian party carrying on the war to the last man and the last rouble, the government will have to consult a little the Catholics, the Protestants, and the Mussulmans, who united form more than one-third of the population of the empire, and who have certainly a right to be heard in the matter."

Reform in the administration of public affairs, and especially in the finance of the empire, became a pressing necessity for the new monarch. The treasury was very low, and willing as the people were to maintain the war, their means of doing so were very sensibly impaired. A report was spread through Europe that the emperor was obliged to sell the crown diamonds, at the suggestion and with the urgent advice of his chancellerie. Some account of these jewels will doubtless interest our readers:—"The crown treasury of the czars at Moscow contains precious stones of considerable amount. The two most considerable are diamonds, one the size of a pigeon's egg rose-cut. The Russians have given it the name of the Orloff. The other has the form of an irregular prism, and is of the size and almost the length of a little finger; it bears the name of the Shah, and its history is as follows:—It formerly belonged to the Sophis, and was one of two enormous diamonds which ornamented the throne of Nadir Shah, and which were designated by the Persians by the names of 'Sun of the Sea,' and 'Moon of the Mountains.' When Nadir was assassinated his treasures were pillaged, and his precious stones divided among a few soldiers, who carefully concealed them. An Armenian named Shafraş resided at that period at Bussora with his two brothers. One day an Affghan came to him, and offered for sale the large diamond, 'the Moon of the Mountains,' as well as an emerald, a ruby of fabulous size, a sapphire of the finest water, called by the Persians the 'Eye of

Allah,' and a number of other stones, for the whole of which he asked such a moderate sum that Shafra's suspected that they had not been honestly come by, and told him to call again, as he had not the money in the house. The Affghan, fearing Shafra's was going to act with treachery towards him, left the place and could not again be found, although the three brothers made every search for him. Some years afterwards the elder brother met the man at Bagdad, who told him that he had just sold all his precious stones for 65,000 piastres and a pair of valuable horses. Shafra's had the residence of the purchaser, who was a Jew, pointed out to him, and he went to him and offered him double the price he had given for them, but was refused. The three brothers then agreed to murder the Jew and rob him of his purchase, which they did, and on the following day poisoned the Affghan, and threw both the bodies into the river. A dispute soon after arose between the brothers as to the division of the spoil, which terminated in Shafra's getting rid of his two brothers by poison, after which he fled to Constantinople, and thence to Holland, where he made known the riches he possessed, and offered them for sale to the different courts of Europe. Catherine II. proposed to buy the Moon of the Mountains only. Shafra's requested to come to Russia, and he was introduced to the court jeweller. The terms demanded by Shafra's were—letters of nobility, a life annuity of 10,000 roubles, and 500,000 roubles, payable by equal instalments in ten years. Count Panin, who was then minister, delayed the settlement of the bargain as long as possible, and in the meantime had the Armenian led into such extravagances that he fell into debt, and when the minister found that he had no means of paying what he owed he abruptly broke off the negotiation. Shafra's, according to the laws of the country, could not leave until his debts should be paid, and the court jeweller prepared to take advantage of his embarrassments and intended that the diamond should fall into his hands for a fourth of its value. Shafra's, however, discovered the trap that had been laid for him, and, disposing of some of the less valuable stones among his countrymen, paid his debts, and disappeared. Agents were sent after him, who had even orders to assassinate and rob him, but he escaped them. Ten years after, while he was at Astracan, renewed offers were made to him, but he refused to enter into any negotiations unless the bargain should be settled at Smyrna. Catherine accepted, and became the possessor of the diamond for letters of nobility, 600,000 roubles, and 170,000 paper roubles, making together about two and a half millions of francs. Shafra's, not being able to return to

his country, where he would have had to give an account of two homicides and two fratricides, fixed himself at Astracan, where he married a countrywoman of his, and had seven daughters. One of his sons-in-law poisoned him for the sake of possessing his share of his property. The immense fortune which the murderer had acquired (from ten to twelve millions) was divided, and soon spent, by his successors, and several of the grandchildren of Shafra's are now living at Astracan in abject misery."

From the descriptions of the emperor's coronation afterwards published in Europe, it would appear that these precious treasures were not parted with, at all events irrecoverably. But it is quite true that very extraordinary and humiliating exertions had to be made to keep up the public credit in any measure, or supply the sinews of war.

The only remaining public act of the emperor, which was of interest beyond the bounds of his own empire, was a manifesto to Europe through his ministers and agents at foreign courts. It was communicated in the form of a note from the grand-chancellor. It was the first official paper given to Europe by the new emperor, and will therefore be peculiarly interesting to the page of history. Its contents were also felt to be important in every court and cabinet. This document will appropriately close the chapter on the accession of Alexander II. to the imperial throne:—

St. Petersburg, March 10.

My despatch, of the 2nd inst., will have informed you of the accession of his Majesty the Emperor Alexander II. I also, at the same time, had the honour of sending you the manifesto of our illustrious sovereign, issued on the first day of his reign. This document expresses his majesty's profound sense of the importance of the duties which he is called to fulfil. Those duties have been imposed on him by Divine Providence in the midst of severe trials. Ascending the throne of his ancestors, he beholds Russia involved in a war, the like of which occurring in a new reign history cannot produce. Our illustrious sovereign accepts these trials, trusting in God, confiding securely in the unwavering devotedness of his people, and filled with religious reverence for the memory of his much-loved father. In a child-like spirit of piety he accepts as his heritage two obligations, which, in his eyes, are equally sacred. The first demands from his majesty the employment of all the power which the will of God has placed in his hands for the defence of the integrity and honour of Russia. The second imposes on his majesty the duty of steadily devoting his care to the completion of that work of peace, the bases of which were sanctioned by the Emperor Nicholas. Faithful to the ideas which predominated in the last dispositions and arrangements of his illustrious father, the emperor has renewed and confirmed the instructions with which the plenipotentiary of Russia had been provided from December until the time when the Vienna conferences were to have been opened. In this way the intentions of the Emperor Nicholas are certain to be fulfilled. Their aim was—

To restore to Russia and Europe the blessings of peace. To confirm the freedom of worship and the welfare of the Christian peoples of the East without distinction of rite. To place the immunities of the principalities under a collective guarantee. To secure the free navigation of the Danube in favour of the trade of all nations. To put an

end to the rivalries of the great powers respecting the East, in such manner as to preclude the return of new complications. Finally, to come to an understanding with the great powers respecting the revision of the treaties by which they have recognised the principle of closing the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and in this way to arrive at an honourable settlement.

A peace concluded upon such a basis as this, since it would terminate the calamities of war, would call forth the blessings of all nations upon the new government. Russia, however, feels deeply, and all Europe must acknowledge the fact, that the hope of a restoration of peace would prove vain, if the conditions of an adjustment should overpass that just limit which a sense of the dignity of the crown led our august lord to fix irrevocably. The emperor will wait tranquilly until the cabinets called to deliberate in common with Russia on this question of universal interest for all Christendom shall declare the views by which their policy will be guided. Our august lord will enter upon these important deliberations in a sincere spirit of concord; this is the declaration which I

am expressly commissioned by his majesty to make to you in his name.

The general instructions with which you are provided prescribe to you the course which you are to continue to follow in your intercourse with the governments to which you are accredited. The emperor, in confirming you in the post to which you were appointed by the grace of his illustrious father, relies implicitly on your fidelity and zeal. It is his desire that on all occasions your conduct and language should bear witness to the loyalty with which Russia regards obligations involving fidelity to treaties; to its constant desire to live on good terms with all allied and friendly powers; and, finally, to its reverence for the inviolability of the rights of every state, as well as its firm resolve to maintain intact and make respected those rights which Divine Providence has entrusted to the emperor in making him the protector of the honour of the nation.

You are instructed to bring this to the knowledge of the court at which you had the honour to represent the Emperor Nicholas of glorious and much-loved memory.

NESELRÖDE.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL IN MARCH.—PROGRESS OF THE RAILWAY.—IMPROVEMENT OF BALAKLAVA.—RESTORED HEALTH OF THE TROOPS.—ACTIVITY OF THE ENGLISH GENERALS.—UTILITY OF FOREIGN LABOURERS.—PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW BOMBARDMENT.—SORTIES, COMBATS, ETC.

"Dishonour not your mothers,—now attest
That those whom you call fathers did beget you!
Be copy now to men of grosser blood,
And teach them how to war! And you good yeomen,
Whose limbs were made in England, show us here
The mettle of your pasture; let us swear
That you are worth your breeding, which I doubt not,
For there is none of you so mean and base
That hath not noble lustre in your eyes."

SHAKSPEARE.

Urox the progress of the railway from Balaklava to the trenches so much depended, that all intelligence concerning it was eagerly sought and perused in England. Happily it was under the direction of such men as Messrs. Peto and Brassy, and the immediate superintendence of Mr. Beattie; for had it been under any government department whatever, it would either have proceeded so slowly as to be of little use, or have altogether failed. Steadily did the work proceed during the whole month of March, and by the opening of the second bombardment in April, material of war was brought up to the very trenches. At the beginning of March, the rail was very useful in carrying up ammunition and guns for portions of the way, which became more and more extended as the month advanced. Commissary-general Filder declined to use it for his purposes, even when nearly half finished; alleging that forming a depot at the terminus, unloading the waggons, and again loading mules and men, would increase labour, and consume time, to such a degree as would render the use of the rail no saving on the whole. There was much force in this, as the commissary was well provided with other means of transport by this time. He did not object to the commissaries of divisions using the rail, so far as it served them; and they all professed to derive the greatest advantage from it. When the shot, shell, powder, &c.,

were deposited at the temporary termini, as the rail advanced, large parties of muleteers and Highlanders received the burdens and brought them to the lines. The Highlanders were more worked in this way than any other of the troops, which may perhaps account for their indifferent health during this month, especially in the 79th. Many of them carried very oppressive burdens from the railway up to the depot behind the lines. Very early in its operations, the railway enabled the British to return the good offices of the French, who had so often assisted them with ambulances, mules, and men, in the agony of their endurance during the winter. Instead of bringing up with horses whatever was required for Bosquet's camp on the edge of the plateau overlooking the Woronzoff Road, the railway, with little labour and with rapidity, deposited such things within a convenient distance for Bosquet's *corps d'armée* to remove. The French paid many compliments to the discipline, order, and regularity which prevailed among the navies; and evidently wondered how so much organisation and system could prevail in English departments worked by voluntary enterprise, when such confusion and helplessness pervaded everything conducted by government—the converse of this being the case among themselves. Our polite allies were not aware that the provost-marshal had to be invited more

than once to curb the rough spirit of refractory navvies. It is but justice to them to add, that although boxing and wrestling matches, and rough experiments in new sources of amusement, engaged them sometimes, to the annoyance of those around them, they were good workmen, good-tempered, good-natured, and hearty in the cause from patriotic feeling. The French were particularly obliged by the carriage of hut and hospital timber, as soon as the railway was in a working condition. One of the earliest advantages of the enterprise arose from a branch having been formed to the other side of the harbour, so that the harbour on both sides became available, and guns and ammunition were brought up from what was called the Diamond Wharf. Another great advantage, very early obtained, was the removal of the issue department for fuel and fodder belonging to the commissariat from Balaklava to Kadikoi, where the navvies constructed a depot and platform, with suitable sheds, as they would have done on an English line. The value of forming the fuel and fodder issuing department at Kadikoi may be judged from the fact that 1000 sacks of barley were daily given out. It was a great relief to Balaklava, to subtract so large an amount of business from a place where so much that was chaotic and distracting interfered with the efficient distribution of every material. The navvies worked a limestone quarry in front of the third division, whence they were enabled to obtain lime of an excellent quality, which proved not only useful for building purposes on the railway, but also for purifying Balaklava, and for placing in the pits where so many dead bodies had been putrifying. The lime-burning in front of General England's division proved a source of amusement to the British, and of great annoyance to the enemy, who, seeing the smoke so constantly ascending thence, concluded that extensive works were going forward, and shells were constantly thrown to interrupt them. The shells fell harmlessly about the lime-kilns, and thus the navvies, without losing a man, gave the enemy trouble, and caused him an extra expenditure of ammunition. These energetic fellows also erected a large washing-house for the hospital, which was of very great utility—it had been one of the chief *desiderata* both at Balaklava and Sentari, in connection with the care of the sick.

Up to the middle of March, the climate seemed to agree well with the railway labourers, but they then began to complain of lassitude, and an inability to produce their usual complement of labour; they, however, rallied in health subsequently, and performed their useful and important task. The improvement at Balaklava became very great, and the facilities of receiving from the ships what was

wanting on land, aided much the efficiency of the army during March.

The electric telegraph was another of the agencies which proved a useful auxiliary. By it Balaklava and the camp were connected by prompt communication, so that Sir Colin Campbell could at once inform Lord Raglan of any operations upon his flank by the Russian army in the field, and his lordship as quickly communicate his instructions. Headquarters were, by this means, brought into contact as it were with all the attacks, and with General Bosquet. The French worked the semaphore system of telegraphs, Canrobert giving to them the preference.

The increased means of transport in various forms enabled the English to regard the time necessarily consumed in the construction of the railway without impatience; for so pressing were the demands for supplies of all sorts at the lines, that the British army would have been much endangered if relying only upon the railway, without the other new accessories, or upon the latter without the railway. The usual amount of labour at Lord Raglan's disposal would have been literally useless to meet the waste in the trenches, and the vast preparations requisite for the second bombardment, to which the expectation of the armies and of the civilised world was now turned. A considerable number of Turks from Constantinople and Smyrna, who had been employed there as porters—a motley crowd from the shores of the Levant, of men good, bad, and indifferent, the bad and indifferent being much the more numerous—and still larger numbers of Croats,—were employed in the new department of the land-transport service. They worked hard, were paid well, fought fiercely among themselves, and were kept well in hand by the English provost-marshal. These men carried up prodigious loads, and were employed in promoting the objects of the sanitary commission, which arrived later than was expected, but set to work with vigorous earnestness when it did arrive, until dead horses disappeared from the surface of the plateau, houses in Balaklava were whitewashed, the burial-places covered with lime, the filth cleared from the harbour, and various other measures completed, which the gentlemen connected with the commission and the railway co-operated in accomplishing. Mr. Rawlinson, the engineer of the sanitary commission, Doctors Sutherland and Gavin, his medical coadjutors, and certain practical men acting as inspectors, executed what, had it been left to the staff of the British army, would never have been attempted.

The health of the troops varied with the weather, and "March many weathers," an expression so proverbial in England, applied

to the Crimea: it "came in like a lion," and went out as fiercely. Some portions of it were as mild as early summer, and the spring-like appearance of the country charmed every eye. The fruit-trees, which had not been cut down close to Balaklava, were rich with blossom; verdant grass sprung up on the trodden and bare earth behind the camp; the crocus, hyacinth, and other Crimean spring flowers, burst forth over the sun-warmed plateau; and so prolific was this fair vegetation, that it was no uncommon thing to see the crocus peeping up from beneath iron shot or bomb-shells, and to descry the little snowdrop nestling in its purity and beauty amidst broken planking, piles of ammunition, or in the corner of some rude hut. The vines put forth their luxuriant branches early, pushing their way into the wooden tenements of the soldiery. The birds commenced their carolling, and all nature seemed turned into smiles and song. The soldiery caught from her this inspiration, and every face looked cheerful, and the old home ditties resounded through the camp—"Scots wha hae," and "Rory O'More," were as familiar to the ear of the dwellers at camp, as they had been in the autumn, before famine, fever, and frost, the pelting storm, and the pitiless rain, had deprived the men of joy, although no combination of misfortunes had robbed them of their courage. Frequently, however, the azure sky was suddenly overcast, and as if the Storm King made his home among the bleak hills of the Taurus, gusts of fierce power would sweep the earth and clouds. Many a night of bitter frost, and some of heavy snow, followed days of sunshine, and even of relaxing heat. The men were well supplied with warm clothing; comforters, socks, and shaggy coats of all patterns were in abundance:—the people of England had sent out enough for English, Turks, French, and Russians. The men seemed to think that, whether the day was hot or cold, these articles should be worn in honour of the donors, and many caught cold by being obliged, from excess of heat, to throw off those winter garments, and then, finding themselves on duty in the trenches, shivering for twenty-four hours for want of the articles with which they had encumbered themselves upon the sunny plateau. Sir George Brown, true to his habits as a martinet,—as he was to his sword and his queen in the day of battle,—resolved to put an end to the irregular habits of the men as to their attire, and published a divisional order, insisting upon a strict costume, and *the reappearance of the discarded stock!* And the general being a man to be obeyed, a great change was speedily effected in the light division.

Many of the men suffered from those sudden climatic changes, which were especially felt from the want of good shoes and boots. There

were large supplies of shoemaker's work of some sort, but the work itself was generally atrocious, although this had been a subject of complaint with the previous supply. Both boots and shoes were too small in the majority of cases; and when they could be got on, they seldom were worn longer than ten days before the soles came off. The thick mud of the plateau was a severe test for any shoe or boot, but those with which the soldiers were supplied were almost useless; many a night of severe frost, and often nights of rain, during that month, the soldiers did duty without soles to their shoes. From these causes there were many invalids in March, notwithstanding the abundance of fresh meat and vegetables, and the consequent disappearance of scurvy; and although the comforts of the men in other respects were various, and generally ample, the sickness, at the close of February, made the medical returns for the beginning of March rather inauspicious. Lord Raglan sent home the report of the 2nd of March, from the medical-inspector of hospitals, Dr. Hall, which was in substance as follows:—

"The result of the sanitary condition of the army is by no means so satisfactory as the previous improvement during the week of fine weather that we had, had led me to anticipate; but, though the unfavourable change in the weather, from the genial warmth of spring to the bitter cold of winter, which took place on the 20th, had an injurious effect on certain classes of disease in weakly subjects, still there is sufficient improvement remaining to enable us to look forward with confident hope to the future; and I am more inclined to indulge this hope from the favourable change which has taken place in the type of fever prevailing in the General Hospital at Balaklava, in the 93rd Highlanders and some other regiments, from low typhoid to that of a remittent, and even intermittent, form.

"Bowel complaints continue to be the most prevalent class of diseases; but I think they are not so serious as they were a short time ago; nor is scurvy so manifest as it was since the issue of lime-juice daily as a portion of the men's ration. Lately, I have instructed the medical officers of regiments to inspect the men, for the purpose of detecting this complaint (skin diseases), and seeing that the men are clean in their persons, and change their shirts and flannels at stated periods. The last weekly report is favourable. In the 4th division, which is the only report I have at hand in my hut, only 138, out of 2596 men inspected, bore any traces of scurvy; and this is one of the divisions which was as much, or more, effected with it than any division in the army a short time ago. Mr. Roberts, the staff surgeon recently appointed to superintend the

medical concerns of the division, is an intelligent, active, and zealous officer, and he has effected wonderful reforms since he joined. If the issue of fresh meat could be insured, together with vegetables and lime-juice, I am quite satisfied, now that the men are warmly clad, and will soon be better sheltered, a manifest improvement would take place in their health. And if the military operations carrying on would only admit of some longer exemption from duty, a still greater improvement would be observed. I am inclined to think our greatest difficulties and miseries have been surmounted, and we may now look forward for better and more cheering times. It was wonderful to see the cheering effect the few fine days had on the health and spirits of the men; and as the winter may now be considered nearly at an end, I am full of hope and confidence."

On the whole, the men were much better off in March than they had been since landing in the Crimea, for food, shelter, clothing, cleanliness, medical attendance, medicine, hospital accommodation, and, above all, relief from excessive labour. The generals also paid more direct attention to the men, showing a deeper personal interest in them: for the first time since the opening of the siege, a general officer visited the trenches daily. Major-general Jones, of the engineers, was also a frequent visitor of the works, inspecting everything with minute attention. His report of the conduct of the officers of engineers and artillery was very flattering. As the former class of officers in the British service were depreciated, it is but just to mention that General Jones, after the war was over, in a speech at a public meeting in England, declared that the competency, courage, and attention to duty of those who composed that arm of the service before Sebastopol, were worthy of the highest eulogy. He found the greatest promptitude to obey his orders, and the most satisfactory performance of the most arduous and intellectually difficult services. Perhaps never in any army did the artillery behave better, either as to activity, courage, or intelligent qualifications for their duties.

Pleasing, on the whole, as the accounts are which appear in the foregoing pages, it must not be supposed that confusion, mismanagement, and selfishness had taken their departure from the British camp in the Crimea, and from the harbour of Balaklava. The following incident, related by Mr. Russell, is evidence to the contrary:—"As an instance of the way in which public money is squandered by the authorities,—well, if not by the authorities, by somebody or other who is vicegerent for the Genius of Misrule at Balaklava,—I will just mention a circumstance which has recently

come to my knowledge, and which any economist on the committee of inquiry may profitably ask a question or two about. Mr. Alfred Pratt, an officer of customs, was appointed by the War-office some time ago to superintend the warehousing and landing of stores at Balaklava, and was sent out there by the government with a staff of one foreman of works, eight warehousemen, and thirty dock-labourers, with whom he arrived a month ago. This little expedition has, up to the present moment, cost the country about £5000, and has not done a particle of good for the money. Mr. Pratt, who is a practical engineer, offered to build a landing-wharf, but the authorities would not give a site for it. They would not employ him on the duty which the government commissioned him to execute. He states that he has been treated with neglect, and has been subjected to contumely and affront; and at this instant he is employed side by side with a corporal in superintending the levelling of ground for wooden huts at a salary of 25s. per diem!"

It was obvious that, in the midst of improvements effected by civilians, and by persons sent out from the government with especial commissions to overrule the routine of the departments, the disposition of the officials to impede all reform,—even although the public interests were sacrificed by their opposition,—was but little abated. Where they could, with any safety, obstruct, they resisted all deviation from their own ways, although horrors unutterable, and "confusion worse confounded," were the consequences of these ways. Every man who applied business habits and energy to the reformation of abuses, was "a dangerous man" in the official vocabulary, and insult as well as obstruction met him at every turn. The overbearing power of public opinion in England, and the exposure of these practices in the London press, alone protected those who saved the soldier, and saved their country from contumely and hindrance on the part of most of the Crimean authorities. These censures do not apply to the generals of division and brigade, who were, for the most part, from the commencement of the expedition, noble soldiers, men of experience in their profession and patriotism in their principle and feeling. It must not be supposed that the bad conduct and incompetency of those who have fallen under public disapprobation, at home or abroad, has been exaggerated in this work. A very small portion of the misdoings of these people, and their gross ignorance, has been noticed; and many of the most painful instances of the sort only came to light too long after the events for the public to insist upon retribution on account of them. As an instance of this, the author last quoted relates, in March, 1855,

(and the circumstance was first made public by him), an occurrence connected with the battle of Balaklava, which might have led to the defeat of our heavy cavalry, and would have caused such an issue but for their extraordinary skill and courage:—"It will scarcely be credited (but it does no harm now to mention it) that at Balaklava the Scots Greys *had no cartridges* to fit their carbines, and that they were armed with the old cavalry sword, which bent in several instances on coming in contact with the thick coats of the Russian horsemen. The new swords are excellent weapons, and afforded great satisfaction to all but those on whom they were tried." Such an event could not have happened by any mere mistake: either utter neglect, ignorance, cupidity, or treason, must have placed the Scots Greys almost unarmed before their foes.

It was only during the month of March that some portions of the infantry received Minié or other superior muskets, instead of the old and inferior weapons which they had brought to the Crimea.

Mr. Russell relates a striking case of mismanagement in a single instance, being felt long after, and the extraordinary impunity allowed to the perpetrators. Under date of the 6th of March, he wrote:—"We have now about sixty garrison carriages at the artillery depot, and the stores of shot and shell seem inexhaustible, but, in reality, are not too much for thirty hours' firing. Our guns of position will now be available, if ever we require to use them. The story of these guns is instructive. It will be remembered that the Russians inflicted great loss upon us by their guns of position at the Alma, and that we had none to reply to them. Indeed, had they been landed at Kalamita Bay, it is doubtful if we could have got horses to draw them. However, if we had had the horses, we could not have had the guns. The fact is, that sixty fine guns of position, with all their equipment complete, were shipped on board the *Taurus* at Woolwich, and sent out to the East. When the vessel arrived at Constantinople, the admiral in charge, with destructive energy, insisted on transhipping all the guns into the *Gertrude*. The captain in charge remonstrated, but in vain; words grew high, but led to no result. The guns, beautifully packed and laid, with everything in its proper place, were hauled up out of the hold, and huddled, in the most approved higgledy-piggledy *à la Balaklava ancienne*, into the *Gertrude*, where they were deposited on the top of a quantity of medical and other stores. The equipments shared the same fate, and the hold of the vessel soon presented to the eye of the artilleryman the realisation of the saying ancient the arrangement of a midshipman's chest, 'everything uppermost, and nothing at hand.'

The officer in charge got to Varna, and in vain sought permission to go to some retired nook, discharge the cargo, and re-stow the guns. The expedition sailed, and when the *Gertrude* arrived at Old Port, had Hercules been set to clear the guns, as his fourteenth labour, he could not have done it. And so the medicines, that would certainly have done good, and the guns, that might have done harm, were left to neutralise each other."

In the above gross case of clumsy and incompetent management, medicines to heal the sick, and arms to fight the enemy, were huddled together, and both made inaccessible. It was the fashion at home to boast of the order and good management of everything in connection with the navy: this case is but a specimen of very many which would prove the disorderly way in which matters were managed in that branch of the service. The state of the harbour of Balaklava at any time, up to the end of March, 1855, would prove the same thing.

Perhaps one of the most glaring abuses was the way in which the transports were permitted to remain in the harbour as places of abode for certain gentlemen who preferred them to Balaklava or the camp. For these transports the government paid enormous sums; and there they remained, rocking on the waters of Balaklava harbour, perverted to private purposes, under a system of favouritism and corruption. The author of these pages does not know the names of the gentlemen who possessed these expensive hotels, while the men were in want of those things which the increased transports should have been employed to convey for them; he can, therefore, have no invidious object in view while he records this; he simply performs a duty which historical fidelity demands. The money of the nation was squandered in this way in a manner disgraceful to the government, and to the people who tolerated such faithlessness.

No exhibition of injustice and the abuse of authority was more signal than that in the case of Captain Christie, a brave and upright sailor, who did his duty with fidelity and skill. On an earlier page of this history the loss of the *Prince* and other transports was noticed, which were wrecked in the great gale of the 14th of November, in consequence of Captain Dacres having refused to allow them inside the harbour—notwithstanding the importunities of Captain Christie, who superintended the transports, for their admission, and his strong representations in reference to the *Prince* in particular, because of the value of her cargo, and the state of her anchors. It is necessary to refer to this matter again, as with the month of March the captain's services

at Balaklava terminated. The loss of the *Prince*, the *Fulcrum*, and so many other transports, caused a great sensation in England, and some violent parliamentary discussions: it was necessary for the government and the heads of departments to do something to appease the public clamour, and satisfy so many of the most respectable and powerful of their own supporters, who were discontented, and openly and strongly expressed that discontent. The usual mode of procedure in such cases was resorted to: it is an infamous mode, but will of course continue so long as the electors of the United Kingdom permit. The approved plan of quieting the public to which we refer is, to sacrifice some person who has least power and political interest, and who may with some degree of plausibility be selected. Thus, to conciliate the people when discontented with the campaign of 1854 in the Baltic, an attempt was made to turn Sir Charles Napier into the "scapegoat" of the Admiralty. Sir Charles would not go silently into the wilderness; he could use his pen and tongue, had money and connexions, and, as a Jupiter Tonans of agitation, shook the old Admiralty to its foundations. Captain Christie was neither an orator, nor a writer—a rich man, nor a man of large political connexion; and it was very convenient to make a sacrifice of him, and thereby prove how zealous the government was, and how plainly any mischief which ever happened resulted from individual misdeed, which they were ever ready to punish. This was the work of the Aberdeen cabinet. Mr. Gladstone, "in his place," assured the House of Commons that Captain Christie having arrived at Malta, a telegraph ordered him back to the Crimea, to be tried by court-martial for the loss of the transports under his care. This was very satisfactory to the house, and placed the good Mr. Gladstone in a favourable light, and very much in contrast to the wicked Captain Christie, who allowed the storm to wreck the transport fleet! The real facts were, that Captain Christie never received any orders at Malta to go back to the Crimea and stand his trial. *He had not gone to Malta at all. He never left his post for a day.* He was ordered to be tried by court-martial, and after his heart was nearly broken, the admiral informed him that there was no ground for such a procedure, and he was free to go home. He was superseded in his command, and the man selected to fill his place was the Captain Heath who went about canvassing certificates from the transport captains, *that the harbour of Balaklava was in a condition of order, and that matters there were regulated with precision and system.* Every one knew at home and abroad what a scandalous imposition this would have

been if the glaring untruth of the statement did not render an imposition upon any one impossible. Captain Heath is a very efficient officer, no doubt, and may have been as competent as Captain Christie to assume the office the latter so worthily filled, but it was not therefore he was chosen. His toadyism, not his talent, gained for him the responsible post; while Captain Christie, whom every member of the government and all the authorities in the Crimea knew to be free from blame, was superseded, in order to cover the delinquencies of greater favourites, and make some sacrifice to the public indignation against the mismanagement at Balaklava. The mode in which Captain Christie was worked out of his post by an unprincipled intrigue was this:—About two months, or a little more, after the disastrous gale, Quartermaster-general Airey wrote to the captain, requesting details as to the loss of the *Prince*; this letter of the general's contained an enclosure, which was a letter from Captain Daeres the harbour-master, assuring General Airey that the *Prince* should be brought in as soon as possible. To Sir Richard Airey's letter Christie replied as follows:—

Orient, Balaklava.

"Sir,—In reply to your letter relative to the loss of the *Prince* steamer, I beg to state that she arrived off Balaklava on the 8th of November, in fine weather, when, in attempting to anchor, she lost both bower anchors and chains, they not having been securely clenched. She hung on by the *Jason* while she disembarked her troops, and in the evening stood out to sea and got another anchor ready. Being myself on board the *Melbourne*, at anchor outside, I was most anxious to get the *Prince* into harbour, and sent an officer repeatedly to the senior naval officer to request that she might be allowed to go in; but the object being at that time to have as few vessels in the harbour at the same moment as possible, he, although as anxious as myself, would not allow it. On the 14th of November, the day of the gale, the steam of the *Prince* was up in good time, but the sea rose and became so heavy that she drove, cut away her mast, and the survivors state that the mizen rigging fouled her screw before she struck.

"I have the honour, &c.,

"P. CHRISTIE."

"Major-general Airey, Quartermaster-general."

No intimation of any change of feeling towards him was made to Captain Christie: from the *Times* newspaper he learned the fact, by reading the speech of Mr. Gladstone, when describing him as ordered back from Malta—a statement which might well fill the mind of the ill-used officer with amazement. On the 20th of February, however, the mystery was

cleared up, for he was informed that he was superseded, and that Captain Heath, the very officer under whose management as harbour-master Balaklava attained its very bad reputation for confusion and filth, was appointed in his place! There was literally an outburst of sympathy in the Crimea. The captains of ships subscribed £200 as a tribute of respect; and all ranks and classes out of the naval and military clique that so disastrously co-operated with the government at home, were open in their expressions of condolence and esteem. In reply to the intimation that he was to be tried by court-martial, the captain thus addressed Captain Milne of the Admiralty:—

Orient, Balaklava, March 5, 1855.

“MY DEAR MILNE,—Many thanks for your kind note of the 16th. Although a court-martial is at all times a formidable thing, still on this occasion I feel such perfect confidence of success, that I rather rejoice at it. It will, I am in hopes, prove to the Admiralty and the public the rectitude of all my proceedings. I am as innocent of the loss of those two ships, *Prince* and *Resolute*, as a babe in a cradle. No officer could do more than I did in my endeavour to place them in safety. I only wanted a tug and leave to enter the harbour to accomplish this. After the *Prince* arrived on the 8th of November, there were four days before the gale of the 14th in which she might have gone in. There was nothing of greater importance in my opinion going on at the time. There was plenty of room in the harbour, two tugs, two line-of-battle ships, and several other men-of-war present; yet, with all this force at command if necessary, my earnest request was not attended to, and this ship, with her one anchor and valuable cargo, was allowed to remain outside. I of course did not order her to sea with one anchor, as I expected her to be taken in every hour, and I knew that it was of great consequence to the army that the warm clothing should be landed as soon as possible, as well as the rest of the cargo. I don't think poor Dacres will ever forgive himself for this. The transport captains and agents are all outrageous at my being superseded, and I trust the lords of the Admiralty will soon be convinced how little I have merited such treatment.

“P. CHRISTIE.”

It was the end of March before the gallant captain was informed, by a letter from Admiral Lyons, that he was at liberty, as no charge could be substantiated against him. On the first of April he left the Crimea, and soon died of a broken heart. He prized his professional reputation far more than his lucrative post; he was dismissed from the former

arbitrarily and unjustly, and robbed of the latter infamously.

Having sketched the general condition of affairs during the month of March, we shall now proceed to chronicle the more prominent incidents of the history of the siege.

A despatch of Lord Raglan's, written on the 3rd, discloses the view he took of matters at the opening of the month:—

Before Sebastopol, March 3.

MY LORD,—Some more ships are said to have been sunk since I wrote to your lordship on the 27th. I am not certain of this; but, according to my observation, the new barrier across the harbour appeared yesterday evening to have been extended beyond the point at which I had seen it two days before.

The enemy is busily occupied in establishing a work considerably nearer the French batteries, on the extreme right, than that which was attacked by our allies on the morning of the 24th.

The enemy seem to be increasing their force in the neighbourhood of Sebastopol, both to the northward and upon the Tchernaya.

The railway continues to progress satisfactorily, and we already make considerable use of it in the conveyance of stores, hutting materials, &c., as far as Kadikoi; and the electric telegraph is completed between that village and my head-quarters.

The weather has again become extremely cold, and there was a fall of snow yesterday, and some little this morning.

I enclose a return of casualties to the 1st instant, inclusive.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The Lord Pannmure, &c.

No attempt to disturb the Russians in the construction of these new works was made by our allies, against whom they were chiefly directed. His lordship's despatch does not mention that the cavalry horses continued to suffer, and that Colonel Dogherty had only three horses fit for service on the 3rd of March. The late hutting of the horses of the British cavalry division was a great misfortune, as the details of the Crimean inquiry, and those given before the Chelsea board of general officers long after, proved; yet we cannot but think that both Lords Lucan and Cardigan have had far more than their just share of public censure in connection with these transactions. Mistakes and blunders were made everywhere, as if by a fatal concurrence of misfortune; and frequently, as in the case of these generals, by men who had no wish to spare themselves, and were ready to lay down life in the service of the army and of their country.

The French signalled the opening of March by throwing shells and rockets into the town of Sebastopol; the long range of these projectiles enabled our ally to set fire to houses, and alarm the enemy for the safety of their magazines.

In the despatch of Lord Raglan, he announces the fact of the Russians increasing their numbers. It was afterwards ascertained what the Russian forces were at the time his

lordship wrote, or, rather, a few days subsequently, when the reinforcements were placed to which he referred. The following was the arrangement of the Russian army in the Crimea, as reported at the French head-quarters from a reliable source of information :—

In the town and in the suburb to the south of the Great Fort	39,000 men.
To the north of the Great Fort, and in places distant at the utmost 6000 yards, Belbek, Tchergoum, &c.	35,000 "
On the Alma and towards Eupatoria.....	25,000 "
At Perekop	10,000 "
At Theodosia and Kertch.....	10,000 "
Total of infantry	119,000 "
On various points—cavalry.....	15,000 "
Engineers and artillery	10,000 "
Sailors	5,000 "
Grand total.....	149,000 "

A division of infantry was announced as hourly expected; as also a division of grenadiers and a brigade of reserve.

At daybreak, on the morning of the 4th of March, the Russians made an ineffectual sortie against the French. For an hour a severe fusillade rang up the heights; the cannon also gave forth their thunders. The Russians retired, and the day rose in brightness and silence. There was a grand council between the French chiefs and Lord Raglan in the course of the morning.

On the 5th, there were smart skirmishes at dawn between the French and Russians. The ninth division of the French army was moved to the right of the British attack.

The English were in good spirits, and amused themselves in all the old home ways when that was at all practicable. A "spring meeting" took place on the top of the ridge near Karangi, where horse-racing, after a sort never seen in England, delighted jockeys and spectators. There was a large assemblage of soldiers, sutlers, railway-labourers, Turks, and Croats, who gazed with eager delight upon the scene. The Cossack videttes on Canrobert's Hill and at Kamara could not comprehend the very peculiar movements of the English, and galloped about in the strangest excitement. While the races were going on, two Russian officers deserted in an ingenious manner. They were both Poles, and one had been degraded to the ranks for a political offence. They belonged to a party of the new reinforcements, and requested the men, twelve in number, to advance with them to the English vidette, persuading the party that he was a Russian soldier—the uniform of both the English and Russian light cavalry being frequently blue. When the party approached the English dragoon, he fired his carbine, and the Russians fled, the two Poles dashing forward to the English lines. The Cossacks, perceiving their object, galloped

hard to intercept them; but the English dragoon picket, gallantly pushing forward, were enabled to protect the fugitives. Their gratitude for their escape was touchingly expressed. They rode beautiful horses, which they said were not their own, and begged that Sir Colin would return them to the enemy, that no pretext might be left for them to say that the fugitives had stolen them. Sir Colin had the horses brought out to the last position occupied by our videttes, and then letting them loose, they naturally galloped back to their own lines. These men stated that a corps of 8000 men had just joined the army between Baidar and Simpheropol.

On the 6th, the news of the death of the Emperor Nicholas arrived. General Canrobert was greatly excited: immediately on receipt of the intelligence he wrote a note to each of his two chiefs of *corps d'armée*, ending his despatch with the words, "this is great news." Lord Raglan wrote home a few days afterwards as follows :—

Before Sebastopol, March 9.

MY LORD,—I am happy to be able to inform you that the weather is exceedingly fine, and that I entertain great hopes, derived from the reports of the principal medical officer, that the sick will materially benefit by the improvement in the temperature.

Our advanced batteries are making considerable progress.

Every effort is directed to the maintenance of the camps in a healthy state, which, as the warm weather approaches, becomes daily more important.

I enclose the return of casualties to the 8th.

I received, on the evening of the 6th inst., a telegraphic despatch from Lord John Russell, dated Berlin, the 2nd, announcing the death of the Emperor of Russia at 12 o'clock on that day. According to the information of deserters, the event has not been promulgated at Sebastopol.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The Lord Ponmore, &c.

The tidings of the czar's death spread "like wildfire" through the camps; and perhaps never before was there so much political discussion in an army since that commanded by William III. in Ireland, or the iron host of Oliver Cromwell in England. The speculations about "the great fact" were as numerous as in the fashionable political circles of Western Europe. Whether the Russians had heard the tidings in Sebastopol was doubted; but they kept up an incessant fire all day, working their guns with fierce energy, as if to show that they had not lost heart, but were still ready to

"Confront the danger when the waves rolled high,
Thwarting the storm."

During the previous fortnight a steamer had been anchored at the head of the harbour, armed with two long pivot-guns, which did considerable damage to the French working parties engaged around the new batteries on the heights of Inkerman. A battery of three guns, distant 1500 yards from the ship, was unmasked, and red-hot shot prepared. When

it was clear day the guns suddenly opened; the three shots passed right over the enemy's deck; the watch instantly rushed to turn up the screw; but, before she could be moved, several shots had struck her rigging, some her hull, and others her machinery. She slipped her cable, and hauled under the land. A deserter informed the English that three men were killed, three wounded, and the vessel so damaged that she was obliged to lay up and careen for repairs.

It is probable that there was another vessel there, which hauled off in time to escape damage, for Lord Raglan, in a despatch written on the 8th, refers to two steamers; but other credible accounts represent the matter as it is given here. The despatch of his lordship was as follows:—

Before Sebastopol, March 8.

MY LORD,—The enemy continue to manifest great activity in preparing the work which I mentioned to your lordship in my despatch of the 3rd, and are now bringing up platform timber and guns for the equipment and armament of it. Vast convoys are daily observed arriving on the north side of the town; and I learn, from information entitled to credit, that the road leading from Simpheropol is covered with waggons, laden with provisions and munitions of war. This morning three British guns, placed in a battery overhanging the Tchernaya, opened upon two small steamers anchored at the head of the harbour, and, after a fire of about an hour, obliged them to take refuge behind a point. One of them appeared to have sustained considerable damage, and is supposed to have been deserted by her crew. The weather was fine yesterday, and is particularly so to-day, and the country is becoming quite dry. I have reason to hope that the sick are deriving material benefit from this change. I have established a convalescent hospital on the heights immediately above Balaklava, near a fine spring of water. The inspector-general of hospitals entertains great expectations of the advantages that will result from placing the huts in so healthy a locality. Lieutenant-general Pennecfather has resumed the command of the 2nd division, and is, I am happy to be able to report, looking remarkably well. I enclose the casualties to the 4th inst.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The Lord Panmure, &c.

It was not until the 6th of March that Lord Raglan received official information of the death of the czar, which became instantly known in the camp. The next day his lordship sent information to the Russian general under a flag of truce, who thanked him coolly, and either affected to put no faith in the statement, or disbelieved it. That night they constructed several more rifle-pits—a means of annoyance to the French more harassing than any other which the besieged had as yet employed. These pits were constructed in front of the Mamelon, already described, and, being opposite the French advanced parallel, were a source of destructive inconvenience to those who occupied it. Many and fierce encounters between the two hostile parties were waged for the possession of these pits; and bitter, and perhaps humiliating, reverses were experienced by our ally in the attempts made to conquer them. Some shots from the English 9-pounders scat-

tered the gabions and sand-bags, and dashed the earth and embankments about; but our allies did not, during the month's operations, storm the pits at the point of the bayonet with sufficient resolution and numbers to drive the enemy from the position.

The efforts for arming all the batteries with the heaviest armaments ever before used in war, were unceasing. Several sea-service mortars, with a range of 3500 yards, were brought up to the British front. The second parallel was converted into one great battery; and detached works were constructed within 600, 800, and 1000 yards from the enemy's guns; but the "attacks" were in the same position as on the 17th of October, when the first bombardment was opened; they were, however, enlarged, better finished, stronger, and more heavily armed.

General Simpson and Sir John McNeil having arrived in the Crimea, both made a grand tour of inspection over all the works, and at the posts about Balaklava. General Simpson assumed the office which he was sent out to fill,—that of chief of the staff,—relieving Lord Raglan of much trouble, and the quartermaster and adjutant-generals also.

The French became extremely impatient of the delay in opening the new bombardment. Mr. Russell, in his journal, seems repeatedly to have doubts whether the French were as well advanced in preparation as the British. The fact was, that while such doubts were expressed by English correspondents in the Crimea, the French commander-in-chief was painfully urgent upon Lord Raglan, and perpetually complaining to his own government of the slowness of the English commander, and the danger to the cause thus created—giving thereby the enemy every opportunity to strengthen himself for the crisis. Very early in March, Canrobert informed Lord Raglan that he would be ready to open fire along his whole line on the 13th. The reply of the English general was:—"Your excellency knows that the English engineers have begun new batteries, which will play no unimportant part in the operations against the place. These batteries are somewhat advanced, but they will not be finished on the day which you indicate; and I cannot at this moment name, with precision, the time when they, as well as the other English batteries, will be able to open fire under proper conditions of preparation." The comment made upon this letter by the commissioner of the Emperor of the French, the Baron de Bazancourt, was as follows:—"It was impossible not to see that all these delays were fatal, and that they allowed the defence to acquire a development which doubled the obstacles and multiplied the dangers. The Russians, favoured by the configuration and

nature of the ground around Inkerman and Carcening Bay, had, by skilful works, rendered it impossible to attempt anything against the Malakoff, except a powerful diversion. The difficulty of this perilous position was apparent to every one; and General Canrobert therefore continued daily to urge the commander-in-chief of the English army to hasten his preparations for opening the fire."

The letter of General Canrobert to the French minister of war, written on the 17th, reveals the state of things as they appeared from the point of view taken at the French headquarters:—"Our batteries present the enormous figure of nearly 500 guns ready to fire; and I am waiting, ever since the 14th, for the English to be ready to act with us. I urge them as much as I can, officially and officiously; for I feel the imperative necessity of throwing ourselves upon that part of Sebastopol, which it may be, perhaps, possible for us to take; but I am also bound to remember that it is my duty not to act without the concurrence of our allies. The important affair of the moment is to take by storm the Mamelon on the south of the Malakoff Tower, where the enemy is strongly intrenched under the protection of an encircling fire of artillery."

Again, on the 20th of March, he wrote:—"The English cannot yet tell me when they will be ready. This delay is the more fatal as the enemy profits by it to increase daily the strength of his works, and to add new ones to those which already exist."

On the 22nd the general again writes to his minister:—"Yesterday I urged Lord Raglan as strong as circumstances would permit. I have not been able to obtain a positive reply."

It is obvious from these communications, directed to Marshal Vailant by General Canrobert, that the French considered themselves ready to open fire early in March, and that they were deterred from doing so through the delays interposed by the English general.

Returning from this consideration to the actual progress of affairs, an important event occurred in the allied camp on the 12th. Omar Pasha landed at Kamiesch. The allied generals and admirals held council of war. The decisions of the council were to the effect that the Egyptian division which for some time had been at Constantinople, should be required for service at Eupatoria, and that Omar, with 22,000 men, the pick of his army, should land at Badaklava and Kamiesch to take part in the siege. The arrival of the Egyptian division which was at Eupatoria, would enable the allies to hold the place with 30,000 men, compelling the enemy to keep an army of observation there, and preventing the hope of a successful attack. If the attack upon the town should prove successful, Omar was to return to

Eupatoria with his own troops, a French division, and an English brigade, and march against Simpheropol, or such point of the Russian line of communication with Sebastopol as might be most strategically skilful.

On the 14th General Bisson was on duty in the French trenches, and, under his directions, Captain Champanhet, at the head of his grenadiers, captured three of the Russian advanced posts. The enemy returned the same day, and found the French Colonel Frossard at work with his sappers; the suddenness of the attack placed the French at great disadvantage, who held the ground with difficulty, and must have been driven from it had not Major Gibou and a party of riflemen charged with the bayonet, and driven the enemy down into the ravine. Such was the result, according to the French relaters of the action.

On the 15th five detachments of the 3rd Zouaves, headed by Colonel de Brancion, carried five ambuscades, which the sappers destroyed under a heavy fire. Some hours after, the enemy, reinforced, stormed the captured ambuscades, but, failing in their attempt to carry them, retreated, after a severe loss in killed and wounded.

The account given by Mr. Russell of the first of these contests differs, at all events in the result. He magnifies the conflict of the 14th, and represents the issue to have been adverse to the French. Comparing the various accounts, Mr. Russell's statement of the issue appears to be the correct one. The Russians ultimately held the ambuscades, which fact our French friends somewhat disingenuously suppress. On the 15th the French held several of the ambuscades on the right; but the Russians never allowed their fire upon the spot to intermit, and our ally suffered much.

Early in the morning of the 17th a brave French officer of distinction, Lieutenant-colonel Vaissier, was killed by a shot from the Russian rifle-pits, he having volunteered to relieve the French rifles opposed to them. Of this officer the French entertained a very high opinion, and afford the following information concerning him:—"He was between forty and fifty years of age, and had served with great distinction in Africa. In 1843 General Changarnier specially recommended him to the minister, speaking of him, as 'a very distinguished officer, from whom much may be expected.' He took part in all those struggles which occurred at every instant on the soil of Africa; and everywhere he showed himself full of energetic boldness and genuine military qualities. Captain in 1846, he entered in 1852 as major, in the 16th regiment of Light Infantry. It seems, sometimes, as if war respected such audacious bravery. Thus Vaissier was not wounded until the expedition of

Kabylia. Though struck by a shot, he continues to fight at the head of his battalion; carries the enemy's position, and receives upon the field of battle itself the congratulations of General St. Arnaud. Called to join the army in the East, as lieutenant-colonel, he conducts himself brilliantly at the battle of Alma; on the sanguinary day of Inkerman he leads his troops into the thickest of the fight; he was one of the heroes of that imperishable page of military history. On the 17th of March, in the following year, he was killed in front of the enemy."

General Canrobert's despatch thus referred to the combats that had taken place, and the general progress of events:—

Sebastopol, March 17.

In the night between the 14th and 15th inst. we carried a first line of the enemy's ambuscades which had been established in front of that mamelon before the Malakoff Tower, on which the enemy had thrown up a new work. From this ambuscade the enemy's rifles had annoyed our working parties, and on the morning of the 14th had killed Captain Guilhot, of the engineers, whose loss we deeply lament. The troops entrusted with this operation performed it with much vigour and impetuosity, under a fire of musketry and artillery kept up from the place. It was necessary to continue the operation during the night between the 15th and 16th; as, on the previous night, it was very vigorously carried out. The ambuscades have been razed. General Bosquet highly extols the energy of the troops employed in these two combats, giving occasion, as they did, to most honourable feats of individual prowess. Generals Niel and Bizot inspected the open parallel last night, and they have prepared the execution of another parallel near the mamelon in front of the Malakoff Tower. We are about to commence it to-night, in a soil where, unfortunately, rock is very near the surface of the ground, an obstacle we have constantly had to contend against in almost every part since the commencement of the siege. On the left, we have continued our works before the central bastion. During the same nights of the 14th-15th, and 15th-16th, notwithstanding a hot fire of grape and musketry, we formed a new parallel, more than 400 metres in length, to connect the old works with the trench forming a salient angle in the direction of this bastion. These operations have cost us about thirty men either killed or wounded; among the former is Captain Adin, of the 2nd regiment of the Foreign Legion. In the night between the 15th and 16th the besieged, probably wishing to create a diversion on our extreme left, and supposing also no doubt that the works commenced on the right engrossed all our attention, directed against this left a sortie composed of 450 volunteers from various corps. Their effort was supported by a company of the 10th battalion of Foot Chasseurs and one company of Voltigeurs from the 2nd regiment of the Foreign Legion. This combat was most brilliant; the assailant, received by a sharp fire, and driven back at the point of the bayonet beyond the parapet of the trench, left in our hands twenty-nine men killed or wounded, and the same number on the ground that separates the trench from the ambuscade whence he had issued. He had, however, removed a large number with the aid of detachments provided with hand-barrows. On the whole, this little affair must have cost the Russians a third of their effective force engaged in it. It cost us five men killed and twelve wounded. During the eight days that have just elapsed, we have tried the fire of a small battery which we have erected, but which is armed and served by the English, and which commands some open spots in the principal harbour. We had observed that one of the war steamers, the *Gromonotetz*, by whose fire we had been annoyed, had been struck by our balls. We now learn they had barely time to take her to the stockade in the outport, when she foundered. The incident is not with-

out its value, particularly on account of the moral effect it must have produced on the garrison. The port is, in fact, the line of retreat for this garrison, and the more threatening our action becomes against that line, the more will the troops feel uneasy and discouraged.

CANROBERT.

The following despatches from Lord Raglan will throw additional light on the progress of events:—

Before Sebastopol, March 13.

MY LORD,—The enemy commenced working upon the mamelon in front of the Tower of Malakoff in the night of Friday; but the nature of the work, from the thickness of the atmosphere, could not be distinguished. Great progress, however, had been perceived on Sunday, and that night a strong working party of the British troops was occupied in commencing a parallel from the advanced point of our right attack, with a view to form a junction with the corresponding parallel to be made on their side by the French, who began it on the following evening; and much was done to forward the operation before daylight this morning, and it is hoped that the object will be completed to-night.

The weather is generally fine in the early part of the day, but towards evening heavy sea fogs come rolling in, and wholly obscure the view of the place.

The enemy have shown a battalion and some Cossacks on the heights above Balaklava and towards Kamara, probably with the view to interrupt the French and English wood-cutting parties for the construction of gabions in the immediate neighbourhood, but the allied detachments have not been obliged to discontinue their work.

I enclose a return of casualties to the 10th inst.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The Lord Pannure, &c.

Before Sebastopol, March 17.

MY LORD,—The progress of the parallel which I reported to your lordship in my despatch of the 13th inst. has not been as rapid as was anticipated, the ground being extremely rocky, and the difficulty of procuring cover consequently excessive, and rendering it almost impossible to carry on the operation during the day. Both the English and the French have now, however, succeeded in establishing the communication between them. Her majesty's troops have not been assailed, but our allies have been kept constantly in action, and they have succeeded in driving the enemy from the rifle-pits in which they had established themselves, in their immediate front, with distinguished gallantry and great perseverance. They, however, have sustained some loss, though not equal to that which they have inflicted upon their opponents.

A steady fire has been maintained upon the mamelon in the occupation of the enemy from the guns in our right attack, and the practice of both the navy and the artillery has been conspicuously good, and reflects the highest credit on those branches of her majesty's service.

Although no positive attack had been directed against our works, our approaches are carried so close to the enemy that the casualties are greater than they have lately been, as your lordship will be concerned to remark in examining the returns I have the honour to enclose; and it is my painful duty to announce to your lordship the death of Captain Craigie, of the Royal Engineers, whose zeal and devotion to the service could not be surpassed, and who was killed on the 13th, after he had been relieved from the trenches, and was on his way to the Engineer Park, by a splinter from a shell, which burst close to him.

I have the honour to report the arrival of Lieutenant-general Simpson, who joined my head-quarters yesterday, and that of Sir John McNeill and Colonel Tulloch, who reached Balaklava a few days before.

I have, &c.

RAGLAN.

The Lord Pannure, &c.

Before Sebastopol, March 20.

MY LORD,—It is with deep concern that I transmit for your lordship's information the copy of a letter which I received on the 18th inst. from General Canrobert, announcing, with every expression of concern, the death of a British officer, who appears to have wandered into the French camp, and, not answering the challenge that was repeated three times, was shot dead by the French sentry whose post he approached. This officer, Surgeon Le Blanc, of the 9th foot, occupied the tent near the hospital huts of his regiment, situated at some distance from the encampment of the regiment itself. He was a gentleman of most temperate habits, and was occupied in reading, when, suddenly, upon the alarm sounding, he rose from his seat, leaving his candle lighted and his book open, and walked out—he was never seen alive afterwards. It should be explained that shortly after the close of day on the 17th there was a very heavy fire on the left of the French right, which was maintained for several hours. None of the English posts were attacked, but it was considered prudent to get the greater portion of our troops under arms. Mr. Le Blanc was shortsighted, and probably mistook his way from the first, the night being excessively dark, for he was found far distant to the left, and must have wandered from our position without knowing the direction in which he was going. Being anxious to ascertain the facts of this unfortunate case as correctly as possible, I have set on foot an inquiry, to be conducted by English and French officers, in association with each other; and I propose to do myself the honour to send you their report. I have addressed a similar letter to the general commanding-in-chief.

RAGLAN.

The Russians not only worked with energy at Sebastopol, as the despatches of the allied generals admitted, but the energy extended to the whole of Southern Russia. Not only had large reinforcements been hurried to the Crimea as soon as the roads became passable, but preparations were made to continue thence reinforcements on a still larger scale. A letter from Odessa of the 16th appeared in the *New Munich Gazette*, to the following effect:—"The cavalry corps concentrated around Odessa, under the orders of General Schabelski, is exclusively composed of dragoons, to the number, it is said, of 12,000 men. It has received orders to proceed immediately to the Crimea, and a part of the corps left yesterday. The seventh army corps, stationed at present in Bessarabia, will leave for the Crimea. The troops remaining in Bessarabia will be placed under the orders of General Luders, who will fix his head-quarters at Bender. According to reports received at Vienna, and there held worthy of credit, Sebastopol is provisioned for three months. The garrison is only 12,000 strong, but may easily be reinforced, whilst the bulk of the army, under the immediate command of General Osten-Sacken, numbers 40,000 men at the Belbek. The Russians have cut down all the trees in the district behind Inkerman, and behind the trunks they have, during the winter, constructed intrenchments and batteries in excellent positions. Prince Gortschakoff intends, it is said, to operate from Petekop and Simpheropol against Eupatoria at the head of 60,000 men."

The Russian journals meanwhile indulged in bombastic announcements of the prowess of

the besieged, and the failures of the besiegers. According to them the fire from the allied batteries was an almost harmless expenditure of ammunition. The following appeared in the *Invalide Russe*:—"In order to complete the telegraphic despatch from Sebastopol, relative to the erection of a new redoubt in front of the Korniloff bastion, during the night between March 10th and 11th, A.D.C. General Baron Osten-Sacken announces, under date of March 11th, that notwithstanding the heavy fire of the besiegers, the works are being successfully carried on in the new fortification. The fire of the enemy's artillery does us scarcely any harm; thus, for instance, on the 11th of March last no less than sixty bombs fell on one of our bastions, and yet only one man was wounded. The galleries of the besiegers' mine, which we discover, are constantly destroyed with unvarying success. Nothing remarkable has occurred in the neighbourhood of Eupatoria. According to the statement of the prisoners, the Turks had about 1000 men killed and as many wounded in the affair of February 17th."

General Sir Harry Jones in a speech delivered in England after the conclusion of the war, represented the fire of the allies as most destructive, and delivered with the most beautiful precision.

The condition of the British army about the middle of March is well conveyed in a brief paragraph by the *Times*' correspondent:—"The number actually under arms, not employed on any duty whatever, yesterday (March 16) amounted to 20,600 men. The effectives now amount to 26,000 men (including rank and file and sergeants). The deaths in camp yesterday (March 15), I am told, amount to 15 only. This is another sudden fall. We have now 40,000 men and more alive; and of these, between 15,000 and 20,000 of the noblest and strongest troops that ever handled musket. In dear old England the cavalry have long been numbered among the dead; but surely there must have been some mighty resurrection, inasmuch as Colonels Hodge and Paget have still at their call nearly 1000 sabres."

The 17th of March was a day of account in both armies; in the British, it being "St. Patrick's day," the national saint-day of Ireland, there were, of course, fun and joke wherever an Hibernian was to be found. Our French friends had races and other amusements, whether in compliment to their Irish allies does not appear. Mr. Woods says, that nearly half of the British army displayed some green substitute for a shamrock in their hats, caps, helmets, or whatever else covered their heads. As half the army was not Irish, it is to be presumed that their British fellow-countrymen paid the Patlanders the compli-

ment of wearing the national colour on the national day. The British fourth division had "a race," the Hibernians were of course numerous, and the hilarity great, and characteristic of the occasion and those who enjoyed it; the race-ground was within long range of the enemy, who thundered over the course during the whole time. Still they "snatched a dangerous pleasure," and gave vent to all the exuberance of their high animal spirits.

A letter from General Canrobert on the 18th, announced to Lord Raglan the loss of a deserving British officer, in these terms:—

Head-quarters, March 18, 1855.

"MY LORD,—I am grieved to have to inform you of an event, much to be regretted, which painfully engrosses the French army and its commander-in-chief. Last night, while the troops were kept perpetually on the alert, an English officer presented himself before the line of the 18th regiment, established near the watch-tower behind our trenches of the left attack. Although summoned three times by the *qui vive* the officer did not reply; the sentinel fired, and he was killed on the spot. I can hardly understand how this unhappy officer found himself at such an hour so far from the English camp. I believe that his death can only be attributed to his own imprudence; but I do not the less deplore the event, which must also be attributed to the natural emotion of a young soldier, who, in the midst of the events which marked last night, rigorously executed the military regulation.

"GENERAL CANROBERT."

Field-marshal Lord Raglan, &c.

The gentleman thus referred to was Mr. Edward Le Blanc, surgeon to the 9th regiment of the line.

On the night of the 17th and 18th, the French renewed their attack on the Russian rifle-pits; for four hours the warfare was waged around the blood-stained place, but the Russians were in the end victorious. So fiercely and bravely did the French fight for the possession of those ambushes, that there is little doubt they would have gained possession had not their supports failed to arrive.

Our allies did not appear to advantage in this description of warfare; their attacks were seldom well planned, while those of their enemy were most skilfully managed. The vigilance of the Russians was generally superior on these occasions. Two British divisions were under arms to assist the French, but the latter retired, sorely discomfited and crest-fallen, upon their lines. The officers behaved with even more than their usual gallantry, encouraging the men by voice and gesture, and placing themselves in the foremost position of danger. Above the roll of the musketry the

voice of the officers could be heard, exclaiming, "*En avant, mes enfans!*" "*En avant, Zou-aves!*"

On the 18th a large body of men, probably not less than 15,000, entered Sebastopol from the north side. An equal number were detached from the corps of observation at Inkerman, and moved down to McKenzie's Farm. There did not appear to be any object in these movements, unless to carry out some system of relief.

About four o'clock in the evening General Canrobert reconnoitred the position of the rifle-pits and the Mamelon, and seemed to pay especial attention to the large square redoubt which the Russians had raised to the right of that work. This reconnaissance was preliminary to another attack on "the pits," for at nightfall a body of troops unusually large for these nightly enterprises passed to the front with six 12-pounder fieldpieces. Once more a fierce encounter raged around these centres of slaughter, which issued in both French and Russians retiring upon their own lines.

The 19th was an eventful day, for it revealed the unwelcome fact that the labours of the Russians had been even greater than was imagined; the battery lately fought for so gallantly against the French was now fully equipped: on the Mamelon a formidable new work appeared ready to receive its armament. It was observed that, for some reason which was not conjecturable, they had closed up forty of the embrasures of their batteries. Mr. Russell, writing at this date says:—"Our siege-works are in a state of completion. Those of the French are almost as far advanced. In speaking of siege-works, I refer to those which have been recently constructed in addition to our former batteries. The defences of Balaklava are strengthened day after day, guns of large calibre are placed in position along the heights, and the disadvantages of a plunging fire are obviated as far as possible. The French have thrown up a new work, containing six guns, right above our 32-pounder battery on the road to Kadikoi."

On a previous page we pointed out the error into which this gentleman,—always so painstaking and eloquent, and generally so accurate,—had fallen as to the comparative state of the French and English works. No doubt he had seen both, and was a very keen and observant witness. Either he wrote in error, or the French were very impatient, and General Canrobert was solicitous to begin the bombardment not only before his ally was armed, but before his own batteries were prepared. Perhaps it would reconcile these discrepancies to suppose that Canrobert, finding Lord Raglan was not ready on the 12th, 13th, or 14th of March, when he was anxious to open the bombard-

ment, he also began new works, and *these* had not quite approached their completion when Mr. Russell wrote. But even this idea fails to reconcile entirely the discrepancy between the accounts of English correspondents and French despatches; for, at the end of March, General Canrobert's complaints of the English, in his *private* correspondence with the French minister of war, were as bitter as ever. The Baron de Bazancourt, so much in the imperial confidence, thus observes upon the state of Canrobert's mind, with which he must have been acquainted:—"The presentiments of the commander-in-chief as to the gravity of the situation were not slow in being realised. The Russians, to whom we conceded so much precious time, accumulated defence upon defence, and constantly held ready powerful reserves to protect their new works."

"For these reasons," wrote General Canrobert, on the 31st of March, "in the region of our new attacks, all attempts, either on our side or that of the enemy, must cause combats of large proportions; and in order to meet this serious state of things, I am obliged to reinforce the 2nd corps with the division of the reserve, and to send every evening two battalions of the guard to take up a position near to it."

"I have hopes," adds the general, "that the English will be able to open fire in the first days of next week (about Tuesday next). This fire can be actively sustained for ten or twelve days. It will facilitate the approaches of the allies towards the place; it will diminish the difficulties which are presented to us in the carrying by force of certain of the out-works; and its effects will permit one or two columns of assault to lodge themselves upon some point of Sebastopol, and to plant our flag there."

However slow the English might have been; there was a solidity in their works which our allies might well have copied; the fire of the English artillery was also superior to theirs, and was directed every day, more or less, with precision and effect upon some portion of the enemy's works. Thus, during the 18th, shot and shell were thrown from the English batteries right into the Mamelon, and into the new redoubt to the right of it. Many lives must have been lost under a fire so precise and so galling. Nevertheless, the Russians planted sixteen heavy guns in the redoubt, which was covered by the fire from Inkerman, and the forts across the Tchernaya, and the Malakoff, so as to converge upon its approaches: it now became a thoroughly formidable bulwark of defence.

The night of the 19th-20th was one of storm, and the roar of the sea and the tempest could be heard all over the plateau. The enemy were either kept quiet by the hurricane,

or were so from policy. The allies did not disturb their repose.

On the 20th, Lord Raglan sent home the following despatches. The report contained in his second despatch from Dr. Hall was important, as showing how far the army was physically prepared for the operations so soon to be undertaken.

Before Sebastopol, March 20, 1855.

MY LORD,—In my despatch of the 17th inst. I reported to your lordship the progress made in forming the parallel constructed to unite the right of our attack with the left of the French on the Inkerman heights.

The contest of the latter with the enemy for the possession of the rifle-pits in their immediate front was renewed after dark on that night, and was continued for several hours, the fire being excessively heavy, particularly of munitry, and considerable loss must have been sustained by our allies, I fear, as well as by the enemy, who continue to hold the umbosendes; but the French persevere, notwithstanding, in working forward, and are approaching the Mamelon, on which the Russians are busily engaged in building a formidable work, though frequently interrupted by our batteries and those of the French.

On the night of the 17th the English parallels were not attacked; but the fire to which I have above alluded was so continuous, that the whole force was either under arms or ready to turn out.

I enclose the returns of casualties to the 18th inst.

It was currently reported yesterday that Prince Menschikoff had died on his way to Moscow. I have not been able to ascertain if this report be founded; but it was so fully credited as to have been dispatched to Constantinople.

Prince Gortschakoff is stated to have arrived at Bagtché Serai, and to have assumed the command of the army.

Reinforcements are reported to be on their way from Russia, and the 9th division to have reached the neighbourhood of Eupatoria. The position of the Russian troops in the vicinity of the Tchernaya remains unaltered.

The progress of the railway continues to be satisfactory, and we are already enabled to use it with considerable advantage, both for the conveyance of supplies and hutting, so far as the high ground some way on this side of Kadikoi. Mr. Beattie's exertions deserve every commendation.—

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The Lord Panmure, &c.

Before Sebastopol, March 20, 1855.

MY LORD,—I do myself the honour to transmit to your lordship a letter from the inspector-general of hospitals, forwarding the weekly return of sick to the 17th inst. The number of sick is not diminished, but the cases are lighter, and every day the men in camp exhibit a more healthy appearance.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN.

The Lord Panmure, &c.

Before Sebastopol, March 19, 1855.

MY LORD,—In transmitting the weekly state of sick of the army to the 17th inst., I have the honour to state that though the sickness still amounts to 14.31 per cent., the mortality does not exceed 0.51 per cent., which is a proof that the disease is milder in character; and I think I may safely say, the general health and appearance of the men is greatly improved, and had not the duty, by the unavoidable operations of the siege going on, been increased of late, I think the sick list would have been still more diminished, as the men's condition is, in every other way, so much improved both in diet, dress, and accommodation.

It has been proposed by the minister-at-war to give the men tea, coffee, and cocoa, on alternate mornings; and to-morrow your lordship will receive the report of the medical board ordered to consider the subject. The

two first I think good, and the change will be both agreeable and beneficial to the men; but *cæca*, I am afraid, requires too much preparation to be usefully adopted in the army under present circumstances.

The prevailing diseases are fevers of a low typhoid form in some instances, and in others assuming an intermittent and remittent type, and bowel complaints. Fevers have been rather on the increase of late, but bowel complaints have become much fewer in number, and milder in character. Scurvy, too, though the number appears large in the return, is on the decrease; and I can assure your lordship, from recent personal inspection of the men of the different divisions, that the generality of the cases returned under that head are of the most trifling character; and under the use of the present change of diet, I am in hopes the disease will soon totally disappear from our list.

In the first division, the brigade of Guards continues to improve in health and appearance, from its change of situation, and the brigade of Highlanders is also efficient. The 79th and 93rd are influenced by the locality of their camps, which cannot well be changed, and have more sickness than the 42nd, which are more favourably placed; and in this regiment the most scrupulous attention is paid to the sanitary condition of their camp.

To show how locality affects the health of the men, I may mention the wing of the 2nd battalion of the Rifle Brigade, which occupies the high promontory of the southern extremity of the Balaklava lines overlooking the sea; and here, though the men are exposed, and the duty is as severe as in any other part of the camp, there is little or no disease.

In the second division, the 41st and 95th regiments have been more unhealthy than the rest, and have had a larger number of fever cases than others admitted into hospital, and many of them have been of a serious character. It is difficult to account for this, as there is nothing in the locality of the ground occupied by these two regiments different from that of the rest of the division. Perhaps their tents were a little more crowded than the rest, and the hospital huts, from the pressure of sickness, had more men in them than was advisable; but this I directed to be remedied when I visited the hospitals a few days ago.

The health of the third division is improved, decidedly so in some of the regiments; and the health of the fourth and light divisions is improved also.

The cavalry, with the exception of the 2nd Dragoons, is in good health; and the health of the 2nd, the superintending medical officer seems to think, has been influenced by local causes that are now in course of removal.

The health of the artillery has been tolerably good during the week, and the cases under treatment, both in the general and convalescent hospitals at Balaklava, have progressed favourably; and when the remainder of the hospital huts at the castle come into use, I expect great advantage from their occupation, both by convalescents and wounded men, should we unfortunately have any.

I have, &c.,

J. HALL,

Inspector-general of Hospitals.

*To Field-marshal Lord Raglan, G.C.B.,
Commanding-in-chief.*

CHAPTER LXXIV.

PROSECUTION OF THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL, FROM THE END OF THE THIRD WEEK IN MARCH TO THE OPENING OF THE SECOND BOMBARDMENT.—DEATH OF ADMIRAL ISTOMINE.—STRUGGLES FOR THE RIFLE-PITS IN FRONT OF THE MAMELON.—DESPERATE SORTIE OF THE RUSSIANS ON THE NIGHTS OF THE 21ST-22ND.—BURIAL TRUCES, COUNCILS OF WAR, COMBATS.

“Nil actum reputans dum quid superesset agendum.”

It was known on the 20th of March in the allied lines that Prince Gortschakoff had succeeded Prince Menschikoff in the command in chief of the enemy's forces. Deserters reported that the latter prince had died of a wound in the leg, at Perekop; but this proved to have been an unfounded report. He was, however, severely wounded, and greatly reduced by sickness, as well as chagrin at his repeated defeats, and the displeasure of his new sovereign weighed heavily upon his heart. According to the same sources of information, the Russian admiral, Istomine, had been killed in the Mamelon, while there reconnoitring the allied approaches. In this case the report was true. He was the last of the enemy's admirals in Sebastopol. When Nachimoff and Korniloff set out upon the expedition to Sinope, Istomine remained behind in command of the fleet. Thus all the naval chiefs who had taken part in the defence of Sebastopol perished.

On the night of the 21st an immense convoy entered the city. Complaints of the inadequate numbers of the English army for the work imposed on them were very generally heard. The engineer officers could not obtain

men to perform what was requisite; the troops were still borne down with fatigue in the trenches; and the trenches were often inadequately defended from the smallness of the covering parties. The ruinous plan of Lord Raglan in undertaking a proportion of the siege labour altogether beyond the strength of his army still bore down the men, delayed the operations, and gave to our ally cause for incessant complaint. Lieutenant-general Sir John Burgoyne left the camp and embarked at Kamara: a brave and skilful officer was lost to the army, whose services, in many respects, would have been invaluable if retained.

On the night of the 21st the French made a new attempt upon the rifle-pits; five were attacked, one was conquered; the conflict was long and sharp, and the loss on both sides considerable. Such is the testimony of Mr. Woods: Mr. Russell represents the French as more successful, having conquered and retained three of the pits, and maintained a tormenting fire against the enemy from the position thus occupied. The French accounts convey impressions still more favourable to their arms, describing the enemy as driven out of all the pits. As well as we can gather, the whole of

these accounts were right: the French expelled the Russians, who, reinforced, drove the French out of all the pits except three, two of which they abandoned after daylight, because of the heavy fire from the Russian batteries. The mortar practice of the British was very annoying to the defence. The two sea-service mortars recently brought up threw some splendid shells, one of which went over the Malakoff Tower, bursting among the buildings in the rear of it; another fell through the roof of one of the public buildings, of which it made a total wreck. Both the French and English threw shot and shell into the Mamelon with such precision that the enemy must have severely suffered. Prodigious exertions were made to bring up shot, shell, powder, and even guns, numerous as these weapons of destruction already were at the batteries. The British army seemed to labour in the spirit of the motto at the head of this chapter, thinking nothing done while anything remained to be done.

Some new regulations for the promotion of order at Balaklava were set on foot, where, in spite of recent improvement, they were much required. A gentleman who landed there on this day gives the following account of what he saw and what were his impressions; his representations do not accord with the official reports, and even the "own correspondents" must have been thankful for very small improvements when they wrote such pleasant things about Balaklava at this juncture:—"I was prepared to find Balaklava a muddy dirty place, but the reality far exceeded all my preconceived notions of how very dirty a place could be. What Balaklava had become in our hands I do not presume to say; but there appears to have been extraordinary ingenuity displayed in rendering what must have been a very pretty village or town almost uninhabitable. Sides and tops of houses are beaten in, streets and roads destroyed, trees cut down, and in all directions heaps of filth and rubbish impeding the paths and thoroughfares; and heaped up along the landing-places, in the midst of the mud, all sorts of costly goods. Tents, huts, fire-places, provisions, shot, shell, and in fact, whole ship-loads of things just landed so as to clear the vessels; the place crowded with extraordinarily-dressed people, and on the very roughest ungroomed and dirty miserable looking ponies and mules. The mud is garnished on each side of the road with frozen snow and icicles. The harbour crowded to excess with all descriptions of vessels, most of them having some disfigurement, the loss of a bowsprit, figure-head, or a something which made them look anything but with the usual smartness of English vessels; the boats moving about crowded with officers and men on forag-

ing expeditions among the shipping, and crawling from ship to ship with the most extraordinary agility; in fact, to do anything like business in Balaklava harbour it is necessary for a human being to be half cat, half monkey, as you are expected to take the most lengthy jumps from ship to ship, and scramble up a high vessel's side or over bow without ladder or rope; and it is wonderful how agile hunger makes even a soldier. The road to the camp is distinctly traceable by all sorts of vehicles and the most motley dressed pedestrians—and alas! also by dead horses and mules putrifying and poisoning the air. The tents only partially keep out the rain, and at night your breath ascends, freezes, then thaws, and descends in the form of large drops. Some days they feed well; and for days together they have nothing but their salt rations, frequently come in from the trenches wet to the skin, up to the knees in mud, tired, have a bit of salt meat and biscuit, and then sleep, wet as they are. Still, with all these drawbacks, they are cheerful and happy, and many really like it. It is impossible to say too much in their praise, and if ever men deserved promotion it is those who have served, and are serving, before Sebastopol. There is more to be endured in one month of this work than in twenty 'Almas.'

THE BATTLE OF THE TRENCHES.

On the night of the 22nd a furious battle was fought along the whole of the allied lines, which exceeded in magnitude any which had taken place since the ever-memorable day of Inkerman. The French had united their lines at Inkerman with the British right attack by parallels; the advanced parallel passed in front of the Mamelon within five hundred yards. The line of intrenchment was thus rendered continuous from Inkerman on the extreme right of the British to the extreme left of the French. The reader will remember that the French were obliged to occupy the extreme of the English right in consequence of the numerical incompetence of the latter to retain so extended a line as they had previously maintained. There were, however, two obstacles to the perfect continuity of the lines from Bosquet's forces, on the extreme right of the plateau, to the batteries of the extreme left attack, which was more immediately under the eye of Canrobert. These obstacles were called "valleys" by the Russians: they were, in some parts, deep ravines. One of these, the lesser, separated the extreme right of the British from the batteries at Inkerman, manned by Bosquet; the other separated the extreme left of the British, where Lieutenant-general Sir Richard England held the ground, and the extreme right of the original French

attack; this was called "the great ravine." It will be seen from this simple description that the advanced parallels of the French (of Bosquet's *corps d'armée*) in front of the Mamelon fell upon the right of the lesser ravine, and upon the left of that valley the advanced trenches of the British right attack rested. The ground on the slopes of this ravine is broken by the edges of the quarries, which served the Russians so well as ambuscades, or, as Lord Raglan's despatch calls them, "concealments." This ravine, passing beyond the lines of intrenchment, wound round to the left, separating the English attack from the Malakoff, until it was itself lost in the great ravine where it entered Sebastopol. This description is divested of military technicalities as much as possible, so that the reader unacquainted with military matters may have a clear view of the ground upon which the bloody battle of the night of the 22nd of March was fought.

For two or three days before, the Russian batteries were comparatively silent: it was resolved this night to break the silence by a desperate attack upon the whole line of the besiegers. Deserters afterwards reported that the reason for choosing that occasion was the arrival of the Grand-duke Michael; Prince Gortschakoff had, however, determined to signalise his assumption of command by some great operation. He was of opinion that the strategy of Prince Menschikoff had not been sufficiently bold, and the pro-Russian prints in Germany had boasted in virulent articles, and flaming telegraphic announcements, that the General Prince Gortschakoff had resolved upon the destruction of the allies, had already chosen his measures and his means, and would, upon his arrival, drive all before him, raising the siege, and sweeping the allies into the sea, or to their ships.

The attack appears to have been made with the choicest men which the prince could find available. The crews of the fleets were generally picked soldiers of the army, who, to the discipline of the land service added the hardihood of the sea service. Upon these Gortschakoff mainly relied for the execution of his purpose. Prince Gortschakoff himself described the force as consisting of "eleven naval battalions, and a detachment of the 35th crew." General D'Autemarre's report to Canrobert thus estimated it:—"From the extent of the line of battle of the enemy, and calculating the depth of his columns and the length of the attack, I estimate that we have had to contend with at least fifteen or sixteen battalions." The attack was committed to the Russian General Kruloff.

In the evening of the 22nd the French threw shot and shell for several hours upon

the enemy's batteries, the latter description of missile doing considerable mischief to the parapets of the works and to the houses beyond. At about seven o'clock two Russian columns were observed descending from the Mamelon: at eight o'clock they opened a brisk fire on the French left, where the engineers were finishing some works, and this fire was maintained for some time. Mr. Russell, in his journal of this date, dated at a quarter to eleven, P.M., represents the firing as having then lasted three quarters of an hour—he could not have been in the camp earlier, or he must have been unable to hear what went on at the extreme left of the French. At nine o'clock, says the French journal of the siege, "a heavy fire of musketry begins; and in spite of the darkness we could follow the movement of the black masses deploying before our most advanced works. It was evident that the Russians wished, if not to invade our works, at least to molest them, and to stop their being finished, by a murderous fire and by the menace of an imminent attack. Such was, in fact, the purpose of the enemy. He foresaw that, in face of the new works which he was forming to connect the redoubts of Mount Sapoun (named by us '*les Ouvrages Blancs*'), we should not remain inactive; and he therefore attempted a strong sortie against the head of the French approaches."

"The column," says a staff officer of the French army, "which had thus been perceived, advanced against our front, while two others were to direct their course, the one against our right, the other upon our left. Their purpose was to turn the ravines of Karabelnaia, and to take us in flank, whilst the right extremity of the English trenches would also be attacked." The night was one of intense darkness, and the wind, which was very high, blew from the allies, rendering the noise of the Russian approach inaudible—so that the whole space along the allied front was covered with assailants before the grand rush upon the works was made.

To give a combined view of the whole action is extremely difficult, for the reasons assigned by Lord Raglan in his despatch; but it may be safely said that no account of this battle extant is at once so clear, comprehensive, and yet condensed, as that which is contained in the despatch of the British commander-in-chief. It is also the most truthfully correct—free from all exaggeration, and contrasts pleasingly with the French accounts; all of which—at all events all that we have seen—mingle sly detraction, and magniloquent eulogy, when describing the part the British took in the transactions of the night. Thus the French general of the trenches, D'Autemarre, in his private report, wrote:—"The enemy, before the ener-

getic and desperate resistance which is opposed to them, soon finish by spreading themselves along our whole left, and occupying all the space between the left '*tête-de-sap*' and the zigzag occupied by the English,—unfortunately too weakly defended." The emperor's private agent adds to this:—"Before the supporting troops of our allies have been able to oppose any resistance, they penetrate, in numbers, within the parallel; spreading themselves in the communications, and making their way into the rear of our left, they take it in flank with a most murderous fire. It is at this moment that our losses are the greatest;" but appends the compliment—"On two other extreme points the enemy has rushed upon the English intrenchments. For a moment he clears them, but meets an obstinate resistance, which he vainly tries to overcome. Our brave allies have recaptured their position, of which it is impossible to dispossess them. The Russians, at length repulsed, after a violent struggle, are at this point obliged to retreat."

The despatch of Lord Raglan shows that, had the French been able to maintain their position, the British would not have been endangered, and that the greatest peril the English sustained resulted from their generous efforts to give support to their allies. Throughout this work all justice has been done to France, and all praise accorded to her braves, but, except in the mere matter of hard fighting, French writers upon the war, and French officers of distinction, have shown a disposition to run down their allies in a quiet but effectual way, where justice and truth, not to say kindness, demanded a different course.

Before Sebastopol, March 24.

MY LORD,—On the morning of the 22nd, the French troops in the advanced parallel moved forward and drove the enemy out of the rifle-pits in their immediate front, but nothing of any importance occurred during the day. Early in the night, however, a serious attack was made upon the works of our allies in front of the Victoria Redoubt, opposite the Malakoff Tower. The night was very dark, and the wind so high that the firing which took place, and which was very heavy, could scarcely be heard in the British camp; it is therefore difficult to speak with certainty of what occurred from anything that could be heard or observed at the moment. It appears, however, that the Russians, after attacking the head of the sap which the French are carrying on towards the Mamelon, fell with two heavy masses on their new parallel, to the rear of which they succeeded in penetrating and momentarily possessing themselves of it after a gallant resistance on the part of our allies. Having broken through, they passed along the parallel and in rear of it, until they came in contact with the troops stationed in our advanced parallel extending into the ravine, from the right of our advance, where it connects with the French trench. The enemy was here met by detachments of the 77th and 97th regiments, forming part of the guard of the trenches, who, although thus taken suddenly both in flank and rear, behaved with the utmost gallantry and coolness. The detachment of the 97th, which was on the extreme right, and which, consequently, first came in contact with the enemy, repulsed the attack at the point of the bayonet. They were led by Captain Vicars, who, unfortunately, lost his life on the occasion;

and I am assured that nothing could be more distinguished than the gallantry and good example which he set to the detachment under his command. The conduct of the detachment of the 77th was equally distinguished; and the firmness and promptitude with which the attack, in this part of our works, was met, were in the highest degree creditable to that regiment. These troops were under the direction of Major Gordon, of the Royal Engineers, who was wounded on the occasion so severely, as for some time, I fear, to deprive the army of the benefit of his valuable services.

The attention of the troops in our advanced works having been by these transactions drawn to the right, the enemy took occasion to move upon, and succeeded in penetrating into, the left front of our right attack, near the battery where two 10-inch mortars have recently been placed. They advanced along the works until they were met by a detachment of the 7th and 34th regiments, which had been at work in the neighbourhood, under the direction of Lieutenant-colonel Tylden, of the Royal Engineers, who promptly made them stand to their arms, and led them with the greatest determination and steadiness against the enemy, who were speedily ejected from the works and fairly pitched over the parapet, with but little or no firing on our part. Lieutenant-colonel Tylden speaks in the highest terms of the conduct of the troops on this occasion, and particularly of that of Lieutenant Marsh, acting-adjutant of the 33rd regiment, whose services and activity throughout the night were very useful to him. Captain the Hon. Cavendish Browne, of the 7th, and Lieutenant Jordan, of the 34th regiment, were unfortunately killed in this attack, after displaying the most distinguished gallantry, and Lieutenant M'Henry, of the former regiment, was wounded, but I hope not very severely. Lieutenant-colonel Kelly, of the 34th regiment, who commanded in the trenches, is, I regret to have to add, missing. The French, in retiring from their advanced parallel upon their supports, speedily rallied, and fell upon the enemy, whom they repulsed with great loss, and followed so far up towards the Mamelon that they were enabled to level and destroy nearly all the "ambuscades" or "ride concealments," crested along their front. I fear, however, that this success has not been accomplished without considerable loss on their part, although that of the enemy is much greater. Yesterday the whole of the ground between the posts of the two armies was covered with their dead, amounting to several hundreds, besides those which they had undoubtedly carried off before daylight. In the meanwhile the enemy in great numbers found their way into the advanced batteries on our extreme left, which are not yet armed, and momentarily got possession of them. The working parties were, however, speedily collected and re-formed by Captain Chapman, of the 20th regiment, acting-engineer, and they at once drove the enemy out of the trenches with the utmost gallantry. Captain Montagu, of the Royal Engineers, who was superintending the works, unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy. I enclose the return of casualties to the 22nd inclusive. The wind is excessively high, but the weather is in other respects fine.

I have, &c.,

RAGLAN

The Lord Panmure, &c.

To the description given in this despatch it is only necessary to add the detail by which the excellent outline may be filled up. On the point of the French line first attacked, the scouts descried the enemy's approach, and fell back noiselessly according to the orders they had received. The service companies for the night, of three battalions of Zouaves, under the orders of Commandant Banon, lined the trenches, who remained silent as death under cover of the parapets, until, at a given signal, they rose as one man just as the head of the Russian column approached near enough to deploy, and before that manœuvre was attempted

the whole head of the column was swept away by the volley. So sudden and terrible was the shock, that the enemy fell as if a mine had exploded, and cleared the space above it of every living thing. Before the Russians had time to recover from the shock another volley smote them, and the head of the column, which still stood without an attempt to deploy, was cut off as the corn before the reaper's sickle, or the grass before the mower's scythe. Instantly they deployed with loud cries, apparently of mingled astonishment, alarm, and ferocity; the dark masses extended rapidly to the right and left, the head of the sap was stormed, and the two wings of the assailing mass took the advanced work on either flank, where the fearless little Zouaves maintained their position against such unequal numbers. The French were surrounded, and there was no immediate help, and no way of immediate safety, but to cut through the assailing host with the bayonet. The Zouave bugle sounded the charge—it was responded to bravely, and the line of the enemy went down beneath the bayonets of the gallant little band. But they could not penetrate the dense mass of determined men before them, and fell back to their position under a galling cross fire from either flank of the redoubt. Again the trumpet sounded the charge, and the response of the few brave hearts was noble as before; a second time the front line of the enemy went down, but it was vain to persist in the attempt to pass through them—the little party fell back again to their position. Once more the trumpet rings out its clear and chivalrous blast, and a third charge, as desperate and sanguinary as those that preceded it, attested the courage and the energy of the invincible Zouaves. Still it is in vain, the mighty mass of the enemy rolls on in the darkness, happily ignorant of how few were opposed to them. At this moment no alternative to a gallant death seemed to remain for the soldiers of Africa, when Captain Montois, with two companies *d'élite*, charged the enemy on the left flank of the work, clearing a passage through which the Zouaves retired upon their lines, pouring a deadly although a desultory fire into their confused and crowded foes. The Zouaves retire slowly, for Major Banon, an Irish officer in the French service, charged at the head of a battalion; he fell dead in advance of his men, pierced through the heart by a musket-ball.

On the left Colonel Janin of the Zouaves resisted the onset of the Russians, which was sudden and strong as a torrent. They overthrew the "gabionade" (a phrase given by our ally to a rifle ambushade formed with gabions and sand-bags) which the French had nearly completed, and which formed the head

of their sap. Colonel Janin had to make desperate efforts to preserve his position even for a little while; a musket-ball grazed his skull, and, while nearly blinded by the blood which flowed from his wound, a Russian soldier scrambling into the work, struck him with a huge stone in the face; having staggered back from the force of the blow, and with weakness from loss of blood, his men gave way, but recovering himself, he rushed forward upon the enemy, his men rallying by the example of their officer. Support arriving, a bayonet charge, close and bloody, in the darkness, decided the doubtful fray in favour of the Zouaves.

While these fierce contests raged along the right and left of the French positions, the British also fought and conquered an hour before their allies had cleared their front of the assailants.

Prince Gortschakoff succeeded in distracting the attention of the English outposts by causing a great excitement to appear in the Mamelon—drums beat, trumpets sounded, and loud shouts rent the air. During these proceedings, which appeared to the English on outpost duty as very odd and unaccountable, a powerful column of the enemy passed up the ravine from Sebastopol, and dividing, precipitated themselves upon the British right and left attacks. On the English right there was a newly erected mortar battery, where the Russians were for a time successful. The English sentries behaved with the greatest stupidity—they were at least as dull as they were indisputably brave. They had often been deceived all along the English line by the Russians answering the accustomed challenge in French. Whatever excuse there might be for this in General England's position, because of the contiguity of the extreme right of the French attack, there could be none on the right of the British line, until General Bosquet's corps mauled the defences of Inkerman. It is to be presumed that in this case the English sentinels supposed that Bosquet's men had strayed across the ravine and stumbled upon their lines. It was a thing certainly possible; the French might in some secret attack, or stealthy reconnaissance, have got to the wrong side of the separating valley; but the probabilities were so few that the English deserve censure for this want of vigilance and soldierly alertness. When they heard the tramp of feet, they gave the usual challenge, and were answered, as the Russians *often before answered them in the surprises they effected*, by "Bono Franciz." The ruse was very stale, and one is tempted to ask concerning our sentinels, as the Bechnanas did concerning idolaters, when they first heard of them, "Had they any heads?" Hearing the clumsy phrase, "Bono Franciz," the English quietly allowed the

Russians to walk into the trenches, and were rather astonished when their guests began to bayonet those nearest to them. Then the English stood to their arms, but it was too late—the Russians were in, and not so easily sent out. The English might pronounce a great many Bonos in as bad French as that of the Russians, before one would leave who found the phrase such a convenient “open Sesame.” The steadiness of the British, thus surprised, was truly wonderful, nothing could surpass it—not even their dulness; they fought with a heroism never excelled; their obstinacy so amazed the Russians that they more than once paused as if in homage to the extraordinary valour of the few heroes who so undauntedly withstood them. The Russians were led by an Albanian, who, when next day he was seen stretched in death, was magnificently dressed. He was a chief, urged by his religious fanaticism to fight for Russia, believing that he was thereby fighting against all heretics and the yoke of Islam. He was a man of over fifty years of age, extremely handsome, and his garb resembled that of old Gaul. This man, like another of his class who had fallen in a previous sortie, had led many such attacks, and always with a courage worthy of his race. He was the first man to mount the parapet of the English mortar battery; the first to resist him was the Hon. Captain Brown, of the 7th Fusiliers, who, breaking his guard, wounded him. The Albanian drew a pistol, and shot Captain Brown dead; but he fell immediately from the wound inflicted by the captain’s sword—when, turning to the magazine of the trench, the locality of which he knew, he fired another pistol into it; the ball did not penetrate the planking. The fallen chief then struck wildly about him with a large curved dagger, until the bayonets of the English pierced his heart, and extinguished his courage, energy, and fanaticism for ever.

Mr. Russell represents Mr. Brown as having been wounded in the trench, and afterwards found dead in advance of it, whither, although wounded, he had pursued the foe. Mr. Woods and Colonel Hamley declare that he was killed upon the spot by the pistol of the Albanian chief. It was at this moment that the Russian column, of not less than 8000 men, rushed upon the French parallel opposed to the Mamelon, driving out the Zouaves, after the bloody resistance already described. Having driven the French back, the attacking column divided; one division, turning to the right, took the English parallel that joined the French in the rear. D’Autemarre and Bazancourt represent the French as embarrassed by the weakness of the English defence, but this is disingenuous and untrue; it was because the French gave way (after a most desperate re-

sistance) that the enemy was able to penetrate to the rear of the English parallel. Here the Russians were received by the trench guard, consisting of small detachments of the 77th and 97th (or Earl of Ulster’s own), who fought with inconceivable bravery and tenacity. The hero of the occasion was Captain Vicars, of the 97th. This gentleman was one of the noblest officers in the English army—

“Palman qui meruit ferat.”

He kept his men in hand with admirable skill and self-possession, although it was his first feat of arms. Seldom has any British officer, with so few followers, accomplished so much. Leading his men precisely at the opportune moment along the parallel, he charged the Russians in flank, exclaiming, “On 97th!” “Follow me 97th!” They did follow, with the characteristic courage of Ulster men, and drove ten times their number of the enemy out. Vicars was first and bravest where all were forward and brave. Three Russians resisted his course—he was at the moment too far in advance of his men—two of them fell by his sword almost instantly; he fought like one inspired; the third fired into his side, and he fell wounded; he rose again—advanced upon the enemy—cleared the parapet—pursued them, and at last fell dead, pierced with three bayonet wounds in the breast. Never died a nobler soldier. He was a man of the most consistent and exemplary piety, and had spent the evening before the action in reading the Holy Bible and praying with his men. They were worthy of him; like him, most of them died to save their country in a desperate emergency. Never did men love an officer more dearly, or follow an officer more heroically. While this was going on Captain (Major) Gordon, of the Engineers, with a slight switch in his hand, stood upon the parapet encouraging the men, and hurling stones down upon the assailants. How this officer escaped with life is truly marvellous; he was wounded. Colonel Hamley says in the head and in the arm; Mr. Woods says he was wounded in two places; Mr. Russell says he received two balls, one in the arm and one in the shoulder; Lord Raglan represented him as severely wounded: his life was, one might say, miraculously preserved. After the death of the intrepid Vicars, the Russians rallied, and swarmed into the battery in overwhelming numbers. They were probably in possession of it for a quarter of an hour, when the 90th, 34th, and 7th regiments, who had been in advance of the battery to support the French, hearing the firing behind them, fell back. In the confusion and darkness no one knew what was best to be done, but Captain Vaughan, at the head of a party of the 90th light infantry, led his men stealthily

along the covered way, and surprised the Russian flank. His men opened a galling fire of musketry, and then charged the enemy with a valour which rivalled that of the 97th. Here, from some cause, probably from the Russians not answering their fire (not having recovered from their surprise), a cry arose, "We are firing into the French!" The result was that confusion ensued, and the little band was thrown into complete disorder by the Russians opening upon them a powerful fusillade. The moment was critical; Vaughan, like his predecessor, Vicars, resolved to sacrifice himself, and rushing forward sword in hand, exclaimed, "Men of the 90th, follow me!" Sergeant Henry Clarke, Sergeant Bittle, Sergeant Essex, Corporal Caruthers, and fourteen men of the 90th, and a few of the 7th Fusiliers, charged the Russians with the bayonet. This little band fought like giants; they were giants in determination and strength. Most of them escaped with life, but covered with wounds. The parties of the 7th and 34th now arrived, and, most opportunely, a detachment of the Connaught Rangers, who seem to have gone astray from another part of the trenches; these parties dashed against the enemy, and within the narrow space of the traverse and the battery a hand to hand struggle took place of the most determined and murderous character. The Russians far outnumbered the scattered parties which here united against them. Colonel Kelly of the 34th commanded; he was wounded and carried off by the enemy. Lieutenant M'Henry, of the 77th, had been disabled early in the action, when Captain Vicars distinguished himself so much. Colonel Tylden, of the Engineers, arrived and took the command, and skilfully organised the disjointed fragments of the victorious parties. The victory on the British right was complete. The conquerors were few, and never were conquerors covered with more glory—the living and the dead.

On the British left the struggle was less sanguinary. The detachments on duty were of the 20th, 21st, and 57th regiments; they were not deceived like their comrades on the right by "Bono Franciz," to which reply they answered again by their musketry, and the enemy, daunted, fell back. Major Montagu, of the Engineers, was of too forward a courage, and fell into the hands of the enemy. Later in the night the assailants returned to the British left, the guards of which were this time not so much on the alert, supposing that the danger had passed; the Russians, without firing a shot, dashed into the advanced batteries. Captain Chapman, R.E., rallied the trench guard, charged the enemy with the bayonet, and in a short, clever, and decisive contest, cleared the works of them, except

their dead and wounded, who remained with the victors. Long after the English front was clear of the foe, their allies were plying the musket and the bayonet, and the whole of the British divisions were under arms and advanced to their support; the French, however, completed their own work, the enemy was beaten on all the line—beaten signally, and with terrible loss.

The loss of the British in this fierce night battle is stated in the despatch of Lord Raglan; that of the French will be found in the despatch of General Canrobert, who estimates the Russian loss much below what was afterwards discovered to be the fact:—2000 men of the Russian army were put *hors de combat*.

The following is the despatch of the French general, which contained, as enclosures, two orders of the day in reference to the preliminary combats for the ambuscades, which are appended:—

March 23.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,—We had last night a very hard-contested, and, for our troops, very glorious combat, on our right works of attack, in front of the Malakoff Tower. At about eleven o'clock at night the enemy attempted a general sortie on that side, in which it appears that not less than fifteen battalions took part, which, according to Russian prisoners, were 1000 strong. These troops, divided in two columns, attacked *en masse*, and with savage yells, the head of the sap (*cheminement*) which we had undertaken in advance of our parallel to reach the ambuscades previously occupied by the enemy—ambuscades which it is our intention to join solidly together, to make a *place d'armes* of them. Thrice repulsed, and thrice brought up again to the attack by the exhortations of their officers, the Russians were compelled to abandon the occupation of this point, which was defended by companies of the 3rd Zouaves, commanded by Chef de Bataillon Banon. An obstinate struggle took place there, which has cost us dear, but with far greater loss to the enemy, in proportion to the masses brought against us. Colonel Janin, of the 1st Zouaves, commanded on this point, and fought personally with admirable energy. He was covered with blood from two wounds in the head, but which, happily, are not dangerous. The enemy, finding that their efforts, which only succeeded in overthrowing our gabion defences, which had not yet been filled up, were in vain, bore against the left of our parallel towards the Karabelnaia ravine, where a warm fusillade welcomed them, and prevented them from entering. They then suddenly threw themselves upon the right of the English parallel, succeeded in crossing the works, and took up a position in the rear of our left, which for a moment was exposed to a murderous cross fire. General D'Autemarre, on duty in the trenches, made the necessary dispositions with his usual energy and coolness. The fourth battalion of Chasseurs, coming up to the support, were ordered to charge in the ravine, and threw themselves valiantly upon the enemy, who, in an exposed position, and having suffered considerable loss, was driven back, to return no more. More to the left, the English, who had as yet been able only to assemble forces far inferior in number to their assailants, attacked the enemy with their habitual valour, and, after an obstinate struggle, drove him back. Still more to the left the English had been attacked by a sortie, which seemed to be a diversion, and which they soon mastered. *En résumé*, this operation of the besieged differed completely from all those hitherto attempted against our works. To effect it, and notwithstanding the strong force of the garrison, they had sent for two regiments (eight battalions) of fresh troops (regiments Dnieper and Ouglitch) from outside the walls. It was a sort of general attack upon our advances, and appears to have been well combined

for obtaining an important result. The importance of this failure of the besieged must be estimated, therefore, by the greatness of the object they had in view. The prisoners we have taken declare that their losses were enormous, and we think, in fact, that this disorderly combat, as all night combats are, and where the firing lasted for many hours, must have cost the Russians, considering the masses they brought forward, 1000 to 1200 men at least *hors de combat*. The ground in front of our parallels is strewn with the slain, and General Osten-Sacken has just sent to demand a suspension of hostilities, which has been granted, and is fixed for to-morrow, to pay the last duties to the dead. Our own loss, of which General Bosquet has only been able to send me as yet an approximate estimate, is considerable, and cannot be under 200 to 320 killed and wounded. We have especially to regret the death of Chef de Bataillon of Engineers Dumas, a superior and meritorious officer, who had a bright future before him, and who found a glorious death. He was killed by bayonet thrusts, after having already been wounded at the head of the works of attack. You knew him and esteemed him, Monsieur le Maréchal; your regret will be equal to our own. The same may be said of Chef de Bataillon Banon, of the 3rd Zouaves, who is missing and supposed to be killed. I will send you a detailed account of our losses. I have nothing to add to what I said in my last despatches respecting the health of the troops. It is satisfactory. I am informed that many families, under the pressure of other doubtless legitimate occupations, are astonished that no exchange of prisoners has as yet taken place in the Crimea, and address complaints and petitions to you on the subject. On this head I can only reply that, in concert with Lord Raglan, I wrote on the subject to the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, as far back as January last. Prince Menschikoff shortly afterwards sent a reply to the effect that he would refer the matter to his government, and that he would inform us of its ultimate decision. Thus matters rest, and I do not think it is for us to break a silence which they seem disposed to keep.

Accept, M. le Maréchal, the homage of my respectful devotion.

CANROBERT, *Commander-in-chief.*

P.S.—You will find annexed two orders of the day relative to previous combats.

GENERAL ORDER.

The troops of the second corps and Brunot's division, intrusted, under the direction of General Division Bosquet, with the new works of attack on the right, have vigorously opened the trenches in front of the Malakoff Tower. In the night between the 14th and 15th of March the troops under the orders of General Bisson, on duty in the trenches, did good service. Two companies *d'élite* of the 100th regiment of the line carried with much resolution the ambuscades of the enemy. Captain Champanhet's company of grenadiers especially displayed great energy in defending the post it occupied against very numerous assailants. Menaced, at daybreak, in its position by a strong force of infantry, it was supported by three companies of the Algerian Rifles, who, cheered on by the voice of Chef de Bataillon Gibou, threw themselves upon the enemy with the most daring courage, routed him, ejected him, and drove him back within the town. The commander of the Russian troops was seriously wounded; the second in command was killed. From the 15th to the 16th of March the troops under the orders of the general of the trenches, De Failly, acted with no less vigour in advance of the parallel in the attack and destruction of the Russian posts. The second battalion of the 3rd Zouaves, under the immediate orders of Colonel de Brancion, of the 60th of the line, threw itself upon the enemy with its usual impetuosity; and in this very interesting military episode, acts of courage most honourable to the performers took place. This *ensemble* of works, executed under the enemy's fire, and intermixed with combats in which, according to the enemy's own reports, the besieged always suffered considerable losses, does the greatest honour to the energy of the troops who have made their *début* in the difficult and laborious practice of siege operations. The engineer corps directed on the right

by Colonel Frossard has distinguished itself by its accustomed solidity and incessant activity, in which the Chef d'Escadron of the Staff Bisson constantly took part, he being charged with the laborious post of major of the trenches. On the extreme left of our works of attack in the night, between the 15th and 16th of March, the besieged made a considerable sortie on the point defended by the company of the Voltigeurs of the 2nd regiment of the Foreign Legion, Captain Bertrand, and by the 7th company of the 10th battalion of Chasseurs, commanded by Second-lieutenant Bédès. Warned by their videttes, these two companies calmly awaited the advance of the enemy till they were within a few metres of the parapet of the trench, when they poured in a volley almost point-blank, then attacked them at the point of the bayonet, without committing the fault of pursuing them too far. Notwithstanding the promptitude and care they evinced in carrying off their killed and wounded, the enemy left twenty-nine in our hands, and as many in front of the parapet on the ground traversed in their precipitate retreat. They lost in this affair at least one-third of the force engaged. This short and brilliant action does honour to the troops that fought it. They displayed a coolness worthy of veterans, and with them I congratulate the Chef de Bataillon L'Hérillier, of the 2nd regiment of the Foreign Legion, whose skilful and decided dispositions were crowned with complete success.

The above general order is followed by a number of promotions in the order of the Legion of Honour.

GENERAL ORDER, No. 2.

The works executed by the first corps to complete the advanced parallel of our works of attack on the left, under difficult and dangerous circumstances, brought into relief the self-possession and solidity of the troops employed at them. The engineer corps has given here additional proofs of the vigorous tenacity which has earned it, since the commencement of the siege, the praises and the esteem of the whole army. Captain Monhaut, of the Engineers, acting under the immediate command of Lieutenant-colonel Jourjon, has particularly distinguished himself, and I reward his ancient services by conferring upon him in the emperor's name the Cross of the Legion of Honour.

CANROBERT.

On the 27th of March Lord Raglan wrote a supplemental despatch, an armistice for the burial of the dead (to be noticed in another page) having in the meantime occurred; and on the 31st he concluded his despatches for the month, giving the latest official information sent home for that month:—

Before Sebastopol, March 27.

MY LORD,—Adverting to my despatch of the 24th instant, I do myself the honour to state that the following officers have been brought to my notice as having distinguished themselves on the night of the 22nd and morning of the 23rd, in addition to whose names I have already submitted to your lordship:—Major the Hon. James Lyon Browne, of the 21st regiment, brother of the Hon. Captain Browne, of the Royal Fusiliers, who, it has already been my painful duty to report, fell upon this occasion; Captain Butler, of the 20th, and Captain Rickman, of the 77th. I am happy to say that Captain Montagu, of the Royal Engineers, who was taken prisoner, was not wounded, and that Lieutenant-colonel Kelly, of the 34th regiment, who also fell into the enemy's hands, is not severely wounded, though he received some injury both in his head and hand. Major-general Eyre, the general officer of the trenches, highly eulogises the dispositions of Lieutenant-colonel Kelly, and laments the loss of his services. The major-general also speaks in the warmest terms of the conduct of Lieutenant-colonel Tilden, Royal Engineers, who received a contusion, which, however, I am glad to be able to assure your lordship, does not incapacitate him from continuing those exertions and displaying those qualities which render him so valuable an officer. There was a suspension of hostili-

ties for about three hours on Saturday for the purpose of burying those who had fallen in the late encounters, and it was evident, from the numbers of bodies of the enemy and of the French, to whom the last sad offices had to be paid, that the loss sustained both by the French and the Russians had been very severe, particularly that of the latter. Some French, too, were found lying close to the Mamelon—a proof that their gallant spirit had carried them up to the enemy's intrenchments. Nothing of importance has since occurred. The siege operations continue to progress, and during the last two nights the interruption from the fire of the enemy has been inconsiderable. The enemy are very assiduous in the improvement of their defences, and in the establishment of a trench in the front of the Mamelon, towards which our ally is advancing by serpentine sap. The weather continues very fine, and the appearance and health of the troops are manifestly improving. Dr. Gavin, of the Sanitary Commission, and Mr. Rawlinson, civil engineer, have arrived, and are earnestly applying themselves to the discharge of the duties they have undertaken to perform; and I will take care that they receive every assistance it may be in my power to afford them. I enclose the return of casualties to the 25th instant. The *Himalaya* has arrived, and has been disembarking her horses yesterday and this day in Kasatch Bay. Since writing the above, I have received the official report that Captain A. E. Hill, of the 89th regiment, was severely wounded and taken prisoner last night while posting his sentries in front of the advanced trench on our extreme left.

The Lord Panmure, &c.

I have, &c.,
RAGLAN.

Before Sebastopol, March 31.

MY LORD,—Since I wrote to your lordship, on the 27th instant, the operations of the siege have been continued, without any material interruption from the enemy, beyond occasional shots from guns and mortars, and the more constant firing of musketry from rifle-pits, which have occasioned, I regret to say, the casualties which your lordship will see in the returns I enclose. Captain A. E. Hill, of the 89th regiment, whom I mentioned in my despatch as having been severely wounded and taken prisoner, died, I regret to say, of his wounds, before he reached the Russian ambulance, as I learned last night from General Osten-Sacken, to whom I had written for information on the subject. He had gone forward with a view to place the sentries in front of our advanced works, as I stated to your lordship on Tuesday, and he unfortunately mistook a Russian for a French picket, and, having challenged it in French, he was immediately fired upon, and brought to the ground. Early yesterday morning a fire was observed in the town of Sebastopol, which raged with violence for a considerable time, but how it originated I have not been able to ascertain. The enemy has made no movement on the side of the Tchernaya. The railway continues to progress in the most satisfactory manner, and last night had nearly reached the top of the hill usually called the Col de Balaklava, and advantage has been taken of it to bring up large quantities of ammunition and stores.

The Lord Panmure, &c.

I have, &c.,
RAGLAN.

The following letters from the camp give a brief but effective picture of the feelings of those engaged, and present in their just light the heroic actions of Captain Vicers, one of the most gallant soldiers and excellent men who fell victims to the war. The description given by the national poet in his *Henry VI.*, would well apply to this good and brave soldier:—

"Whilst any trumpet did sound or drum struck up,
His sword did ne'er leave striking in the field."

Camp before Sebastopol, March 23.

"THE action of last night—I might almost dignify it by the name of 'battle'—has been

a glorious and decisive victory. It was Inkerman on a small scale—an attack in very great force, and on all points; and everywhere they were beaten back with vigour and heavy loss. I saw at least 300 Russian bodies lying on the field. We calculated that their loss must have exceeded 1200 men. The French lost 500, and the English four officers and about 50 men. Captain Vicers, of the 97th, was in the advanced parallel of our right attack, with a picket of his regiment. The enemy attacked the French lines close alongside where he lay; a ravine only separated them. They at first drove back the French; and part of them then turned to their right, crossed the ravine, and took our trench in flank. We were unprepared, and at first thought the advancing body was one of the French. But Vicers found out they were the Russians, and ordered his men to lie down, and wait till they came within twenty paces; and they did so. When the enemy was close enough, Vicers shouted, 'Now, 97th, on your pins and charge!' They poured in a volley, charged, and drove the Russians quite out of the trench. Vicers himself struck down two Russians, and was in the act of cutting down a third with his sword, when another man, who was quite close (for the coat was singed), fired, and the ball entered his uplifted right arm close to where it joins the shoulder, and he fell. The arteries were divided, and he must have bled to death in a few minutes. Thus his end was as peaceful and painless as a soldier's death could be, and nothing could have been more noble, devoted, and glorious than his conduct in this, his first and last engagement. He was universally beloved, and none can doubt who knew him that he is now in the presence of that great and holy God whom on earth he deeply loved, and earnestly and successfully sought to serve. Poor fellow! he chose the Psalms and lessons for the preceding day (the Day of Humiliation), and read the service, when several of us met together to worship God; all present must have noticed the fervour of his manner; little did we think that he was so soon to be numbered with the dead."

A letter dated off Sebastopol, March 24, says:—"On the 22nd the Russians made a heavy sortie in the night on both ours and the French trenches; they were repulsed with great loss, but we also suffered—nine officers and 100 men killed and missing, among whom is the colonel of the 29th—whether killed or missing is uncertain. On the same evening the town was set on fire by some of our mortars, which are doing great execution, and kept burning all night. The deserters still confirm the report of Menschikoff's death, saying he died five days after receiving the wound in his knee. Admiral Istomine was also killed

by a shell in the Malakoff Battery—the same person who was well-known to Sir Edmund Lyons, and who exchanged presents—‘a cheese for a deer,’—some time back. Summer is fast making its appearance. Thermometer often at 60 degrees, and the weather exceedingly mild. The Russian Captain Kowseloff, who was on board the *Agamemnon* some time, and was ultimately exchanged for Lord Dunkellan, was shot 48 hours after he had landed for having been captured drunk.”

One of the most painful episodes of this action was the wounding and capturing by the Russians of a Captain Létors de Crécy, of the French service:—“I was present,” writes an officer, “at the suspension of hostilities; and that is what I learned, from a Russian officer, who had been Crécy’s adversary. ‘The officer of whom you speak,’ said he, ‘has been well cared for by some of the Russian religious sisterhood. He has been able to write to his mother and wife. He was obliged to suffer amputation. He is a brave man. For a long time we fought against him hand-to-hand, and we were not able to take him prisoner, until, wounded several times, he fell exhausted; his strength failing to support his courage. He has, in me, a friend; and I make it a duty to watch over all that concerns him.’”

The following letter was directed to the Empress of Russia by the superior of the Greek Sisters of Charity concerning the fate of this officer:—“He had received several bayonet thrusts in the chest, and the head laid open by a sword-cut. He lived six days, and that struggle with death was really astonishing. He was very strong, and of a very robust constitution. He was placed in a separate room, and confided to the care of the mother Séraphine. The orders of the doctors were punctually followed, and we were much grieved when the latter declared to us that our patient had not much longer to live. On the last day, an hour before his death, I went to see him. He gave me his hand, asked after my health, and remarked that I was very pale. I could scarcely answer him; I immediately quitted the room. Mother Séraphine did not quit him, and was present at his last moments. To-day his interment took place. Our Russian priest said the prayers. A black coffin was made for him, and I with the mother Séraphine and two of our sisters accompanied him to the cemetery. The soul was saddened at the sight of this tomb, at which no relative was present. There, I thought of the letters he dictated to a French officer for his wife, his mother, and his sister. Involuntarily tears flowed from my eyes. I remained near the tomb until it had been filled. The cross of the Legion of Honour, and a few *brloques* which he had upon his person, were sent to the French camp.”

Bazancourt adds, “Directly after the death of the captain, a flag of truce brought a little packet, upon which was written, ‘Cross of Honour of Captain Létors de Crécy, and different objects which had belonged to him;’ this little packet was given to Colonel Raoult, major of the trenches of the left attack, where the interviews of the flags of truce took place; and was immediately sent to headquarters.”

On the 21th a truce was agreed upon for burial. Mr. Russell states that the allied commanders requested the armistice: all the other authorities represent Prince Gortschakoff as having sought it. Mr. Russell describes it as a two hours’ truce: all the other narrators of the event state it as having been for three hours. The truce, however, took place at a given signal, and the scene was one of considerable interest. The number of Russian dead found in and about the allied lines was very great, and the time was actively employed in removing them. Mr. Russell describes the appearance of the Russian slain as coarse and soldierly-looking; their shirts and feet (which were stripped by their conquerors for the sake of the boots) he declares to have been singularly clean. Mr. Woods says that many of these soldiers were soft and ruddy-looking, not unlike English recruits, and that they were *extremely dirty*. Colonel Hamley agrees with Mr. Woods. All these gentlemen stood upon the ground during the truce, and conversed with vanquished and victors. The French believed that the Russians sought the truce as a *ruse de guerre*, and therefore had the trenches well guarded, and the guards well supported.

It had been a matter of surprise the previous night that the mortars in the British mortar-battery had not been spiked, as the Russians were so numerous, and so long in possession of that battery after their first successful attack. The mystery was cleared by the discovery having been made that the party who seized the battery had no spikes; for at some distance in front of it an Albanian was found dead, holding the hammer and spikes which had been intended for this purpose. Near him were several Greek civilians lying among the slain—volunteers for their faith, which they believed to be concerned in the war. The allied officers had a good opportunity of seeing Sebastopol during this truce; and the Russian officers slyly informed them they would never have a nearer view of it, except as prisoners. During the truce the opposing troops mingled as on neutral ground. The Russian officers made some attempts to draw the French and English common soldiers into conversation, in the hope of thereby gaining some knowledge of the state of things in the camps. A French soldier was asked if the allies were not suffering



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